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Abstract 
Inventing Chinese Buddhas: 
Identity, Authority, and Liberation in Song-Dynasty Chan Buddhism 
Kevin Buckelew 
 
This dissertation explores how Chan Buddhists made the unprecedented claim to a level 
of religious authority on par with the historical Buddha Śākyamuni and, in the process, 
invented what it means to be a buddha in China. This claim helped propel the Chan 
tradition to dominance of elite monastic Buddhism during the Song dynasty (960–1279), 
licensed an outpouring of Chan literature treated as equivalent to scripture, and changed 
the way Chinese Buddhists understood their own capacity for religious authority in 
relation to the historical Buddha and the Indian homeland of Buddhism. But the claim 
itself was fraught with complication. After all, according to canonical Buddhist 
scriptures, the Buddha was easily recognizable by the “marks of the great man” that 
adorned his body, while the same could not be said for Chan masters in the Song. What, 
then, distinguished Chan masters from everyone else? What authorized their elite status 
and granted them the authority of buddhas? According to what normative ideals did Chan 
aspirants pursue liberation, and by what standards did Chan masters evaluate their 
students to determine who was worthy of admission into an elite Chan lineage? How, in 
short, could one recognize a buddha in Song-dynasty China? The Chan tradition never 
answered this question once and for all; instead, the question broadly animated Chan 
rituals, institutional norms, literary practices, and visual cultures. My dissertation takes a 
performative approach to the analysis of Chan hagiographies, discourse records, 
commentarial collections, and visual materials, mobilizing the tradition’s rich archive to 
  
measure how Chan interventions in Buddhist tradition changed the landscape of elite 
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Introduction: Discerning Buddhas in China 
 
The state of buddhahood cannot itself proclaim, “I am the state of 
buddhahood!” 
佛境不能自稱「我是佛境」。 
—The Record of Linji (Linji lu 臨濟錄)1 
 
 
How to recognize a buddha 
 
When Siddhārtha Gautama was still an infant, he is said to have received a prophecy of 
his future greatness from a brahmin expert in the arts of omen-reading and physiognomy. 
This brahmin, observing that the young man’s body displayed the thirty-two “marks of 
the great man” (Skt. mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇa; C. da zhangfu xiang ⼤大丈夫相 or daren xiang 
⼤大⼈人相)—which include visible features like webbed fingers and toes, wheel-marks on 
the soles of the feet, a “broad and long tongue,” an overall golden hue, and other unusual 
attributes—predicted that the child would inevitably grow up to be either a buddha 
(awakened one) or a cakravartin (wheel-turning king).2 Many Buddhist scriptures, which 
                                                
1 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, T. no. 1985, 47: 499a12; translation follows Sasaki, The 
Record of Linji, 206, with slight modification. 
 
2 James R. Egge, “Interpretive Strategies,” 191–93; Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest, 3–5. The 
physiognomists are presenting in these narratives as evaluating the Buddha’s bodily signs on an 
authority that precedes his final birth as Siddhārtha Gautama—ironically, a paradigm of authority that 
the Buddha’s enlightenment is understood to have exceeded and rendered irrelevant. As Michael 
Radich has shown, however, there is no evidence that the thirty-two “marks of the great man” 
preceded Buddhism historically, although physiognomic ideas certainly may have; see Radich, “The 
Somatics of Liberation,” 299–309; and Powers, A Bull of a Man, 18. Some versions of the story relate 
that after this initial prediction was given, a sagely ṛṣi named Asita came along and, again observing 
the young Gautama’s body, asserted confidently that he would become a buddha, not a cakravartin; 
 2 
record sermons attributed to the Buddha after he had grown up, renounced his princely 
life, and attained enlightenment in the forest, also describe the adult Buddha as 
recognizable by his “marks of the great man.” In Mahāyāna literature, the marks are 
shown not only to authenticate his status as a buddha and by extension the authority of 
his teachings, but moreover to positively move onlookers to ardent faith and conversion, 
to serve as potent objects of visionary contemplation, and to inspire among all who would 
walk the Buddhist path the aspiration to attain a body with these marks for themselves.3 
Describing how the marks of the great man constitute a “physiognomy of virtue,” Daniel 
Boucher characterizes them as “the sine qua non of [the Buddha’s] attainment, the visible 
signs of his spiritual transformation, and the symbols of maximal greatness for a human 
being.”4 
 Little wonder, then, that the Buddha’s “marks of the great man” also inspired 
jealousy. Susanne Mrozik writes of a story found in the vinaya (monastic code literature) 
in which the Buddha’s evil cousin Devadatta requests the help of his patron, King 
Ajātaśatru, in overtaking the monastic community from the Buddha Śākyamuni, only to 
be turned down. 
But the king does not object to Devadatta’s conduct. He objects to 
Devadatta’s appearance. King Ajātaśatru refuses to grant Devadatta’s 
request because Devadatta does not look like a buddha. Specifically, he 
does not have a buddha’s golden-colored body (suvarṇa-varṇa-kāya). 
Undaunted, Devadatta visits a goldsmith and has himself gilt in gold. The 
story ends with Devadatta screaming in pain, no closer to buddhahood 
                                                                                                                                            
see Mrozik, Virtuous Bodies, 63. So also goes the version contained in the Chan Buddhist Tiansheng 
guangdeng lu published in 1036; see X. no. 1553, 78: 427b6–17. 
 
3 Egge, “Interpretive Strategies,” 193–4; Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest, 5–12; Powers, A Bull of 
a Man, 23. For further examples of meditations which take the body of buddhas and their marks as 
objects of contemplation, see Harrison, The Samādhi of Direct Encounter. 
 
4 Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest, 10. 
 
 3 
than before. In another version of this story in the same monastic 
regulations, King Ajātaśatru refuses to establish Devadatta in buddhahood 
because Devadatta does not have the sign of a wheel on the soles of his 
feet, as is the case with buddhas. With remarkable perseverance, 
Devadatta commissions a blacksmith to brand his feet with the sign of a 
wheel, but once again he gets nothing for his efforts but severe pain. 
Unfortunately for Devadatta, a buddha’s looks are hard to fake.5 
 
Indeed, Devadatta’s attempts to imitate the Buddha’s majestic bodily appearance are 
shown in these stories to be so far off the mark that even an ordinary and none-too-
virtuous king will not be fooled—let alone a real expert. But despite the narrative lesson 
that Devadatta’s actions resulted in nothing more than his own suffering, the story 
nevertheless reveals a basic anxiety about the possibility that someone might try to fake 
the appearance of a buddha—perhaps more successfully than Devadatta—and in so doing 
unjustly usurp religious authority from its rightful holder.6 In the case of a really 
convincing likeness, who would be able to tell the real buddha from the imitation? 
 Many hundreds of years later and halfway across the world, Chan Buddhists in 
China faced a similar problem. Beginning in the latter half of the seventh century, a series 
of rival groups began to claim special religious authority on the basis of their professed 
inheritance of a unique Buddhist transmission passing through a lineage of elite 
meditation masters beginning with Bodhidharma. By the eighth century this lineage was 
extended all the way back through a chain of Indian “patriarchs” to the Buddha 
Śākyamuni, and even to the six buddhas who preceded him in long-past eras. While this 
                                                
5 Mrozik, Virtuous Bodies, 62–63. 
 
6 Historically speaking, as Elizabeth Morrison notes, “The treatment of Devadatta in canonical sources 
suggests that the attempt to succeed or replace the Buddha may have been made by some but was 
rejected, if not by the Buddha himself, certainly by those who maintained control of the tradition and 
composed the accounts available to us. We do not know if Devadatta did in fact attempt to take over 
the sangha; we do know that the accusation that he did is meant to be damning.” Morrison, The Power 
of Patriarchs, 18. 
 
 4 
emerging tradition’s very name—the “Chan tradition” (chanzong 禪宗)—attested to its 
origins among specialists in meditation (chanshi 禪師), between the eighth and eleventh 
centuries Buddhists claiming to be heirs of this lineage began criticizing the practice of 
seated meditation and advancing, in place of this specialized identity, the virtually 
unprecedented idea that they were in fact a lineage of full-fledged buddhas. 
This powerful claim to buddhahood over mere specialized excellence in 
meditation authorized the elevation of the recorded sermons and dialogues of Chan 
masters to a level of religious authority on par with the translated canonical scriptures 
attributed to the Buddha Śākyamuni, helping secure Chan’s public legitimacy and rise to 
dominance of elite monastic Buddhism in China, deeply shaping its soteriology, and 
playing an important role in bringing about broader shifts of religious authority in China. 
At the same time, it came with a host of problems. After all, as we saw above, the 
Buddha was easy to identify and impossible to imitate; even the crafty Devadatta could 
not successfully fake buddhahood. But what about Chinese buddhas? Do they look like 
the Buddha Śākyamuni, with his “marks of the great man,” or not? If not, then how does 
one recognize them? Who among the ranks of Chan Buddhists were real buddhas, and 
who were fakes? What exactly was it about Chan masters that lent them the authority of 
buddhas? 
This dissertation explores how Chan Buddhists worked through these problems 
and, in so doing, changed Chinese Buddhism in ways that can be felt even up to the 
present day. Although scholars have for several decades identified in passing the Chan 
claim to the status of buddhahood as a fundamental component of Chan identity, no one 
has performed a sustained inquiry into the topic. How was Chan’s vision of personal, 
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embodied buddhahood defined and negotiated in the tradition’s voluminous textual 
output, how was it enacted in routine public-facing ceremonies, and how was it 
administered on the ground in the ways Chan masters selected lineage disciples to carry 
on the tradition? By claiming to be buddhas, Chan Buddhists had to navigate fissures 
between categorical metaphysics and heroic exemplarity, identity and likeness, precedent 
and innovation. They had to determine—we might say invent—what it means to be a 
Chinese buddha, a process that received authorization from canonical notions of 
buddhahood even as it transformed those same notions. It was on the basis of this 
unprecedented claim to religious authority that the Chan tradition ended up producing 
one of the largest bodies of religious literature in Chinese history, just as the translation 
of Indian Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and the production of apocrypha attributed to 
the historical Buddha were entering a permanent decline. In so doing, the Chan tradition 
forever altered the ways Chinese Buddhists saw their own capacity for religious authority 
and changed their relationship to the soteriological example provided by the Buddha 
Śākyamuni, who had lived so long before and in so distant a land. 
 
Buddhas, buddhahood, and the making of Chan identity 
 
How exactly did Chan masters claim to be buddhas or buddha-like? The answer is not 
simple, for rarely did Chan masters actually come out and say “I am a buddha” (though 
statements to this effect are not entirely unknown either). On the contrary, perhaps the 
best-known facet of the claim by Song-dynasty Chan masters that they held a status 
equivalent to buddhas centers around subtle details of ritual performance and monastic 
architecture. The Chanmen guishi 禪門規式 (Regulations for the Chan School), a text 
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purporting to preserve a unique set of monastic regulations attributed to legendary Tang-
dynasty Chan master Baizhang Huaihai 百丈懷海	 (720–814), states that Chan 
monasteries have no need for buddha halls or the images of the Buddha Śākyamuni 
typically housed within them, since the abbot of any Chan monastery—a Chan master—
is already effectively a buddha: 
The reason we do not erect a buddha hall, but only build a dharma hall 
[wherein the abbot preaches], is to make manifest [the fact] that the 
buddhas and patriarchs (or buddha-patriarchs) have personally entrusted 
[the Chan transmission to the abbot, who] should be treated as most 
esteemed in place [of the Buddha].7 
 
Although the Chanmen guishi was included in Baizhang’s entry in the first imperially-
sponsored Chan lamp record, the Jingde chuandeng lu 景德傳燈錄 (Jingde-era Record 
of the Transmission of the Lamp) of 1009, and is known to have circulated independently 
in the Northern Song,8 no extant versions of this text predate the Song and it does not 
seem to have ever actually been implemented to regulate any monasteries.9 In fact, as T. 
Griffith Foulk has shown, Chan monasteries in the Song were not uniquely sectarian 
constructions but rather ordinary public monasteries that had been redesignated as “Chan 
monasteries” following the growing recognition of Chan as the standard-bearer of elite 
Chinese Buddhism, a designation which limited the abbacy to members of a Chan 
lineage.10 These monasteries had both buddha halls and dharma halls, and thus the 
                                                
7 不立佛殿，唯樹法堂者，表佛祖親囑授當代為尊也。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 
251a9–10. 
 
8 Jia, The Hongzhou School, 95. 
 
9 See Foulk, “The ‘Ch’an School,’” 352–79; and Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 158–
61 and 170–71. 
 
10 Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice.” 
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Chanmen guishi’s statement about monastery construction ought to be read in terms of its 
rhetorical role in establishing a mythological ideal of earlier Chan-specific monasticism 
that participated in the formation of Chan identity just as the tradition was rising to elite 
status during the early Song. In this connection, it is particularly suggestive that the text 
sees fit not merely to functionally describe a monastic setting within which the abbot (a 
Chan master) has fully replaced the image of the Buddha, but also to explain in no 
uncertain terms what we should understand this to signify: Chan masters are themselves 
equivalent to buddhas. 
 Even if the Chanmen guishi presented a picture of Chan monasticism that never 
really existed, its description of the abbot’s physical and ceremonial position when 
performing rituals in the dharma hall echoed an important feature of actual monastic life 
in Chan monasteries during the Song. As T. Griffith Foulk and Robert Sharf write: 
The exalted religious status associated with the rank of “abbot” or 
“venerable” is vividly manifest in the ritual known as “ascending the hall” 
(shang-t’ang)— perhaps the single most important rite performed by 
abbots of public monasteries in the Sung period. During this rite the abbot, 
accompanied by much pomp and ceremony, would ascend an ornate 
throne (the “high seat” or “dhyāna seat”) installed on an altar in the center 
of the dharma hall. After receiving obeisance and offerings from the 
community, the abbot delivered a short and highly mannered sermon 
which was meant to signify the spontaneous discourse of an awakened 
Buddha. The significance of this rite, in which the abbot ascended an altar 
functionally homologous to the altar occupied by a Buddha icon, was 
unambiguous: the abbot was rendered the spiritual equal of a Tathāgata.11 
 
The power of this ritual claim to the Chan master’s status as a buddha was not only 
manifested each time this ceremony was performed as a routine component of monastic 
                                                
11 Foulk and Sharf, “On the Ritual Use of Ch’an Portraiture,” 176–77. Foulk and Sharf have also 
discussed the Chan master’s ritual status as a buddha in Sharf, “The Idolization of Enlightenment”; 
Sharf, “Ritual”; and Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice.” 
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life,12 but was also preserved for circulation inside and outside the monastery (and for 
posterity) in purported verbatim transcriptions of exchanges that took place during a 
given master’s performances of the “ascending the hall” ceremony over the course of his 
(or much more rarely, as we will see, her) career. These records of ritual questions and 
answers in large part constitute a genre known to scholars as “encounter dialogue” (Ch. 
jiyuan wenda; J. kien mondō 機緣問答),13 and they fill the Song-dynasty Chan tradition’s 
lamp histories (denglu 燈錄), discourse records (yulu 語錄), and “public case” (gong’an 
公案) commentarial collections. The “ascending the hall ceremony” and its ritual 
performance of the Chan master’s buddhahood, in other words, lay at the center not only 
of Chan monastic life, but also of the Chan tradition’s broader religious, literary, and 
cultural identity as it was transmitted through its written literature. These records make 
up a vast archive attesting to the ways myriad Chan Buddhists in the Song dynasty 
performed their identities and negotiated the contours of their claim to buddhahood—a 
task for which these texts have, remarkably, almost never been mobilized by scholars. 
 Yet precisely because Foulk and Sharf’s observation is so pivotal for our 
understanding of the operations of identity and authority in Chan Buddhism, it is worth 
probing more deeply into the problem of equivalence between Chan masters and buddhas. 
In the ascending the hall ceremony, Foulk and Sharf write, “the abbot was rendered the 
spiritual equal of a Tathāgata” (emphasis added). What exactly was involved in this 
                                                
12 As Robert Sharf notes, “The Ascending the Hall ceremony may have been performed daily at some 
monasteries in the Northern Song, but by the Southern Song it was scheduled approximately every 
five days.” Sharf, “Ritual,” 263. For more on this ceremony, see Poceski, “Chan Rituals.” For a recent 
reappraisal of the ceremony in Japanese Rinzai Zen, see Joskovich, “Playing the Patriarch.” 
 
13 The term was first coined in Japanese by Yanagida Seizan; see Yanagida, “The Development of the 
‘Recorded Sayings.’” See also McRae, “Encounter Dialogue”; McRae, “The Antecedents of 
Encounter Dialogue”; and McRae, Seeing Through Zen, Chapter 4. 
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rendering? How did it work, and perhaps just as importantly, did it always work for 
everyone? Was its efficacy ensured only by the master’s successful fulfillment of certain 
formal criteria, or did it also depend on something specific to the particular Chan master 
performing the ritual in any given time and place? Historically speaking, did it work from 
the first time anyone ever “ascended the hall,” or did it take a while to become 
efficacious? Of course, we know that somehow or other it did work, because the Chan 
tradition demonstrably gained and maintained a virtually unrivaled elite status in Song 
dynasty Buddhist monasticism. Even when this performance of identity worked best, 
however, we are still justified in asking what traces it preserved of the two previously 
separate categories—Chan masters and buddhas—whose equivalence had been thereby 
forged. In this dissertation, I propose to explore the contingent social and soteriological 
processes through which the Chan tradition’s authority, in Stephen Greenblatt’s words, 
“acquired compelling force.”14 
To begin, let us examine the problem from a historical angle. How did the notion 
that Chan masters might be buddhas emerge and gain currency in the first place? Likely 
the earliest articulation of something resembling this idea is found in the Platform Sūtra 
(Tanjing 壇經), which famously portrays its protagonist, the sixth Chan patriarch 
Huineng 慧能 (638–713), as a buddha. It does so, first, by having Huineng declare to the 
fifth patriarch Hongren 弘忍 (600–674), upon arriving at his monastery, that he has come 
seeking nothing else than to “be a buddha,” an encounter to which we will return. Second, 
it describes other people later in the text extolling him as a buddha.15 And third, the text’s 
                                                
14 Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, 5. 
 
15 Liuzu tanjing, T. no. 2007, 48: 342a20–22; Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra, 162. 
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title itself—which designates the text a sūtra (jing 經) instead of a “treatise” (lun 論) or 
other term more conventionally used to title medieval Chinese Buddhist writings not 
attributed to the Buddha—implicitly claims that Huineng’s recorded sermon holds an 
authority equivalent and not subsidiary to the recorded sermons of the Buddha 
Śākyamuni. As Alan Cole and Eric Greene have suggested, Huineng was not the first 
figure in Chinese Buddhist history to be elevated to buddha-like status; by the time the 
Platform Sūtra was written, legendary scholar-monk Tiantai Zhiyi 天台智顗 (539–598) 
and founder of the Three Levels movement (Sanjie jiao 三階教) Xinxing 信⾏行 (540–594) 
had already been portrayed in certain materials as quasi-buddhas.16 Nevertheless, the 
Platform Sūtra’s claim for Huineng’s buddhahood was considerably stronger than these 
earlier precedents. Not satisfied to suggest that Huineng was merely buddha-like, it goes 
so far as to state outright that he was a buddha. 
On the other hand, as Morten Schlütter has observed, the Platform Sūtra does not 
claim that every Chan master is a buddha, but instead uses the idea of Huineng’s 
buddhahood to extol his uniquely heroic status. The earliest extant editions of the 
Platform Sūtra imply that the lofty patriarchal transmission of Chan reached its pinnacle 
in the person of Huineng but went downhill thereafter, as his disciples were nowhere near 
his spiritual equals and could only hope at best to carry on by upholding his teaching.17 
Even this more limited claim by the Platform Sūtra for Huineng’s special status as a 
buddha was, as John Jorgensen has suggested, not widely accepted until the advent of the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
16 Cole, Fathering Your Father, Chapter 2; and Greene, “Another Look at Early Chan,” 106–8. 
 
17 Schlütter, “Transmission and Enlightenment,” 406. The designation sūtra may not even have been 
applied to the text of Huineng’s sermon until the late Tang period (618–907), as Christoph Anderl has 
argued in “Was the Platform Sūtra Always a Sūtra?” 
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Northern Song period (960–1126).18 The timing of this broadening acceptance of 
Huineng’s buddhahood is not surprising, since as we have seen, it was precisely during 
the Northern Song that Chan Buddhists began to advance other, more categorical claims 
that every member of a Chan lineage holds religious authority equal to the Buddha. Not 
coincidentally, newer versions of the Platform Sūtra produced in the Northern Song 
contained revisions that narrowed the spiritual gap between Huineng and his disciples, 
suggesting that some of them may have lived up to their master’s lofty example after 
all.19 
 To say that the Platform Sūtra marked a turning point in early Chan history would 
be an understatement. It would be better to say that the Platform Sūtra, along with the 
broader polemical project undertaken by the mastermind of Huineng’s legacy, Heze 
Shenhui 荷澤神會 (684–758), helped precipitate a fundamental transformation in the 
meaning of the word chan. The critique of meditation leveled by Shenhui and the 
Platform Sūtra might seem surprising—after all, the very word chan is derived from 
channa 禪那, a transliteration of the Sanskrit dhyāna, which refers to meditation practice. 
Before the late seventh century, the compound chanshi 禪師 generally referred to a 
Buddhist monastic who had attained special excellence in the practice of seated 
meditation. But the history of the Chan tradition involves many twists and turns, not least 
of which is its renegotiation and transformation of the meaning of the word chan from 
meditation to something much larger. 
                                                
18 Jorgensen, Inventing Hui-neng, 70. 
 
19 Schlütter, “Transmission and Enlightenment,” 407–8. 
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Hu Shih 胡適 famously called Shenhui a “revolutionary” in the history of Chinese 
Buddhism,20 and while the scholarly consensus surrounding early Chan (and Chinese 
history generally) has changed considerably since Hu’s time, this appraisal should not be 
disregarded as mere hyperbole. At the very least, we can, with John McRae, treat Shenhui 
as a powerfully compelling evangelist for a radically new vision of the Chan tradition.21 
As Hu Shih puts it, Shenhui pronounced “a new Ch’an which renounces ch’an itself and 
is therefore no ch’an at all.” This new Chan claimed for the first time to be not a tradition 
of meditation masters, but a lineage of buddhas.22 Shenhui’s main goal seems to have 
been the elevation of his master, Huineng, to the status of sixth Chan patriarch in place of 
the so-called “Northern School” master Shenxiu 神秀 (605–706).23 In this task he made 
use of a potent rhetorical weapon: the notion of “sudden awakening” (dunwu 頓悟), 
which had its roots in the earlier doctrinal writings of Daosheng 道⽣生 (360–434).24 By 
means of this idea, Shenhui and the Platform Sūtra portrayed Shenxiu as a hopelessly 
“gradualist” meditation master, stuck on a treadmill of mediated practice incapable of 
                                                
20 See Hu, Shenhui heshang yiji, 22–23; 39–40. See also the translation and critique in McRae, 
“Religion as Revolution.” 
 
21 McRae, “Religion as Revolution”; and McRae, “Shenhui as Evangelist.” 
 
22 Hu, “Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism in China,” 7; quoted in McRae, “Religion as Revolution,” 80. See also 
Yanagida, Shoki zenshū, 437–60. 
 
23 I follow John Jorgensen in considering Shenhui the likeliest “inventor” of Huineng’s hagiography. 
Jorgensen writes that “it is most probable that the hagiography of Hui-neng had to be conjured out of a 
factual vacuum; in other words, he was a constructed saint. The suspicion must be entertained then 
that it was Shen-hui who was mostly responsible for the forging of the legend of Hui-neng.” Jorgensen, 
Inventing Hui-neng, 70–71. The authorship and/or compilation of the Platform Sūtra, which includes 
but is not limited to the hagiography, is a subject of considerable scholarly dispute; for a concise 
overview, see Schlütter, “Introduction,” 16–17. 
 
24 See Lai, “Tao-sheng’s Theory.” For theoretical reflections on the sudden/gradual paradigm, see 
Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, especially Chapter 2. 
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leading anyone to buddhahood, while Huineng by contrast was shown to have recognized 
the buddha-nature already fully present within himself and immediately became a 
buddha.25 
Shenhui’s vigorous application of the stark logic of sudden awakening, which 
permits no gradation, opened up a paradox that would go on to underpin real institutional 
dilemmas faced by Chan Buddhists. On the one hand, the notion of sudden awakening to 
one’s inherent buddha-nature implies both universality and ready accessibility, because 
everyone is already a buddha and seeing this fact in the midst of daily life is ostensibly 
much easier than laboring at seated meditation for years or lifetimes.26 On the other hand, 
however, it sets an extremely high bar for admittance, since only those heroes who 
perfectly embody its categorical logic deserve to be recognized as true masters. The 
Platform Sūtra itself describes its teaching as intended for those of superior capacities,27 
which would become a common formulation in Song-dynasty Chan literature, and 
portrays Huineng as an illiterate genius who attains buddhahood without having practiced 
seated meditation a day in his life.28 As Alan Cole notes, in the Chan tradition “[o]ne is a 
master or not; there are no half-masters, just as there are no half-kings, and thus 
                                                
25 For foundational studies on the topic, see McRae, The Northern School; McRae, “Shen-hui and the 
Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment”; and Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy. 
 
26 As Robert Sharf has recently suggested, “In conflating meditation and wisdom, ... Chan reformers 
[like Shenhui] may have sought to democratize enlightenment by touting a new approach to practice 
that operationalized wisdom.” Sharf, “Mindfulness and Mindlessness,” 953 (emphasis in the original). 
 
27 Liuzu tanjing, T. no. 2007, 48: 342b27–28; Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra, 164. 
 
28 The exception is the Caoxi dashi biezhuan, which describes Huineng initially attempting to practice 
seated meditation before giving it up as pointless and going to see the fifth patriarch Hongren. See X. 
no. 1598, 86: 49c15–18; translated in Jorgensen, Inventing Hui-neng, 681. 
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movement between ordinary identity and buddha-identity cannot be gradual.”29 Bernard 
Faure, observing this same ambivalence inherent in the idea of sudden awakening, writes: 
“There may be a type of sudden awakening that, like humor, totally subverts all dominant 
categories (and as such is not itself a category), and another that, reflecting an elitist 
conception of practice, remains a socially determined category.”30 
 The complex relationship between sudden awakening, universal buddha-nature, 
and the status of actually being a buddha is encapsulated in the phrase “to see one’s 
nature and [thereby] become a buddha” (jianxing chengfo 見性成佛), which is used 
(along with variations) repeatedly in the Platform Sūtra. The expression, originally 
derived from a Six Dynasties-era commentary on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra,31 carries a slippery 
blurring of epistemology and ontology: as soon as you realize you are already a buddha, 
you will become a buddha. As its conventional doctrinal origins suggest, this expression 
does not itself necessarily entail a strong claim that one will literally become a buddha in 
the mold of Buddha Śākyamuni. Instead, it participates in a widespread medieval Chinese 
Buddhist exegetical practice of separating the understanding of buddhas as actual persons 
from buddhahood as a metaphysical concept. The metaphysics of impersonal 
buddhahood came to perform similar doctrinal work to the notions of all-pervading 
“mind” (xin ⼼心), “thusness” (ru 如 or zhenru 真如), and “buddha-nature” (foxing 佛性). 
But unlike these other concepts, personal and metaphysical buddhahood were difficult to 
tell apart, because both could be referred to with the same word, fo 佛. Indeed, there is 
                                                
29 Cole, Fathering Your Father, 23. 
 
30 Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 46. 
 
31 Da banniepan jing jijie, T. no. 1763, 37: 490c25–491a3. On this connection, see Yanagida, 
Yanagida Seizan shū dai ikkan, 448–49. 
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evidence to suggest that Chinese Buddhists themselves were not entirely sure how to 
understand the relationship between these two models of buddhahood. Take, for example, 
this exchange in the famous Chan scholiast Yongming Yanshou’s 永明延壽 (904–976) 
tenth-century Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄 (Record of the Source-Mirror): 
[Question:] Śākyamuni Buddha opened the minds of all sentient beings, 
[causing them to] accomplish the knowledge-vision of buddhahood. The 
first [Chinese Chan] patriarch Bodhidharma directly pointed to people’s 
minds, [causing them to] see their nature and become buddhas. [Even] if 
one comprehends this One Mind, how does this mean that one [thereby] 
“becomes a buddha”? 
 
Answer: The One Mind does not move, and all dharmas (things) are 
natureless (or essenceless). Because they are natureless, everyone becomes 
a buddha.32 
 
In this passage, the question posed to Yanshou hints at reservations over the notion that 
individuals might, merely by bearing witness to the all-pervading One Mind, thereupon 
literally become buddhas in the same sense that Śākyamuni was a buddha. Yanshou’s 
answer is metaphysical, suggesting that because all things are without essence and are 
encompassed in the One Mind, there can be no limit to buddhahood: it pervades 
everything, and thus everyone “becomes a buddha” in the most abstract sense. But the 
problem of personal buddhahood seems to linger on as a kind of remainder, not fully 
resolved by Yanshou’s reply, which does little to address the problem of becoming itself. 
Neither does Yanshou admit the possibility that difference and hierarchy might somehow 
be related to buddhahood. Yet difference and hierarchy were not only essential to 
canonical notions of the Buddha’s status, as we will see, they were also inherent to the 
                                                
32 夫釋迦⽂文佛，開眾⽣生⼼心，成佛知見。達磨初祖，直指⼈人⼼心，見性成佛。若體此⼀一⼼心，云何是




very institutional foundations of Chan, which cast itself—and was treated by increasingly 
large and powerful segments of society—as an exclusive lineage of elite heroes holding 
religious authority on par with the Buddha. 
 As we will find over the course of this dissertation, Chan Buddhists strongly 
advocated the idea that metaphysical buddhahood is so universal as to itself be utterly 
invisible, formless, and signless. But these doctrinal developments neither erased the 
institutional fact of Chan’s elite exclusivity, nor simply displaced the common knowledge 
that the Buddha Śākyamuni, and indeed all buddhas, look a certain way. Metaphysical 
buddhahood might be signless, but buddhas are recognizable by a canonical set of signs: 
the “marks of the great man,” which are so frequently discussed in Buddhist scriptures 
and narrative tellings of the Buddha’s life story that they would undoubtedly have been 
familiar to anyone with even a passing knowledge of Buddhism in Tang and Song China. 
The Buddha’s lofty appearance and status was moreover embodied in the icons of 
buddhas and bodhisattvas adorning altars in every Buddhist temple, which visibly 
displayed some of the “marks of the great man,” were typically elevated at a height above 
worshippers, were haloed by mandorlas, and featured other formal markers of special 
authority and status. As John McRae remarks, “‘the Buddha’ was for medieval Chinese 
Buddhists not the humanistic image recreated by modern scholarship, but a magnificent 
golden deity capable of almost unimaginable feats of wisdom and magic.”33 
 The hagiography of Huineng and the Platform Sūtra intervened in this discursive 
split between metaphysical and personal understandings of buddhahood in a manner that 
deserves our careful attention. The story begins with Huineng’s life as an illiterate rustic 
                                                
33 McRae, “Daoxuan’s Vision of Jetavana,” 68–69. 
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on the margins of the Tang empire who attains enlightenment after hearing someone 
preaching the Diamond Sūtra (Jin’gang jing ⾦金剛經), then proceeds north to the 
monastery of the fifth Chan patriarch Hongren 弘忍 (602–675), taking up residence as an 
unordained laborer in the granary. After some time there he upstages the educated head 
monk Shenxiu in a poetry contest and in the middle of the night receives authorization 
and transmission from Hongren to be Sixth Patriarch, finally fleeing southward for his 
life in fear of retribution from the other monks angry about this unexpected turn of events. 
This story was written and refashioned in various standalone versions, but in the Platform 
Sūtra this dramatic narrative is told in the first person by Huineng and embedded as the 
opening to a comparatively sober doctrinal sermon concerning the nature of mind and 
reality. 
 As we have seen, the Platform Sūtra’s repeated claims that Huineng is a buddha, 
introduced above, were virtually unprecedented in Chinese Buddhist history. While 
scholars have paid closest attention to the poetry contest and transmission narrative in the 
Platform Sūtra’s account of Huineng’s life, here I would like to focus on an earlier scene 
that first begins to establish the story’s claim for Huineng’s status as a buddha, in which 
Huineng arrives at Hongren’s monastery and encounters the master in person. 
Great master [Hong]ren said: “Where are you from? Why have you come 
to pay obeisance to me? What do you seek?” Chan master [Hui]neng 
replied: “Your disciple is from Xinshan, Lingnan, and thus have I come to 
pay obeisance to you: only seeking to be a buddha, and not seeking any 
other thing.” Great master [Hong]ren said: “You are a barbarian from 
Lingnan. How could you be a buddha?” Chan master [Hui]neng said: 
“What difference is there between the buddha-nature of a barbarian and 
your buddha-nature, master?” Great master [Hong]ren marveled deeply at 
his words, and wished to speak to him further. [Taking account of] the 
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people around them, however, he sent [Huineng] to perform labor along 
with the assembly.34 
 
Of course, as Alan Cole notes, Hongren’s suggestion that people from the deep southern 
margins of the empire lack buddha-nature “flies in the face of all Buddhist thought,”35 by 
which he means that it contradicts the categorical metaphysics of universal buddhahood. 
But this is precisely the point: Hongren’s question is a needling, half-ironic provocation, 
perhaps the earliest ever example of what would become a hallmark of Chan encounter 
dialogues from the tenth century onward. It is half-ironic because (as everyone knew very 
well) buddha-nature is universal. In turn, it is a provocation because it clearly operates 




遂發遣，令隨眾作務。 Shenhui heshang chan hualu, 109. I have here translated the version of the 
story found in the Shenhui yulu, but it is worth noting that there are two textual traditions concerning 
this passage. The earliest manuscript editions of the Platform Sūtra, such as the Stein edition 
(Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra, 127n19) and the Dunbo 敦博 edition (Deng and Rong, Dunbo ben 
Chanji lujiao, 223), have Huineng saying that he seeks only “Buddha-dharma to practice” (fofa zuo 佛
法作). However, in other early versions of Huineng’s biography he says that he seeks only to “be a 
buddha” (zuofo 作佛), as I have rendered it here. These latter cases include the Caoxi dashi biezhuan 
(X. no. 1598, 86: 49c23; translated in Jorgensen, Inventing Hui-neng, 681), the Shenhui yulu (cited 
above), and the Lidai fabao ji 歷代法寶記 (Yanagida, Shoki no zenshi II, 122; translated in Adamek, 
The Mystique of Transmission, 328–29). A recently discovered manuscript edition of the Platform 
Sūtra dated to 959 (see Anderl, “Was the Platform Sūtra Always a Sūtra?,” 128) held at the Lüshun 
Museum 旅順博物館 in Dalian City ⼤大連市, Liaoning Province 遼寧省, China, attests in an 
interesting way to this conflicted textual history. The scribe who authored this manuscript seems 
originally to have written weiqiu fo zuo 唯求佛作, but then added in the margin the character fa 法 in 
between fo 佛 and zuo 作, presumably upon deciding that it should instead read fofa zuo, putting it in 
line with Stein and Dunbo. The text continues, however, to have Hongren respond by asking how 
Huineng, being a southerner, could be a buddha (kan zuofo 堪作佛), in line with the Caoxi dashi 
biezhuan, Shenhui yulu, and Stein (the Lidai fabao ji omits this line entirely), but differing from 
Dunbo. See Guo and Wang, Lüshun bowuguan, 7. This suggests that the author of this edition was 
struggling to decide between the multiple versions of this story that were circulating just before it 
achieved its final, codified form. However, in the end it was zuofo (“to be a buddha”) that was used in 
the Zutang ji, j. 2, v. 1, 125; Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2061, 50: 754c20–26; and Jingde chuandeng 
lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 222c9–13. Zuofo thereafter became fixed as the definitive version. It is for this 
reason that I have chosen to translate an early version that anticipates this later consensus, in which 
Huineng says he seeks “to be a buddha.” 
 
35 Cole, “Conspiracy’s Truth,” 155. 
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narratively as the first test posed to Huineng on his path to recognized mastery and 
unsurpassed status within the Chan tradition. Needless to say, Huineng passes the test. 
 Yet although Hongren’s question is half-ironic, it is also half-serious. After all, 
Huineng has just said something provocative and audacious himself. Asked his reason for 
coming, Huineng says that he seeks not simply to become a buddha (chengfo 成佛), as 
the conventional expression “see one’s nature and become a buddha” would have it, but 
rather more dramatically to be a buddha (zuofo 作佛). At this point in the narrative he is 
an unlikely buddha indeed: his knowledge of Buddhism is limited to the fragment of 
scripture he happened to overhear, but more to the point, he is understood to be an 
illiterate rustic from the “barbaric” south.36 As I have already suggested, Hongren and 
every other elite monastic in medieval China knew what buddhas looked like—there 
were images of buddhas in every temple and descriptions of them in every scripture—and 
Huineng didn’t fit the bill. Of course, both Huineng and the Buddha were “foreigners” 
from the perspective of Chinese Buddhists, but the similarities ended there: the Buddha 
was born a prince, Huineng a peasant. In other words, Hongren’s response is not mere 
prejudice, but is rooted in canonical traditions holding buddhas to look a particular way, 
to carry a certain royal dignity—traditions whose orthodoxy is no more assailable than 
doctrinal descriptions of metaphysical buddhahood.37 It is thus immediately apparent to 
Hongren that Huineng doesn’t look like any buddha he has ever seen, and he tells him so. 
                                                
36 Cole suggests this geographic identity is incoherent, since Huineng’s father is said to have only just 
lost his official job in Hebei; see “Conspiracy’s Truth,” 154–55. 
 
37 This becomes even clearer in a scene first found in the Zutang ji of 952 depicting the childhood of 
someone who would later become a disciple of Huineng, Nanyang Huizhong 南陽慧忠 (675–775). 
Having grown up in a rustic farming household, we’re told, the boy’s precocious aspiration to join the 
Chan school is manifested when a Chan master passes through the town, and (to the shock of his 
family) the boy rushes out to greet the master, requesting ordination and admission into a Chan 
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 What is Huineng’s reply? He returns Hongren’s question with a question of his 
own: “What difference is there between the buddha-nature of a barbarian and your 
buddha-nature, master?” This answer is remarkable because, precisely in the act of taking 
rhetorical recourse to the categorical metaphysics of buddhahood and disavowing the 
notion that buddhahood might have a particular figurative shape, it lays the groundwork 
for the text’s authorization of an entirely new figure—Huineng, the illiterate rustic 
genius—to stand recognized as a buddha. This impressive rhetorical achievement is 
paralleled with remarkable similarity in the discourse record of Shenhui, the mastermind 
of Huineng’s legacy. As John McRae describes, after Shenhui makes the rather 
astonishing claim to be a bodhisattva of the tenth and final stage, his incredulous 
interlocutor replies: 
Bodhisattvas of the first stage can manifest multiple bodies in a hundred 
buddha realms, bodhisattvas of the second stage can manifest multiple 
bodies in a thousand buddha realms, and bodhisattvas of the tenth stage 
can manifest multiple bodies in immeasurable and infinite billions of 
buddha realms. You now say you’re at the complete tenth stage, so 
manifest some divine transformations for us now.38 
 
                                                                                                                                            
lineage. The master replies, “In this school of mine, one must be the son of a silver wheel-turning king 
or the grandson of a gold wheel-turning king before one can carry on [the lineage] and not let its 
reputation fall into decline. A child like you from a three-family village, a boy raised upon the back of 
an ox—how could you enter into this school?”是我宗門中銀輪王嫡⼦子、⾦金輪王孫⼦子，⽅方始得繼續
不墜此門風。是你三家村裏男⼥女、⽜牛背上將養底兒⼦子，作摩⽣生投這個宗門？不是你分上事。 
The child, reiterating Huineng’s reply to Hongren, answers with a quote from the Diamond Sūtra: 
“This is a Dharma of equality; it has neither high nor low.” 是法平等，無有⾼高下。 Predictably, the 
master thereupon recognizes that this is no ordinary child and suggests the boy pay a visit to Huineng. 
(See Zutang ji, j. 3, v. 1, 162. The Diamond Sūtra quote originates in Jin’gang bore boluomi jing, T. 
no. 235, 8: 751c24.) 
 
38 初地菩薩分身百佛世界，⼆二地菩薩分身千佛世界，乃⾄至⼗十地菩薩分身無量萬億佛世界。禪師
既⾔言在滿⾜足⼗十地位，今日爲現少許神變。 Shenhui heshang chan hualu, 24; translation from 
McRae, “Shenhui as Evangelist,” 141. 
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In a manner similar to Huineng, Shenhui responds to this demand that he demonstrate a 
resemblance to canonical bodhisattvas of the penultimate stage to buddhahood by 
circuitous reference to the metaphysical identity of his mind with that of the Buddha: 
The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “When the Thus-Come One was in the 
world, he only recognized Cunda’s mind as identical to the mind of the 
Thus-Come One. Although Cunda’s mind comprehended the permanence 
of the Thus-Come One, the Buddha did not recognize Cunda’s body as 
identical to the Thus-Come One’s body.” The sūtra says, “Adoration to 
Cunda! Adoration to Cunda! Although his body is the body of an ordinary 
unenlightened person, his mind is the mind of the Buddha’s!” When the 
Thus-Come One was in the world, he only recognized that the 
comprehension of Cunda’s mind was like that of the Thus-Come One—he 
did not speak of realization in the body. For my body to be that of an 
ordinary person in this final age of the Dharma, and yet to have cultivated 
to the point of attaining the tenth [bodhisattva] stage—why should this be 
considered strange?39 
 
Commenting on Shenhui’s reply, McRae observes: 
This bit of doctrinal sophistry allows Shenhui to negotiate a very 
important point for Chinese Buddhists… Shenhui had devised a way to 
argue that Chinese Chan teachers had the same religious authority as the 
Buddha himself. Although the specific argument was never used again, as 
far as I know, this was a culturally liberating innovation.40 
 
It may be true that no Chan Buddhists ever again made specific reference to the canonical 
figure of Cunda in service of this particular rhetorical maneuver. But as we have seen, 
and will continue to see over the course of this dissertation, the rhetorical technique of 
claiming personal buddhahood and then justifying that claim on the grounds of 
metaphysical buddhahood was indeed repeated: perhaps first and most consequentially in 
the hagiography of Huineng. These two cases—Shenhui claiming to be a bodhisattva of 
                                                
39 ⼤大湼槃經云：「如來在日，只許純陀⼼心同如來⼼心，⼼心了如來常，不許身同如來身。」經云：
「南無純陀，南無純陀，身雖凡夫身，⼼心如佛⼼心。」如來在日，尚只許純陀⼼心了如來常，不⾔言
身證。今日神會身是凡夫，末法時中分，修得⼗十地法，有何可怪？Shenhui heshang chan hualu, 
24; translation follows McRae, “Shenhui as Evangelist,” 141–42, with alterations. 
 
40 McRae, “Shenhui as Evangelist.” 
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the highest level and Huineng affirming that he has come to Hongren’s monastery only to 
“be a buddha,” along with their shared recourse to the categorical metaphysics of 
universal buddhahood when pressed on the fact that they don’t resemble buddhas or 
advanced bodhisattvas—are remarkably similar. And although McRae is, again, correct 
that this was a culturally liberating innovation, this innovation achieved its full 
transformative potential through the figure of Huineng, not Shenhui—who despite his 
importance during his own lifetime and for several subsequent generations went on to be 
largely forgotten and effaced from the history of Chan.41 The hagiography of Huineng 
and the Platform Sūtra, by contrast, survived. Huineng has remained the orthodox sixth 
patriarch of Chan to the present day, and his life story received increasingly more 
attention over the centuries as Chan rose to greater and greater heights of prominence into 
and throughout the Song dynasty. So why did these two narrative encounters—Shenhui’s 
debate with an interlocutor and Huineng’s exchange with Hongren—experience such 
different fates? 
 As we have already seen, the Platform Sūtra bolsters its claim to Huineng’s 
buddhahood by having other people proclaim him a buddha later in the text, as well as by 
titling the text itself a sūtra. But perhaps the most powerfully affecting dimension of the 
Platform Sūtra again comes down to resemblance. No, Huineng does not look like any 
buddha anyone has ever seen. But he does resemble certain Chinese cultural heroes who 
would have been widely known in the Tang and Song. John Jorgensen has suggested that 
                                                
41 Indeed, as Albert Welter notes, in his own time Shenhui’s achievements were recognized before 
those of his master: he received imperial recognition as seventh patriarch in 796, while Huineng was 
imperially recognized as sixth patriarch only in 816; see Welter, Monks, Rulers, and Literati, 57. 
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Huineng’s story bore key similarities to that of Confucius,42 while Cole describes 
Huineng as a “bumpkin buddha” who resembles a Zhuangzian sage.43 I would add that 
Huineng may have resonated with more literary celebrations of rusticity, such as the 
“Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove” (zhulin qi xian ⽵竹林七賢) and the “pastoral” (or 
“fields and gardens,” tianyuan 田園) poetry of Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 (365?–427). We 
will return to the role of rustic simplicity in the formation of Chan identity in Chapter 6. 
These conventions set the stage for the Platform Sūtra, but the figure of Huineng 
that took shape in its pages became a hero all his own: an underdog, a humble rustic and 
simple genius, a charismatic and compelling archetype of Chinese buddhahood in the 
personal, rather than metaphysical, sense.44 Huineng’s response to Hongren’s needling 
interrogation—“you, a buddha?”—offered a model for responding to the harshest 
questions that would face any subsequent Chan master claiming buddhahood, but it did 
not on its own resolve the problem of resemblance once and for all. Rather, the rhetorical 
use of metaphysics was broadly efficacious and convincing in the world of its reception 
only in combination with the uniquely compelling narrative of Huineng’s heroic life and 
personality. These two types of claims about buddhahood, metaphysical and personal, 
came to mutually implicate and require each other. But the Platform Sūtra, again, could 
not on its own accomplish the massive feat of ensuring Chan’s successful elevation of its 
members’ religious authority from a group of theoretically silent meditation masters to a 
lineage of often quite vocal buddhas; as we discussed above, the text only authorized 
                                                
42 Jorgensen, Inventing Hui-neng, 77–90. 
 
43 Cole, Fathering Your Father, 217. 
 
44 As Jorgensen writes: “The biography of Huineng offered in the Platform Sūtra is a compelling story 
of a hero who perseveres against great odds.” Jorgensen, “The Figure of Huineng,” 25. 
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Huineng and not every Chan master as a buddha. The extension of this claim, then, had to 
be accomplished piecemeal by later Chan Buddhists who, by reenacting Huineng’s 
powerful rhetorical example in new contexts, gradually built up a larger institutional 
identity of equivalence—between Chan masters and buddhas—in spite of their manifest 
lack of resemblance. 
 It might be objected that up to now I have spoken relatively little of one of the 
most important aspects of the nascent Chan tradition, namely its recourse to the trope of 
genealogy. Indeed, scholars have rightly focused a great deal of attention on the role of 
genealogy in the slow elaboration of what would become the mature Chan tradition and 
its investment with a level of authority unprecedented in Chinese Buddhist history. Not 
only did the notion of a lineage directly connecting Chan Buddhists in Tang and Song 
China with the Buddha Śākyamuni ground Chan claims to being a “special transmission 
outside the teachings” (jiaowai biechuan 教外別傳),45 but (as scholars have also 
observed) the longstanding importance of genealogy itself to Chinese culture and kinship 
practice gave it a special resonance that likely facilitated the welcome reception Chan 
eventually received.46 That being said, I suspect that these lineages would not have been 
nearly as compelling—either to ambitious Buddhists themselves aspiring to enter into 
Chan lineages, or to potential outside patrons of Chan—were they not populated by 
charismatic figures like Huineng whose heroic examples inspired admiration and 
devotion. 
                                                
45 See Foulk, “Sung Controversies”; and Morrison, The Power of Patriarchs. 
 
46 See McRae, “Encounter Dialogue,” 359; and Bodiford, “Dharma Transmission,” 262–69. For 
further analysis of the role of transmission and lineage in Chan, see Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 
Chapter 1; and Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission. 
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 During the Tang, charisma and transmission intersected in the form of a 
particularly disputed “contact relic” that served as a mythological token of the Chan 
patriarchy: the “robe of Bodhidharma.” The legend of Bodhidharma transmitting his robe 
and bowl to his disciple Huike 慧可 (487–593), after which these objects were passed 
down by all the patriarchs through Hongren to Huineng, appears again likely to have 
been invented by Shenhui.47 After Shenhui’s time, the robe as proof of transmission was 
in turn disputed; most famously, the Lidai fabao ji 歷代法寶記 claims the robe was 
given to Empress Wu Zhao 武曌 (also known as Wu Zetian 武則天, 624–705), who 
bestowed it on a monk named Zhishen 智詵 (609–702)—considered in that text to be the 
seventh Chan patriarch—from whom it eventually made its way down to Baotang 保唐 
master Wuzhu 無住 (714–774).48 As Wendi Adamek writes: “The stories surrounding 
transmission of the patriarchal robe in the Lidai fabao ji highlight the instability of 
received Buddhist criteria determining standards of authority and morality.”49 Along 
similar lines, Peter Gregory remarks: “The artificiality of the story of the transmission of 
the patriarchal robe begun by Shen-hui and repeated in the LTFPC [Lidai fabao ji] and 
Platform Sutra underlines the fact that there was no commonly accepted procedure for 
                                                
47 See Jorgensen, Inventing Hui-neng, 274–96; and Schlütter, “Transmission and Enlightenment.” 
Shenhui compared the robe of Bodhidharma to a robe legendarily passed from the Buddha Śākyamuni 
to his disciple, who would later be considered the first Indian Chan patriarch, Mahākāśyapa (see 
Jorgensen, Inventing Hui-neng, 277), but only in the Baolin zhuan of 801 was the idea advanced that 
these might be one and the same robe (see Foulk, “Sung Controversies,” 232). This latter connection 
was made more explicit in the Zutang ji of 952 (Foulk, “Sung Controversies,” 239). 
 
48 Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, Chapter 5. 
 
49 Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 5. 
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transmitting the dharma.”50 Indeed, although it served a temporary purpose in attesting to 
the authenticity of Huineng’s status as sixth patriarch over other figures like Shenxiu, the 
trope of Bodhidharma’s robe was of little practical use after Chan lineages began to 
proliferate along multiple simultaneous branches. It is unsurprising, then, that subsequent 
lineage texts beginning with the Baolin zhuan 寶林傳 of 801 all agreed that the robe 
stayed at Huineng’s monastery and was not passed down to later generations.51 
 What was it, then, that authenticated Chan mastery after tropes like the robe of 
Bodhidharma had exhausted their purpose, as lineage transmission moved from the stuff 
of myth to a matter of everyday administration? Most concretely, by the Song period 
lineage certificates came into broad use as visible tokens of Chan lineage affiliation.52 
But this merely begs the question: on what grounds, according to what criteria, were 
individuals selected as worthy of receiving those lineage certificates and being admitted 
into the elite institution of Chan? Traditionally, scholars have understood transmission to 
hinge on the student’s attainment of enlightenment under the guidance of a master, and 
the master’s recognition and authentication of that enlightened mental state. Such a 
notion undergirds many of the Chan tradition’s slogans, such as “using mind to transmit 
mind” (yixin chuanxin 以⼼心傳⼼心) or the metaphor that casts the Chan lineage as a series 
of lamps, the flame (symbolizing the enlightened mind) of one lighting the next. On the 
other hand, Robert Sharf has challenged uncritical scholarly repetition of this traditional 
understanding in the following terms: 
                                                
50 Gregory, Tsung-mi, 51, n. 82. 
 
51 Guifeng Zongmi 圭峰宗密 (780–841), for example, writes that we hear no more of the robe after 
Huineng; see Foulk, “Sung Controversies,” 235. 
 
52 Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 159–60. 
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According to certain popular conceptions, certification [of transmission] 
was granted to a disciple only after he could demonstrate that he had 
attained an authentic experience of awakening or satori. While we do find 
stories in the ‘recorded sayings collections’ (語錄 yü-lu) that would seem 
to lend credence to this view, in point of fact certification had little if 
anything to do with the verification of any specific ‘religious experience.’ 
Rather, it was typically given to those who had spent the requisite years 
mastering the elaborate scriptural corpus and ritual procedures necessary 
to perform the duties of abbot. Only after prolonged study under the strict 
guidance of seasoned monks could one be entrusted to wield the rhetorical 
sword of emptiness in a manner that upheld, rather than threatened, the 
long-term viability of the monastic institution.53 
 
Sharf’s point about “experience” is well taken, but important questions remain: in what 
ways did the goals and norms of Chan training differ from what preceded it? Was it 
always enough for aspiring members of a Chan lineage to put in their time and master the 
scriptural and ritual corpus of Chan? When, if ever, did that scriptural and ritual corpus 
become fixed—and even after it became at least relatively fixed, was it ever unfixed, 
contested and changed? What in particular did mastery in the Chan tradition look like, 
and how did its specific shape impact the tradition’s public identity and claims to 
authority, as well as its internal operations and soteriology? 
 We cannot answer these questions without considering once again the Chan 
tradition’s foundational claim that its masters were equivalent to buddhas. Indeed, by the 
early eleventh century we find evidence of Chan masters pushing back against lineage as 
the main guarantor of Chan authority, as for example in this famous sermon attributed in 
the Jingde chuandeng lu to Xuansha Shibei ⽞玄沙師備 (835–908): 
As for the transmission that is passed down [in Chan lineages], nowadays 
everyone says they receive it from that other [person], Śākyamuni. I say 
that Śākyamuni and I are fellow students under the same master (tongcan 
                                                
53 Sharf, “Whose Zen?,” 42. 
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同參). So tell me: under whom are we training? Do you understand? This 
is really not easy.54 
 
Xuansha’s formulation attempts to flatten genealogy into a horizontal fellowship of 
equivalence between himself as a Chan master and the Buddha Śākyamuni. This idea was 
rendered even more categorical in the original title given to the same Jingde chuandeng 
lu in which this sermon first appeared, namely Fozu tongcan ji 佛祖同參集 (Compilation 
of Buddhas and Patriarchs Studying under the Same [Master]), which suggests that all 
Chan masters as patriarchs are by definition “fellow students” of Śākyamuni. Moreover, 
it is also in the Jingde chuandeng lu that we first find the Chanmen guishi’s spatialization 
of lineage-based authority in service of the claim that Chan monasteries have no need for 
buddha halls because the abbot is already a buddha, which we have considered in Chapter 
3. These various gestures toward equivalence over lineal descent not only offered a 
public-facing claim about Chan identity, they also participated in an emerging soteriology 
that exhorted Chan aspirants not simply to reach enlightenment as long-distant lineal 
“progeny” of the Buddha Śākyamuni, but to actually become buddhas themselves. 
 Even after Chan Buddhists established this logic of equivalence between 
patriarchs and buddhas in a state of relative hegemony during the Song, however, its 
efficacy in the world was never, could never possibly have been, categorical. It was 
always contingent and subject to contestation. The basic question that Hongren posed to 
Huineng—“you, a buddha?”—and the metaphysical response—“haven’t you heard that 
buddha-nature is universal?”—would be repurposed, asked and answered again and 
again by myriad Chan masters from the Song period onward—in other words, from the 
                                                
54如今相紹繼盡道承他釋迦。我道釋迦與我同參。汝道：參阿誰？會麼？⼤大不容易。 Jingde 
chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 344a29–b2. 
 
 29 
time that Chan’s claim to its masters’ status as buddhas became widely current. At the 
same time, there was almost always something else besides recourse to categorical 
metaphysics needed to present a truly compelling answer to this question. Metaphysics 
could get someone off the hook provisionally when pressed on not resembling the 
Buddha, but in the end Chan masters had to demonstrate other, heroic credentials to 
prove they really held the authority of buddhas. 
The institutional stakes of these demonstrations were high. As scholars have 
shown, Chan was never a sect in China, which is to say that it was never an institution 
that granted its own kind of monastic ordination. Rather, it was an elite lineage that 
existed over and above traditional systems of Buddhist monastic ordination operating in 
China (the vast majority of Chan lineage members were ordained monastics). We can 
measure the Chan tradition’s rise to dominance in the Song period not only by the 
proliferation and popularity of its literature in Chinese society, but also by the fact that 
the majority of elite public monasteries, controlled by the imperial state, were proclaimed 
“ten-directions Chan monasteries” (shifang chanyuan ⼗十⽅方禪院) and had their abbacies 
limited to members of Chan lineages.55 These public monasteries owned income-
generating estates and enterprises like oil presses and mills, and regularly performed 
rituals for the benefit of the emperor and the empire.56 Admission into a Chan lineage 
thus granted monastics in the Song access to the highest echelons of elite Buddhist life. 
                                                
55 See Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 166. There were also private cloisters of several 
kinds not controlled by the state, but over the course of the Song many of these became public; see 
Schlütter, How Zen Became Zen, 44. 
 
56 Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 164. 
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How, then, can we understand beyond the concept of enlightenment what specific 
features characterized Chan mastery and what criteria determined entry into the 
institution of Chan? We might begin by considering an important 1987 article by Judith 
Berling on the emergence of Chan’s “discourse record” or “recorded sayings” (yulu) 
genre. She writes: 
The genre of Recorded Sayings, building on earlier conventions, brought 
the ideal of the Buddha radically down to earth. Rather than relying on the 
supernatural signs of the charismatic power of the historical or celestial 
buddhas as in earlier sutras, in these collections the power of the 
Buddhism is depicted directly in the human master, specifically through 
his bold, ferocious, and shocking words and actions. These figures are not 
contained by the conventional human mold, but they are not superhuman 
either. Their actions are unique, eccentric, and unforgettable. Such 
extraordinary figures had enough impact on the culture at large to become 
literary motifs, appearing in Sung and post-Sung fiction and drama as 
slightly mad, mysterious, powerful, and knowing figures.57 
 
Berling’s description of Chan masters as we find them depicted in many Song-period 
discourse records evokes their captivating yet elusive character: they are bold and 
ferocious, no ordinary humans but—unlike the way medieval Chinese Buddhists 
understood the Buddha Śākyamuni—not quite superhumans either. Chan masters instead 
seem irreducibly connected to the bodily and earthly: they hit and shout at each other, 
equate buddhahood with “three jin of sesame,”58 describe the reason for Bodhidharma’s 
coming to China as “the oak tree in front of the courtyard,”59 and instruct disciples to 
                                                
57 Berling, “Bringing the Buddha Down to Earth,” 86. 
 
58 問洞⼭山：「如何是佛？」洞⼭山云：「麻三⽄斤。」Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 386c21. 
See also the discussion in Chapter 1. 
 




simply “defecate, urinate, wear clothes, eat food, and lie down when tired.”60 
Importantly, as Berling observes, Chan masters do not rely on supernatural signs to make 
themselves known, but rather are recognizable precisely by their own uniquely down-to-
earth yet exciting modes of behavior and speech. In short, Chan Buddhists “brought the 
Buddha down to earth” by inventing what it looks like to be a buddha in China. 
 As we have seen, however, this was not merely a literary process; it was bound up 
with the ritual life of Chan monasteries, especially the “ascending the hall” ceremony that 
many Chan discourse records purported to record. In turn, the proliferation of these 
records helped define the sort of behavior and dialogue that was expected to transpire 
during these rituals. This intertwining of emerging literary conventions and monastic life 
is part of what made the Chan tradition’s enactment of buddhahood (in settings wholly 
unlike the canonical circumstances of the Buddha Śākyamuni’s sermons) so powerful. 
The famously bold, ferocious, and sometimes perplexing behavior of Chan masters was 
not merely entertaining but seriously compelling—sufficiently so, as we have seen, that it 
secured for the Chan tradition high-profile patronage and access to the most elite 
abbacies in the empire. These models of behavior set the terms according to which the 
public evaluated Chan masters, and established the criteria by which Chan masters in turn 
evaluated their disciples to determine who would be admitted into their lineages. They 
also filled the gap left by Chan masters’ lack of literal resemblance to buddhas—the 
absence on their bodies of the “marks of the great man,” their inability to magically 
transform their appearance in front of an audience, the lack of an adoring heavenly 
retinue accompanying their persons. In so doing, these models of behavior served Chan 
                                                
60 屙屎、送尿、著衣、喫飯、困來即臥。 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, T. no. 1985, 47: 
498a17; translation follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 185, with tense altered. 
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masters in the Song dynasty the way Huineng’s heroic life story helped compensate for 
everything about his person that seemed to make him an unlikely buddha: as a new sign-
system of personal buddhahood that could fill the vacuum left by the signless 
metaphysics of universal buddhahood. 
 Yet even as the Chan tradition worked to cast aside the canonical “marks of the 
great man,” replacing them with new signs by which buddhas might be recognized in 
China, they nevertheless also retained and leaned heavily upon the figure of the “great 
man” (da zhangfu ⼤大丈夫) itself. Indeed, as Miriam Levering has shown, the boldness 
and ferocity that characterizes depictions of Chan masters in the Song was closely bound 
up with the gendered ideal of the “great man,” an overdetermined expression that already 
held deeply embedded cultural meanings in China before it was used by Buddhist 
translators to render the Sanskrit term mahāpuruṣa into Chinese.61 As Anna Seidel has 
observed, more than adjacent terms like “great fellow” (dashi ⼤大⼠士) and “great person” 
(daren ⼤大⼈人), the term “great man” suggested in early pre-Buddhist Chinese literature not 
just a virtuous individual capable of being a ruler, but more specifically “the adult male, 
virile and robust, the incorruptible official, the courageous warrior, and the hero with 
strong will.”62 Whereas the word “buddha” (fo) itself was, as we have seen, ambiguous—
it could refer to an individual person or to a categorical metaphysics—the epithet “great 
man” was much more clearly figurative and personal, rarely sliding into the metaphysics 
of buddhahood. For this reason, exploring the deployment and reception of the term 
                                                
61 Levering, “Lin-chi (Rinzai) Ch’an and Gender.” In her necessarily brief overview of the history of 
the term da zhangfu, Levering does not seem to have realized that it was used to translate mahāpuruṣa. 
 
62 “…ta tchang fou est d’abord l’homme adulte, viril et robuste, le fonctionnaire incorruptible, le 
guerrier courageux et le héros à la volonté forte.” Seidel, “Daiji,” 673. 
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“great man” in Chan writings gives us an especially clear window into how Chan 
Buddhists, no matter how much they emphasized the universal metaphysics of 
buddhahood, also placed great soteriological emphasis on a personal model of realization 
and mastery. 
The adoption of the figure of the “great man” presented Chan Buddhists with both 
challenges and opportunities. The main challenge was that, as we have seen above, the 
“great man” was closely associated in Buddhist scriptures with the canonical “marks of 
the great man,” and more generally with the notion that buddhas look a certain way—a 
way that Chan masters in the Song did not look. But this problem of resemblance, too, 
provided an opportunity for rhetorical ingenuity from Chan Buddhists. Taking advantage 
of the overdetermination of the term da zhangfu, they deftly combined the indigenous 
Chinese sense of the great man’s vigorous martiality and fearlessness in the face of death 
with canonical Buddhist tropes of the Buddha Śākyamuni’s heroism to articulate a new 
Chinese Buddhist ideal that could help govern the Chan tradition’s identity. Indeed, the 
Buddha as mahāpuruṣa was himself also a “hero with a strong will”: as Chan Buddhists 
knew, the very meaning of the Buddha’s given name Siddhārtha is “one whose purpose is 
accomplished,” and he is routinely portrayed in canonical literature as a “bull of a 
man.”63 
 The “great man” was a gendered concept in India as it was in China, and Chan 
Buddhists both provided opportunities for women to join the ranks of Chan masters and 
challenged those same women aspirants on parallel grounds to the way Hongren 
challenged Huineng: “you, a buddha? But you’re a woman!” How did those few women 
                                                
63 See Powers, A Bull of a Man; and my discussion in Chapter 2. 
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who persevered under such scrutiny—successfully gaining admission into Chan lineages, 
securing abbacies, and having their words recorded for posterity—reply? As we will see 
in Chapter 5, the few extant Song-period records featuring female Chan aspirants and 
masters are described as replying just as Huineng did, by pointing out that buddha-nature 
is universal and knows no difference of bodily form. But like Huineng, these women 
knew that recourse to metaphysics alone was insufficient, and so—as Miriam Levering 
has shown—they sometimes also cited the canonical example of the Dragon Girl, a 
female character in the Lotus Sūtra who becomes a buddha.64 Gender was thus never 
incidental to Chan’s figurative reinterpretation of buddhahood in hybrid Buddho-Chinese 
terms. On the contrary, it offers us a powerful litmus test for the very real stakes of the 
Chan tradition’s adherence to a figurative, and not merely metaphysical, understanding 
and enactment of buddhahood. 
The ways Chan Buddhists construed, performed, and transformed the figurative 
shape of buddhahood, of the “great man,” in turn shaped the Chan tradition’s public 
identity, molded the soteriological goals of anyone who aspired to admission into a Chan 
lineage, and structured the norms according to which masters already in the lineage 
understood their own positions and selected those among their students worthy of 
admission. At the same time, Chan’s intervention in Chinese Buddhist tradition was not 
merely definitional, but also involved a transformation in the practices by which those 
very definitions of buddhahood could be evaluated and contested. In the process of 
wresting ultimate Buddhist authority from the towering figure of the Buddha Śākyamuni, 
Chan Buddhists may have got more than they bargained for, opening that authority up for 
                                                
64 Levering, “The Dragon-Girl”; for more on this topic, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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ongoing disputation within and between Chan communities, as well as between Chan 
Buddhists and others outside of their lineages, such as rival Buddhists and lay literati. 
This broadening circle of contestation for ultimate religious authority in turn shaped and 
reshaped the very terms upon which the debate was carried out. 
 
Shifting paradigms of authority in Chinese Buddhist history 
 
The Chan tradition’s rise and its radical claim that Chan masters hold religious authority 
equivalent to the Buddha carried important consequences for the broader history of 
authority in Chinese Buddhism. Tansen Sen has argued that the transition from what he 
calls Buddhist-dominated to trade-centered exchanges between China and India from the 
seventh to fifteenth centuries—which corresponds to the declining influence of newly 
arriving Indian Buddhist texts in China—was due less to the decline of Buddhism in 
India than to changes in Chinese attitudes toward Indian Buddhism. He identifies Wu 
Zhao’s reign (690–705) as a significant turning point, during which important steps were 
taken toward identifying China as the center of the Buddhist universe. This process 
culminated in the Song, he observes, when the status of Buddhist translators declined and 
new indigenous literatures emerged from the Chan and other traditions.65 The Chan 
tradition’s claim to its masters’ buddhahood was not merely incidental or epiphenomenal 
to this much larger transformation of the landscape of religious authority in China and its 
                                                
65 Sen, Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade, Chapter 3. Sen writes that “the movement of Buddhist 
monks and artifacts between India and China during the tenth and eleventh centuries is not the crucial 
issue. What seems to be more perplexing is the fact that despite the significant Buddhist traffic 
between the two countries, Buddhist doctrines from India seem to have had little impact on the 
development of Buddhism after the Tang period” (103). On the general decline of translation from the 
eighth century onward, see also Funayama, Butten wa dō kan’yaku sareta no ka, 244–5. 
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relationship to the Indian homeland of Buddhism. Rather, Chan Buddhists and their 
claims to buddhahood participated in a fundamental way in this historical sea change. 
 From Buddhism’s first arrival in the Eastern Han through the Tang dynasty, a 
period which throughout this dissertation I will designate as the “medieval,” the figure of 
the Buddha held virtually unchallenged authority over Buddhist textual production. Of 
course, many scholar-monks enjoyed reputations for erudition in the interpretation and 
elaboration of Buddhist scriptures, but their works were always properly speaking 
hermeneutic: they took as their task the elucidation of the Buddha’s teachings, not their 
negotiation or disputation. If one reads the works of the famous Tiantai Zhiyi, for 
example, one finds that he always seeks justification for his claims in canonical 
scriptures. On no occasion does he write “I disagree with the Buddha concerning such 
and such point”; it is simply not an option for him to do so, because the Buddha’s 
position as ultimate religious authority was for Zhiyi and other medieval Chinese 
Buddhist scholiasts unquestionable.66 Anxiety about the possibility that Chinese 
Buddhists might introduce error or heterodoxy during the process of propagating 
Buddhism is made explicit in Huijiao’s 慧皎 (497–554) treatise on Buddhist preachers 
(changdao shi 唱導師) included in the Gaoseng zhuan ⾼高僧傳, where after discussing 
the power of skilled speakers to inspire an audience, he warns that if one is not 
sufficiently knowledgeable or eloquent one should stick to the letter of the text and not 
improvise, lest one make mistakes that might (among other things) lead “the assembly of 
                                                
66 Scholarship on Zhiyi is too extensive to cite in any systematic fashion, but for an example of his 
writing in annotated English translation, see Swanson, The Great Cessation-and-Contemplation. 
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monks to pervert the teaching of the old Buddha, and having cut off the sprouts that 
produce goodness, merely to increase the confusion of frivolous discourse.”67 
Even so, medieval Chinese Buddhists wishing to invent new teachings were not 
completely without options. They could and often did author apocryphal scriptures, 
which allowed specifically Chinese Buddhist religious concerns to be addressed through 
sermons attributed to the Buddha Śākyamuni, opening with the signature canonical line 
attributed to the Buddha’s disciple Ānanda that attest to the allegedly oral origins of the 
sermon to follow, “Thus have I heard…” (rushi wo wen 如是我聞). Although in one 
sense the authors of apocryphal scriptures succeeded in violating the authority of the 
Buddha by putting their own words in his mouth, in another sense they proved the strong 
grip of Buddha’s authoritative power: only by relying on the figure of the Buddha as 
authoritative teacher could these authors revise his teachings in a manner that might be 
accepted by Chinese Buddhists. Cataloguers of Buddhist scriptures in medieval China 
were themselves aware of this phenomenon and routinely excluded scriptures they 
deemed spurious from authorized canons, though a number of important scriptures that 
modern scholars have determined to be apocryphal nevertheless passed muster in 
medieval China and continued to be transmitted as authentic translations to the present 
day.68 In short, there was throughout the medieval period both a pervasive identification 
                                                
67 眾僧乖古佛之教，既絕⽣生善之萌，秖增戲論之惑。 Gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2059, 50: 418a22–23. 
In the same treatise Huijiao elaborates on his ambivalence toward preaching: “In my previous draft of 
the Gaoseng [zhuan], I included [only] eight sections. [Later,] however, I sought out [exemplary 
figures in] the two skills of scripture-mastery and preaching. Although these are last (or superficial, 
mo 末) in the Way, they are estimable in their capacity to awaken ordinary people, and thus I added 
these two sections to bring the total number to ten.” 昔草創⾼高僧本以⼋八科成傳，却尋經導⼆二技，雖
於道為末，⽽而悟俗可崇，故加此⼆二條⾜足成⼗十數。 Gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2059, 50: 417c28–418a1. 
 
68 Foundational works on Chinese Buddhist apocrypha include Mochizuki, Bukkyō kyōten; Makita, 
Gikyō kenkyū; and Buswell, Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha. On the discernment of scriptural 
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of ultimate Buddhist authority with the teachings of the Buddha, and robust interpretive 
regimes for discerning the authenticity of texts attributed to him. 
At the end of the medieval period, this basic structure of Buddhist authority in 
China underwent rapid and significant changes that corresponded to the decline of both 
translation and the production of new apocrypha.69 To gain a sense of how Chan 
Buddhists intervened in Chinese Buddhism’s longstanding structure of authority, let us 
consider a passage from the discourse record of Yunmen Wenyan 雲門⽂文偃 (864–949) in 
which the master comments on a well-known scene from the beginning of the canonical 
life story of the Buddha Śākyamuni: 
[The master] raised [a case for comment]: “When the World-Honored One 
[the Buddha] was born, he pointed with one hand to heaven and pointed 
with the other to earth, saying, ‘Above heaven and below heaven, I alone 
am honored.’” The master [Yunmen] said: “If I had seen [the Buddha do 
this] at that time, I would have killed him with a single blow and fed him 
to the dogs, in hopes of bringing Great Peace to all under heaven.”70 
 
Even bearing in mind the Chan tradition’s popular reputation for iconoclasm, Yunmen’s 
remark about killing the infant Buddha is rather astonishing. It is hard to think of another 
example anywhere in the world of someone subjecting the founder and chief authority of 
their religion to such vitriol and being not condemned but celebrated—as Yunmen, one 
                                                                                                                                            
authenticity by medieval Chinese Buddhist cataloguers, see Tokuno, “The Evaluation of Indigenous 
Scriptures.” 
 
69 As Kyoko Tokuno notes, “although the manuscript period witnessed the continuous production of 
indigenous [apocryphal] scriptures, once printing began, virtually all prospects for circulating new 
indigenous scriptures were eliminated.” Tokuno, “The Evaluation of Indigenous Scriptures,” 32. 
 
70 舉：世尊初⽣生下，⼀一⼿手指天，⼀一⼿手指地，周⾏行七步，目顧四⽅方，云：「天上天下，唯我獨
尊。」師云：「我當時若見，⼀一棒打殺與狗⼦子喫却，貴圖天下太平。 Yunmen Kuangzhen 
chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 47: 560b16–19. 
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of the most famous Chan masters of all time, certainly was.71 How did such a thing come 
to pass? What permitted and authorized it? Yunmen’s statement and the welcome 
reception it enjoyed in the Song period can only be comprehended in light of the Chan 
tradition’s radical reorientation of Chinese Buddhist authority on the grounds that Chan 
masters are themselves effectively buddhas, and therefore have every right not merely to 
propagate or interpret but to evaluate and even condemn the words and actions of the 
Buddha Śākyamuni.72 
 Yunmen’s radical rhetorical gesture was not appreciated by all Chinese Buddhists. 
For example, Zanning 贊寧 (919–1101), compiler of the Song gaoseng zhuan 宋⾼高僧傳 
of 988—the third of three medieval compendia of monastic biographies compiled 
between the sixth and tenth centuries—pointedly omitted Yunmen from inclusion in his 
collection.73 Like the compilers of biographical collections of eminent monks before him, 
Zanning divided the biographies that filled his text into ten categories (ke 科) based on 
outstanding performance in particular Buddhist disciplines: translators (yijing 譯經), 
exegetes (yijie 義解), meditators (xichan 習禪), elucidators of the monastic code (minglü 
明律), defenders of the Dharma (hufa 護法), [demonstrators of] sympathetic resonance 
(gantong 感通), abandoners of the body (yishen 遺身), chanters (dusong 讀誦), bringers 
                                                
71 As Steven Heine, for example, observes, “Xuedou and many other Song Chan leaders regarded 
Yunmen as the single major role model for the prototypical Chan adept.” Heine, Chan Rhetoric of 
Uncertainty, 7. 
 
72 As Yuanwu Keqin commented on Yunmen’s remark, “only in this manner can one properly begin 
to repay [the kindness of the Buddha].” 如此⽅方酬得恰好。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 
2003, 48: 156c17–18. For more on the concept of repaying the Buddha’s kindness, see Chapter 4. 
 
73 Ishii, Sōdai Zenshū, 48–49. 
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of merit (xingfu 興福), and miscellaneous famous worthies (zake shengde 雜科聲德).74 
Zanning’s criteria for inclusion among the ranks of China’s eminent monks was thus both 
traditional and inclusive, encompassing a broad range of possible avenues for individuals 
to achieve excellence and be deemed worthy representatives of monastic Buddhism’s 
best and brightest. The omission of Yunmen suggests that his rhetoric really may have 
scandalized Buddhists like Zanning who held a reverent and ecumenical vision of the 
Chinese Buddhist tradition. 
 As Albert Welter has observed, from the Gaoseng zhuan through the Xu gaoseng 
zhuan to the Song gaoseng zhuan, we witness a gradual diminution in the proportion 
allotted to translators and exegetes, and a rising number of entries for meditators (that is, 
chan masters).75 Yet by the time Zanning compiled the Song gaoseng zhuan, expertise in 
meditation no longer fully captured the meaning of the term chan, which had already 
come to be closely associated with Chan lineages that often explicitly rejected meditation 
practice as the defining feature of their tradition. The distinction between chan and Chan 
“is lexically obscure yet analytically crucial,” as Eric Greene notes, “for early meditation 
masters do not necessarily have anything in common with later Chan, and later Chan did 
not necessarily emphasize meditation.”76 Even as Zanning tried to wrap his head around 
                                                
74 These categories differed slightly from earlier eminent monk collections, though some section 
titles—including xichan—were used in all three. 
 
75 Welter, Monks, Rulers, and Literati, 42. 
 
76 Greene, “Another Look at Early Chan,” 51. 
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this problem, however, the ground was shifting beneath his feet. He could not, by 
omitting Yunmen from his collection, stop the tidal wave that was about to hit.77 
Only sixteen years separated the Song gaoseng zhuan from the initial compilation 
of the first imperially sponsored Chan lamp collection, the Jingde chuandeng lu, but the 
differences between them heralded a total metamorphosis of Chinese Buddhist attitudes 
toward eminence and authority.78 As John Kieschnick remarks: 
Unlike the Song Biographies, the Transmission of the Lamp is only 
tangentially interested in the feats of asceticism, thaumaturgy, and 
scholarship that so concern the Biographies of Eminent Monks. Rather, it 
is most interested in the bon mots of “recorded sayings” and in lineage… 
Therefore, the success of the Transmission of the Lamp in addition to 
signaling the success of a new image of the monk also signaled the 
success of a new genre of Buddhist hagiography.79 
 
Throughout the Song dynasty and beyond, imperially-sponsored Chan lamp histories 
beginning with the Jingde chuandeng lu were, as Kieschnick notes, repeatedly reissued 
and updated. “In contrast, while the Eminent Monks series was continued with a Ming 
Biographies of Eminent Monks, this work was much shorter than its predecessors and 
seems to have had little influence.”80 In other words, the publication of the Jingde 
                                                
77 Northern Song Chan master Juefan Huihong 覺範慧洪 (1071–1128) criticized Zanning for placing 
exegetes first in his collection and misclassifying or omitting entirely several key Chan masters, 
including Yunmen; see Ishii, Sōdai Zenshū, 1; and Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk, 13 and 135. 
Huihong’s criticism registers not only a sectarian objection to the ecumenism of these collections’ 
criteria for inclusion—which in the case of Zanning seems to have merged with a disdain for Chan’s 
more radical rhetoric—but also the uncertainty and confusion caused by the shift in meaning of the 
term chan from referring straightforwardly to meditation to naming an elite lineage and tradition 
whose identity, despite its name, was not primarily rooted in meditation practice. 
 
78 See Ishii, Sōdai Zenshū, 1–6. 
 
79 Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk, 136. As Kieschnick notes, there were earlier precedents to Song-
period Chan lamp collections, from the Chuan fabao ji to the Zutang ji, but they did not attain nearly 
the wide recognition or readership that the Jingde chuandeng lu attained. 
 
80 Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk, 137. 
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chuandeng lu marked the eclipse of the medieval order of Buddhist eminence and 
authority and the birth of an entirely new Chinese Buddhist world, remade in the image 
of the living buddhas and “great men” of Chan.81 
 In place of the ten categories of specialized excellence that organized medieval 
biographical collections of eminent monks, Chan lamp collections had only one criterion 
for inclusion: membership in a Chan lineage. Yet this brings us back to the administrative 
problem of lineage transmission that we have already considered: according to what 
kinds of criteria, measured against what norms and ideals, were aspirants admitted into 
Chan lineages in the first place? These ideals were never written down once and for all, 
but rather were negotiated in and through Chan ritual performance and textual 
production. In the Zutang ji of 952 and the Jingde chuandeng lu of 1009 we first see the 
emerging genre of “encounter dialogue,” much of which claims to record the sermons 
and responses to questions from the audience given by Chan masters during the 
“ascending the hall” ceremony. As Kieschnick notes, the sources for biographical entries 
in Chan lamp collections were not primarily funerary inscriptions, which undergirded the 
biographical collections of eminent monks, but rather discourse record (yulu) literature. 
Lamp collections were thus relatively heavy on teachings and dialogues, and 
comparatively light on biographical data. For this reason, although they shared broad 
                                                
81 Mark Halperin offers a sense of why the Jingde chuandeng lu so appealed to Chinese literati, whose 
power in Chinese society was on the rise: “In [the Jingde-era] Transmission of the Lamp, literati 
encountered representations of monks’ lives that resonated strongly with their own, far more so than 
did most sutras and commentaries. Its narratives, highlighted by sharp verbal and theatrical encounters, 
echoed accounts readily found in biji literature and paralleled records of masters and students in 
ancient China. In an ironic twist, men attracted to a religion that propounded the illusory quality of 
discrimination embraced enthusiastically a literary genre that highlighted the performance of a 
discrimination between the enlightened and benighted.” Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 70. 
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structural similarities, the actual contents of Chan lamp collections differed dramatically 
from medieval biographical collections. 
 Already in the Zutang ji and Jingde chuandeng lu, we find the first signs of an 
emerging culture not only of recorded discourses, but also of commentary on “old cases”: 
sermons and encounter dialogues in which Chan students and masters raise for 
commentary short selections from canonical Buddhist literature (as we see above with 
Yunmen) and, more commonly, from other Chan discourse records. The Jingde 
chuandeng lu in turn collects various examples of such excerpting and commentarial 
practices into a single section of fascicle 27, organizing commentaries into five 
categories: “raising” (ju 舉), “citing” (zheng 徵), “holding up [between thumb and 
forefinger]” (nian 拈), “replacing [the original answer to a question posed in the 
excerpted passage with the commentator’s own response]” (dai 代), and “[adding] a 
separate [response to a question posed in the excerpted passage in addition to the original 
answer]” (bie 別).82 Finally, later in the eleventh century we see the emergence of full-
fledged collections of Chan commentaries in both verse and prose on what came to be 
called “public cases” (gong’an 公案; J. kōan), a legal metaphor that cast the commentator 
as judge presiding over a case.83 The most famous such collection from the Northern 
Song is Yuanwu Keqin’s Blue Cliff Record (Biyan lu 碧巖錄), to which we will 
repeatedly return over the course of this study. 
                                                
82 See Ishii, Sōdai Zenshū, 93–103; and Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 434b29–437b24. 
 
83 See Foulk, “The Form and Function.” 
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   Song dynasty Chan literature constitutes a vast, rich, and multifaceted archive. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I aim to draw out of this textual universe evidence of 
the ways Chan Buddhists used their tradition’s emerging repertoire of ritual and literary 
practices to address some of their most pressing institutional questions. What exactly 
does a buddha look like? What do Chinese buddhas in particular look like? Do they all 
look alike or is each unique? Can both men and women be buddhas, or just men? How 
does one discern a real buddha from a fake? Where does ultimate religious authority 
reside? These questions were so fundamental to Chan that we cannot pick up any single 
text and find the tradition’s answer. Rather, they animated its entire literature, creating, in 
Michel Foucault’s words, “an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more 
and more.”84 The Chan tradition’s reconfiguration of Buddhist authority sanctioned not a 
new kind of hermeneutics but an outpouring of evaluation, in which an unprecedentedly 
and increasingly large number of people saw themselves fit to stand in judgment of the 
authority and religious attainments of other Buddhists. These same people, however, had 
to watch their backs, for the very principle that authorized them to judge also left them 
vulnerable to judgment from others.85 Remarkably, then, the Chan tradition’s rise to 
power led not to a consolidation of Buddhist authority in the hands of a select few 
individuals, but rather to its relative diffusion. Of course, this is not to say that Chan 
restructured Chinese Buddhism to be more “democratic”; better to say, as we will see in 
Chapter 4, that it opened up an arena for gladiatorial battle. 
 
                                                
84 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 18. 
 
85 See Foulk, “The Form and Function”; and Ahn, “Who Has the Last Word.” 
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Methodological considerations: performance, identity, discernment 
 
This dissertation does not take as its point of focus any one individual, lineage, or text. 
Instead, it explores the claim to buddhahood as a topic common to all Chan lineages and 
lineage members in the Song dynasty by virtue of their shared mythology, literary style, 
and institutional structure. It traces how these claims provoked reactions both inside and 
outside of Chan, how they carried deep problems in relation to authority and past 
example, and how Chan Buddhists sought to work through these problems. In so doing, I 
follow the lead of William LaFleur, who in his 1983 book The Karma of Words writes 
that when Buddhism arrived in Japan, it 
had within it certain conceptual problems and points of great debate. Its 
thinkers certainly did not always agree with one another. Thus, when the 
Japanese imbibed deeply from this continental source they inherited not 
only the treasures of the Mahayana but also many of its problems. My 
general approach… is to leave these problems and tensions in place. I am 
more interested in defining the arena and the bases for the debates of the 
time than in focusing on a particular thinker or school seen as having 
resolved the large questions with a higher harmony or synthesis.86 
 
In a similar way, my analysis focuses on the arena of negotiation surrounding the Chan 
claim that its masters are buddhas—a claim deeply indebted to the canonical Buddhist 
tradition even as it staged a radical intervention in the shape that same tradition was to 
take in China—rather than trying to identify any single definitive answer.  
Turning more specifically to scholarship on the Chan tradition, Robert Gimello’s 
1992 article “Marga and Culture: Learning, Letters, and Liberation in Northern Sung 
Ch’an” opened by issuing a similar call to probe beyond the strictly normative schemata 
of the Buddhist path found in doctrinal literature, searching instead for evidence of lived 
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contingency. How did the paths to liberation offered by various Buddhist traditions 
actually work in practice? Gimello writes that “attention to the historicity of mārga [the 
path]—to mārga as parole rather than langue, as performance rather than competence—
may lend urgency and specificity to such questions.”87 Gimello’s reference to parole and 
langue invokes the theoretical legacy of structural linguistics, suggesting that the 
“language” of Buddhist soteriology always unfolds in performative acts of “speech”—
what J. L. Austin called speech acts.88 It is precisely in order to restore the urgency and 
specificity—not to mention sheer audacity—of Chan Buddhists’ claim to buddhahood 
that I pay particular attention in my analysis to the performative dimensions of Chan 
literature. 
Austin’s speech act theory, despite its unassuming premises—that words have the 
power not only to describe or make propositions about the world, but also to act upon the 
world in various ways—turns out to offer a powerful lens through which to analyze the 
Chan tradition. This is so in part because, as we have seen, Song-dynasty Chan’s core 
literary genre of “encounter dialogue” often centered on the purported verbatim records 
of Chan masters’ live performances of the “ascending the hall” ceremony, a public ritual 
we know to have been central to everyday life in Song-dynasty Chan monasteries.89 At 
the same time, it is important to recognize how the theoretical notion of performance and 
speech acts can be useful for analyzing not only literal staged performances or “records” 
                                                
87 Gimello, “Mārga and Culture,” 372. 
 
88 Austin, How to Do Things. 
 
89 Some ritual theorists have put the theory of ritual in conversation with Austin’s speech act theory. 
See, for example, Grimes, Ritual Criticism, which uses Austin’s notions of felicitous and infelicitous 
speech acts to help understand ritual efficacy and failure. 
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thereof, but also the performative dimension of all textual and visual engagements and 
interventions in the Chan tradition. “Records” of Chan masters’ on-stage performances 
were often, perhaps nearly always, embellished or even composed in writing out of whole 
cloth from the start. This fact does not undermine their performative nature, however, but 
merely displaces who we understand the real actors to be. Neither does it rule out the 
power of these records to model behavior for subsequent staged performances of the 
“ascending the hall” ceremony. Moreover, Chan “acts” of writing also include, for 
example, commentaries and sub-commentaries on famous encounter dialogues that came 
to form the basis of gong’an collections, occasional and commemorative poetry by Chan 
masters, and many other genres. These textual interventions not only said things, but also 
did things. For example, Yunmen’s comment on the canonical story of the infant Buddha 
that we considered above serves performatively to evaluate the Buddha’s conduct, and by 
extension to enact a particular relationship of authority between Yunmen and the Buddha, 
contravening traditional reverence for the Buddha’s person and provocatively situating 
Yunmen above the Buddha in the position of judge meting out a punishment. 
Speech acts (conceived in this broadened sense) like Yunmen’s were not mere 
reflections or expressions of an idea that everyone already agreed upon—that Chan 
masters are buddhas—precisely because, in the simplest terms, not everyone did agree 
upon it; the consensus surrounding this claim was contingent. If we are to see how 
Yunmen’s statement did not merely reflect an established fact, but rather participated in 
the evolving claim that Chan masters are buddhas, we must always recall the contingency 
of these claims even after the Chan tradition was established as the most elite and 
powerful Buddhist organization in China. And indeed, speech act theory is useful not 
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only for analyzing the performative capacity of claims to authority, but also for 
examining the circumstances under which those claims achieve efficacy (or fail to do so). 
Austin observes that while speech acts cannot be judged true or false, because they do not 
describe anything, their power can instead be measured in terms of their efficacy—in 
Austin’s words, in terms of whether they are “felicitous” or “infelicitous.” By this he 
means that a speech act either has the intended effect or it doesn’t, a difference that 
hinges largely on the situation of its utterance, the identities of the people speaking and 
listening, and so on. One of Austin’s most famous modern-day examples is the statement 
“I do,” which enacts a commitment to enter into the legal institution of marriage with 
another person only under certain very specific social conditions, while under all others it 
does not bring about any such outcome.90 Expanding this concept from the simple 
scenarios laid out by Austin to the broader task of measuring the efficacy of rhetorical 
claims and performances of identity—as numerous scholars have done in Austin’s 
wake—holds enormous promise for the study of Chan history. 
To see what I mean, let us return to the historically earliest test case for the Chan 
claim to buddhahood: a comparison between the efficacy attained respectively by the 
records of Huineng and Shenhui. As we saw above, Huineng and Shenhui were both 
credited in written texts with the same sort of claim to buddhahood or near-buddhahood, 
after which they were challenged in similar ways (“you, a buddha?”), in response to 
which challenge they issued more or less the same reply (“haven’t you heard that buddha-
nature, or buddha-mind, is universal and independent of bodily form?”). And yet 
Huineng’s story turned out to be powerfully efficacious in the world, laying the 
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foundation for the identity of the mature Chan tradition, while Shenhui’s encounter was 
forgotten and Shenhui himself written out of Chan history. If the two claims were 
virtually identical, then why was one efficacious—or felicitous—and the other not? 
While there are many factors involved in this comparison, it likely had something to do 
with the heroic persona attributed to Huineng, which gave vivid and compelling narrative 
evidence for his special claim to status and authority. Of course, it is no coincidence that 
Huineng’s persona was invented as a fiction, while the chief inventor of this persona—
Shenhui—had himself to live with a reputation forged through his own real monastic 
career. Indeed, fiction allowed the story of Huineng to offer a particularly powerful 
rhetorical combination of the metaphysics of universal (impersonal) buddhahood and the 
narrative of heroic personhood. 
And yet, as I have already suggested, this was only the very beginning of the 
history of the Chan tradition’s claim to a more categorical identity as a lineage of 
buddhas, for several reasons. For one thing, it only authorized one single person as a 
buddha—Huineng himself—and not the entire lineage of Chan masters. Although it 
offered itself up to be replicated by all future Chan masters familiar with the story, each 
reiteration of the formula by subsequent Chan masters seeking to justify their own claims 
to buddhahood had necessarily also to rely not only on categorical metaphysics, but also 
on their own compelling demonstrations of charismatic personal heroism. Of course, 
what later Chan masters of the Song dynasty lacked in demonstrable heroism compared 
with the fictionalized Huineng, they surely gained in proportion to the broadening social 
hegemony of Chan’s institutional claim to buddhahood. In other words, each time the 
claim to buddhahood was successfully (or felicitously, in Austin’s words) reiterated, it 
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became more conventional and less radical. But, as I will seek to demonstrate, no matter 
how conventional the claim by Chan masters to buddhahood became, the Chan tradition 
always relied publicly on the personal charisma of its masters to sustain its reputation. 
Moreover, to be admitted into Chan lineages in the first place necessarily also required 
aspirants to demonstrate to their masters the possession of heroic charisma, the capacity 
for greatness. And precisely because it was buddhas Chan masters were claiming to be, 
their demonstrations of personal charisma were very often performed with some kind of 
reference to the particular set of canonical signs and tropes surrounding the person of the 
Buddha Śākyamuni. 
If we are to restore urgency and specificity to our understanding of Chan’s 
intervention in Chinese Buddhist history as Gimello suggests, we cannot take these 
contingent repetitions and reiterations of Huineng’s (and Shenhui’s) rhetorical gesture for 
granted, because in them lies the explanation we seek for how Chan Buddhists not only 
established but sustained their claim to buddhahood, building and maintaining the 
conditions for this claim’s ongoing efficacy and felicity. Digging into this fertile ground 
of the myriad acts—often similar but never identical—by which the efficacy of the Chan 
claim to buddhahood was established and sustained allows us, following Bruno Latour, to 
“reassemble” the tradition from the ground up. Latour distinguishes sociological 
approaches that presuppose “the social” as an already-coherent unit of explanation from 
his own approach of tracing each and every association that constitutes what we call “the 
social,” writing: “For sociologists of the social, the rule is order while decay, change, or 
creation are the exceptions. For the sociologists of associations, the rule is performance 
and what has to be explained, the troubling exceptions, are any type of stability over the 
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long term and on a larger scale.”91 The question that faces us, then, is: how do we get 
from the story of Huineng and Hongren to the broad, and broadly (but not universally) 
accepted, institutional claim that all Chan masters are effectively buddhas—a claim 
whose degree of efficacy or “felicity,” I argue, offers a valuable measure of the 
tradition’s astonishing success? 
This question will inform my entire dissertation. And because taking it up with 
Latour’s injunction in mind means we cannot cheat or take shortcuts, cannot at any point 
simply say “well, that needs not be explained; it is just Chan,” we will have to take the 
scenic route instead. For now, let us begin by asking: what exactly did the Platform 
Sūtra’s deployment of Huineng’s formulation—answering a question of resemblance 
with recourse to categorical metaphysics—entail? In the first place, it relied on an 
unstable alliance between two ultimately incompatible understandings of buddhahood, 
metaphysical and personal, which required routine rhetorical upkeep by those who 
deployed it subsequently. Categorical metaphysics, read on its own terms, proposes to 
resolve the entire problem of Buddhist soteriology in a single gesture: buddhahood is 
universal. This metaphysics is simple and flexible, capable of authorizing various specific 
and sometimes incompatible projects, activities, and claims, of which Huineng’s response 
to Hongren’s interrogation is just one example. Yet we cannot simply take this 
metaphysics at its word; it does not categorically resolve anything as far as we are 
concerned. Instead, we must trace each instance of its rhetorical deployment in order to 
understand its role in the Chan tradition’s constitution of a new approach to buddhahood 
in China. By this I do not simply mean, in the colloquial sense, that categorical 
                                                
91 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 35. 
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metaphysics is “mere rhetoric” and therefore “not real.” On the contrary, it is undeniably 
real, but what exactly it does and how it does it remain to be seen. 
By contrast, resemblance does not operate according to a categorical logic; it is 
associative, moving through similitude and likeness, modeling behaviors and attitudes, 
undergirding systems of evaluative criteria. It operates through shapes, figures both 
textual and visual, whose contours we must also trace in some detail if we are to 
understand what is going on. And we must do so over the protestations of the Chan 
Buddhists we are studying, who never let up in their critique of “signs” or “marks” (xiang 
相) as utterly incapable of representing buddhahood. Despite these criticisms, and in a 
manner that often vexed Chan Buddhists themselves, we can observe that it was 
irreducibly necessary for them to agree upon some set of signs as conventional criteria by 
which to outline a normative shape of Chinese buddhahood. When Chan masters 
encouraged their disciples in various terms to be great men and be buddhas, these were 
not categorical exhortations, but rather calls to engage in a particular relationship of 
exemplarity—presenting problems for the tradition, as we will see, both because its 
masters and aspirants never looked anything like the canonical Buddha, and also because 
the tradition’s normative literature enjoined aspirants to be perfectly spontaneous, 
authentic to themselves, and totally independent from external authority. Copying others, 
taking on an appearance that did not reflect one’s essence, was anathema. Those who did 
such things were not authentic masters but “wild foxes” (yehu 野狐). 
To understand what exactly this normative heroism of Song-dynasty Chan looked 
like—by what signs buddhahood was to be recognized in China—and the changing 
circumstances under which these signs were to be efficacious, we must consider the 
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fraught relationship between Chan masters as heroic buddhas and the canonical example 
offered by the Buddha Śākyamuni. In this endeavor it is helpful if we turn to the 
elaboration of Austin’s speech act theory offered by Jacques Derrida in his influential 
essay “Signature Event Context.” There, Derrida argues that embedded within the very 
power of the sign to signify is also its capacity to be cited and reiterated in new contexts 
that alter its meaning: 
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the current 
sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can be cited, put between 
quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, 
engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely 
illimitable. This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, 
but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or 
absolute anchoring [ancrage]. This citationality, this duplication or 
duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neither an accident nor an anomaly, 
it is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could not even have a 
function called “normal.”92 
 
While Derrida is of course famously associated with the “deconstruction” of texts, his use 
of speech act theory is not focused simply on demonstrating the ultimate incoherence or 
infelicity of all speech acts, but rather on showing in a way not anticipated by Austin the 
ways all speech acts intervene in and transform the system of signs that they presuppose 
even as they rely on that same system to achieve efficacy or “felicity.” He draws our 
attention not to any fundamental impossibility but, on the contrary, to the possibilities of 
speech acts.93 Derrida demonstrates that we cannot take for granted a stable and enduring 
                                                
92 Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” 12. Song-period intellectuals like Huang Tingjian 黃庭堅 
(1045–1105)—who was friendly with Chan Buddhists—had their own theories and figurations of 
citational practice, such as “stealing the embryo and transforming the bones” (duotai huangu 奪胎換
骨); see Zhou, Zhongguo chanzong, 179–96; and Palumbo-Liu, The Poetics of Appropriation, 156–71. 
 
93 He writes: “I take things up here from the perspective of positive possibility and not simply as 
instances of failure or infelicity: would a performative utterance be possible if a citational doubling 
[doublure] did not come to split and dissociate from itself the pure singularity of the event?” Derrida, 
“Signature Event Context,” 17. 
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langue (structural “language” of signs) that is merely made manifest through parole 
(“speech” broadly conceived); rather, we must understand that each act of parole has the 
power to fundamentally reconstitute the langue, that indeed sign-systems are always 
involved in this dynamic process of lived reconstitution. 
Along similar lines, linguistic anthropologist Michael Silverstein writes (again 
with reference to Austin’s speech acts and their “felicity conditions”): 
Identities are, we may note, indexically presupposed by social acts… that 
is, such identities are presumed to comprise the (felicity-conferring) 
context for the constituent social acts of a lengthier interactional text. But 
identities are indexically created by such social acts as well; they are in 
effect entailed as the contextual consequence of such social acts. / So: 
frameworks of self- and other-definition constitute both an essential 
contextual input, as it were, to the various social acts of which interactions 
are built, and they emerge as an important contextual output of such acts. 
In this respect, we see, the flow of social behaviors like communicating 
with language and its penumbral sign systems is dynamically 
contextualizing, and what we might term context at any given point in 
interaction is always indexically balanced between presupposed input and 
entailed output.94 
 
Only by taking as our starting point this dynamism inherent in signs, and the role of 
speech acts (broadly conceived) in (re)creating the contexts within which they attain 
efficacy, can we come to understand how Chan Buddhists appropriated the canonical 
sign-system of buddhahood, transforming it and rendering it efficacious in a new time 
and place even as they remained bound to certain of its key canonical premises. 
 Why did the Buddhist tradition need a sign-system of buddhahood like the “marks 
of the great man” in the first place? Did not Buddhists critique signs and marks as 
incapable of truly representing buddhahood? Yes, they did—but only in their elaboration 
of a categorical metaphysics of buddhahood that was formless and ineffable. The 
                                                                                                                                            
 
94 Silverstein, “The Voice of Jacob,” 485. 
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personal interpretation of buddhahood, which never disappeared, also never lost its 
connection with a particular canon of signs. For this reason, the “marks of the great man” 
and other tropes of buddhahood remained enduringly necessary for the tradition because 
they served as a kind of signature, recognition of which authorized an individual’s status 
as an authentic buddha. As we have seen, the paradigmatic Buddhist example of this 
process of authorization via signs is found in the life story of the Buddha Śākyamuni, 
where sagely experts in physiognomy observe the signs on his infant body and predict 
that he will go on to be a full-fledged buddha. As we will see, the Chan tradition’s 
critique of signs helped undermine the straightfoward canonicity of the “marks of the 
great man,” in the process clearing the space not only for an abstract metaphysics but also 
for an entirely new collection of signs. This hybrid repertoire of signs and tropes—which 
drew from both the Buddhist canon and indigenous Chinese culture, while also including 
some truly novel inventions—came to constitute the Song-dynasty Chan tradition’s own 
“signature” of buddhahood. 
 Yet as we consider the practical centrality of signs to Chan’s public reputation, 
soteriology, and institution of transmission, we must also consider that the very power of 
signs to authenticate an individual’s status also carries a weakness, and here Derrida’s 
essay offers one further insight that will be crucial to our analysis. He observes that 
signatures, in order to operationally authenticate an individual’s identity in different times 
and places, must be repeatable. But precisely in this necessary capacity for repetition lies 
the signature’s susceptibility to forgery. Indeed, this also turns out to be the Achilles heel 
in the sign-system of buddhahood: the “great man” is a conventional category, and any 
“great man” can be recognized as possessing the same conventional set of marks (again, 
 56 
recalling that by conventional I don’t necessarily mean static). Theoretically, then, 
anyone possessing these marks is a buddha and “great man.” But what about those who, 
knowing of the marks, would forge them? Indeed, it is precisely because of this ever-
present threat that we are told in canonical Buddhist literature of the devious attempts of 
Devadatta to fake the “marks of the great man” and pose fraudulently as a buddha. Even 
as these stories narrate the inevitable fruitlessness—the inefficacy and “infelicity”—of 
Devadatta’s attempts at forging buddhahood, they also serve as a prescient warning: 
beware, because signs are not always what they seem. 
As Chan Buddhists transformed the canonical sign-system of buddhahood to 
establish an unprecedented institution of Chinese buddhas, they faced the same problem. 
How can one tell real Chan masters, true “great men,” from imposters? The question was 
not merely philosophical, but institutional (and rather urgent), because every Chan master 
was duty-bound to obtain an abbacy and transmit the lineage on to the next generation of 
disciples.95 It was part of the job description of the Chan master, then, not only to train 
disciples but also to deploy a particular expertise in discernment to decipher who among 
those students truly deserved admission into the elite and exclusive Chan tradition. As we 
will see, this imperative gave rise to a vast practical vocabulary of hierarchical 
difference—tropes of gold and base metals, dragons and snakes, and so on—which could 
be deployed when evaluating students (or, in commentarial literature, to judge other Chan 
                                                
95 As Morten Schlütter notes, “the vast majority of Chan monks without abbacies were simply 
forgotten.” How Zen Became Zen, 66. Soteriologically speaking, Yuanwu Keqin remarks that a Chan 
lineage holder might indeed choose to live in reclusion for a time, but eventually one has to “repay the 
kindness of the buddhas and patriarchs” (bao fozu en 報佛祖恩) and “transmit the buddha-mind seal” 
(chuan foxin yin 傳佛⼼心印); see Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 165c16–19. 
Chapter 4 takes up the notion of “repaying the kindness” in Chan. On reclusion as a problem for Chan 
Buddhists, see also Heller, Illusory Abiding, Chapter 3. 
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masters and even the Buddha Śākyamuni himself). Perhaps the most pivotal trope of all 
was, again, the “wild fox”: a creature that knowingly takes on an appearance not its own. 
Like the tropes of gold and base metals, dragons and snakes, the “wild fox” both 
presupposes that each individual has a delineable and authentic essence that must be 
discerned, and also warns that appearances—visible signs—can be cloudy windows onto 
those essential identities. The looming threat of the wild fox, then, demanded that the 
Chan master be expert not only in sign-reading but also fraud detection. Our analysis of 
this issue takes up, in Silverstein’s words, “the particular ways that anxieties of 
authenticity are both heightened and assuaged by regimes of verification.”96 
Even if the speech acts by which the Chan tradition’s claim to buddhahood 
reached fruition were deeply vexed, enmeshed in what I will call a “paradox of 
exemplarity”—a set of conflicting imperatives that Chan masters be singularly authentic 
examples, on the one hand, and do so in a manner somehow resembling exemplary 
models of the past like the Buddha Śākyamuni on the other—this should not necessarily 
lead us to conclude that Chan Buddhists were acting in bad faith.97 For one thing, such an 
evaluation ironically runs the risk of placing scholars of Buddhism in the hazardous 
position of religious authorities, divining Chan Buddhists’ true motives and judging them 
to be nothing but Devadattas or wild foxes who cunningly fake buddhahood for personal 
gain. Perhaps more importantly, however, it prematurely—and by means of an overly 
simplistic theory of agency—forecloses a number of analytical avenues that might be 
taken to explore the historical, religious, and cultural problems raised by Chan. Instead 
                                                
96 Silverstein, “Fabrication, Verification, Authentication,” 2. 
 
97 The most vocal advocate for reading Chan texts with a strong hermeneutic of suspicion is Alan 
Cole; see his Fathering Your Father and Patriarchs on Paper. 
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we might follow Latour in viewing action, authorship, and authority “as a node, a knot, 
and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly 
disentangled.”98 The point again is not simply to conclude that Chan’s claim to 
buddhahood is “socially constructed” and therefore “not real,” because as Latour 
suggests, “the social” is not a given fact with which we can explain away problems but 
precisely itself a conglomeration of agencies that needs to be untangled. The point rather 
is to trace, in as open-ended a manner as possible, the threads of these intersecting 
agencies—threads that sewed together (but also sometimes tore apart) categorical 
metaphysics and figurative resemblance, individuals and institutions, social life and 




This dissertation consists of this introductory chapter and five subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2, “Signs of Authority and the ‘Marks of the Great Man,’” explores the canonical 
Buddhist notion that a buddha possesses bodily “marks of the great man,” and the place 
of these marks in the constitution of Chan identity and authority. Although many Chan 
Buddhists vigorously critiqued the capacity of marks or signs to represent buddhahood, in 
this chapter I show that they nevertheless relied on canonical tropes of buddhahood—
including the figure of the heroic “great man” itself—in claiming an institutional identity 
as fully-realized buddhas. I pay special attention to one particular “mark of the great man,” 
the crown-mark or uṣṇīṣa, which was traditionally understood to be invisible to ordinary 
human beings. I argue that this property of invisibility not only symbolized the Buddha’s 
                                                
98 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 44. 
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ultimate transcendence of form, but also stood for his authority, as many canonical 
scriptures describe it as invisible not because it is impossible to see it, but because it is 
forbidden by karmic law on penalty of death to go above the Buddha and look at the top 
of his head. With this in mind, I analyze records of Chan masters performing the ritual 
“ascending the hall” ceremony during which their authority as buddhas is challenged on 
the grounds that they lack the canonical marks of buddhahood. I explore how Chan 
masters faced with such interrogations utilized the notion of the uṣṇīṣa’s invisibility and 
the doctrinal metaphysics of universal buddha-nature to justify their particular authority, 
with varying degrees of success. 
 Chapter 3, “The Heroic ‘Great Man,’” examines how Chan Buddhists used the 
figure of the “great man” to model the ideal Chan master’s heroic stature. This term, 
which had both canonical Buddhist and indigenous Chinese precedents, allowed Chan 
Buddhists to distance themselves from the longstanding notion that Chan was a tradition 
whose authority was grounded in expertise in meditation. Instead, they used the “great 
man” to demonstrate their equivalence to buddhas as well as their commensurable status 
with the “great men” of Chinese lore: loyal ministers and valiant warriors. The Chan 
Buddhist “great man” came to be most typically characterized in terms associated with 
martial heroism, resulting in a nexus of tropes that normatively defined the ideal Chan 
master as brave, decisive, and fearless. This connection was used by certain Chan 
Buddhists to suggest that the enlightened authority of Chan masters was capable of 
ensuring the emperor’s hegemonic sovereignty across the land.  
 Chapter 4, “Buddhahood, Sovereignty, and the Chan Master,” considers how 
Chan Buddhists’ uses of the figure of the “great man” preserved canonical Buddhist 
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connections between buddhahood and kingship, exceeding the term’s Chinese 
associations with loyal service to the state. This chapter begins by exploring various ways 
Chan Buddhists articulated a normative ideal of the master as cosmic sovereign, and then 
turns to Chan understandings of liberation as entailing a kind of spiritual battle for the 
crown of buddhahood. I analyze cases in which the notion that Chan encounter dialogues 
stage battles—not merely of wits but of authority—was discussed within the dialogues 
themselves, and then explore the way commentarial collections of “public cases” like 
Yuanwu Keqin’s Biyan lu evaluated participants in encounter dialogues according to the 
same logic of battle, trying to discern the victor. 
 Chapter 5, “The Consistency of a ‘Great Man,’” explores how the Chan 
tradition’s normative models of selfhood reflect and expand the notion that Chan masters 
ought to be cosmic sovereigns discussed in the previous chapter. In the discourse records 
of Chan masters like Linji Yixuan and Deshan Xuanjian, attributed to Tang-dynasty 
figures but written and edited over the early decades of the Song dynasty, we find a 
vision of liberation as entailing the realization of a sovereign self: a mode of subjectivity 
in perfect command over circumstances, social interactions, and mental disturbances 
alike. This results in an ethos of radical self-reliance and total independence of outside 
influence. Anyone unable to attain such sovereignty of mind, Linji and Deshan warn—
anyone who listens to or relies on others while walking the path to liberation—is in truth 
nothing more than a ghost. Ghosthood, in turn, is not only a risk to oneself, but to the 
community, as ghosts who think they are buddhas have the capacity to mislead others—a 
state best encapsulated by the trope of the “wild fox.” Wild foxes, normatively gendered 
female, were understood in Chinese folklore to assume human form in order to bewitch 
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and seduce unsuspecting men. The chapter concludes by examining the gendered 
implications of the trope of the “great man” and its opposite, the female-gendered “wild 
fox.” 
 Chapter 6, “Farming, Rusticity, and the Chan Work Ethic,” analyzes the notion of 
“farming Chan” (nongchan) legendarily invented by Baizhang Huaihai, according to 
which the Chan tradition was said to have pioneered a model of self-sufficient 
monasticism in which everyone participated in routine communal labor in the fields. In 
light of recent scholarship showing this notion to be legend rather than historical fact, I 
explore how the myth of “farming Chan” served the rhetorical purpose of articulating a 
novel attitude toward productivity and idleness, which assisted in the formation of Chan 
identity as a lineage of industrious hard-workers rather than “idle” meditators. During a 
time of dramatic population growth and increasing demands for agricultural productivity, 
I argue that the discourse of “farming Chan” broke ranks with a longstanding logic of 
exchange according to which Buddhists received donations in order to generate “fields of 
merit” through their religious activity. According to “farming Chan,” monastics should 
learn to multitask, producing both merit and literal crops. The legend of “farming Chan,” 
I suggest, emerged alongside Chan sermons warning Buddhist aspirants that if they failed 
to gain enlightenment, the day would come when they would have to pay for the donated 
food they had eaten, the sandals they wore—in short, to pay their debts, if not voluntarily 
then by force through the mechanism of karma. I situate this analysis in the broader 
context of what I call Chan Buddhism’s “rhetoric of rusticity,” which built on the early 
example of the Sixth Patriarch Huineng to identify Chan masters generally as humble 
rustics whose simplicity of spirit granted them special access to Buddhist insight. I argue 
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that the rhetoric of rusticity allowed Chan Buddhists to render their identity 
commensurable with Song-dynasty literati, as both groups used shared conventions of 
poetry, literary prose, and visual culture to cast their own cultural authenticity in terms of 




Signs of Authority and the “Marks of the Great Man” 
 
I am the great painter with the divine brush, Lu Zhen! Whether it be the heavenly 
spirits above or the ghostly souls below, from the Queen Mother of the West to 
the ox-headed and horse-faced attendants in hell—not to speak of emperors, 
generals, and ministers; ladies and scholars; and even the playthings stashed away 
in the crown prince’s palace—I portray them with subtle perfection. It’s only the 
buddha-patriarch Bodhidharma, who came from the West, that I have not yet 
painted; nor do I know whether his earlobes really touched his shoulders, or 
whether a long horn grew from his forehead. Fortunately, no one has ever seen 
him with their own eyes anyway. 
— Gao Xingjian ⾼高⾏行健, Snow in August (Bayue xue ⼋八月雪)1 
 
 
What would a mark be that could not be cited? Or one whose origins would not 
get lost along the way? 
— Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context”2 
 
 
What does a Chinese buddha look like? By what signs can one be recognized? According 
to canonical Buddhist scriptures, one knew the Buddha Śākyamuni was really who he 
said he was—a buddha—because, if nothing else, his body indisputably possessed the 
“marks of the great man,” allowing even skeptics to verify his identity. This was no small 
matter, because the Buddha claimed superiority over all the gods of his time, who, 
according to his hagiography, immediately comprehended their newly subordinate status 
and worshipped him from the moment he was born. In China between the eighth and 
eleventh centuries, Chan Buddhists began to suggest that they too were superior to all 
                                                
1 神筆⼤大畫師盧珍是也！上⾄至天神，下⾄至鬼魂，從王母娘娘到⽜牛頭馬面，更別說帝王將相，閨
閣書房，乃⾄至春宮秘藏的那點玩意，老夫筆下可都毫髮畢露，維妙維肖。唯獨尚未畫過西天來
的佛祖達摩，也不知是不是耳垂抵肩？還是額頭上長角？好在誰也不曾親眼見過。 Gao, Bayue 
xue, 19. 
 
2 In Limited Inc, 12. 
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their peers, being not merely eminent monastics but “great men” holding the authority of 
living buddhas. How, then, did they understand the “marks of the great man” to figure 
into their claims to buddhahood? What role did this canonical sign-system play in the 
Chan tradition’s rise to dominance of Song-dynasty Buddhist monastic culture? 
 In this chapter we will explore how, despite regularly criticizing the capacity of 
marks—and the “marks of the great man” in particular—to represent buddhahood, Chan 
Buddhists nevertheless relied on these and other sign-systems to demonstrate their 
possession of special religious authority. In the Tang period, hagiographical literature 
often described eminent monks as bearing on their bodies one or more of the canonical 
Buddhist “marks of the great man,” as well as various indigenous Chinese tropes of 
unusual sagely appearance, which served to visibly demonstrate their extraordinary 
character. Chan Buddhists in the Tang were no exception to this trend, and famous Chan 
masters like Mazu Daoyi were described as possessing buddha-marks such as wheel-
marks on the soles of the feet and an exceptionally long tongue. 
 In the Song period, however, the medieval hagiographical practice of attributing 
one or several buddha-marks to eminent figures seems to have lost its power to 
straightforwardly demonstrate outstanding character and special religious authority for 
Chan Buddhists. Instead, the “marks of the great man” began to be treated ironically, as 
signs manifestly not possessed by Chan masters, despite their claims to buddhahood. 
Indeed, navigating the inherent tension in this position through clever wordplay became 
itself a way for Chan masters to demonstrate their authority. At the same time, the marks 
nevertheless hung in the air, continuing to surface in encounter dialogues and other 
contexts. Why did they not simply disappear? Did not Chan Buddhists, after all, 
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completely banish such old-fashioned notions from their teachings? Not exactly, for in 
claiming to be buddhas and “great men” they continually called forth the canonical tropes 
associated with buddhahood, which required constant attention and interpretation in order 
to work out exactly how Chan mastery ought to resemble canonical buddhahood, and 
how it might differ. 
 One among the buddha-marks turned out to be particularly important during this 
period of transition: the uṣṇīṣa or “crown-mark.” The uṣṇīṣa was often understood in 
canonical Buddhist literature to be invisible, which made it easy for Chan Buddhists to 
reinterpret its meaning as coextensive with the entire universe, operating in the same 
manner as the metaphysical buddhahood we have considered in the Introduction. This 
invisibility also meant it was perhaps the only canonical mark that Song-dynasty Chan 
masters could claim to literally possess without needing to demonstrate its presence on 
their bodies. Yet the uṣṇīṣa’s invisibility was not only a metaphysical property, but also a 
function of its status as the locus of the Buddha’s authority and position at the uppermost 
point of his body, indiscernible because all beings stand below the Buddha both literally 
and figuratively. The uṣṇīṣa was thus central to Song-dynasty Chan in part because it 
resided at the intersection of metaphysical and personal understandings of buddhahood, 
of universal liberation and individual authority—precisely the crossroads where the Chan 
tradition made its home. 
 
Great men with unusual bodies: Huangbo Xiyun and the “marks of the great man” 
in Tang-dynasty Chan 
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The Chan tradition is well known for its criticism of the capacity of any and all signs or 
marks (xiang 相) to represent buddhahood, emphasizing instead the soteriological power 
of a metaphysical buddhahood that is signless and ineffable. An illustrative example can 
be found in the recorded teachings of Chan master Huangbo Xiyun 黄檗希運 (d. 850), 
whose Chuanxin fayao 傳⼼心法要 (Dharma-essentials of the Transmission of Mind) and 
Wanling lu 宛陵錄 (Record of Wanling)—which anticipate the mature Chan discourse 
records (yulu 語錄) that proliferated several centuries later in the Song period, but differ 
from these considerably in style—are among the only such records of a mid- to late-
Tang-dynasty Chan master datable to a period closely following the master’s death.3 In 
one of his recorded sermons, we find Huangbo preaching that ultimately neither the 
Buddha nor sentient beings exist. An interlocutor remarks: “The thirty-two marks [of the 
Buddha] and the salvation of sentient beings manifestly exist. How can you say they do 
not?” Huangbo replies: “All existing marks are empty delusions. If you view all marks as 
non-marks, [only] then will you see the Thus-Come One [i.e. the Buddha].”4 Huangbo’s 
response reverses the notion found in many canonical Buddhist scriptures that it is 
precisely by means of the “marks of the great man” that one can recognize and 
authenticate the status of a buddha. Instead, Huangbo suggests, because all marks—the 
“marks of the great man” included—are nothing but “empty delusions,” it is only by 
effacing them altogether, seeing them as “non-marks,” that one can truly see the Buddha. 
                                                
3 See Wright, “The Huang-po Literature.” 
 
4 云：「現有三⼗十⼆二相及度眾⽣生；何得⾔言無？」師云：「凡所有相皆是虛妄。若見諸相非相，




 But these words are not Huangbo’s own. They are a direct but unattributed 
quotation from Kumārajīva’s translation of the Diamond Sūtra (Jin’gang jing ⾦金剛經),5 a 
scripture famously beloved by Chan Buddhists ever since the sixth patriarch Huineng was 
said to have attained sudden enlightenment upon hearing it preached. Indeed, a 
commentary on the Diamond Sūtra called the Jin’gang jing jieyi ⾦金剛經解義 and 
attributed to Huineng, but likely actually written in the late-8th or early-9th century, had 
already singled out this particular passage for special attention even before Huangbo 
alluded to it.6 At first glance, then, Huangbo’s critique of the capacity of the canonical 
thirty-two “marks of the great man” to signify buddhahood seems coherent, harmonious 
with the broader identity of Chan that had begun to emerge by the mid-Tang, and firmly 
grounded in Mahāyāna scriptural tradition. 
 Yet the situation was never so simple as this. Introducing the other collection of 
Huangbo’s teachings, his patron and lay disciple Pei Xiu 裴休 (797–870/1) sums up the 
master’s charisma and celebrity in the following terms: “Disciples from all four 
directions hurried to [Huangbo’s] mountain, and, viewing his marks [of buddhahood], 
                                                
5 Jin’gang bore boluomi jing ⾦金剛般若波羅蜜經, T. no. 235, 8: 749a24–25. Alan Cole has read this 
line as participating in what he considers the Diamond Sūtra’s attempts to wrestle authority away from 
the person of the Buddha and invest it in the Diamond Sūtra itself; see Cole, Text as Father, 179–80. 
 
6 Jin’gang jing jieyi, X. no. 459, 24: 533a23–b3. On the dating of this text, see Takeuchi, “Enō sen 
‘Kongōkyō kaigi’”; and Ibuki, “‘Kongōkyō kaigi’ no seiritsu.” Relatedly, Huineng is also associated 
with the notion of “formless precepts” (according to the standard translation, but more literally 
“markless” or “signless” precepts, wuxiang jie 無相戒), discussed in the Platform Sūtra; see Groner, 
“The Formless Precepts.” In Buddhist translations the Chinese term wuxiang usually renders Sanskrit 
animitta, “marklessness” or “signlessness,” a classic explanation of which can be found in Huiyuan’s 
慧遠 (334–416) Dasheng yi zhang ⼤大乘義章: “What is called ‘marklessness’ has two explanations. 
The first is as a manifest name for principle (li 理). Principle cuts off all marks; thus it is called 
‘markless.’ The second is as an explanation for the dharma-mark of nirvāṇa. The dharma of nirvāṇa 
abandons and departs from the ten marks; thus it is called ‘markless.’” ⾔言無相者，釋有兩義。⼀一就
理彰名。理絕眾相，故名無相。⼆二就涅槃法相解釋。涅槃之法，捨離⼗十相，故曰無相。 
Dasheng yizhang, T. no. 1851, 44: 488c24–27. 
 
 68 
attained enlightenment (duxiang er wu 覩相⽽而悟).”7 This final expression is adapted 
from canonical descriptions of onlookers viewing the Buddha’s “marks of the great man” 
and spontaneously giving rise to faith, comprehension, or the aspiration to attain 
buddhahood themselves.8 Here, prefacing the discourse record of a Chan master, it 
suggests that Huangbo’s body also featured the canonical “marks of the great man” to 
similarly powerful soteriological effect. 
 Of course, this expression operates as a trope for succinctly conveying that 
Huangbo’s teaching was on par with that of any canonical buddha. We have already seen 
in the Introduction that well before Huangbo’s time, the Platform Sūtra already portrayed 
the Sixth Patriarch Huineng as a buddha. At first consideration, then, this claim does not 
necessarily seem radical. But Pei Xiu’s reference to Huangbo’s possession of the “marks 
of the great man” is also more than a simple metaphor, as Huangbo went on to be 
remembered for literally possessing an extraordinary bodily appearance. The Patriarchs’ 
Hall Collection (Zutang ji 祖堂集) of 952, for example, reports that he was “seven chi 
(roughly equivalent to feet) in height, with a flesh-pearl on his forehead, open by nature 
and not bound by trifles.”9 His hagiography in the Song-era Biographies of Eminent 
Monks (Song gaoseng zhuan 宋⾼高僧傳) similarly relates that he was “only one chi 
                                                
7 四⽅方學徒望⼭山⽽而趨，覩相⽽而悟。 Huangbo Duanji chanshi chuanxin fayao, T. no. 2012A, 48: 
379c4–5; Iriya, Denshin hōyō, 3. 
 
8 On the theme of viewers seeing the marks and giving rise to faith in Buddhism, see Boucher, 
Bodhisattvas of the Forest, 5–12. On the particular phrase “viewing the marks” (duxiang) being used 
in canonical Buddhist literature to describe experts in physiognomy viewing a buddha’s bodily marks 
and predicting his future attainment of complete buddhahood, see Da baoji jing, T. no. 310, 11: 
317b2–5; and Shijia shipu, T. no. 2041, 50: 89c29. For other examples of soteriologically powerful 
responses to viewing a buddha’s bodily marks, see for example Kuiji’s 窥基 (632–682) Amituo jing 
tongzan shu, T. no. 1758, 37: 336b28–c4; and ibid., 341b21–23. 
 
9 身長七尺，額有⾁肉珠，閌閬天⽣生，不拘小節。 Zutang ji, j. 16, v. 2, 729. 
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shorter than Wang Shang 王商 in height, marked by a flesh-pearl protruding from the 
middle of his forehead, noble and unbridled; people could not easily fathom [his 
depths].”10 The Wang Shang (d. 13 CE) mentioned here was a Western Han official who, 
as Herbert Giles writes, “was 8 feet [chi] in height, and of such martial appearance as to 
strike terror into the heart of the Khan of the Hsiung-nu, who had come to Court.”11 As 
we will see in Chapter 3, the comparison of Huangbo’s robust stature to that of a Han-
dynasty hero was perhaps not incidental, but heralded an emerging discourse of Chan 
heroism that drew upon indigenous Chinese tropes and examples of martial prowess and 
resolute determination, with a marked preference for the illustrious examples provided by 
Han military heroes.12 Nor is it a coincidence that Huangbo is described as being noble, 
unfettered, and lacking concern for trivialities, as these would also become defining 
features of the Chan tradition’s reiteration of the ideal “great man” (da zhangfu ⼤大丈夫). 
Suffice it for now instead to focus on Huangbo’s other unusual bodily feature 
besides his height: the “flesh-pearl” (rouzhen ⾁肉珠) on his forehead. What is a flesh-
pearl? The term has no obvious direct precedent, but it evokes several canonical Buddhist 
associations. On the one hand, it seems to be an amalgamation of two of the Buddha’s 
thirty-two marks: a white tuft of hair between the eyebrows often said to be coiled in such 
a way as to resemble a pearl (zhenzhu 真珠), and a protuberance on top of the head (Skt. 
                                                
10 身量減王商裁⼀一尺所，額間隆起號為⾁肉珠，然倜儻不羈，⼈人莫輕測。 Song gaoseng zhuan, T. 
no. 2061, 50: 842b29–c1. 
 
11 Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary, 837; see also Hanshu, j. 82, v. 10, 3370. 
 
12 Of course, texts associated with “early Chan”—a very broad designation—are hardly univocal on 
these issues. For a counterexample, the third patriarch Sengcan was described in various Tang and 
Song materials as being afflicted with a serious and visible bodily illness, but was nevertheless 




uṣṇīṣa; C. dingxiang 頂相), sometimes called in Chinese a “fleshly hair-bun” (rouji ⾁肉髻
), to which we will return below.13 On the other hand, however, Huangbo’s flesh-pearl 
has another important reference point, namely the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra’s 
parable of the “forehead-pearl” (e’zhu 額珠). In this story, a heroic strongman (da lishi 
⼤大⼒力⼠士) in residence at a royal palace and wearing a decorative “adamantine pearl” (jin’
gang zhu ⾦金剛珠) on his forehead is struck by a strong blow while engaging in a 
competition of strength, and the pearl enters into his body. Not knowing where in his 
body the pearl has gone, the strongman panics. But a doctor tells him not to worry, 
because although the pearl is beneath his skin, it is still visible. When the strongman does 
not believe him, the doctor holds up a mirror and the strongman sees that the pearl, 
despite having sunk under the skin, is indeed radiantly visible on his forehead. Having 
narrated this parable of the strongman, the Buddha then explains its soteriological 
meaning: the strongman represents sentient beings who have forgotten the pearl-like 
buddha-nature residing within themselves, and the doctor represents the Buddha who 
holds up the mirror of wisdom that allows them to recognize it.14 
Huangbo himself seems to have been familiar with this parable, and it is cited in 
one of his recorded sermons: 
Realizing the Way entails simply realizing one’s fundamental mind-
buddha. Eons of diligent effort [as opposed to instantaneous realization] 
                                                
13 See, for example, the Chang ahan jing, which says: “The thirty-first [buddha-mark] is a tuft of 
white hair between the eyebrows, which is soft, thin, and lustrous. When pulled it is a single long 
strand, but when let go it forms a rightward spiral that resembles a pearl. The thirty-second [mark] is a 
flesh-coil on the crown of the head.” 三⼗十⼀一、眉間白毫柔軟細澤，引長⼀一尋，放則右旋螺如真珠。
三⼗十⼆二、頂有⾁肉髻。 T. no. 1, 1: 5b16–18. 
 
14 Da banniepan jing, T. no. 374, 12: 408a9–b12. For a complete English translation, see Blum, The 
Nirvana Sutra, 230–31. 
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are [thus] cultivated in vain. It is like the strongman attaining the pearl: he 
has simply attained a pearl already in his forehead. It is unrelated to [any 
kind of] strength in seeking outside oneself.15 
 
Yet although the original story is explicitly framed as a parable—the particularity of its 
protagonist being a strongman merely incidental—and though Huangbo himself seems to 
have understood it as such, the reception of Huangbo’s legacy apparently took the story 
as inspiration for the idea that a heroic Chan master might really have a flesh-pearl 
protruding from the forehead and offering a visible sign of spiritual excellence, turning 
the image into a kind of apocryphal buddha-mark.16 The fact that this apocryphal mark 
was connected in particular to a parable about a physically brawny strongman— 
notwithstanding Huangbo’s claim that the parable’s true meaning is “unrelated to [any 
kind of] strength in seeking outside oneself”—emblematizes the slippery relationship in 
Chan between parable, trope, and normative model. As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, 
the boundary separating “inner” from “outer” strength was always porous. 
Huangbo’s case is hardly unusual. Many hagiographies of legendary Chan 
masters from the Tang describe them as possessing one or more of the buddha-marks, or 
other similar extraordinary features.17 To begin with, exceptional height was an 
extremely common hallmark attributed to eminent monks. Chan master Shenxiu 神秀 
                                                
15 證道時秖證本⼼心佛。歷劫功用並是虛修。如⼒力⼠士得珠時，秖得本額珠，不關向外求覓之⼒力。 
T. no. 2012A, 48: 380c16–18; Iriya, Denshin hōyō, 20. 
 
16 This legend retained currency well into the Song period, as attested for example by reference to it in 
the writings of Yuanwu Keqin 圓悟克勤 (1063–1135). Besides mentioning Huangbo’s height and 
forehead-pearl, Yuanwu adds that “the radiance of his eyes penetrated [other] people” (muguang she 
ren 目光射⼈人) and “he had quite unusual features (or marks)” (po you yixiang 頗有異相); see Foguo 
Yuanwu Chanshi Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 151b18–20. 
 
17 They also include other tropes attesting to the person’s extraordinary religious attainment, such as 
the phenomenon of an unusual (pleasant) smell in the air upon their death; see Funayama, “Seijakan 
no ni keitō,” 398–404. 
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(605–706), who came to be associated with the “Northern School” of Chan—to give just 
one of countless examples—was said in certain hagiographical accounts to have been 
eight chi in height, even taller than Huangbo.18 But most famous is Chan master Mazu 
Daoyi 馬祖道⼀一 (709–788), later considered founder of the Hongzhou 洪州 school of 
Chan, who was remembered as possessing “the gaze of a tiger and the gait of a bull, with 
[the buddha-marks of] a tongue that could reach past the tip of his nose and large 
characters inscribed on the soles of his feet.” Ironically, the same hagiographical text 
continues on to register the apparent contradiction between this description of Mazu’s 
unusual body and the Chan tradition’s official doctrinal stance on the unreality of marks, 
but to nevertheless insist on Mazu’s truly extraordinary bodily appearance: “Although the 
sense faculties and the objects perceived by them are [ultimately] identical with the 
dharma-essence, still his physical appearance was exceptional and unlike other illusory 
bodies.”19 
These descriptions of Chan masters’ unusual bodily features were typical of 
medieval Chinese hagiography, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike. Indeed, as scholars like 
Zhang Yuan 張遠 and others have observed, the system of the Buddha’s “marks of the 
great man” bears a strong resemblance to indigenous Chinese traditions dating to 
antiquity according to which “sages”—a category that, like the Indian “great man,” 
straddled kingship and religious eminence in complex ways—possess an “unusual 
                                                
18 Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2061, 50: 756a19–20. 
 
19 虎視⽜牛⾏行，舌過鼻準，⾜足⽂文⼤大字。根塵雖同於法體，相表特異於幻形。 Ibid., T. no. 2061, 50: 
766a15–17; translation adapted from Poceski, The Records of Mazu, 260. In contrast with the 
specificity of many of these descriptions, one of Mazu’s disciples named Zhenshu 甄叔 (d. 820) was 
said more generically to have “possessed the marks of the great man” (ju daren xiang 具⼤大⼈人相); 
Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2061, 50: 770b21–23. 
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appearance” (shengren yixiang 聖⼈人異相).20 Medieval Chinese Buddhists themselves 
recognized the similarity between the two sign-systems, as attested by the seventh-
century Guang hongming ji’s 廣弘明集 explicit comparison of the “Middle Kingdom’s 
marks of the sage” (Zhongguo shengren zhi xiang 中國聖⼈人之相) and the “Western 
region’s marks of a buddha” (Xiyu fotuo zhi xiang 西域佛陀之相).21 Little wonder then 
that Chinese Buddhist hagiographies routinely combined or conflated the two, as for 
example when the fifth Chan patriarch Hongren 弘忍 (602–675) was said from at least 
the Song dynasty to have possessed both the “marks of the sage” (shengren zhi xiang 聖
⼈人之相) and the “marks of the great man” (daren xiang ⼤大⼈人相).22 
Even more telling is a combination of unusual bodily features found in 
hagiographies of three different Chan masters, namely Yefang 業⽅方 (668–766), 
Daochang Rune 道場如訥 (fl. ca. 10th c.), and Zhuo Yanming 卓巖明 (fl. ca. 10th c.), all 
said to have possessed not only the canonical buddha-mark of “arms extending down past 
the knees” (chuishou guo xi 垂⼿手過膝), but also the “eyes with double-pupils” (mu you 
chongtong 目有重瞳) legendarily attributed to the ancient Chinese sage-king Shun 舜.23 
                                                
20 See Zhang, “Fotuo sanshi’er xiang.” 
 
21 Guang hongming ji, T. no. 2103, 52: 177b3–7. 
 
22 Chuanfa zhengzong ji, T. no. 2078, 51: 746b3–7. 
 
23 For Yefang, see Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2061, 50: 873a6–9; for Daochang Rune, see Jingde 
chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 320b17–18; for Zhuo Yanming, see Brose, Patrons and Patriarchs, 48. 
Brose adds: “Portents aside, this confluence of authority was far from auspicious. Zhuo was little more 
than a pawn in [the kingdom of] Min’s brutal political endgame; he was assassinated after just two 
months on the throne, his erstwhile kingdom vanquished less than two years later. The events 
surrounding the life and death of Zhuo Yanming exemplify the blurred boundaries delineating the 
saṃgha and the state in the kingdom of Min” (ibid.). For discussion of Shun’s double-pupils in early 
Chinese materials, see for example Shiji, j. 7, v. 1, 338. Other monks said to have possessed “arms that 
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As for monks outside of Chan circles, we find it said that the famous Huisi 慧思 (515–
577), teacher of Tiantai Zhiyi 天台智顗 (539–598), had “the gait of a bull and the gaze of 
an elephant, with a fleshly hair-coil (uṣṇīṣa) on his crown, his unusual appearance stately 
and dignified.”24 Of Niutou Farong ⽜牛頭法融 (594–657) we are told: “His head was 
massive, swelling up [steep as] the Five Sacred Peaks, his countenance long and broad, 
his forehead thick and flat. He had the gait of a tortoise and the gaze of a crane.”25 
Sengyuan 僧淵 (519–602) possessed “a countenance as smooth as jade and a body like 
red bronze… with [buddha-]marks of wheels on the soles of both feet.”26 Baoqiong 寶瓊 
(504–584) had “dragon-writing on his shoulder blade and thirty-nine teeth in his 
mouth.”27 Fayuan’s 法圓 (900–973) “body and face had a purple hue, his eyebrows grew 
down below his eyes, his moustache and temple hair was [as fine as though it were] 
                                                                                                                                            
reached past the knees” include Tanyan 曇延 (516–588) (Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2060, 50: 488a09); 
and Huikuan 惠寬 (584–653) (Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2060, 50: 600c10). 
 
24 ⽜牛⾏行象視，頂有⾁肉髻，異相莊嚴。 Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2060, 50: 564a05. Other Tang-
period monks said to have had an uṣṇīṣa include Daowu 道悟 (748–807); Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 
2060, 50: 769c21–22. 
 
25 頭顱巨⼤大，五岳隆起，眉目長廣，顙頰濃張，龜⾏行鶴視。 Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2060, 50: 
605a29–30. The broad forehead is reminiscent of popular descriptions of Laozi; see for example 
Campany, To Live as Long, 199. 
 
26 容⾊色⽟玉潤，狀若赤銅 … 兩⾜足輪相。 Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2060, 50: 574b13–14. On the 
importance of a jade-like countenance to early Chinese “material virtue” ethics, see Csikszentmihalyi, 
Material Virtue, 127–30; and Yang, Rujia shenti guan, 189–90. 
 
27 背胛龍⽂文，⼝口三⼗十九⿒齒。Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2060, 50: 478c9–10. According to 
physiognomy texts found at Dunhuang, extra teeth were considered a sign of nobility; see Wang, 
Dunhuang xieben xiangshu, 207. 
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penciled in, the hair dark purple and spiraling, his lips red and glossy, his teeth fine and 
delicate.”28 
If hagiographies of Buddhist monks adopted this colorful repertoire of unusual 
bodily marks from indigenous Chinese culture to supplement the canonical “marks of the 
great man” in bolstering their claim to exemplary status, we also find canonical buddha-
marks ascribed to secular rulers in various official histories of the Six Dynasties (222–
589), as Ji Xianlin 季羡林 has shown.29 Furthermore, as Wang Jingbo 王晶波 has 
demonstrated, certain buddha-marks are also found in medieval Chinese manuals of 
physiognomy intended for popular use and recovered at Dunhuang.30 A particularly 
illustrative case not mentioned by these scholars of the ease with which bodily marks 
signaling extraordinary character moved multidirectionally between Buddhist and non-
Buddhist traditions in medieval China is the legend of an array of moles adorning an 
exemplary person’s chest and resembling the Northern Dipper constellation. This 
extraordinary bodily feature was attributed to Yu the Great (Da Yu ⼤大禹), a legendary 
sage-king of early Chinese antiquity, in Han-dynasty “weft texts” (weishu 緯書).31 By the 
sixth century we find hagiographies of Yu that not only elaborate on this description, but 
also incorporate the buddha-mark of “arms reaching the knees” into their description of 
                                                
28 形貌紫⾊色，眉長過目，髭鬢如畫，髮紺⽽而螺旋，脣紅潤⿒齒密緻。 Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 
2061, 50: 853c6–7. It is interesting to observe that Fayuan’s hair that looks penciled-in, as well as 
Baoqiang’s body like red bronze, suggest an association with the appearance of Buddhist statuary. 
 
29 Ji, “Sanguo Liang Jin Nanbeichao.” 
 
30 Wang, Dunhuang xieben xiangshu, 271–74. 
 
31 See Yasui and Nakamura, Weishu jicheng, v. 2, 779. The feature of moles on the chest resembling 




Yu’s unusual body.32 The tradition of auspicious moles found on the chest, which came 
eventually to be known by the shorthand “dipper-chest” (douxiong ⽃斗胸), in turn went on 
to be sufficiently influential that the Chan monk Daoqian 道潛 (d. 961) too was said to 
have “a chest with seven moles resembling the net of the dipper.”33 
All of this demonstrates that the attribution of extraordinary bodily features to 
eminent individuals as one way (among many others) of justifying claims to special 
religious and/or political authority was perfectly common in medieval China, and thus 
constituted one example among many of the ways that the Chan tradition during the 
centuries of its first emergence remained deeply embedded in broader medieval Chinese 
culture.34 This, again, might seem a dilution of the Chan tradition’s fierce criticism of all 
marks, and by extension of the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) genre of 
                                                
32 See Jinlouzi, j. 1: 6b, 797. 
 
33 胸前黒⼦子七點若⽃斗之綱魁焉。 Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 2061, 50: 788c10. 
 
34 Commenting on the unusual bodily features attributed to Tang-dynasty Chan masters like Mazu and 
Huangbo, Albert Welter writes: “The purpose of such descriptions is to call attention to the Chan 
master as a new kind of figure, a hero (or antihero) whose physical attributes are an indication of the 
novel style they represent. … This is not a new phenomenon in Buddhism. The depiction of a Buddha 
as possessing certain kinds of physical marks and features is a precursor to this. The Chan master as a 
new kind of Buddha exhibits marked characteristics, some of which (forehead protuberance and wheel 
insignias on the soles of the feet) are directly borrowed from established precedent. Others, however, 
seem distinctly designed to suggest the Chan master as a novel Buddhist hero.” Welter, The Linji lu, 
138–39. Welter’s point is well taken and in certain ways anticipates my exploration of the ways Chan 
Buddhists depicted the tradition’s masters as new kinds of buddhas and novel Buddhist heroes suited 
to a new era. But as I hope to have made clear, the attribution of a combination of Buddhist and 
indigenous Chinese “physiognomies of virtue” to Mazu and Huangbo demonstrate not Tang-dynasty 
Chan’s break with the past and invention of a new way of living, but rather the emerging tradition’s 
full participation in representational practices widespread in medieval China—shared by canonical 
Buddhist scriptures, theories of the sage from Chinese antiquity, and combinations of the two that 
proliferated in medieval China—focusing on the unusual bodies of exemplary figures to prove their 
special claim to religious and/or political authority. Even the “marks of the great man” attributed to 
the Buddha himself relied narratively upon non-Buddhist religious authorities to authenticate his 
unique status (although the tradition’s specific “marks of the great man” likely did not actually 
precede Buddhism historically). It is precisely the tensions inherent in this “paradox of exemplarity” 
that I explore in more detail in subsequent chapters and especially Chapter 6. 
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Mahāyāna Buddhist literature upon which it drew—if not a contradiction or hypocrisy 
then at least an unfortunate concession to popular demand for vivid and spectacular signs 
of extraordinary religious charisma. But we should pause before arriving at such a 
conclusion, not least because Perfection of Wisdom literature itself is inconsistent in its 
treatment of the “marks of the great man.” 
We have observed that Huangbo’s criticism of the “marks of the great man” was a 
direct quotation from the Diamond Sūtra. Yet despite the Perfect of Wisdom’s reputation 
for systematic deconstruction, demonstrating through exhaustive argumentation that all 
categories and concepts lack independent substantial existence, we should not simply 
assume that the Perfect of Wisdom treated all categories with equal deconstructive 
attention. Indeed, it turns out that the buddha-marks were usually safe from the Perfection 
of Wisdom’s critique, likely because these marks were still needed to attest to the power 
and veracity of the Perfection of Wisdom teaching itself. To give just one example, a 
chapter of one of the major Perfection of Wisdom texts, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra 
translated by Xuanzang ⽞玄奘 (602–664), entitled “Chapter on Revealing the Tongue-
Mark” (Xian shexiang pin 現舌相品) opens as follows: 
At that time, the World-Honored One revealed his broad and long tongue 
mark, which pervasively covered the great trichiliocosm. Then from the 
tongue mark there emitted a radiance of innumerable, countless colors, 
which universally illuminated buddha-realms as numerous as sands in the 
Ganges in all the ten directions.35 
 
This wondrous manifestation, we’re then told, caused bodhisattvas and mahasattvas in 
these myriad worlds to thereupon come to pay homage to the Buddha and hear him 
                                                
35 爾時，世尊現廣長舌相，遍覆三千⼤大千世界，復從舌相出無量無數種種⾊色光，普照⼗十⽅方殑伽
沙等諸佛世界。 Da bore boluomiduo jing, T. no. 220, 5: 53, b26–28. 
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preach on the Perfection of Wisdom. This refrain is in turn repeated every few lines—in 
total ten more times—over the course of the chapter, and is not followed by a caveat that 
such marks should be treated as ultimately empty of inherent existence; instead, the 
marks simply stand as straightforward signs of the Buddha’s unique and unsurpassed 
religious authority. 
The Diamond Sūtra and its critique of the buddha-marks is thus exceptional rather 
than typical of Perfect of Wisdom literature—and Tang-dynasty Chan Buddhists knew it. 
This, I contend, was a major reason why in articulating their own critique of marks Chan 
Buddhists during the Tang sought to elevate this particular short scripture above all 
others in the first place. Evidence of such awareness on their part can be found, for 
example, in the aforementioned Chan commentary on the Diamond Sūtra, the Jin’gang 
jing jieyi attributed to Huineng but actually dating from the late-8th or early-9th centuries, 
which includes the following lines: 
The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra in six hundred fascicles was a teaching on 
buddha-nature given by the Thus-Come One to bodhisattvas and those 
who had attained [one of the four] fruits [of the lesser śrāvaka path]. But it 
still contains teachings of gradualism. Only the Diamond Sūtra offers 
teachings of the Great Vehicle, the Highest Vehicle. For this reason, in 
this [Diamond] Sūtra [the Buddha] first preaches about the four kinds of 
birth36 and the four marks37 [being empty], then says: “All existing marks 
are empty delusions. If you view all marks as non-marks, [only] then will 
you see the Thus-Come One.”38 
                                                
36 The “four kinds of birth” (sisheng 四⽣生) are respectively birth from egg (luansheng 卵⽣生), womb 
(taisheng 胎⽣生), moisture (shisheng 濕⽣生), and transformation (huasheng 化⽣生). 
 
37 There are several distinct categories of “four marks” (sixiang 四相), but probably most famous is 
that of birth (sheng ⽣生), old age (lao 老), illness (bing 病), and death (si 死), which collectively 








Chan Buddhists appreciated the Diamond Sūtra because it went further than any other 
canonical Buddhist scripture in criticizing the capacity of signs or marks to represent 
buddhahood.39 And yet, as we have seen, Tang-period hagiographical literature was also 
filled with descriptions of Chan masters’ unusual and extraordinary bodies. How can we 
explain the apparent contradiction? Again, we needn’t jump to the conclusion that the 
Chan tradition’s criticism of marks was trivial, hypocritical, or undertaken in bad faith—
or for that matter simply the reflection of a social distinction between sermonizing Chan 
masters who really “got it” and interloping lay compilers of hagiography like Pei Xiu 
who did not. Instead, I would like to suggest that it is a powerful testament to the 
irreducibility of marks, of visible signs of religious authority, that we find such 
widespread use of extraordinary bodily features offered as signs of exemplary 
achievement even in a tradition so dedicated to the critique of formalism as Chan. 
                                                
39 An apocryphal scripture composed in the early eighth century that was widely read by Chan 
Buddhists, the Lengyan jing 楞嚴經 or Śūraṃgama Sūtra, also contained a critique of Mahāyāna 
attitudes toward the marks. In that scripture, the Buddha’s disciple Ānanda is nearly seduced into 
breaking his vow of chastity, but is saved by the Buddha. In their ensuing conversation, the Buddha 
asks Ānanda to recall precisely what excellent characteristics (shengxiang 勝相) of the Buddhist 
teaching prompted his decision to become a monk and reject the deep bonds of conjugal love in the 
first place. Ānanda replies, “I saw the Thus-come One’s thirty-two marks, which were so surpassingly 
wondrous and extraordinary that his whole physique sparkled like precious stones. I often thought to 
myself that [a body with] these marks could not have been born from lustful desire. Why not? Because 
the energy (qi 氣) of desire is coarse and muddy. Putrid and foul sexual intercourse, with its disorderly 
mixing of pus and blood, cannot generate such an assemblage of surpassingly pure and wondrously 
bright purple-gold light [as the Buddha’s body]. For this reason I admired [the teaching], and had my 
head shaved [to become a monk] by the Buddha.” 阿難白佛：我見如來三⼗十⼆二相，勝妙殊絕，形
體映徹，猶如琉璃。常自思惟：此相非是欲愛所⽣生。何以故？欲氣麤濁，腥臊交遘，膿⾎血雜亂，
不能發⽣生勝淨妙明紫⾦金光聚。是以渴仰從佛剃落。 Da foding rulai miyin xiuzheng liaoyi zhu pusa 
wanxing shoulengyan jing, T. no. 945, 19: 106c23–27. While this reply is more or less in line with 
canonical Buddhist attitudes toward the buddha-marks, the Lengyan jing proceeds to ridicule 
Ānanda’s understanding of the Buddha’s body, which it deems symptomatic of an ongoing attachment 
to bodily form that has led directly to his susceptibility to sexual seduction. On this scripture see 
especially Mochizuki, Bukkyō kyōten, 493–509; and Benn, “Another Look.” For examples of Chan 
engagement with this scripture, see Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 180; and Suzuki, 
Tō-godai zenshū shi, 482–502. 
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 Perhaps it tells us something about the flexibility of Chan doctrine and its 
commitment to not growing attached even to revered teachings—or maybe it was merely 
because Chan Buddhists enjoyed being contrarian—that even this oft-repeated line from 
the Diamond Sūtra was eventually subject to a double negation that effectively returned 
to the original position, when Chan master Fayan Wenyi 法眼⽂文益 (885–958) reportedly 
commented: “If you view all marks as non-marks, then will you not see the Thus-Come 
One.”40 Yet this reversal also hints at the incapacity of such strict doctrinal positions to 
truly encompass the entirety of the Chan tradition’s relationship with signs of authority 
and exemplarity. It suggests that instead of being lulled into an easy certainty about Chan 
Buddhists’ stance (one way or the other) on the signifying and normative power of 
marks, we should keep looking at how signs and marks figured authority and modeled 
soteriology within the Chan tradition in powerful but shifting ways. 
 
Immanence, invisibility, and the uṣṇīṣa in Song-dynasty Chan 
 
It was not until the Song dynasty that cracks in the medieval paradigm of using 
extraordinary bodily appearance to straightforwardly signify special authority truly began 
to appear in Chan literature. Of course, Chan Buddhists did not stop being described as 
possessing literal “marks of the great man” altogether, though these attributions became 
less common and tended to focus primarily on the uṣṇīṣa—either ascribed to a living 
                                                
40 《⾦金剛般若經》：「凡所有相皆是虗妄。若見諸相非相，即見如來。」法眼云：「若見諸相
非相，即不見如來。」Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 502a18–20. As Wendi 
Adamek notes with respect to the Baotang 保唐 Chan movement in Sichuan during a similar period of 
the Tang: “The repeated breakdown of received form became a necessary part of Chan continuity and 
viability, thanks in no small part to artistic, literary, and doctrinal experimentation in ninth-century 
Sichuan.” Adamek, Mystique of Transmission, 260. 
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master or discovered among the master’s relics after cremation.41 More importantly, 
however, in the Song period the relationship between these signs and their supposed 
referents started to shift and assume new configurations. What happened to bring about 
such a change? This is a problem that will continue to surface over the course of this 
dissertation, but for now we can observe that in the dynamically changing social and 
technological world of Song China, in which collections of Chan masters’ recorded 
sayings could be printed and circulated in large numbers among monastics and laypeople 
with relative ease and speed, it seems to have become increasingly untenable to suggest 
that living Chinese Chan masters literally possessed these extraordinary marks. The lack 
of claim to extraordinary bodily appearance was, moreover, reinforced by the culture of 
realistic portraiture of Chan masters, whose conventions were virtually identical with 
those of secular portraiture of the same period.42 This suggests that any literal attribution 
of the “marks of the great man” to the bodies of Chan masters might have become not 
only infeasible but also aesthetically unfashionable. 
The Chan tradition’s reorientation of attitudes toward the buddha-marks was often 
playful. Perhaps its best-known mode of expression is the recurring identification of the 
person of the Buddha or his “marks of the great man” with material phenomena and 
mundane bodily gestures. These hermeneutical and pedagogical techniques went beyond 
the apophatic critique of marks adopted by Tang-dynasty Chan Buddhists with reference 
                                                
41 For example, Pingmu Daoda ⽊木平道達 (fl. ca. Northern Song) was said to possess an uṣṇīṣa (Zuting 
shiyuan, X. no. 1261, 64: 406c24-407a1); Xutang Zhiyu 虛堂智愚 (1185–1269) had both the uṣṇīṣa 
and the mark of a tongue capable of extending past the tip of the nose (Xutang heshang yulu, T. no. 
2000, 47: 1063b27). Qisong’s 契嵩 (1007–1072) cremated body was said to have produced an uṣṇīṣa 
relic (Wudeng huiyuan, X. no. 1565, 80: 325b11–12), as was that of Baiyang Shun 白楊順 (1076–
1139) (Sengbao zhengxu zhuan, X. no. 1561, 79: 572c22–23). 
 
42 Lippit, “Negative Verisimilitude,” 67. 
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to the Diamond Sūtra. Instead, they insisted cataphatically on buddhahood’s total 
immanence in the material world down to even its meanest objects, a philosophy that 
drew upon at least three preexisting Buddhist philosophical ideas: (1) a metaphysics of 
the phenomenal world as made up of “mind-only” (weixin 唯⼼心) or “consciousness-only” 
(weishi 唯識)43; (2) the notion that not only all sentient beings but even insentient objects 
possess buddha-nature44; and (3) the idea that the Buddha’s apparently physical body was 
actually nothing but a manifestation (Skt. nirmāṇakāya; C. huashen [transformation body] 
化身 or yingshen 應身 [response body]) of his all-encompassing and formless “dharma-
body” (Skt. dharmakāya; C. fashen 法身).45 Moreover, Chan masters’ use of mundane 
bodily gestures to perform or enact buddhahood was built upon the philosophical premise 
that “essence” (ti 體) or “nature” (xing 性) is identical with “function” (yong 用 or 
zuoyong 作用). According to the most extreme interpretation of this philosophical 
equation of essence and function, any fleeting action is understood to fully embody the 
essence of buddhahood.46 
                                                
43 On the philosophy of “mind-only” and “consciousness-only” and their relationship to Chan, see Lai, 
“The Meaning of ‘Mind-Only.’” 
 
44 See Tsuchiya, Beisong chanzong, 12–15; Sharf, “How to Think with Chan Gongans,” esp. 210–14; 
and Sharf, “Is Nirvāṇa the Same as Insentience?” 
 
45 On the dharma-body and buddha-body theory generally, see Radich, “The Somatics of Liberation.” 
In addition to these Buddhist precedents, Chan Buddhists’ frequent reference to the immanence of 
buddhahood in the material world also resembles a passage from the Zhuangzi, in which the Dao is 
said to be immanent in ants, grass, tiles, and even excrement; see Yang, Zhuangzi yizhu, Waipian 外篇, 
Zhi beiyou 知北遊, 253–54. 
 
46 The essence/function dichotomy in Chinese philosophy dates to the Six Dynasties period, and came 
to be famously associated with the apocryphal Buddhist Treatise on the Awakening of Faith (Qixin lun 
起信論). See the overview in Muller, “The Emergence of Essence-Function.” In Chan contexts, this 
framework came to be closely associated with the doctrinal position attributed to Mazu Daoyi that 
“function is [buddha-]nature” (zuoyong shi xing 作用是性), which amounted to the argument that 
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Expressions of the immanence of the Buddha’s body in the material world include 
a sermon attributed to Zhaozhou Congshen 趙州從諗 (778–897), in which he says: “This 
old monk considers a blade of grass to be [the Buddha’s] 1.6 zhang-tall [about 16 feet] 
golden body, and considers the 1.6 zhang-tall golden body to be a blade of grass.”47 The 
1.6-zhang tall golden body is itself counted among the Buddha’s canonical marks. The 
famous poet Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101), an enthusiast of Chan, versified in similar terms: 
“the babbling creek is [the Buddha’s] broad and longue tongue; / how could the shape of 
the mountains not be his pure and clean body?”48—a poem that went on to be quoted by 
Su’s junior contemporary, Chan master Yuanwu Keqin 圜悟克勤 (1063–1135).49 Less 
lyrical examples that better represent many Song-period Chan Buddhists’ preference for 
combining aesthetic rusticity with economy of speech include this dialogue: “A monk 
asked Dongshan [Liangjie] 洞⼭山良价 (807–869): ‘What is the Buddha?’ Dongshan 
replied: ‘three jin of sesame.’”50 In the hands of Yunmen Wenyan, whose avowed wish to 
                                                                                                                                            
everyday activity—and by extension any bodily gesture—is without exception a manifestation of 
buddha-nature; see Tsuchiya, Beisong chanzong, Chapter 1. 
 
47 老僧把⼀一枝草爲丈六⾦金身用，把丈六⾦金身爲⼀一枝草用。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 
277a10–11. 
 
48 溪聲便是廣長舌，⼭山⾊色豈非清淨身？ “Zeng Donglin zong zhanglao” 贈東林總長老, Su Shi shiji 
hezhu, j. 23, v. 2, 1154. On Su Shi’s interest in Chan and relationship with Chan Buddhists, see Egan, 
Word, Image, and Deed, Chapter 6; Grant, Mount Lu Revisited; and Zhou, Wenzi chan yu Songdai 
shixue. 
 
49 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 175b18–20. Several centuries later in the Yuan 
dynasty, the eminent Chan master Zhongfeng Mingben 中峰明本 (1263–1323) critiqued this poem by 
Su on the grounds that it equated the buddha-marks only to pleasant natural phenomena like a 
babbling creek, when in fact the marks actually encompass the entire phenomenal world, pleasant and 
unpleasant alike; see Heller, Illusory Abiding, 139–40. 
 
50 僧問洞⼭山：「如何是佛？」洞⼭山云：「麻三⽄斤。」 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 
386c21. Jin is a measure of weight roughly equivalent to half of one kilogram. This episode went on 
to be featured as a case in several “public case” (gong’an 公案) collections, including the Foguo 
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kill the infant Buddha we considered in Chapter 1, this line of thought turned into an off-
color humor: “[Someone] asked, ‘What is Śākyamuni [Buddha’s] body like?’ The master 
replied: ‘A dried shit-stick.’”51 
Yunmen was also famous for his use of gesture to explicate the idea of “great 
function” (da yong ⼤大用), a byword for the miraculously salvific activities of buddhas 
and bodhisattvas: 
Once, the master said: “When great function manifests in front of you, 
norms and rules no longer exist.” A monk asked: “What is ‘great function 
manifesting in front of you’?” The master picked up his staff and cried out 
in a loud voice: “Old man Śākyamuni has arrived!”52 
 
Here the premise of Yunmen’s performance is that because buddha-nature is identical to 
mundane activity, simply by watching Yunmen pick up his staff the audience may as well 
have witnessed the Buddha Śākyamuni walk into the room. At the same time, Yunmen’s 
use of the particular figure of the Buddha Śākyamuni is playful, maybe even ironic, 
because the subtext of his performance is that “the Buddha Śākyamuni” should be 
understood to stand in for a kind of boundlessly pervasive metaphysical buddhahood, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu (T. no. 2003, 48: 152c19–25) and the Wumen guan (T. no. 2005, 48: 295b4–
6). See also Iriya, Jiko to chōetsu, 88–94. 
 
51 問：「如何是釋迦身？」師云：「乾屎橛。」 Yunmen Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 
47: 550b15. Though attributed to Yunmen, this episode likely dates from the Southern Song and is not 
found in Northern Song Chan materials. It became a case in the Wumen guan (T. 2005, 48: 295c5–6). 
See also Iriya, Jiko to chōetsu, 95–103; and Furuta, “Ken shiketsu kō.” This phrase was sufficiently 
famous to draw criticism from Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), who mentions the phrase three times in his 
collected writings (twice alongside the related “three jin of sesame”); Zhuzi yulei, j. 124, v. 8, 2973; 
and j. 126, v. 8, 3018 and 3029. See also Yanagida, “Bukkyō to Shushi.” More categorical responses 
to the question “what is the Buddha?” include “what isn’t the Buddha?” (ruhe bushi fo 如何不是佛). 
We find this attributed to both Xifeng Yanzhao 風⽳穴延沼 (879–973), Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, 




云：「釋迦老⼦子來也！」 Yunmen Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 47: 554c2–4. 
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not any particular figurative individual at all. Along similar lines, two other exchanges 
involving bodily gestures are instructive. Both are answers given by Zhaozhou, whom we 
have just considered, in response to the question “What are the marks of the great man?” 
In the first, Zhaozhou simply “gave [the questioner] a sidelong stare.”53 In the second he 
“rubbed his face with his hands, then interlocked his hands and assumed a solemn 
expression.”54 All three examples imply that these simple everyday gestures express and 
represent the “body of the Buddha” and his “marks of the great man” better than any 
extraordinary sign or wondrous display of magical powers possibly could. 
Even if earlier Buddhists had already articulated a metaphysics according to 
which the world is made only of mind or pervaded by universal buddhahood, insisted that 
even insentient objects possess buddha-nature, or prioritized the Buddha’s “dharma-body” 
over his “manifestation body” and “enjoyment body,” it was still quite novel when Chan 
Buddhists began in this manner to equate the literal body of Śākyamuni Buddha and his 
thirty-two major “marks of the great man” with material objects and mundane gestures. 
These rhetorical devices suggested that even to speak of “buddhas” as though they were 
individual figures with uniquely exemplary bodies was ridiculous, because any such body 
could only in the final analysis be metaphysically perfect and therefore fully coextensive 
with the entire universe. In other words, they collapsed the Buddha Śākyamuni and 
buddhas in general—insofar as they were understood in some sense to be individual 
people—into a pervasive and totalizing metaphysics of buddhahood. 
                                                
53 問：「如何是⼤大⼈人相？」師側目視之。 Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 84a3. 
 
54 問：「如何是⼤大⼈人相？」師以⼿手摸面，叉⼿手斂容。 Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 84c14. 
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Yet as with the critique of marks in the Tang dynasty, we would do well to 
remember that the Chan tradition was itself an elite lineage made up of specific people, 
and thus should not hastily conclude from these famous cases that the straightforward 
metaphysics of buddhahood they expounded was the end of the story. A clue to the larger 
issues at stake here can be found by attending closely to one particular buddha-mark: the 
uṣṇīṣa or “crown-mark.” As I have already mentioned, at least a handful of Chan masters 
in the Song were said to literally possess an uṣṇīṣa or fleshy protuberance on the crowns 
of their heads (or to have had one discovered upon being cremated after death), 
attributions that maintained continuity with representational practices surrounding the 
bodies of eminent monks from the Tang dynasty. But for most Song-dynasty Chan 
Buddhists, the uṣṇīṣa became more than simply one bodily mark for signifying greatness 
among all the others. 
In canonical Buddhist sources, the uṣṇīṣa is legendarily considered to be invisible 
to ordinary sentient beings, making it a sign whose very hiddenness from view signals its 
special importance. As Bernard Faure remarks, “On the one hand, it is but one of the 
thirty-two signs that configure the Buddha’s body, obfuscating it while revealing it. On 
the other hand, it is a paradoxical, formless sign that implies its own negation.”55 The 
uṣṇīṣa’s invisibility was well known to Chan Buddhists, as T. Griffith Foulk and Robert 
Sharf have observed. They write: 
Canonical sources offer various explanations for the fact that the Buddha’s 
uṣṇīṣa cannot be seen by living beings. According to some texts, the light 
emanating from the uṣṇīṣa is greater even than the light of the sun, and 
thus cannot be viewed directly. The tradition most familiar to the Chinese, 
however, explained the uṣṇīṣa’s invisibility as stemming from the fact that 
none stands above the Buddha: living beings are always gazing up at his 
                                                
55 Faure, “The Buddhist Icon,” 789. 
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eminence, a position that precludes a view of the crowning uṣṇīṣa. Some 
sources go further and claim that the Buddha is unimaginably tall, with his 
head reaching to the sky.56 
 
This invisible mark on the Buddha’s crown, then, might be said to stand for 
enlightenment itself beyond the reach of representation, a favorite topic of Chan masters 
as early as Huangbo, as we have seen. Its invisibility, in other words, makes it 
particularly amenable to metaphysical reinterpretation, according to which it can be 
stretched and extended from its literal position atop the Buddha’s head to encompass the 
whole universe. It is thus unsurprising that the uṣṇīṣa participated in the Chan tradition’s 
novel doctrinal hermeneutic according to which buddhahood was seen to pervade the 
entire material world, present in all things and yet itself exceeding the representational 
capacity of any particular phenomenal object. For Chan Buddhists, the paradox of seeing 
an invisible sign encapsulates the magic and mystery of sudden awakening. An example 
is found in a sermon attributed to Caoyuan Daosheng 曹源道⽣生 (d. 1198), which avers 
that when someone attains enlightenment, “the invisible uṣṇīṣa of the buddha of [your] 
unconditioned mind will constantly appear before you.”57 Tianyi Yihuai 天衣義懷 (993–
1064) similarly preaches: “If there are any patch-robed monks now who have bright eyes, 
not only the uṣṇīṣa, but the minds of the myriad Thus-Come Ones will all appear before 
you.”58 
                                                
56 Foulk and Sharf, “On the Ritual Use of Ch’an Portraiture,” 163. 
 
57 無見頂相無為⼼心佛時時見前。 Caoyuan Daosheng chanshi yulu, X. no. 1375, 70: 35c23–24. 
 
58 如今若有明眼衲僧，非但頂相，⼗十⽅方世界諸如來⼼心悉現在前。 Xu guzunsu yuyao, X. no. 1318, 
68: 375b4–5. Beyond this mysterious doctrinal meaning, the term dingxiang (“crown-mark,” the most 
common Chinese translation of uṣṇīṣa) also gained a practical significance in Song-dynasty Chinese 
Buddhism, where it served as a synecdoche to refer to any portrait of an eminent monastic, including 
Chan masters. The use of this canonical buddha-mark signifying enlightenment beyond representation 
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Developing the analysis of Stella Kramrisch, Bernard Faure suggests that the 
uṣṇīṣa represents (through its paradoxical invisibility) the Buddha’s transcendence, while 
his other canonical bodily marks stand for his immanence.59 We might add, again, that 
the distinction also mirrors the difference between the Buddha’s “dharma body” and his 
“manifestation” and “enjoyment” bodies. Along similar lines, the relationship between 
this invisible sign and its visible counterparts can be viewed in terms of the Mahāyāna 
binary of the “two truths,” ultimate and conventional.60 Yet we should also reflect on the 
emphasis placed on height in discussions surrounding the uṣṇīṣa, which Foulk and Sharf 
describe as the best-known explanation for its invisibility in China. On this aspect of the 
uṣṇīṣa, Hubert Durt offers a crucial insight: 
Several studies on traditions concerning the head of the Buddha as 
reported in the Buddha’s biographies, canonical texts of ancient Buddhism, 
and archeology have led us to suppose that the anavalokitamūrdhatā 
[invisible uṣṇīṣa] might have evoked less an incapacity than a prohibition 
on viewing the head of the Buddha from above.61 
 
In other words, the uṣṇīṣa is not only the invisible sign of the Buddha’s enlightenment, a 
symbol of the philosophical problem of representationality in relation to an abstract 
metaphysics of buddhahood. It is also the locus of the Buddha’s authority, the vanishing 
point past which authority becomes untestable (even by experts in physiognomy) and 
must be taken on faith. It establishes a vertical hierarchy of authority within which as a 
                                                                                                                                            
to refer to a typically realistic painted likeness of the Chan master was inherently ironic, as we will 
consider in greater depth in Chapter 4. 
 
59 Faure, “The Buddhist Icon,” 791; see also Kramrisch, “Emblems of the Universal Being.” 
 
60 On the “two truths,” see Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism, 76–9. 
 
61 “Quelques recherches dans les traditions concernant la tête du Buddha rapportées par les 
biographies du Buddha, les textes canoniques du Bouddhisme ancien et l’archéologie nous ont 
emmené à supposer que l’anavalokitamūrdhatā pourrait évoquer moins une incapacite qu’une 
interdiction de regarder de haut la tête du Buddha.” Durt, “Note sur l’origine,” 449. 
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rule no one surpasses the Buddha. Durt goes on to relate a tradition widespread in 
canonical Buddhist literature according to which any humans or gods who do not pay 
obeisance to the Buddha will be punished by having their own heads split apart into 
seven pieces.62 Adherence to the invisible uṣṇīṣa’s vertical logic is thus not a suggestion 
but an order, enforced on penalty of violent death by the inevitable and unquestionable 
mechanism of karmic law.63 This and other early traditions concerning the Buddha’s head, 
Durt suggests, establish the Buddha as a “god above the gods.”64 We might add that they 
give new meaning to the traditional Indian Buddhist concept that a “great man” 
possessing the thirty-two marks has the potential to become either a “wheel-turning king” 
or a buddha. According to the logic of the uṣṇīṣa this pair of options might be both more 
similar and more asymmetrical than we realize, since even if a king dictates temporal law, 
a buddha holds the much more powerful reigns of karmic law, and is thus too a “king 
above the kings.”65 
 Only with this in mind can we truly understand either Chan’s radical 
soteriological promise or its equally radical claim to religious authority: it is not simply 
                                                
62 Durt, “Note sur l’origine,” 449–46. Chan Buddhists were familiar with this idea. For example, in the 
Tiansheng guangdeng lu’s account of the Buddha’s infancy, we find the ṛṣi Asita, after seeing the 
infant Siddhārtha Gautama’s thirty-two “marks of the great man,” remarking: “I and all other humans 
and gods ought to bow to him. If the Bodhisattva [Gautama] were instead to bow [to me], [my] head 
would be broken into seven pieces.” 我及⼀一切⼈人天應當作禮；菩薩若返禮者，頭破七分。 
Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 427b13-14. 
 
63 In some cases it was the Buddhist protector deity Vajrapāṇi who enforced karmic law and the 
integrity of the sangha by shattering the heads of offenders; see Faure, Bouddhisme et Violence, 136. 
 
64 Durt, “Note sur l’origine,” 444–43. On this topic, see also Étienne Lamotte, History of Indian 
Buddhism, 644–48. One of the Buddha’s epithets is “god among gods” (Skt. devātideva; Ch. 
tianzhong tian 天中天). 
 
65 Of course, the reverse also holds: the Buddha anchors karmic law, and thus any threat to his person 
or supremacy is also a threat to the entire karmic order. It is therefore not simply that karma is set up 
as universal law to protect the Buddha arbitrarily, but rather that the Buddha and karmic law guarantee 
each other and operate in perfect coordination. 
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that successful Chan aspirants will be able to see the invisibly immanent uṣṇīṣa lurking in 
all phenomenal things, but that they can actually become buddhas and attain an uṣṇīṣa of 
their very own. Indeed, Hongzhi Zhengjue 宏智正覺 (1091–1157) made precisely this 
promise in his recorded teachings: “If in an instant you exhaustively purify [your mind], 
[becoming] vast and clear, not relying on anything, then all buddhas of all times will be 
unable to see your uṣṇīṣa.”66 Hongzhi here ups the stakes of the popular Chan slogan “see 
your nature and become a buddha” (jianxing chengfo 見性成佛), suggesting that 
aspirants ought to aim not just to become one buddha among all the others, but to become 
the best buddha, to flip the vertical relationship that usually obtains between an ordinary 
person and the Buddha’s uṣṇīṣa, ascending above everyone else to a height of unrivalled 
eminence. Along similar lines, Yuanwu Keqin regularly remarks in his discourse record 
that Chan aspirants who attain awakening will be able to “walk around on top of 
Vairocana’s head.”67 Vairocana is, of course, another buddha whose crown one should 
only attempt to walk around upon if one really knows what one is doing. 
Those Chan aspirants bold enough to do so, we can assume, will not find their 
heads split into seven pieces, because they will have legitimately earned their newfound 
position at the top of the hierarchy of religious authority. They will be buddhas, fully 
qualified to receive transmission in an elite Chan lineage and have their words converted 
into an authorized discourse record, holding religious authority on par with the sermons 
of the Buddha. Yet if the uṣṇīṣa became for Song-dynasty Chan Buddhists the locus and 
                                                
66 若⼀一念淨盡去，廓落無依去，三世諸佛望爾頂相不及也。 Hongzhi chanshi guanglu, T. no. 
2001, 48: 65c18–20. 
 
67 Yuanwu foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 714c17–18, 725b10–11, and 805b27–c4. Sometimes 
instead Yuanwu talks about “standing atop Vairocana’s head,” as in Yuanwu foguo chanshi yulu, T. 
1997, 47: 741b24 and 771a24–5. 
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invisible source of their claims to special authority, this did not mean that the other 
“marks of the great man” simply disappeared. Instead, as we will see, they and other 
tropes of the Buddha’s uniquely heroic majesty continued to hover around the Chan 
tradition, over and over raising the question of resemblance. Chan masters in the Song, 
after all, did not look like buddhas, and potential patrons could not simply take them at 
their word they truly were living buddhas without some kind of compelling proof. How, 
then, did Chan masters demonstrate that they deserved to be treated like buddhas? And 
did it always work? 
 
Encountering Chinese buddhas: “marks of the great man” and the negotiation of 
authority 
 
Buddhist scriptures and meditation manuals had by the Tang and Song dynasties long 
directed practitioners toward visionary “direct encounters” with buddhas possessing the 
recognizable “marks of the great man.”68 As we have seen, however, Chan Buddhists 
rejected the notion that a buddha can truly be seen by means of these canonical marks. 
The rejection of the marks was important to Chan soteriology not only because it pushed 
practitioners to seek liberation in a formless and ineffable buddhahood rather than in any 
figurative buddha, but also because it attempted to remove the requirement that one need 
look like a canonical buddha to be counted as a buddha. It opened up the space, in other 
words, for Chan masters to claim the status of buddhas. The Linji lu (Record of Linji), 
attributed to Linji Yixuan 臨濟義⽞玄 (d. 866) but actually written and edited over the 
                                                
68 See Harrison, The Samādhi of Direct Encounter; Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest, 9; and 
Greene, “Meditation, Repentance,” 613. 
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course of the tenth and early eleventh centuries,69 addresses the issue in the following 
verse: 
If you seek externally for a buddha possessing the marks, 
You won’t find him to resemble you; 
If you wish to know your own original mind, 
It is neither united with nor separate from [him].70 
 
Linji’s record here reveals a keen awareness of the problem of resemblance, or rather the 
absence of resemblance, between Chan masters and canonical buddhas. It seeks to 
resolve this problem by rejecting the canonical “marks of the great man”—in which Chan 
aspirants will only find a figure manifestly different from themselves—and propose 
instead that each and every practitioner’s “original mind” is deeply coextensive with 
metaphysical buddhahood, beyond even the duality of unity and separation, if only they 
knew it. Yet while Linji solves the first half of the problem—how a Chan aspirant ought 
to come to know the “original mind” and, it is implied, thereby attain buddhahood—he 
leaves the second half unresolved. Having borne witness to one’s original mind and 
become a buddha—but, of course, not a buddha that looks anything like the canonical 
buddhas with their “marks of the great man”—how can one demonstrate one’s 
buddhahood to others? How can the newly acquired authority of buddhahood be made 
manifest and put to work in the world? 
Song-dynasty Chan soteriology did not primarily emphasize the need to pursue 
visionary encounters with buddhas. But it did involve ritual encounters with Chan 
masters performing their buddhahood in the monastic ritual of “ascending the hall,” and 
                                                
69 See Welter, The Linji lu. 
 
70 外求有相佛，與汝不相似。欲識汝本⼼心，非合亦非離。 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, 
T. no. 1985, 47: 501c24-25. Translation follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 262, with alterations. 
 
 93 
in the discourse records purporting to transcribe the “encounter dialogues” that took place 
during these rituals and in other monastic contexts. Although texts recording question-
and-answer exchanges between Chan masters and their students can be found in earlier 
materials like the records of Huangbo, these early examples tend to involve short 
questions followed by long expository answers that operate like sermons. We do not 
begin to see the Chan tradition’s signature style of snappy dialogues filled with 
witticisms, blows and shouts, and apparent non-sequiturs until the middle of the tenth 
century, although these exchanges are often attributed to earlier Chan masters who lived 
from the eighth to tenth centuries.71 
T. Griffith Foulk has observed that the basic structure of Chan encounter dialogue 
configures religious authority in particular ways: 
It is a convention of the dialogue genre in Ch’an/Zen literature that the 
voice of the master (the figure whose status as an heir to the lineage 
provides the raison d’être for “recording” the dialogue in the first place) 
always represents the standpoint of awakening, speaks with the greatest 
authority, and thus occupies the position of judge. The voice of the 
interlocutor, on the other hand, may represent abject delusion, striving for 
awakening, or awakened insight rivaling that of the master, but it is always 
in the inferior position of being evaluated by the voice of the master.72 
 
Like encounters with the Buddha Śākyamuni or other buddhas of the cosmos, then, 
encounters with Chan masters performing their buddhahood involved a particular 
hierarchy of authority. Yet if canonical descriptions of (or prescriptions for) visionary 
encounters with buddhas stressed the importance of visually engaging with their “marks 
of the great man,” the living buddhas of the Chan tradition met with in encounter 
dialogues were conspicuous for seeming to lack those marks. In this context, many Chan 
                                                
71 The earliest extant text containing this kind of encounter dialogue is the Zutang ji of 952. 
 
72 Foulk, “The Form and Function,” 33. 
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encounter dialogues engage with the tension between the understanding that Chan 
masters are buddhas and voices of authority, on the one hand, and their manifest lack of 
the Buddha’s “marks of the great man” or other visible signs of buddhahood on the other. 
Here I will suggest that the Chan master’s authority was not automatically guaranteed by 
the rules of the encounter dialogue genre alone. Of course, Chan masters occupied the 
position of authority vis-à-vis their interlocutors, but they still needed to offer a 
compelling performance of buddhahood, and were vulnerable to unfavorable evaluation 
if they failed to do so. Each encounter dialogue thus offers a window onto how Chan 
masters performed buddhahood and compellingly convinced their audiences of their 
authority. 
Let us begin, for example, with a dialogue between an inquiring monk and Chan 
Master Nanyuan Daoming 南源道明 (d.u.), a disciple of Mazu Daoyi, where we find the 
monk asking: “what is ‘a single word’?” This is a standard format for raising a question 
in the Chan tradition, bringing up a well-known topic for the master’s comment; and here 
“a single word” refers to the notion that the entire teaching of Buddhism might be 
compacted into a single, penetrating word that will cut to the heart of the Chan tradition’s 
teaching.73 In response, we’re told, the master stuck out his tongue and said: “Wait for me 
to acquire the [buddha-]mark of a broad and long tongue, then I’ll tell you.”74 Here 
Nanyuan is referring to the Buddha’s extraordinary tongue, which as we have seen is one 
                                                
73 See, for example, Fenyang Wude Chanshi yulu, T. no. 1992, 47: 619b12–13, which says: 
“Encompass the myriad dharmas in a single word; cut off the multitude of flows to the four seas.” 了
萬法於⼀一⾔言，截眾流於四海。 
 
74 僧問:「⼀一⾔言作麼⽣生。」師乃吐舌云:「待我有廣長舌相，即向汝道。」 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. 
no. 2076, 51: 249a19–20, with 吐吞 changed to 吐舌 based on other versions, such as Wudeng 
huiyuan, X. no. 1565, 80: 81a14–15. 
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of the canonical “marks of the great man,” and is associated with the Buddha’s capacity 
to preach skillfully to myriad different types of sentient beings according to their 
respective capacities and needs. On the one hand, Nanyuan is the voice of authority in 
this dialogue, embodying the role of the Chan master as enlightened living buddha. On 
the other hand, however, he is playfully drawing attention to the obvious fact that he 
lacks the canonical marks of buddhahood, and in particular, the mark of a broad and long 
tongue that would grant him the eloquence to skillfully respond to the monk’s question. 
Moreover, it seems plain that Nanyuan will not in any literal sense gain a marvelous 
buddha-like tongue any time in the near future, lending his reply a particularly sarcastic 
humor—the monk will be waiting a very long time indeed to receive his answer.75 And 
yet, the dialogue’s subtext suggests that the master is actually answering the inquiring 
monk’s question in a roundabout way, implicitly suggesting that even a “single-word” 
explanation would still contain too many words, and the student must realize buddhahood 
firsthand in his own mind. In this final sense, Nanyuan reinstates his authority as a true 
master by gesturing at buddhahood’s ultimate ineffability. 
 Other dialogues preserve a variety of witty responses by Chan masters to 
questioners asking about the buddha-marks. In one, a monk asks Nanquan Puyuan 南泉
普願 (748–835), “what are the ‘marks of the great man’?” The master replies, “When I 
                                                
75 This expression follows a formula found relatively commonly in Chan literature. See, for example, 
the following dialogue between Mazu Daoyi and Layman Pang (Pang jushi 龐居⼠士, d. 808) found in 
the Zutang ji: “[Layman Pang] asked great master Ma: “Who is the person that does not befriend the 
myriad dharmas?” Mazu replied: “When you swallow all the water in the west river, then I’ll tell you.” 
因問馬⼤大師：「不與萬法為侶者，是什摩⼈人？」馬師云：「待居⼠士⼀一⼝口吸盡西江⽔水，我則為你
說。」待居⼠士⼀一⼝口吸盡西江⽔水，我則為你說。 Zutang ji, j. 15, v. 2, 699. 
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was three sui [two years] old, I had them; now I do not.”76 Nanquan’s reply, though 
difficult to parse, seems to be a joke about the tendency for hagiographical narratives to 
discuss these unusual bodily marks primarily in the context of the individual’s childhood 
as harbingers of greatness to come, but then not to bring them up again in the context of 
the person’s adult life. The effect of the joke, then, is to suggest sarcastically that as a 
living buddha Nanquan by rights ought to possess the canonical buddha-marks, but that 
for reasons explicable only with recourse to the generic conventions of hagiography, he 
no longer seems to possess them as a fully-grown adult. Indeed, the joke itself is a skilled 
rhetorical maneuver: by drawing attention to the merely conventional, genre-contingent, 
and therefore artificial status of the “marks of the great man,” Nanquan both evades the 
need to literally display any bodily marks to prove his authority, and also demonstrates 
that authority precisely through his skill in wordplay. For his part, Nanquan’s disciple 
Zhaozhou, in addition to his gestural responses to this same question discussed above, 
sometimes is said to have simply feigned ignorance of the matter entirely, meeting the 
question “what are the ‘marks of the great man’?” with the reply: “What’s that?”77 
 In some cases, questions posed to Chan masters touching upon the special marks 
or person of the Buddha confronted the master’s authority more directly. Take for 
example an encounter between an inquiring monk and Chan Master Yuanwu Keqin: 
“[Someone] stepped forward and asked: ‘What is your uṣṇīṣa like, master?’ The master 
                                                
76 有僧問：「如何是⼤大⼈人相？」南泉答曰：「王老師三歲時則有，如今無。」Zutang ji, j. 19, v. 
2, 860. This dialogue is embedded within a conversation attributed to two other Chan masters, 
Caoshan Benji 曹⼭山本寂 (840–901) and his master Dongshan Liangjie 洞⼭山良价 (807–869), who are 
discussing stories they have each heard or witnessed. It follows their discussion of a nearly identical 
exchange with another Chan master, Xiyuan Da’an 西院⼤大安 (793–883). 
 
77 問：「如何是⼤大⼈人相？」師云：「是什麼？」 Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 84b24. 
 
 97 
replied: ‘Wrong.’ The monk prostrated, and the master said: ‘As expected, as 
expected.’”78 At one level, Yuanwu’s terse response might be read in line with the Chan 
tradition’s longstanding critique of marks. According to this critique, it is absurd to think 
that the all-pervasive cosmic uṣṇīṣa might be limited to a single individual. The single-
word answer “wrong” was also a relatively common response to student questions in 
Chan encounter dialogues.79 Yet in this case, the student does not merely ask about the 
“marks of the great man” in a general way, but specifically inquires about the quality of 
Yuanwu’s uṣṇīṣa, the source of his authority as a Chan master and living buddha. Is this 
question impertinent, or simply part of the routine banter of Chan encounter dialogue? It 
is difficult to say, but in any case, Yuanwu shuts the question down before it can get off 
the ground. The student in turn signals submission by lowering his own head to the 
ground in prostration, suggesting that this scene stages not just a dialogue but a 
confrontation, even a battle.80 “As expected,” Yuanwu concludes to the prostrate 
                                                
78 進云：「如何是和尚頂相？」師云：「錯。」僧禮拜。師云：「果然果然。」 Yuanwu 
Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 760b24–25. 
 
79 Indeed, Yuanwu’s student Dahui Zonggao writes of Yuanwu prompting lay disciples to reply to the 
phrase “The word that expresses being and the word that expresses non-being are like wisteria vine 
clinging to a tree.” Whenever anyone said a word, Yuanwu would reply, “wrong!” See Miriam 
Levering, “Was There Religious Autobiography in China before the Thirteenth Century?,” 102. 
 
80 For a more detailed discussion of how Chan Buddhists viewed encounter dialogues as battles, see 
Chapter 3. In case 26 of the Biyan lu, Yuanwu offers a hint of his understanding of the semiotics of 
prostration in the context of such an encounter dialogue battle. The exchange upon which Yuanwu is 
commenting occurs between an unnamed monk and Chan master Baizhang, in the middle of which the 
monk bows in apparent submission to the master’s superior authority, yet Baizhang nevertheless 
proceeds to hit him. Yuanwu remarks: “This monk’s bow is different from ordinary [bowing]… This 
monk’s bow is like pulling a tiger’s whiskers: he is simply contending for a pivotal position. 
Fortunately Baizhang possesses an eye on the crown of his head and a talisman [for subduing demons] 
at the ready (lit. behind his elbow). [His vision] shines through everything on the four [continents] 
under Heaven and deeply discerns oncoming winds. So he hit him.” 這僧禮拜與尋常不同。... 這僧
便禮拜似捋虎鬚相似，只爭轉身處。賴值百丈頂門有眼，肘後有符，照破四天下，深辨來風，
所以便打。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 167a5–15. Case 75 of the same 
collection features yet another monk bowing, this time to master Wujiu 烏⾅臼 (d.u.), and Yuanwu 
 98 
student—in other words, as expected: you were bluffing in your challenge to my 
authority. 
We have seen how encounter dialogues often begin when a student raises a well-
known phrase for the master’s comment. In one case, found in a passage that only 
survives as an unattributed extract preserved in a later collection, an anonymous 
questioner raises for critical discussion the popular expression attributed to Xuansha 
Shibei that we considered in the Introduction: “Śākyamuni and I are fellow students under 
the same master.” As I suggested there, this widely-repeated phrase participated in the 
Chan tradition’s broader rhetorical repertoire for claiming that Chan masters were not 
simply eminent monks but fully-realized buddhas. In this case, however, the questioner 
interrogates this slogan: “[It has been said that] ‘I am a fellow student under the same 
master with old Śākyamuni.’ [But] old Śākyamuni possessed the thirty-two major marks 
and the eighty minor marks, so how can [a Chan master] claim to be his fellow student?” 
While the original response to this question is now lost, the compiler of the collection 
within which this question is preserved—Chan Master Foyan Qingyuan 佛眼清遠 
(1067–1120)—follows the Chan commentarial convention of replacing the original 
answer and offering his own alternative response in its place: “Don’t come here polluting 
my ears and eyes.”81 The question perhaps offends Foyan because it seems to 
misunderstand Chan Buddhists’ oft-repeated preference for metaphysical over personal 
buddhahood. Yet from our vantage point, it is interesting because it betrays the instability 
                                                                                                                                            
similarly observes, “This bow is the most poisonous; it is not well-intentioned.” 這箇禮拜最毒也， 
不是好⼼心。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 202c25–26. 
 
81 問：「『我與釋迦老⼦子同參。』釋迦老⼦子具三⼗十⼆二相⼋八⼗十種好。如何說同參底事？ 代云：
「莫來污我耳目。」 Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 224b3-5. 
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of Chan attempts to use metaphysics to justify personal claims to buddhahood, raising a 
basic question that likely never fully disappeared even after Chan’s rhetorical battle for 
legitimacy was largely won: how can you Chan masters really be buddhas when you 
don’t look like buddhas? Facing such challenges, the burden was on the Chan master to 
demonstrate authority in a manner somehow equally compelling to the Buddha’s awe-
inspiring bodily marks, the miraculous displays that accompanied his sermons, and so on. 
With all of this in mind, we may turn to encounter dialogues accompanying the 
occasion of a Chan lineage recipient’s appointment to a public abbacy. While this 
moment receives less scholarly attention than the moment of lineage transmission (which 
we will consider further later on), it was not only a prestigious honor but a pivotal turning 
point in any Chan master’s career, since the attainment of an abbacy was necessary to 
take on lineage disciples and secure one’s place in the broader history of Chan.82 Shortly 
following such an appointment, the master’s nascent career was launched with the very 
first performance of the ritual “ascending the hall” ceremony, an occasion that received 
the special designation of “opening the hall” (kaitang 開堂). Although recorded less 
frequently than standard “ascending the hall” ceremonies in discourse records and lamp 
collections, “opening the hall” ceremonies occurred frequently enough that we can get 
some sense of their particular conventions. 
An abbot’s “opening of the hall” offered the first occasion for the public to see 
what kind of person would be leading their local monastic community. Government 
officials who oversaw appointments to the abbacies of public monasteries were also often 
in attendance. In such ceremonies it was common that the master be asked something 
                                                
82 Schlütter, How Zen Became Zen, 66. 
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along the lines of: “what is your lineage style (zongfeng 宗風, or sometimes ‘house style,’ 
jiafeng 家風)?” This question suggests that lineage affiliation was an important source of 
the new, and as yet untested, abbot’s authority. Seeing how the new abbot answered such 
a question also helped the interested public gain a sense of the particular flavor of the 
new abbot’s authority by locating it with reference to the specific repertoire of tropes 
associated with a (hopefully) reputable Chan lineage.83 Some newly appointed abbots, 
however, faced a rather different line of questioning that tested their authority not with 
reference to lineage, but by making unfavorable comparisons between the master’s 
mundane person and various aspects of the historical Buddha’s marvelous body and 
heroic career. This sort of question might be said to have cut more deeply to the heart of 
the problem of authority in Chan: how, in exactly what ways, are Chan masters buddhas? 
To understand the thrust of this line of questioning, we must first bear in mind 
that it depends centrally upon a pun on the Chinese term chushi 出世, which literally 
means “emergence into the world” but conventionally refers to an individual’s birth. In 
Chan, however, it also carries a second meaning: it refers to the Chan master’s 
“emergence into the world” as an abbot, following a period of unaffiliated wandering 
sometimes lasting upwards of several decades since that person received lineage 
transmission.84 The pun pivots on this association to compare the miracles surrounding 
the Buddha’s birth with the apparent lack of corresponding miracles accompanying the 
Chan master’s appointment to an abbacy. Here is a fairly typical example featuring 
                                                
83 On the convention of asking Chan masters about their “house style” or “lineage style,” see 
Yanagida, “Goroku no rekishi,” 568. 
 
84 See Buckelew, “Pregnant Metaphor.” I thank Jason Protass for first drawing my attention to the 
dual meanings of chushi. 
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newly-appointed abbot Shishuang Chuyuan ⽯石霜楚圓 (986–1039), who invites the 
assembly to ask questions that bear directly on his illustrious lineage as the source of his 
authority: 
[The master said:] “Today’s event is no small opportunity [for us to meet]. 
As I offer a stick of incense to my [lineage teacher], Chan master 
[Fenyang] Wude 汾陽無德 (946–1023/4), I ask you all: do you recognize 
Chan Master Wude? If you do not recognize him, then please ask me 
about any doubts you have.” A monk asked: “When the World-Honored 
One was born into the world, Brahma led his way and Indra followed 
behind. Today you have been ‘born into the world’ [as abbot]. I ask you, 
teacher, to please preach the Dharma [as the Buddha did].” The master 
replied: “Thus[ness] (ru 如).”85 
 
This passage is striking for its clear juxtaposition of these two quite different sources of a 
Chan master’s authority: lineage affiliation and claim to buddhahood. First, Chuyuan 
anticipates doubts about his authority and invites inquiries into his Chan credentials by 
raising for discussion and ceremonially making offerings to his famous lineage master, 
Fenyang Wude.86 Indeed, given that this is the first public engagement of his career, 
Chuyuan has little else to vouch for his authority besides his connection to his 
distinguished master. Yet despite Chuyuan’s attempt to steer the conversation in this 
direction, the question he receives from an inquiring monk does not follow his lead in 
tracing his authority through his respectable Chan pedigree, and turns instead to the Chan 
tradition’s broader institutional claim that he is (by definition, as a Chan master) a living 
buddha. Chuyuan’s terse but multivalent reply might simply mean “it is so,” but it also 
                                                
85 「…此日⼀一會不是小緣。將⼀一辨香為我無德禪師，且道諸⼈人還識無德禪師麼。若也不識，有
疑請問。」僧問：「世尊出世，梵王前引，帝釋後隨。今日和尚出世，請師說法。」師云：
「如。」 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 504c12–15. 
 
86 On Fenyang Wude as an early progenitor of commentary on “old cases,” see Heine, Chan Rhetoric 
of Uncertainty, 10–11. 
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very clearly alludes to the metaphysical notion of true “thusness” as the fundamental 
substance of reality. Having considered at some length Huineng’s response to Hongren’s 
interrogation concerning Huineng’s lack of resemblance to a buddha in the Introduction, 
this metaphysical response to a question of resemblance should not surprise us. By means 
of this rhetorical gesture, Chuyuan suggests that his claim to buddhahood can be justified 
not in virtue of his possession of homologous bodily signs and miracles to the Buddha, 
but instead owing to a metaphysics of their consubstantial existence in all-pervading 
thusness. Though perhaps not as decisive as Yuanwu’s forceful “wrong,” this reply 
nevertheless seems to pass adequately for the occasion, and the assembly thereupon 
moves to other questions. 
Still, among the array of variations on this question we find in eleventh-century 
lamp collections,87 the above version turns out to be a relative softball. Rather than 
requesting that the new abbot come up with a demonstration of authority as convincing as 
the heavenly entourage that accompanied the infant Buddha, it concludes 
anticlimactically by simply asking the master to preach the Dharma. Other variations are 
less forgiving, as when Longhua Wusheng 龍華悟乘 (964–1022), again on his first day 
as abbot, is said to have been asked the following more pointed question by a monk: 
“When a buddha is born into the world, all the gods pay homage at his feet. Now that you 
have been ‘born into the world’ [as abbot], master, who will pay homage at your feet?” 
                                                
87 Examples of other variations on this question can be found in a handful of cases from the Jingde 
chuandeng lu: in the records for Shishuang Hui ⽯石霜輝 (fl. ca. Tang period), T. no. 2076, 51: 330, 
a14–17; Bao’en Qinghu 報恩清護 (916–970), T. no. 2076, 51: 379b15–17; Wan’an Qingyun 萬安清
運 (fl. ca. 10th c.), T. no. 2076, 51: 383a11–13; Bao’en Kuangyi 報恩匡逸 (fl. ca. Northern Song 
period), T. no. 2076, 51: 411c3–5; Qingliang Fadeng 清涼法燈 (d. 974), T. no. 2076, 51: 414, c13–20; 
and Ciyun Kuangda 慈雲匡達 (fl. ca. Tang period), T. no. 2076, 51: 418a23–25. 
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The master replies: “It is enough to recognize the meaning of [Bodhidharma’s] coming 
[from the West].” Here Longhua, punning rather flatly on the character zu ⾜足 that can 
mean either “feet” or “enough,” pivots away from the terms upon which the monk has 
asked the question and attempts to justify his authority as abbot by claiming to have 
understood the meaning of the patriarch Bodhidharma’s coming from India to China—a 
basic topic frequently raised in Chan encounter dialogues—suggesting that he has 
awakened to the fundamental truth of Chan. Not unlike Chuyuan’s reply, Longhua’s 
response implies that the signs by which a buddha might be recognized have changed 
since the time of the Buddha Śākyamuni, and in the Chan tradition one need only 
recognize the meaning of the patriarch’s coming from the West in order to be certified a 
living buddha and enlightened Chan master. 
But the questioner persists: “What is the Buddha like?” The master replies: “If I 
tell you it’s the thirty-two marks, would that suffice?” Again, this reply is 
underwhelming: as we have seen, the notion that the Buddha might be equated with the 
canonical “marks of the great man” in any straightforward way would by this time have 
already felt hopelessly passé. More importantly, Longhua has missed the subtext of this 
question, which like the previous question is probably more concerned with discerning 
the nature of his understanding of—and claim to—buddhahood. The question then is 
calling not for Longhua to simply state the canonical fact of the “marks of the great 
man,” thereby setting up an insurmountable distance between himself and the historical 
Buddha, but rather to reveal his own proverbial “marks of the great man,” to offer a 
glimpse of his uṣṇīṣa—that is, to demonstrate the foundations of his enlightened 
authority. The questioner finally gives up on these roundabout questions and asks: “In a 
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word, what are you, [Master] Longhua, like as a person?” But Longhua does no better 
with direct than indirect questioning, and at this point decides to finally throw in the 
towel: “I have no further skillful [answers to give you].”88 
 Cases such as these suggest that beyond the question of lineage, discussion of the 
“marks of the great man” and the person of the Buddha became in Chan encounter 
dialogues a lively discursive space for the articulation and contestation of religious 
authority. Indeed, despite their sometimes formulaic structure, these dialogues proved 
capable of registering considerable nuance, even of providing a glimpse into the 
contingencies of Chan as a lived institution, made up of masters who had routinely to 
stand in front of an audience and enact the dignity and authority of their office. Cases like 
the challenging series of questions posed to Longhua Wusheng, and his arguably less-
than-stellar performance in responding, provide crucial clues that even if the Chan 
tradition asserted that ordinary-looking people can nevertheless be buddhas too, this does 
not mean that the claim was automatically accepted by everyone; a consensus had to be 
forged in lived practice and, even after it was widely agreed upon, it was always subject 
to dispute. Moreover, it suggests that even people who accepted in principle that Chan 
masters are buddhas did not necessarily grant each individual Chan master the respect 
owed a buddha until it had been properly earned. Longhua’s performance, then, seems to 
have been a “ritual failure,” not quite measuring up to the “felicity conditions” that would 
decisively authenticate his status as a true living buddha.89 Of course, we cannot say for 
                                                
88 師開堂日。僧問：「⼀一佛出世，諸天捧⾜足。和尚出世，什麼⼈人捧⾜足？」師云：「⾜足認來意。」 
問：「如何是佛？」師云：「向儞道三⼗十⼆二相，得麼？」問：「如何是龍華為⼈人⼀一句？」師云：
「別無善巧。」 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 567b16–19. 
 
89 On the notion of “ritual failure,” see for example Hüsken, When Rituals Go Wrong. On “felicity 
conditions,” see Austin, How to Do Things, and my discussion in the Introduction. 
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certain whether this lackluster performance really impacted Longhua’s career or not; but 
it does make us aware that any time Chan masters stepped on stage—and perhaps 
especially during the initial “opening the hall” ceremony—they faced an element of 
uncertainty and risk. 
At the conclusion of the Chanyuan qinggui’s instructions for the routine 
performance of the “ascending the hall” ceremony in Chan monasteries, we find the 
following warning: 
If a questioner should say something funny, no one should burst out 
laughing or even break a slight smile. They should maintain a demeanor of 
sincerity and solemnity while listening to the profound sound [of the 
abbot’s words].90 
 
While this injunction suggests, as T. Griffith Foulk notes, that these “were extremely 
formal ceremonies,”91 it also registers an anxiety about the contingency of the abbot’s 
authority while “ascending the hall,” the vulnerability of that authority to possible 
subversion from the audience. Sometimes a pithy response to a pointed question, uttered 
with rhetorical flourish, seems to have been enough to demonstrate authority to the 
assembled crowd. But unlike the Buddha’s visibly marvelous body and the spectacular 
displays that accompanied his sermons, whose demonstrative power was unmistakable, 
Chan masters’ demonstrations of the authority of personal buddhahood were of necessity 
much more subtle affairs, always subject to contestation and requiring an entirely new 
regime of discernment. Ironically, given the force with which the Buddha’s sole and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
90 如問話⼈人有可笑之事，不得喧堂⼤大笑及破顏微哂。當⽣生慇重肅聽⽞玄音。 Chanyuan qinggui, X. 
no. 1245, 63: 527b19–20. Translation follows Yifa, Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes, 136, with 
alterations. 
 
91 Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 177. 
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unquestionable authority was articulated in most canonical Buddhist sources, it was 
precisely the lack of central authority in Chan—the ever-presence of many Chan masters 
living at the same time—that opened up the space for constant negotiation and dispute. 
Even as the Chan tradition shifted its aesthetic preferences toward an earthy realism 
consonant with the tastes of mainstream elite culture, and even as the “marks of the great 
man” floated into the half-ironic space of a pregnant metaphor, important questions 
remained to be resolved: if not by the canonical thirty-two marks, then how exactly 
should one evaluate Buddhist authority? How can one recognize buddhahood? By 
extension, according to what normative model should one seek to become a buddha? As 
we will see in the next chapter, in providing answers to these questions, many leading 
Chan Buddhists in the tenth and eleventh centuries ended up leaning heavily upon the 




It is said in canonical Buddhist scriptures that when people witnessed the Buddha 
Śākyamuni preach the Dharma, his body adorned with the spectacular “marks of the great 
man,” his presence lofty and majestic, they were powerfully moved to devotion.92 Chan 
masters, for their part, generally lacked any such spectacular traits and thus could not 
count on the same instantaneous positive reaction from their audiences, who sometimes 
not only failed to be inspired but even challenged their authority. How, then, did Chan 
                                                
92 Indeed, accounts of people viewing the Buddha’s bodily marks often pair this salvific moment with 
their hearing the Buddha preach, the combination apparently particularly powerful in convincing these 
people to convert to the Buddhist cause. See for example the cases mentioned above in Amituo jing 
tongzan shu, T. no. 1758, 37: 336b28–c4 and 341b21–23. 
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masters justify their status and successfully convince people that they possessed an 
authority equal to the Buddha? Of course, membership in a Chan lineage was the most 
obvious certification of authority—but as I suggested in the Introduction, this merely 
begs the question of how Chan genealogical claims themselves gained broad public 
legitimacy, and once that legitimacy was established, how an individual might come to be 
deemed worthy to join a Chan lineage in the first place. As we have seen, hagiographies 
of Tang-dynasty Chan masters, like those of non-Chan eminent monks and even secular 
rulers, drew upon a synthetic repertoire of unusual bodily signs drawn from both 
Buddhist scriptures and indigenous Chinese culture to help justify their claims to special 
eminence. But something changed around the beginning of the Song dynasty: these 
inherited tropes lost their power to straightforwardly signify authority for Chan Buddhists. 
What happened to bring about this shift? While it may be impossible to say for 
certain, we can at least hypothesize that it was related to the shifting social landscape of 
the Song period and the new social circles within which Chan Buddhists were moving as 
they consolidated their dominance of elite monastic Buddhism in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries. In particular, the Song-dynasty Chan tradition participated in a newly 
hegemonic literati culture of representational realism, a cultural shift that was both 
aesthetic and epistemological. Does this mean that in the Song we witness a long-
deferred triumph of the critique of visible “signs of buddhahood” promised by Tang-
dynasty Chan masters like Huangbo, but compromised for hundreds of years by Chan’s 
ongoing participation in the medieval culture of using bodily signs to signal special 
authority? We should not be too hasty in arriving at this conclusion. For one thing, as we 
have seen, the “marks of the great man” helped authenticate the authority of the Buddha’s 
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teachings even in Perfection of Wisdom scriptures that were otherwise critical of 
conventional categories. The “marks of the great man” moreover did not simply vanish 
after the rise of Chan, but rather continued to surface for discussion in Chan literature, 
often still serving the same purpose of signaling a Chan master’s authority—if in a more 
oblique or half-ironic manner. Even when the canonical buddha-marks were absent, 
however, we should not take this as evidence that Chan Buddhists had truly moved 
beyond marks and signs; rather, the power to authenticate was merely displaced onto new 
signs. 
For all that changed in Chan across the Tang-Song transition, from a 
straightforward to an ironic relationship with extraordinary bodily signs, from a medieval 
aesthetic of bodily exceptionality to a Song-period aesthetic of realism, the problem of 
representing authority never went away. Indeed, no matter how strongly Chan Buddhists 
insisted on the basic unreality of marks and signs, the very institution of Chan and its 
multifaceted equation of masters and buddhas demanded a model of the Chan master as 
buddha, as well as a mechanism for distinguishing buddhas from non-buddhas, those fit 
to join the lineage and those unfit to do so. After all, this was an elite organization that 
maintained rigorous standards and clearly defined boundaries. If not by the buddha-marks, 
how could the living buddhas of the Chan tradition be distinguished from everyone else? 
As we will see in greater depth going forward, this was a pressing question with many 
facets—pedagogical and exegetical, social and soteriological, public-facing and 





The Heroic “Great Man” 
 
Only when you can cut through nails and shear through iron will you have what it 
takes to be a teacher in our tradition. If you flee from [oncoming] arrows and duck 
away from swords, how can you become a fully capable master? 
斬釘截鐵，始可為本分宗師。避箭隈⼑刀，焉能為通⽅方作者？ 
— Yuanwu Keqin, Blue Cliff Record (Biyan lu 碧巖錄)1 
 
 
In the Song dynasty, the “great man” (da zhangfu) became a central figure of Chan 
mastery, a discursive space wherein the tradition’s emerging social identity and 
soteriological ideals could be articulated and negotiated. But the history of this term, its 
shifting meanings and the various ways it was deployed by Chan Buddhists, has received 
relatively little scholarly attention. The major exception is Miriam Levering’s important 
1992 article “Lin-chi (Rinzai) Ch’an and Gender: The Rhetoric of Equality and the 
Rhetoric of Heroism,” along with subsequent work on women in Chan Buddhism by 
Ding-hwa Hsieh and Beata Grant. Levering’s essay juxtaposes what she sees as two 
contradictory rhetorical modes simultaneously operating in the Song-dynasty Chan 
tradition, with particular focus on the Linji lineage. The first is what she calls the 
“rhetoric of equality,” which maintains that because all beings possess buddha-nature, 
women and men hold equal capacity for enlightenment. The second, by contrast, which 
she calls the “rhetoric of heroism,” centers on the figure of the “great man” and presents a 
vision of a normatively male Chan hero who is fierce, brave, and decisive. This tension 
                                                
1 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi Biyan lu, T. no 2003, 48: 157a16–17. Translation adapted with alterations 




identified by Levering underpins a central argument of this dissertation: that no matter 
how much Chan Buddhists emphasized a metaphysical ideal of universal buddhahood, 
they also established an institutional identity that depended crucially upon normative 
ideals of Chan mastery—ideals that were not metaphysical but personal, not formless but 
figural. 
In Chapter 5, we will build on Levering’s findings to consider the “great man” as 
a gendered trope that shaped the Chan tradition’s attitudes toward normative masculinity 
and its treatment of women who sought entry into its patriarchal ranks. For the purposes 
of the present chapter, we will steer our analysis of the “great man” in a different 
direction. As we have seen, the term “great man” was a canonical epithet for the Buddha, 
and the Chinese da zhangfu was often used to translate the Sanskrit mahāpuruṣa. Its 
deployment as a normative ideal by Chan Buddhists thus participated in the broader Chan 
claim that its masters are buddhas, as well as the negotiations surrounding precisely what 
this entails. Yet the “great man” also had deep roots as a contested category in indigenous 
Chinese culture, where it often referred to loyal ministers and valiant warriors. This 
connection allowed Chan Buddhists to pack the term with overdetermined meaning both 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist, placing themselves alongside generals and ministers as 
indispensable contributors to a well-functioning Chinese state and a well-ordered cosmos. 
 The “great man” was widely understood in China to connote someone with a 
broad, well-rounded character, precisely the opposite of a narrow-minded pedant. This 
feature of the “great man” helped Chan Buddhists reject medieval traditions of evaluating 
eminence in terms of achievements in a particular specialized field of expertise—
including traditions of meditation from which early inventors of the Chan lineage itself 
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first retroactively recruited its purported founding members, as well as traditions of 
expertise in the vinaya (monastic code). In its place, Chan Buddhists deployed the figure 
of the “great man” to make a much broader claim to authority. In so doing, they both 
drew upon these multiple lines of citational resonance—Indian and Chinese—inhering in 
the trope of the “great man,” and in the process transformed this pedigreed ideal into 
something new. We will seek to uncover how these transformations of the “great man” 
contributed to the articulation of Chan identity during the Song, and how they unfolded in 
coordination with broader trends in Song-dynasty Chinese culture. 
We begin by considering how even in the process of dismantling the canonical 
Buddhist formulation of thirty-two “marks of the great man,” Chan Buddhists 
nevertheless continued to articulate their understanding of great manhood using tropes 
adopted from canonical descriptions of the Buddha. Next we turn to Chan Buddhists’ use 
of the term “great man” as a mechanism for separating Chan identity from its earlier 
associations with skill in meditation, instead portraying the Chan tradition as a lineage of 
“great men” who cast off all claims to specialized expertise and simply accomplished the 
path to liberation. This maneuver cleared the way for Chan Buddhists to render Buddhist 
and Chinese ideals commensurable through explicit comparisons of three types of “great 
men”: generals, ministers, and Chan masters. In the end, I suggest that Song-dynasty 
Chan Buddhists tended to place particular emphasis on the ideal Chan master’s bravery 
and martial heroism, in a manner bound up with (yet not entirely determined by) 
changing literati attitudes toward civil and military aspects of governance over the course 
of the Song dynasty. 
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“Towering and majestic” 
 
A sermon attributed to one of Mazu Daoyi’s disciples named Fenzhou Wuye 汾州無業 
(761–822), but first found only in texts dating to the early eleventh century, encapsulates 
with particular clarity the way Song-dynasty Chan Buddhists reordered the terms and 
tropes by which a “great man” might be known: 
[If you would be] great men, just go now and take a rest, suddenly putting 
a stop to the myriad conditions [that perpetuate the cycle of rebirth], 
surpassing the flow of life and death, and far escaping fixed patterns. [For 
those who accomplish this,] all is but a glow of numinous radiance, and 
[such great men] are not bound by material things. Towering and majestic, 
they walk alone [unmatched] in the three worlds. What need is there to be 
1.6 zhang tall, [with a body] of gleaming violet-polished gold, pendants 
hanging from the neck, a halo around the head, or the mark of a broad and 
long tongue? If one views oneself by means of form, this is treading an 
evil path.2 
This passage centers around the definition of the “great man,” which as we have seen was 
a common Chinese translation for the Sanskrit mahāpuruṣa and thus inseparable from the 
canonical thirty-two marks as a sign-system for representing buddhahood. But here Wuye 
suggests, contrary to that tradition, that one needn’t possess the “marks of the great man” 
in order to be a “great man,” going so far as to list a handful of well-known buddha-
                                                
2 ⼤大丈夫兒如今直下便休歇去，頓息萬緣，越⽣生死流，逈出常格，靈光獨照，物累不拘，巍巍
堂堂，三界獨步。何必身長丈六、紫磨⾦金輝、項佩圓光、廣長舌相？若以⾊色見我，是⾏行邪道。 
Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 445a4–8. 
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marks that he claims are totally superfluous to great manhood. His conclusion that it is 
not just misguided but fully an evil heterodoxy to view one’s true self—which is to say 
one’s intrinsic buddha-nature—as something that could be seen through visible form is 
perfectly in line with the critique of formal signs of buddhahood that we have seen 
running through Chan literature for centuries in the previous chapter. 
At the same time, if we look carefully at this passage we notice that Wuye has not 
disposed of canonical tropes of buddhahood entirely: when he says that Chan aspirants 
ought to be “towering and majestic, walking alone [unmatched] in the three worlds” 
(weiwei tangtang, sanjie dubu 巍巍堂堂，三界獨步), he is borrowing phrases used 
routinely in canonical Buddhist literature to describe the Buddha, often in the immediate 
vicinity of descriptions of his thirty-two marks.3 The result is that in the very act of trying 
to cast the canonical marks of buddhahood into the dustbin of history—their 
soteriological power lost in translation, irrelevant to a new time and place—Wuye also 
elevates to special normative importance an adjacent canonical trope of the Buddha’s 
lofty, heroic demeanor and unrivalled status—not to mention amplifying the centrality of 
the figure of the “great man” itself. What is going on here? It is worth lingering over this 
moment, because it hints at the complexity of Chan Buddhists’ relationship with the past, 
                                                
3 For examples of canonical uses of weiwei tangtang, see Fo benxing ji jing, T. no. 190, 3: 751c18–25; 
Wenshushili fotu yanjing jing, T. no. 318, 11: 892a2–10; and Foshuo youtian wang jing, T. no. 332, 12: 
70c15–17. In Tang China poets like Bai Juyi 白居易 (772–846) reiterated this phrase’s chiefly 
eulogistic function in their own poems of praise for the Buddha; see his “Zan fo ji” 讚佛偈 in Quan 
Tangwen, j. 677, 6924, which versifies that the Buddha is “towering and majestic, teacher of gods and 
humans” 堂堂巍巍，為天⼈人師. Emperor Taizong 太宗 (597–649; r. 626–629) adapted the phrase for 
non-Buddhist use to acclaim the famous physician and medical scholar Sun Simiao 孫思邈 (581–682); 
see “Ci zhenren Sun Simiao song” 賜真⼈人孫思邈頌, in Quan Tangwen, j. 4, 49, where he writes that 
Sun is “towering and majestic, teacher to one hundred generations” 巍巍堂堂，百代之師. For 
canonical uses of sanjie dubu, see Fo benxing ji jing, T. no. 190, 3: 806b3-5; Foshuo yizu jing, T. no. 
198, 4: 186a21-24; and Dushi pin jing, T. no. 292, 10: 651b26-29. 
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with canonical tradition, and with the specific example of buddhahood provided by the 
Buddha Śākyamuni. 
“Towering and majestic, walking alone in the three worlds”: these were more than 
passing words meant to spur on students to make effort in their practice. Rather, tropes 
such as these helped fill out a powerfully normative rearticulation of the ideal “great man,” 
which in Song-period Chan began to assume a new shape, not entirely unlike the old one 
but not identical to it either. For an example of this particular trope in action, we can 
consider the case of Baizhang Huaihai 百丈懷海 (720–814), legendary founder of 
“farming Chan” (as we will see in Chapter 7), and his relationship to his students, which 
included Baizhang and other major figures. In the Zutang ji we find the following 
exchange between Chan masters Yunyan Tancheng 雲巖曇晟 (782–841), a disciple of 
Yaoshan Weiyan 藥⼭山惟嚴 (746–829), and Guishan Lingyou 溈⼭山靈祐 (771–853), a 
disciple of Baizhang: 
The master [Guishan] asked Yunyan: “I’ve heard that you have resided 
with Yaoshan for a long time, is that so?” Yunyan replied: “Yes.” Guishan 
asked: “What are Yaoshan’s ‘marks of the great man’?” Yunyan replied: 
“They exist after nirvāṇa.” Guishan asked: “What does ‘they exist after 
nirvāṇa’ mean?” Yunyan said: “Even water can’t get him wet.” Yunyan 
then turned the question back to [Guishan]: “What are Baizhang’s ‘marks 
of the great man’?” Guishan said: “Towering and majestic, blazing and 
shining. Before sound, there is no sound; after form, there is no form. Like 
a mosquito on an iron bull, there’s no place for you to bite.”4 
 
This passage is not, on first reading, very easy to understand. Let us take it a piece at a 
time. What is the conversation about? Guishan and Yunyan are inquiring about each 




處。」 Zutang ji, j. 16, v. 2, 724. 
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other’s respective masters, Baizhang and Yaoshan. Importantly, the way they both frame 
their inquiries is with the question, “what are your master’s ‘marks of the great man’?” 
But the answers are not any of the canonical marks with which we have been dealing so 
far. Instead, the students offer up pithy but not (at first glance) entirely clear turns of 
phrase. The subtext of the question “what are your master’s ‘marks of the great man’?” 
thus seems here in part to be: what makes your master special? What makes your master 
a real buddha, a true great man? What is your master’s specific manner of teaching, his 
“house style,” his particular approach to Chan? Detached from their canonical referents, 
the “marks of the great man” are well suited to encapsulating all of these qualities—
ironic in relation to the original meaning of the term, the literal thirty-two major and 
eighty minor bodily marks, but perfectly earnest in their power to convey the deeper 
question: what is it that gives your master authority, that proves your master is really a 
great man and living buddha? 
 Their respective responses to this question, again, seem at first rather mystifying. 
Yunyan says of Yaoshan’s “marks of the great man” that “they exist after nirvāṇa,” an 
intentional contradiction in terms: nirvāṇa by definition entails extinction, the final end 
of an individual’s existence, the Sanskrit literally meaning “blown out” like a lamp. The 
effect of this reply is a bit like Nanyuan Daoming’s “wait for me to acquire the [buddha-
]mark of a broad and long tongue, then I’ll tell you,” which we considered above. In 
other words, it suggests that the very premise of the question is preposterous. Another 
exchange in the Zutang ji attributed to one of Mazu’s disciples, Mingxi Daoxing 茗谿道
⾏行 (d.u.), features the phrase used to similar effect: 
A monk asked: “What is the road of correct practice?” The master said: “It 
exists after nirvāṇa.” The monk asked: “What does ‘it exists after nirvāṇa’ 
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mean?” The master said: “Don’t wash your face.” The monk said: “[I,] 
your student, do not understand.” The master said: “There is no face that 
you could wash.”5 
 
In this exchange, the point is that if any “road of correct practice” exists, it already leads 
somewhere other than to one’s innate buddha-nature, which one merely needs to realize 
as already fully present; likewise, if there is any face to be washed, it can only be a 
physical face and not the true face of reality, which is already perfect and therefore 
precludes the dualistic reliance on binary categories like “washed” and “unwashed.” And 
yet precisely the logical impossibility expressed by the phrase “existence after nirvāṇa,” 
a seemingly straightforward expression of apophasis, still hints at a mysterious source of 
authority just out of view. The face that cannot be washed suggests the mysterious 
“original face” (benlai mianmu 本來面目) often discussed in Chan literature. Like the 
uṣṇīṣa, this face is understood to be invisible but somehow present. No wonder, then, that 
as Yunyan elaborates, “even water can’t get him wet.” Yaoshan’s true self, the source of 
his authority, the locus of his buddhahood is beyond the reach of such things, cannot be 
touched yet nevertheless powerfully exerts itself in the world. 
 What about Baizhang? He is “towering and majestic,” a reiteration of the trope of 
buddhahood we have been discussing; and moreover, with recourse to an indigenous 
Chinese trope for outstanding brilliance, he is “blazing and shining.”6 The several lines 
                                                
5 僧問：「如何是正修⾏行路？」師云：「涅槃後有。」僧云：「如何是涅槃後有。」師云：
「無洗面。」僧云：「學⼈人不會。」師云：「無面可洗。」 Zutang ji, j. 14, v. 2, 629. 
 
6 The latter half of this four-character expression, “shining” or “sparklingly bright” (huanghuang 煌煌) 
is found in the Shijing, which uses it to characterize the brightness of stars; see Zhou, Shijing yizhu, 
“Dongmen zhi yang” 東門之楊, 194. The Shiji uses the similar expression huanghuang huhu 煌煌扈
扈 to describe bright red flowers; see Shiji, j. 117, v. 9, 3028. The Heshang Gong 河上公 commentary 
to the Laozi uses huanhuan huanghuang 煥煥煌煌 to describe a brightness so bright it cannot be seen; 
see Wang, Laozi daodejing Heshang Gong zhangju, “Neng wei 能為,” j. 1, 35. Other early texts use 
this phrase to describe the emperor or feudal lords. For example, the Hou Hanshu includes the verse: 
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that follow “blazing and shining” embellish these tropes, furthering our sense of what 
they entail in this new context of Chan literature. “Before sound, there is no sound; after 
form, there is no form”—these impossible temporalities beyond mundane life resemble 
Yaoshan’s “existence after nirvāṇa.” And like Yaoshan, Baizhang is ultimately 
untouchable, like an iron bull that a mosquito cannot possibly bite. Thus although 
Baizhang and Yaoshan belonged respectively to the rival lineages of Mazu Daoyi and 
Shitou Xiqian ⽯石頭希遷 (701–791), whose respective soteriologies Ogawa Takashi has 
argued differed in important ways,7 we nevertheless see here that their reputations shared 
crucial similarities. This should perhaps not surprise us, because these similarities hinge 
upon the problem of authority, its signs and sources, which was common to all Chan 
lineages by virtue of the fact that they all shared commitment to the same institutional 
premise that Chan masters were living buddhas. Several centuries later, the Yuan-dynasty 
Chan master Xiaoyin Daxi 笑隱⼤大訢 (1284–1344) made clear these connections when he 
sermonized: “Have you seen these ‘marks of the great man’ that exist after nirvāṇa? At 
ease, reclining the body outside the three worlds; majestic, walking alone before the 
                                                                                                                                            
“the sagely emperor performs the ancestral sacrifices, majestic and shining” 聖皇宗祀，穆穆煌煌; 
Hou Hanshu, “Ban Biao liezhuan” 班彪列傳, j. 40 xia 下, v. 5, 1371. Later in the same text we find 
“the Son of Heaven is majestic; the feudal lords are shining” 天⼦子穆穆，諸侯煌煌; Hou Hanshu, 
“Diwu, Zhongli, Song Han liezhuan” 第五鍾離宋寒列傳, j. 41, v. 5, 1407. And so on. The expression 
huanghuang went on to be widely used in Chan literature. 
 
7 Ogawa argues that Mazu’s Hongzhou school treated buddha-nature as fully identical with one’s 
everyday self, whereas members of Shitou’s lineage critiqued this position by drawing attention to 
gaps between one’s “true” self or innate buddha-nature and one’s everyday self of phenomenal 
behavior and activity. These critiques of Mazu’s position by members of Shitou’s lineage often come 
in the form of witty exchanges and send-ups. See Ogawa, Goroku no shisōshi, Chapter 1. 
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empty eon.”8 These various figures of impossibility are not simply logical paradoxes, but 
register both the marvelously possible impossibility of enlightenment—as we have seen 
above in the case of the uṣṇīṣa—as well as the deep-seated tensions at the heart of the 
relationship between representation and authority in Chan. 
 At the same time, the conversation between Guishan and Yunyan also illuminates 
a meaning of the “marks of the great man”—under whose broadened definition “towering 
and majestic” here appears9—that we have not yet considered: Chan masters, especially 
famous ones like Baizhang and Yaoshan, were never only viewed as individuals of high 
spiritual attainment, but were also understood in their capacity as teachers, often of very 
large groups of disciples. Indeed, this dimension of the buddha-marks’ signifying power 
makes perfect sense in light of the canonical differentiation between buddhas and 
bodhisattvas, on the one hand, and (theoretically markless) arhats and pratyekabuddhas 
on the other. Whereas the former were understood to remain in the world in order to save 
all sentient beings, the latter were, in Mahāyāna polemic, cast as individuals dedicated 
only to their own enlightenment but not to the salvation of others. Unlike the extra-
worldly meditators that populated the earliest Chan genealogies, major figures of later 
Tang-dynasty Chan as well as Song-period Chan masters were always seen as 
bodhisattvas, individuals who—as the canonical refrain often repeated by Chan 
                                                
8 諸⼈人還見此老涅槃後⼤大⼈人相麼？落落橫身三界外，堂堂獨步劫空前。 Xiaoyin Daxi chanshi 
yulu, X. no. 1367, 69: 707a20–21. On the phrase “before the empty eon,” see Tsuchiya, Beisong 
chanzong, 40; and Schlütter, “‘Before the Empty Eon.’” 
 
9 Some Song-dynasty Chan masters seem to have considered “towering and majestic” to be an actual 
canonical buddha-mark; see for example Wansong laoren pingchang Tiantong Jue heshang songgu 
Congrong an lu, T. no. 2004, 48: 256a21–23. 
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Buddhists has it—“benefit themselves and others” (zili lita 自利利他).10 This passage of 
dialogue, then, not only helps us unravel the knot of doctrine and authority considered 
above, but also stages a scene at once more mundane and more complex: Yunyan and 
Guishan as fellow students sharing information about their teachers and comparing notes. 
If their descriptions are anything to go by, these teachers acquired reputations for being 
stern and forbidding, teaching only by lofty negative example, their buddha-marks a 
series of impossibilities, their true selves nearly invisible. Nearly, but not entirely—as we 
have seen, Baizhang was “towering and majestic, blazing and bright,” and these phrases 
are not simply logical contradictions but have a shape, if a hazier one than the canonical 
thirty-two marks. 
The “marks of the great man” and adjacent canonical tropes of the Buddha’s 
heroism thus indexed for Chan Buddhists not only personal realization but also 
pedagogical capacity and style. What did that mean in practice? While we will consider 
this topic in more detail in subsequent chapters, for now we can at least gain a 
preliminary sense of the pedagogical role of these tropes, and their stakes for the 
institution of lineage transmission, by turning to legends surrounding Baizhang’s 
relationship with another of his disciples, Huangbo. Like Baizhang, Huangbo is also 
described in various sources as having been “towering and majestic.” We see this already 
in his entry in the Song Biographies of Eminent Monks, wherein it is said that, during his 
wandering days before finding a master, an inn-keeper advises him to seek out Baizhang 
and remarks just by looking at him that his aspirations are “towering and majestic,” 
                                                
10 On this fissure within Chan identity, see Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 127. 
 
 120 
making him “truly a vessel for the Great Vehicle.”11 This story seems to have developed 
by the eleventh century into a dramatic portrayal of his first encounter with Baizhang: 
When [Huangbo] first arrived at Baizhang’s [monastery], Baizhang 
remarked: “Towering and majestic! Where have you come from?” 
Huangbo replied: “Towering and majestic! I’ve come from the mountains.” 
Baizhang asked: “What have you come for?” Huangbo replied: “For no 
other matter [than to be a buddha].” [Thereupon] Baizhang deeply 
perceived his [eligibility to serve as] a vessel [for Chan transmission].12 
 
This scene strikingly restages Huineng’s first encounter with Hongren in the Platform 
Sūtra that we have considered in the Introduction—Huangbo’s reply “for no other matter” 
(bu wei bieshi 不為別事) alluding to Huineng’s words in that scene—but with quite 
different results. Unlike in the Platform Sūtra, where Hongren immediately challenges 
Huineng on the grounds that he does not look like a buddha, here it is precisely their 
mutual resemblance that leads Baizhang to instantly authorize Huangbo’s promise as a 
student of Chan: it takes a buddha to know one. Transmission thus operates in this case 
uncannily like a mirror. 
This moment of authentication grounded in a canonical trope of the Buddha’s 
lofty heroism, though again clearly fictional, nevertheless brings into view the mechanics 
of the Chan tradition’s institutional continuity, which required some kind of measurable 
criteria for selecting those worthy of becoming a “vessel” of Chan. Of course, this is a 
dramatically simplified portrayal of lineage transmission, and as we will see over the 
                                                
11 勸師可往尋百丈⼭山禪師：「所惜巍巍乎堂堂乎，真⼤大乘器也。」 Song gaoseng zhuan, T. no. 
2061, 50: 842c13–14. 
 
12 初到百丈，丈問云：「巍巍堂堂；從什麼處來？」檗云：「巍巍堂堂；從嶺中來。」丈云：
「來為何事？」檗云：「不為別事。」百丈深器之。Foguo Yuanwu Chanshi Biyan lu, T. no. 
2003, 48: 151b24–27. Later renditions of Huangbo’s encounter with Baizhang added even more 
repetitions of the phrase “towering and majestic” so that each line of dialogue begins this way; see, for 
example, Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 14a15–17; and Wudeng huiyuan, X. no. 1565, 80: 88b4–6. 
 
 121 
course of this dissertation, the real process certainly involved considerably more 
demonstrative work on the part of the student and evaluative work on the part of the 
master. But this passage is still powerful in its suggestion that the criteria used in such 
processes of demonstration and evaluation did not hinge exclusively on the issue of 
enlightenment, as scholars have traditionally thought, but also included repurposed tropes 
like “towering and majestic” originally used to describe the Buddha Śākyamuni’s 
recognizably heroic and lofty demeanor.13 Indeed, the term “towering” (weiwei) in its 
most literal sense refers to extraordinary height, a bodily feature that—as we have seen in 
the previous chapter—was shared by both the Buddha and Huangbo, and played an 
important role in establishing and reproducing the vertical logic of Buddhist authority. 
 Although tropes such as “towering and majestic” were quoted directly from 
canonical Buddhist scriptures, we should keep in mind as I suggested in the Introduction 
that citation itself can be powerfully innovative, and the ways Chan Buddhists redeployed 
these tropes were quite new. It is one thing, after all, to use tropes of heroism to praise the 
Buddha Śākyamuni for his unique accomplishment, as we find in canonical scriptures. 
It’s quite another to suggest, as Fenzhou Wuye, Yuanwu Keqin and many other Chan 
masters did, that all Buddhist aspirants should act in the same way and become heroes 
themselves. This rhetorical maneuver sat in subtle tension with earlier theories of 
universal buddha-nature, as well as with Song-period Chan rereadings of the person and 
bodily marks of buddhahood as metaphysical and fully immanent in the material world. 
                                                
13 Conversely, in a humorous inversion of this sort of trope, when Mazu Daoyi met Fenzhou Wuye 
(both of whom we have considered above), it is said that “Observing that [Wuye’s] bodily appearance 
was extraordinary and mighty, his voice like a bell, Mazu said: ‘A lofty buddha hall, but no buddha 
inside.’” 馬祖覩其狀貌瓌偉語音如鐘，乃曰：「巍巍佛堂，其中無佛。」 Jingde chuandeng lu, 
T. no. 2076, 51: 257a8–9. 
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By transforming eulogistic tropes for the Buddha’s heroism into normative tropes that 
modeled an attainable buddhahood in particular ways, Chan Buddhists laid the 
groundwork for an unprecedented claim to religious authority and a radically new 
soteriology, both grounded in the flickering contours of the figure of the “great man.” 
 
The “great man” and the rejection of specialized excellence 
 
The foundations of the Chan tradition lie in an invented lineage of meditation specialists, 
which connected the figures of Bodhidharma and Huike (who had appeared in the Xu 
gaoseng zhuan), through the otherwise unknown figure of Sengcan, to the “East 
Mountain” (Dongshan 東⼭山) school of Daoxin and his student Hongren. Throughout all 
the Chan lineage’s subsequent vicissitudes, the presence of these five figures remained 
constant.14 Yet by the Song dynasty, Chan identity had undergone a dramatic 
transformation. As T. Griffith Foulk writes: 
It is easy to assume that the mark of a Ch’an master (ch’an-shih) in the 
Sung would have been skill in meditation (ch’an). The term ch’an-shih 
does in fact mean “meditation master” in texts dating from the T’ang and 
earlier, but many proponents of the Ch’an lineage in the Sung vigorously 
denied that the name Ch’an signified any particular reliance on the 
practice of dhyana (ch’an-na, commonly abbreviated as ch’an).15 
 
In other words, Chan Buddhists in the Song worked hard to rewrite the meaning of the 
word chan, and to transform the tradition’s identity from a group of meditation specialists 
to something larger. This does not mean that Chan Buddhists actually stopped meditating 
                                                
14 Only in some of the earliest Chan transmission records was a sixth figure, the translator Guṇabhadra, 
included as the first patriarch, preceding Bodhidharma. See McRae, The Northern School, 89–90; and 
Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 14. 
 
15 Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 160. 
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in the Song, though neither did they meditate any more than other Buddhist monastics.16 
Indeed, Song-period Chan Buddhists were not merely—perhaps in the end not really at 
all—turning against meditation per se, but rather were inventing a radically new 
alternative to the entire medieval structure of evaluating eminence in monastic Buddhism 
in terms of advanced achievements in a particular skill or enterprise, including but not 
limited to meditation. 
How did this shift come about? While the teachings of Shenhui and the Platform 
Sūtra do level critiques at seated meditation,17 it was only in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries that these critiques truly began to transform the Chan tradition’s identity. 
Perhaps the most famous case held up as an example of this shift is a story featuring the 
famous Tang-dynasty Chan master Mazu Daoyi, but only first found in the Zutang ji 祖
堂集 of 952, and thus reflecting an attitude that was emerging just prior to the advent of 
the Song dynasty. In this story, Mazu—while still a student and not yet a master—was 
said to have been practicing seated meditation in hopes of becoming a buddha when his 
teacher Nanyue Huairang 南嶽懐譲 (677–744) came along and mocked his disciple’s 
efforts, comparing Mazu’s prospect of success in this endeavor to that of polishing a 
                                                
16 Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 186 and 192; and Yü, “Chan Education in the Sung,” 
60. 
 
17 These criticisms do not seem to have pushed the matter any further than did canonical scriptures 
like the Mahāyāna Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra (Weimojie jing 維摩詰經), which critiques an overly 
formalistic attachment to the seated posture in favor of an emphasis on one’s state of mind. See, for 
example, the Platform Sūtra: Liuzu tanjing, T. no. 2007, 48: 339a3–6; translated in Yampolsky, The 
Platform Sutra, 140. Indeed, Shenhui himself explicitly cited this passage in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra to 
justify his critique of meditation; see Hu, “Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism in China,” 7. These criticisms likely 
did not entail actual cessation of the practice of seated meditation, and the Platform Sūtra itself closes 
with Huineng instructing students to continue communal meditation after his death; Liuzu tanjing, T. 
no. 2007, 48: 345a20–21; and translation in Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra, 181. See also Sharf, 
“Mindfulness and Mindlessness,” 936–37. 
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brick into a mirror.18 This story is illuminating not only because it involves a criticism of 
seated meditation, but also because it frames this criticism in terms of the perceived 
incapacity of meditation to turn one into a buddha. It thus reveals that the Chan 
tradition’s emerging soteriological goal of buddhahood—and its closely connected claim 
to an authority deriving from buddhahood—was understood to be in tension with, even 
opposed to, expertise in meditation. 
Yet the nascent claim that Chan masters were buddhas entailed more than a 
rejection of skill in meditation as grounds for authority. The Zutang ji preserves two 
illustrative examples of early attempts by members of the Chan tradition to distance 
themselves from specialization-based claims to eminence. Tellingly, in both cases the 
Chan master in question takes rhetorical recourse to the figure of the “great man,” and in 
both cases aims his criticism not at meditation mastery but rather at the alleged pedantry 
of expertise in the monastic code. The first case concerns Chan master Yaoshan Weiyan 
(746–829), whose lofty teaching style as discussed by his disciples we considered in the 
previous section. Yaoshan’s entry in the Zutang ji narrates that after initially receiving the 
precepts at Mount Heng 衡嶽 from a master specializing in the monastic code, he 
nevertheless declined to take up his ordination master’s field of expertise, remarking: “A 
great man ought to depart from [mundane] dharmas (fa 法) and purify himself. How 
could I focus on trivial details like [what kind of] cloth [is appropriate for monks to 
wear]?”19 Thereupon, the story continues, he called upon Chan master Shitou Xiqian, 
                                                
18 Zutang ji, j. 3, v. 1, 191; see also revised version of the story in Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 
51: 240c18–28. 
 
19 ⼤大丈夫當離法自淨，焉能屑屑事細⾏行於布⼱巾耶？ Zutang ji, j. 4, v. 1, 223. 
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from whom he went on to receive lineage transmission. Along very similar lines, in the 
Zutang ji entry for Chan master Yunju Daoying 雲居道膺 (d. 902), he is said to have 
received the precepts and begun to specialize in study of the monastic code, but then to 
have experienced a change of heart, pronouncing: “How can a great man be confined to 
such a petty path and [leave] obscure the open-ended vastness [of the true Way]?”20 He 
too is then said to have set out in search of a Chan master, finally receiving transmission 
from Dongshan Liangjie. 
These two masters’ supposedly spontaneous exclamations of impatience with the 
so-called trivialities of the monastic code at pivotal early points in their monastic careers 
should not be read as avowing an intention to transgress monastic regulations, or even to 
critique monastic institutions themselves in any way. Instead, they reject a specialized 
focus on monastic law—a system of regulations for the behavior of monastics that, we 
should recall, had throughout medieval China played a foundational role in Buddhism’s 
transmission, legitimation, and administration on Chinese soil. In the hands of the authors 
and compilers of Chan hagiographies like Yaoshan’s, such a pedantic focus on the formal 
management of monastic life—like the pointlessly “gradual” practice of meditation—was 
cast as irrelevant to a great man’s lofty ambitions. Of course, these exclamations were 
surely meant in part to make fun of the Nanshan Vinaya tradition, which was already an 
important rival of Chan in the tenth century and continued to compete for prominent 
abbacies during the Song.21 But they also reflect a confidence by Chan masters that, 
many centuries after the arrival of Buddhism in China, the position of Buddhist monastics 
                                                
20 ⼤大丈夫兒焉局小道⽽而晦⼤大⽅方？ Zutang ji, j. 8, v. 1, 364. 
 
21 On the Nanshan Vinaya tradition in the tenth century, see Brose, Patrons and Patriarchs, 39–40; on 
its place in the Song, see Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice,” 166. 
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in Chinese society was sufficiently secure that they could denigrate the importance of the 
vinaya—a collection of documents defining the profession of monasticism as distinct 
from the religious practices of even devout laypeople—without fear that it would actually 
damage the Buddhist sangha’s standing in Chinese society. 
The narratives of Yaoshan and Daoying thus appealed to a normative ideal of the 
“great man” as someone with the ambition to cast off inherited conventions, techniques, 
and modes of specialized excellence in order to set out on a heroic quest in search of a 
Chan master. The trope of a particularly gifted monastic realizing the calling to 
something greater than mere specialization—namely Chan—was reiterated in the Linji lu, 
where Linji describes how “in bygone days I devoted myself to the vinaya and also 
delved into the sūtras and śāstras. Only later did I realize that they were [only] medicine 
to save worldly people, [merely] superficial theories. I at once discarded them all and 
[instead] inquired of Chan masters about the Way.”22 Along similar lines, by the eleventh 
century we find Yuanwu Keqin commenting critically on what he sees as a poor showing 
by Nanquan Puyuan in the “old case” under consideration: “What is he saying? Bah! The 
scriptures have teachers of scriptures; the treatises have teachers of treatises. It’s no 
business of a mountain monk.”23 Here the phrase “mountain monk” performs similar 
rhetorical work as a Chan term of art to the trope of the “great man,” standing for an 
                                                
22 秖如⼭山僧往日曾向毘尼中留⼼心，亦曾於經論尋討。後⽅方知是濟世藥表顯之說，遂乃⼀一時拋却，
即訪道參禪。 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b16–18; translation follows 
Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 235, for some of the wording, but differs in one important way. She reads 
canchan 參禪 as meaning “practiced meditation,” while in fact—and not incidentally to the topic 
under discussion in this section—it refers to the more general study of capital-c Chan while calling 
upon various Chan masters. 
 
23 道恁麼？咄！經有經師，論有論師。不⼲干⼭山僧事。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 
2003, 48: 178a5–6; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 244, with alterations. 
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authentic master who carries a deep and abiding authority without needing to lean upon 
specialized excellence in one field of expertise or another.24 In all of these cases, Chan 
mastery is explicitly contrasted not just with meditation, but with expertise in general. 
By means of rhetorical performances like these, Chan Buddhists in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries gradually untied the longstanding discursive knot binding the signifier 
chan to the signified content of “meditation.” In so doing, they also began to unravel the 
larger sets of criteria by which Buddhist monastic eminence had been evaluated for many 
centuries in medieval China—focusing on a single skill or field of expertise in which a 
given monastic’s reputed excellence could be located, discussed, and textually preserved 
for posterity—and to make room for an entirely new understanding of Chinese Buddhist 
authority. 
 
Three of a kind: general, minister, Chan master 
 
Loyal ministers, valiant warriors: these exemplary figures filled the ranks of China’s 
“great men.” What about Chan masters? The idea that they were in any way comparable 
to the aforementioned two groups was far from self-evident at the start of the Song 
dynasty. Rather, Chan Buddhists had to invent the logic by which they could take their 
                                                
24 Along similar lines, Benjamin Brose writes of how Xuefeng Yicun 雪峰義存 (822–908) once 
chastised his student Zongjing 宗靖 (871–954) for taking his shirt off while performing labor, 
apparently a breach of protocol. “Yicun is said to have reprimanded him, predicting that when he later 
became the abbot of a temple, he would have a thousand students but none of them would be a ‘patch-
robed monk’—a term that by the Song would become synonymous with Chan clerics. Zongjing 
repented and left the assembly. When the king of Wuyue later appointed him to Longxing si, replacing 
Lingzhao, Zongjing did preside over more than a thousand monks, but they were “only” interested in 
the three studies (śīla [ethics], dhyāna [meditation], and prajñā [wisdom]), preaching, and recitation. 
The lack of patched-robe monks is represented here as a mark of failure, and it may be for this reason 
that Chan flame records do not credit Zongjing with any heirs.” Brose, Patrons and Patriarchs, 96. 
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place alongside these icons of civil and martial heroism. Of course, they could not 
manufacture such commensurability out of whole cloth. But by chance of translation, the 
“great man” offered a shared measure of excellence. After all, did not the canonical 
Buddhist scriptures in Chinese translation attest over and over that the Buddha was a 
“great man,” surely at least the equal of any general or minister that could be found in 
China’s official dynastic histories? And if Chan masters were themselves more or less 
buddhas, then they too could be considered alongside China’s native heroes, all of them 
“great men” of one sort or another. 
In premodern China, ministers and generals were closely associated with the 
respective fields of civil (wen ⽂文) and martial (wu 武) virtue. Not surprisingly, we also 
find Song-dynasty Chan masters praised for being skilled in both the civil and martial arts. 
For example, Baoning Renyong (fl. ca. Northern Song) comments on a recorded 
encounter between Nanquan and his disciple Zhaozhou, expressing admiration for the 
two earlier masters in the following verse: “Death and life decided in a single instant, 
[these are] heroic fellows; / Practicing both civil and martial [arts], [they have] the talents 
of generals and ministers.”25 Along similar lines, Yuanwu Keqin’s master Wuzu Fayan 
五祖法演 (d. 1104), appraising a recorded dialogue between Shitou and his disciple 
Yaoshan, says: “Little do you know that old man Shitou possesses both civil and martial 
[skills], and is fully [versed] in both tactics and strategy.”26 A list by Yuqiu Jujing 愚丘
居靜 (1093-1185) of qualities that ought to be possessed by Chan aspirants includes, as 
                                                
25 死⽣生⼀一決英雄⼠士，⽂文武雙⾏行將相才。 Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 812a15–16. 
 
26 殊不知⽯石頭老⼈人⽂文武兼備韜略雙全。 Fayan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1995, 47: 651a26–27. 
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number seven, “you must be accomplished in both civil and martial [arts].”27 On the one 
hand, these references to Chan masters possessing civil and martial skills cannot be taken 
literally. Certainly, many Chan masters were highly educated in civil or cultural arts, 
skilled at reading and writing, not to mention versed in canonical scriptures and Chan 
literature and capable of engaging in vigorous debate. Conversely, however, no Chan 
master was expected to possess actual military experience on a battlefield. Yet reference 
to civil and martial virtue in Chan literature was not merely a joke. It attests to the Chan 
tradition’s emerging engagement in longstanding Chinese philosophical debates 
concerning ideal modes of governance and service to the emperor, as well as normative 
criteria by which individual greatness was evaluated. 
 Discourses surrounding civil and martial virtue, and the questions of which should 
hold priority, when, and for whom, have a long and complicated history in China. 
Records from China’s earliest historical periods attest to an ideal of balance between civil 
and martial dimensions of governance under any given dynasty, but by the Qin and Han 
periods there had emerged many advocates of the primacy of one or the other.28 By the 
Tang dynasty, as David McMullen observes, civil officials—who maintained the 
preponderance of cultural power in Chinese society—predictably upheld the civil as the 
most prestigious realm for the measurement of virtue, and relegated military excellence 
to a secondary status. Grounding imperial authority in a hegemonic civil culture was also 
                                                
27 須⽂文武兼濟。 Jiatai pudeng lu, X. no. 1559, 79: 362b7. 
 
28 Rand, “Li Ch’üan and Chinese Military Thought,” 107–11. Retrospectively, the Qin was often 
understood to have been brought down by its own inability to transition from its military rise to power 
to a stably civil mode of governance; see Chen, The Poetics of Sovereignty, 57. 
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viewed as an antidote to residual tensions following the violence of a dynastic shift.29 
Nevertheless, the situation was far from stable, and even advocates of the primacy of the 
civil conceded that martial skill was sometimes necessary to secure the empire’s interests, 
if as a last resort.30 When Tang scholar-officials did propose a balance between civil and 
martial, it was largely used to advance the position that civil officials—each of whom 
ideally balances civil and martial virtues in his own person—should retain control over 
the highest levels of the military, in opposition to the retention of specialized military 
commanders.31 These civil officials, it was said, ought to “go out as generals [when 
circumstances required it] and come back as ministers” (chu jiang ru xiang 出將⼊入相)—
in other words to serve capably either on the battlefield or in civil administration, 
depending on the needs of the state.32 As the Tang gave way to the Song, these ideals 
ceased to reflect actual circumstances and served instead as rhetorical objections to an 
increasing separation on the ground of civil officials from military professionals and live 
battle.33 
 In the Tang, it was relatively uncharted territory for Buddhists to concern 
themselves with the relationship between civil and martial dimensions in governance, 
public life, and individual exemplarity. Certainly it would not have occurred to the 
meditation specialists who populated the earliest Chan genealogies to address the topic of 
                                                
29 Chen, The Poetics of Sovereignty, 55–59. 
 
30 McMullen, “The Cult of Ch’i T’ai-kung,” 67–68. 
 
31 McMullen, “The Cult of Ch’i T’ai-kung,” 75–76. 
 
32 McMullen, “The Cult of Ch’i T’ai-kung,” 76. 
 
33 Lorge, “The Rise of the Martial,” 136–37. 
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civil or martial prowess in their teachings. But as Chan Buddhists began in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries to articulate an identity that would be more commensurable with the 
status of generals and ministers than with their non-Chan Buddhist monastic peers, it was 
only natural that they adopt some of the language by which the accomplishments and 
character of Chinese heroes had for hundreds of years been extolled. A eulogy that 
Yuanwu Keqin read at the funeral of a recently deceased monk offers an excellent place 
to begin exploring how Chan Buddhists accomplished this rhetorical feat. It opens: 
A loyal minister doesn’t fear death, and thus is capable of establishing the 
great affairs of all under Heaven. A brave warrior has no regard for [his 
own] life, and thus is capable of establishing a great reputation among all 
under Heaven. A patch-robed monk penetrates through life and death, not 
afraid of peril or extinction, and thus is capable of establishing [in the 
world] the rules and standards of the buddhas and patriarchs.34 
 
In the act of eulogizing a fellow monk, Yuanwu also lays out in the clearest possible 
terms the Chan tradition’s basic claim to the equal status of ministers, warriors, and 
“patch-robed monks”—a synonym for Chan masters that performed similar rhetorical 
work to the “mountain monk” and “great man.” The grounds upon which Yuanwu 
establishes this comparison are particularly striking: none of these three figures fear death. 
A loyal minister is happy to die for the cause of a virtuous ruler; a warrior is brave and 
risks his life in battle; and a patch-robed monk, no slouch either for his part, has entirely 
resolved the problem of cyclical birth and death by attaining Buddhist liberation. In 
making this comparison, Yuanwu draws upon both the longstanding Chinese trope that 
                                                
34 忠臣不畏死，故能立天下之⼤大事。勇⼠士不顧⽣生，故能成天下之⼤大名。衲僧家透脫⽣生死不懼危
亡。故能立佛祖之紀綱。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 1997, 47: 810c15–17. 
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loyal ministers and noble warriors do not fear death,35 as well as the equally widespread 
notion in canonical Buddhist literature (expressed using some of the same Chinese four-
character phrases) that buddhas and bodhisattvas do not cherish their own lives and seek 
only to liberate sentient beings.36 Indeed, Yuanwu and others take up this theme often 
when describing the characteristics of a “great man.” 
Of course, forbearance in the face of death is also a perfectly apposite theme for a 
funeral, and immediately following this opening Yuanwu begins to review in more 
personal detail the merits of the deceased. Yet the life of this passage did not end at the 
conclusion of this particular occasion. On the contrary, its reception offers an interesting 
lesson in the ways Chan Buddhists read and refined each other’s discourse records, 
repurposing standout lines to place them more saliently and render them more 
dramatically. Despite its modest origins as an occasion-specific funeral eulogy, the 
preservation of this short speech in Yuanwu’s discourse record meant that others could 
read it alongside records of his formal sermons and encounter dialogues, letters, 
commemorative verses on portraits, and so on. In turn, by the end of the Song period the 
eulogy’s opening passage had been converted into a lively encounter dialogue: 
[Someone] asked: “The minister does not fear death, and thus is capable of 
establishing the great affairs of all under Heaven. The brave warrior has 
no regard for [his own] life, and thus is capable of establishing a great 
                                                
35 For example, see Hanshu, j. 54, v. 8, p. 2455; Sanguo zhi, j. 24, 691; Jinshu, j. 42, v. 4, 1212; Quan 
Tangwen, j. 21, 244a; j. 26, 303b; j. 67, 706a; j. 377, 3835a; j. 432, 4396a; and j. 677, 6918b; and 
Songshi, j. 335, v. 31, 10755; and j. 362, v. 32, 11322. 
 
36 See for example the Fo benxing ji jing, T. no. 190, 3: 668a4–14; Mohe bore boluomi jing, T. no. 223, 
8: 343b18–c2; and Dasheng bensheng xindi guan jing, T. no. 159, 3: 317a1–3. The most famous 
examples of the Buddhist virtue of abandoning one’s life for the sake of others are jātaka stories of the 
Buddha, during his past lives, offering his body to feed hungry animals and for other noble purposes; 
see Ohnuma, Head, Eyes, Flesh, and Blood. Another kind of performance of religious disregard for 
one’s own body and life, namely the practice of self-immolation, was also widespread in Chinese 
Buddhism from the medieval period onward; see Benn, Burning for the Buddha. 
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reputation among all under Heaven. I haven’t yet investigated what a 
patch-robed monk is like.” The master [Yuanwu] said: “[Possessing] an 
authority that shakes all in the land: this is not beyond [a patch-robed 
monk’s] capacity.”37 
 
This latter dialogic version of the passage went on to be quoted in subsequent 
collections.38 The evolution of this passage helps us understand that, even granting the 
skill of a Chan master like Yuanwu to compose finely wrought oratory for particular 
monastic occasions, the project of making the Chan tradition’s most important claims 
broadly efficacious was a team effort, in which keen editors and reissuers knew just how 
to expand the contextual scope of a particular utterance’s “felicity” (in J. L. Austin’s 
wording) to ensure that it really packed a punch. 
While in this particular passage Yuanwu does not explicitly use the term “great 
man,” in other Song-dynasty Chan texts the “great man” explicitly offered a measure of 
commensurability between the three types of heroes under discussion. One important 
example is found in a commentary on the famous Zhengdao ge 證道歌 (Song of 
                                                
37 問：「忠臣不畏死，故能立天下之⼤大名。勇⼠士不顧⽣生，故能立天下之⼤大事。未審衲僧家又作
麼⽣生？」師曰：「威震寰區，未為分外。」 Sengbao zhengxu zhuan, X. no. 1561, 79: 570a17–19. 
 
38 See Fozu lidai tongzai, T. no. 2036, 49: 686a19–22. Yuanwu’s junior contemporary, Tiantai master 
Youming 有朋 (1089–1168), reiterated this idea in a more discursive fashion: “One day, [the master] 
discussed the [figure of the] ‘supreme trainer’ (diaoyu zhangfu 調御丈夫, an epithet of the Buddha). 
Several literati were in attendance. The master said: ‘In the Ruist tradition, normative discourses on 
the topic of the “man” include loyal officials and gentlemen having no regard for [their own] lives; 
warriors [voluntarily] going into dangerous situations and not fearing death; establishing the great 
affairs of all under Heaven; accomplishing the fame of a hundred generations; and not being drowned 
in delusion by [pursuit of] sounds and sites (i.e. music and women) or fame and fortune. [By] all of 
these [measures] is someone called a “man.” In my teaching [of Buddhism], however, the single-
minded [practice of the] “three observations” is the ferry; the five repentances during the six time 
periods [of the day] are the oars. If one subjugates all demonic forces and controls [followers of] 
heterodox paths, not being caged by limited-transformation birth and death, then one may be called a 
“man.”’ The literati [listening to this speech] yielded to him in awe.” ⼀一日講調御丈夫。數⼠士⼈人⾄至。
師曰：「若在儒教論丈夫事，如忠臣事君不顧身，勇⼠士赴難不畏死，立天下之⼤大事，成百世之
顯名，不為聲⾊色名利之所惑溺，皆名丈夫。若在吾教，則⼀一⼼心三觀為⾈舟杭，六時五悔為艣棹，
降伏諸魔制外道，不為分段變易⽣生死之所籠檻者，⽅方名丈夫耳。」⼠士⼈人為之畏服。 Fozu tongji, 
T. no. 2035, 49: 228b1–7. 
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Realizing the Way) attributed to Yongjia Xuanjue 永嘉⽞玄覺 (665–713) but first found 
only in the Jingde chuandeng lu of 1009 (and therefore likely long postdating Yongjia’s 
life). This long poem included a passage that would be quoted again and again by Song-
dynasty Chan Buddhists: 
The great man wields the sword of wisdom, 
Its prajñā-edge of flaming adamant; 
Not only able to subdue heterodox minds, 
He already long ago cut off the bravery of gods and demons.39 
 
Here the “great man” is cast as a kind of spiritual warrior, wielding the “sword of wisdom” 
and subjugating demons in defense of the Dharma. These tropes, of course, are perfectly 
common in canonical Buddhist scriptures, where they eulogize the amazing powers 
possessed by the Buddha Śākyamuni and the larger Mahāyāna pantheon of buddhas and 
bodhisattvas, who act as saviors of ordinary sentient beings.40  But like the notion of 
being “towering and lofty” that we considered above, here these tropes are mobilized for 
an entirely new purpose. To get a sense of the different, let us consider a passage from 
the Huayan jing 華嚴經, in which we find the pilgrim Sudhana attributing these powers 
to the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī in the context of a verse requesting that the bodhisattva bless 
Sudhana with divine assistance: 
                                                
39 ⼤大丈夫秉慧劍，般若鋒兮⾦金剛焰。非但能摧外道⼼心，早曾落却天魔膽。 Jingde chuandeng lu, 
T. no. 2076, 51: 460c9–10. 
 
40 This is not the only figurative sword that Chan Buddhists adopted from canonical Buddhist 
scriptures. For example, the Record of Linji twice makes reference to a “treasure-sword of the 
adamantine [wisdom] king” (jin’gang wang baojian ⾦金剛王寶劍); see Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao 
chanshi yulu, T. no. 1985, 47: 495b4–12 and 504a26–29. This was an apparent adaptation of the 
various “treasure-swords” that proliferate in canonical Buddhist literature, found especially frequently 
in esoteric Buddhist scriptures and iconography. See, for example, Qianshou qianyan Guanshiyin 
pusa guangda yuanman wu’ai da cibei tuoluoni jing, T. no. 1060, 20: 111a4–11; Qianshou qianyan 
Guanshiyin pusa da beixin tuoluoni, T. no. 1064, 20: 118a2–4; and Qiyao rangzai jue, T. no. 1308, 21: 
426c14–22. Yuanwu discusses Linji’s treasure-sword repeatedly in his discourse record; see Yuanwu 
Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 735b17–23; 741c22–26; and 782b8–12. 
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[O you whose] body is adorned by the armor of forbearance, 
And who holds the sword of wisdom: 
Against demonic dangers and evil paths, 
[Would that you] aid me in avoiding the myriad difficulties!41 
 
By contrast, Yongjia’s Zhengdao ge is no petition. It offers a normative definition of the 
“great man,” no longer understood to be a buddha or bodhisattva to whom one offers 
devotion, but rather figuring the buddha or bodhisattva that all Chan masters are 
encouraged to become.42 
In turn, a commentary on the Zhengdao ge attributed to a Chan master named 
Yanqi 彥琪 (d.u.) offers the following remarks on the line “The great man wields the 
sword of wisdom, / Its prajñā-edge of flaming adamant”: 
Among worldly fellows, those who have fervent resolution, who take up 
the Moye blade, whose hearts are loyal and filial, who assist and support 
bright gentlemen (rulers), [exerting] martial authority [over] all under 
Heaven—these are called “men.” Here [in Yongjia’s poem, however,] the 
discussion of the “great man” [refers to one who] possesses the great 
wisdom [that comes from] having left the world [to become a Buddhist 
monastic]; who grasps the sword of wisdom, with prajñā as its blade, its 
                                                
41 忍鎧莊嚴身，執持智慧劍，於魔嶮惡道，濟我免眾難。 T. no. 278, 9: 688c1–2. For other 
examples, see Da baoji jing, T. no. 310, 11: 375b8; Da zhidu lun, T. no. 1509, 25: 169a26–27; 
Weimojie suoshuo jing, T. no. 475, 14: 554b6–c3. On the cults and cultures of savior bodhisattvas in 
China, see for example Yü, Kuan-yin; Zhiru, The Making of a Savior Bodhisattva; and Birnbaum, 
Studies on the Mysteries of Mañjuśrī. 
 
42 The bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, particularly known (including among Chan Buddhists) for wielding a 
sword, did come to be identified with the main image enshrined in the sangha hall of Chan 
monasteries, called the “holy monk” (shengseng 聖僧). Although this identification may postdate the 
Song period (see Yifa, The Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes, 69–72), an early example of Chan 
reverence for Mañjuśrī is already found in the Zutang ji. There we find an account of Chan master 
Baoci Wensui 報慈⽂文遂 (fl. ca. 10th c.) serving as abbot of a Mañjuśrī temple (Wenshu yuan ⽂文殊院), 
during which time he is pressed on why he repeatedly claims that “the buddhas and patriarchs cannot 
show their faces (lit. extend their heads) here,” yet still worships Mañjuśrī as the temple’s main deity. 




adamantine makeup a fierce flame, cutting the net of afflictions, leaving 
the realm of life and death; thus [such a one] is called a “great man.”43 
 
Here not only does Yanqi connect the Buddhist “great man” to worldly martial heroes, 
the “sword of wisdom” to the legendary Moye blade of Chinese antiquity;44 he also 
suggests that between the two options, it is the Chan master and his wisdom-sword that is 
greater. A gallant warrior is truly a “man”—of this we are not left in doubt—but only a 
Chan master is here understood to warrant the loftier appellation of “great man.” 
 The idea that Chan masters are equal or even superior to generals and ministers 
was not merely popular within Chan communities, but powerfully efficacious in 
establishing the Chan tradition’s identity and securing patronage from the highest levels 
of Chinese society during the eleventh century. Perhaps the best illustration of this 
efficacy is found in an anecdote narrated by Li Zunxu 李遵勗 (988–1038), the brother-in-
law of Emperor Zhenzong 真宗 (r. 997–1022), about his experiences undergoing Chan 
training. Li’s enthusiasm for Chan led him to study under and eventually receive lineage 
transmission (while still remaining a layman) from Linji-lineage Chan master Guyin 
Yuncong ⾕谷隱蘊聰 (965–1032).45 After Yuncong’s death, Li wrote a funeral epitaph 
commemorating his master’s life and teachings, in which he included the following story 
about his own experience of sudden awakening while studying under the master: 
                                                
43 世間之⼠士，有慷慨之志，乘鏌鎁之刃，以忠孝之⼼心，佐贊明君，威武天下，謂之丈夫。今⾔言
⼤大丈夫者，具出世之⼤大智，秉智慧之劍，以般若為鋒鋩，中⾦金剛為猛𦦨，破煩惱網，出⽣生死境
界，故云⼤大丈夫也。 Zhengdao ge zhu, X. no. 1241, 63: 270c19–22. 
 
44 The Moye blade (here 鏌鎁, but also written 莫邪, 莫鎁, or 莫耶) is a famous legendary sword 
wielded by heroes in early Chinese literature; see, for example, Zhou, Wu Yue chunqiu jijiao huikao, j. 
4, 40. 
 
45 See Welter, Monks, Rulers, and Literati, 161–62. 
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Once the master [Yuncong] told me of [the case in which] Fang Ru[fu] 
(756–797) asked [Chan master] Jinshan (715–793), “Can I study Chan?” 
[Jinshan] said: “This is a matter for great men; it’s not something generals 
or ministers can do.” As soon as I heard [this old case] raised [for my 
consideration], it was [as though] “a single shout left my ears deaf for 
three days,”46 like I was in a dark room. [Then,] in a flash, [all] was 
suddenly bright, like facing a numinous mountain. I smiled.47 
 
In this passage, Li describes how powerfully affected he was when his master Yuncong 
raised for his consideration an “old case,” in which the Tang-dynasty Chan master 
Jinshan was said to have rebuffed a civil official asking for religious instruction by 
dismissively suggesting that Chan training is far too demanding for mere generals and 
ministers.48 Despite Li’s close connections to the highest levels of the imperial 
government, he was not offended by the assertion attributed in this story to Jinshan that 
generals and ministers are not “great men” and have no business meddling in the lofty 
affair of Chan. He may have been surprised by the statement, but evidently it was a good 
                                                
46 This is an allusion to a line attributed to Nanyue Huairang, discussing his reaction to the teachings 
of his master Mazu Daoyi: “One day, the master [Nanyue] addressed the assembly: ‘The Buddha-
Dharma is no small matter. When this old monk (I) was studying under great master Ma[zu], he gave 
a shout, and directly my ears were deaf and my eyes dark for three days.’” ⼀一日，師謂眾曰：佛法不




日耳聾之話，如處蔀室。㸌爾⽽而頓明，如對靈⼭山，听然⽽而微笑。 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 
1553, 78: 501b9–11. 
 
48 This story involving a civil official’s encounter with Chan master Jinshan (also known as Daoqin 道
欽 and by his honorific title Guoyi chanshi 國⼀一禪師) is not found in Jinshan’s entries in the Song 
gaoseng zhuan or Jingde chuandeng lu. It thus may have been an embellishment added to Jinshan’s 
record sometime between 1009 and Yuncong’s death in 1032, or it may have circulated independently 
for some time before that. The entry for Jinshan in the Song gaoseng zhuan does mention Jinshan’s 
service at the court of Emperor Daizong 代宗 (r. 762–779), during which time an official named Yang 
Wan 楊綰 (fl. ca. 8th c.) was said to have praised him, and other officials including Cui Huan 崔渙 (fl. 
ca. 8th c.) were described as showing him great admiration (T. no. 2061, 50: 764c13–20). It is this Cui 
Huan rather than Fang Rufu who, in other Song-period versions of the story, asks to study Chan and is 
rebuffed by the master. See, for example, Juefan Huihong’s Linjian lu 林間錄, which attributes the 
question to a Cui Zhao 崔趙, likely an error for Cui Huan (X. no. 1624, 87: 246a6–9); and Zhipan’s 
Fozu tongji, T. no. 2035, 49: 378b23–c5. 
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kind of surprise, triggering his enlightenment. Li’s post-enlightenment smile (weixiao 微
笑) alludes to the Chan legend of the Buddha’s “flower sermon.” According to a story 
invented by Chan Buddhists to assert their claim that the Chan lineage stretched all the 
way back to the Buddha Śākyamuni, it’s said that one day the Buddha sat down to give a 
sermon, but instead of speaking simply held up a flower. Everyone in his audience looked 
on in bewilderment, unable to decipher the obscure meaning of this gesture—everyone, 
that is, except the disciple Mahākāśyapa, whose comprehension of the Buddha’s meaning 
was demonstrated with a smile. According to the story, this led the Buddha to declare 
Mahākāśyapa the only disciple worthy of receiving the “treasury of the true Dharma-eye” 
(zheng fayan zang 正法眼藏)—a trope for Chan transmission.49 
Li Zunxu’s account of his own powerful reaction to Yuncong recounting the old 
case of Jinshan insulting the minister was in turn quoted and embellished in subsequent 
Chan literature. A version of Li’s story repeated in the discourse record of Yuanwu Keqin, 
for example, adds that immediately upon undergoing this awakening experience, Li 
spontaneously composed the following poem: 
To study the Way, you must be a man of iron; 
As soon as you set down your hand, your mind will be judged. 
[You should] directly seek unsurpassed bodhi; 
Don’t bother with any [questions of] right and wrong.50 
 
This embellishment is telling, because it carries the sense that Li not only understood the 
wordless truth of Chan in a flash of insight, but also comprehended for the first time what 
it really means to be a “great man,” a Chan hero, a “man of iron” harboring the loftiest 
                                                
49 See Welter, “Mahākāśyapa’s Smile.” 
 
50 學道須是鐵漢，著⼿手⼼心頭便判。直趣無上菩提，⼀一切是非莫管。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, 
T. no. 1997, 47: 773c5–6. 
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ambitions, concerned only with an upward trajectory to the highest wisdom and not with 
petty squabbles about right and wrong. “Set down your hand” (zhuoshou 著⼿手) typically 
means something like “set to work,” but here, given that it follows just after the “man of 
iron” is introduced, and anticipating the martiality of Chan’s understanding of the “great 
man” that we will consider more fully below, it might also refer to making one’s first 
move in battle. In any case, the line suggests that the quality of one’s mind will be 
evaluated the moment one begins to act. Probing the issue of Chan superiority over 
generals and ministers further, Yuanwu then asks: 
But how are “going out a general and coming back a minister,” pacifying 
the state and settling affairs [of governance], or wiping out rebellions not 
manly [activities]? Yet Jinshan says “This is a matter for great men; it’s 
not something generals or ministers can do.” You should know that this 
single uppermost road does not permit the slightest thing [to pass 
through].51 
 
It is interesting that Yuanwu here recognizes the possibility that Jinshan’s statement 
might be met in some quarters with more skepticism than it received from Li himself. 
How, indeed, can the activities of noble generals and ministers be denigrated as not truly 
“manly”? The answer, Yuanwu suggests, is that as challenging as these activities may 
seem, the path of Chan is incomparably more difficult.52 
 Li Zunxu deeply appreciated the story of Jinshan rebuffing a government official, 
as attested by the funerary inscription he wrote for his master, but there is no evidence 
                                                
51 且如出將⼊入相、安邦定業、剪除暴亂，豈非丈夫耶？⽽而徑⼭山何故却道：「此⼤大丈夫事，非將
相之所能為」？須知向上⼀一路毫髮不容。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, X. no. 1553, 78: 425c16. 
 
52 The story was repeated elsewhere in the discourse records of Yuanwu. See, for example, Foguo 
Keqin chanshi xinyao, X. no. 1357, 69: 454b6–9; 478a6–7; and 490a5–8. It was also frequently 
repeated by Yuanwu’s disciple Dahui Zonggao; see, for example, Dahui Pujue chanshu yulu, T. no. 




that he actually authored this verse. Nevertheless, the story of Li composing a verse about 
the ideal Chan master as a “man of iron” likely did capture something important about 
how literati, officials, and even emperors viewed the Chan tradition. Li went on to 
compile the Tiansheng guangdeng lu 天聖廣燈錄 that was published in 1036, the second 
imperially-sponsored Chan lamp record after the Jingde chuandeng lu. While the Jingde 
chuandeng lu received imperial sanction, Li’s collection brought imperial support for 
Chan to new heights, securing a preface from Emperor Renzong 仁宗 (r. 1022–1063) 
himself. As Albert Welter notes, this “marked a new watershed for Chan teaching in 
official circles.”53 Yet beyond the quite remarkable fact of the emperor’s personal 
authorship of a preface to a collection of Chan biographies, it is equally worth paying 
attention to the terms in which the emperor wrote this preface, which began: “[Collected 
herein are] only the explications and teachings of great heroes.”54 The publication of the 
Tiansheng guangdeng lu thus represented not only a triumph for the Chan tradition as a 
whole, but also the particular triumph of the rhetoric of heroism (in Miriam Levering’s 
wording) as a defining feature of Chan identity and soteriology. It is one thing, after all, 
for Chan masters to claim they are greater men even than the empire’s most decorated 
generals and ministers; it is quite another for the emperor himself to give this notion his 
stamp of approval. 
 
Martial heroism, exemplary models, and state power 
 
                                                
53 Welter, Monks, Rulers, and Literati, 187. 
 
54 惟⼤大雄之闡教也。 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, T. no. 1997, 47: 755c14–15. 
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Although in some cases, as we have seen, Chan Buddhists suggested that a skilled master 
ought to be practiced in both civil and martial arts, most typically they emphasized the 
martial over the civil. Albert Welter has already observed this trend in its broad strokes, 
writing: “Chan mythic heroes, I would argue, challenge the ideal of cultivated elegance, 
whether dressed in Confucian or Buddhist garb, favoring instead a highly stylized martial 
power.”55 Similarly, Mark Halperin has described Chan literature as characterized by a 
kind of “swashbuckling iconoclasm.”56 Of course, Chan Buddhists used martial language 
in a discursive setting, as part of a manifestly civil performance of religious exemplarity 
and rhetorical excellence. But it is still worth attending to exactly what this use of martial 
language entailed, how it drew upon both Buddhist and indigenous Chinese sources, and 
how it mediated the relationship between Chan Buddhists and state power. 
 On the Buddhist side, we have already seen how Yongjia’s Zhengdao ge deployed 
canonical Buddhist imagery to describe the great man wielding a sword of wisdom and 
subduing demons. Commenting on this line from Yongjia’s poem, Yuanwu adds: “Right 
now, your spiritual authority [must be] coldly awe-inspiring, your frosty blade majestic 
(tangtang).”57 In another passage Yuanwu defines the “great man” with recourse to an 
even more elaborate set of martial imagery: 
If you wish to break free of the net of passion and surpassingly step into 
greatness, you should put on the armor of forbearance in the face of insult; 
grasp the blade of wisdom; deploy a mind of the highest quality to give 
rise to uniquely outstanding resolution; do battle with the demon of the 
aggregates, the demon of afflictions, and the demon of death; extinguish 
                                                
55 Welter, The Linji lu, 149. 
 
56 Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 9. 
 
57 只如今神威凜凜霜刃堂堂。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 755c14–15. 
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the three poisons; and destroy the net of Māra. Only then will you begin to 
be a great man.58 
 
Here Yuanwu’s normative vision is expressed entirely in Buddhist terms, describing the 
great man as a warrior equipped with the armor of forbearance and the sword of wisdom 
doing spiritual battle with various demonic entities and mental afflictions that seek to 
keep him enmeshed in the net of worldly passion. 
Elsewhere, on the other hand, Yuanwu describes the figure of the “great man” in 
terms that draw upon indigenous Chinese traditions of exemplary heroes. A particularly 
interesting case is Yuanwu’s repeated allusion to the adage “if you don’t go into the tiger 
cave, you won’t get the tiger cub” (bu ru huxue bu de huzi 不⼊入虎⽳穴不得虎⼦子).59 This 
saying originated in the life story of Ban Chao 班超 (32–102), one of the most famous 
generals of the Eastern Han dynasty said to have led tens of thousands of soldiers on the 
empire’s western front in Central Asia.60 Ban’s biography in the Book of the Later Han 
(Hou Hanshu 後漢書) describes him in his youth as “a man of great ambition, who did 
not cultivate trifling details,”61 but who nevertheless labored at low-paying secretarial 
work in order to support his parents. In the course of his work, it is said, Ban had the 
opportunity to read various historical records, discovering therein stories of exemplary 
heroes from times past who had served the empire in battle and diplomacy. 
                                                
58 欲脫愛網超步⼤大⽅方，正應披忍辱鎧操智慧⼑刀，運上品⼼心發殊勝志，與蘊魔煩惱魔死魔共戰，
滅三毒破魔網，始是⼤大丈夫漢。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 729a28–b1. 
 
59 See, for example, Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 771c22–772a2; as well as Foguo 
Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 167a1–3 and 167b22. Yuanwu’s disciple Dahui Zonggao 
also made use of this expression; see Dahui Pujue chanshu yulu, T. no. 1998A, 47: 871a14–15. 
 
60 See Li, Early China, 298; and Yü, “Han Foreign Relations,” 415–18. 
 
61 為⼈人有⼤大志，不修細節。 Hou Hanshu, “Ban Liang liezhuan” 班梁列傳, j. 47, v. 6, 1571. 
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After toiling a long time, one day he abandoned his work, threw aside his 
brush, and sighed: “A great man [can] have no other ambition than to 
imitate Fu Jiezi (d. 65 CE) and Zhang Qian (164–114 BCE), serving 
meritoriously in foreign lands and being enfeoffed as a lord. How can I go 
on [forever] engaging in the idle work of the brush?”62 
 
Although his colleagues laughed at this outburst, a physiognomist examined Ban’s 
features and confirmed that his “swallow’s chin and tiger’s head” (yanhan hujing 燕頷虎
頸) destined him for greatness,63 a prediction that was realized when he enlisted in the 
military and went on to serve with extraordinary distinction on the empire’s western front. 
During this period of service, we are told, he uttered his famous slogan—“if you don’t go 
into the tiger cave, you won’t get the tiger cub”—while formulating a battle plan against 
the Xiongnu.64 
 Ban Chao’s life story was well known to Chan Buddhists. The entry for “tiger-
cave” (huxue 虎⽳穴) in the 1108 Chan encyclopedia Zuting shiyuan, for example, 
consisted solely of a passage from Ban’s biography.65 The fact that Chan Buddhists like 
Yuanwu were attracted to Ban’s story attests to the role of indigenous Chinese models in 
the constitution of a “great man” that served Chan as a soteriological ideal. Ban’s case 
also bears a certain resemblance to the passages from the Zutang ji entries for Yaoshan 
Weiyan and Yunju Daoying that we considered above. As we saw, both of those men 
                                                
62 久勞苦，嘗輟業投筆歎曰：「⼤大丈夫無它志略，猶當效傅介⼦子、張騫，立功異域，以取封侯，
安能久事筆研閒乎？」 Hou Hanshu, “Ban Liang liezhuan” 班梁列傳, j. 47, v. 6, 1571. 
 
63 Hou Hanshu, “Ban Liang liezhuan” 班梁列傳, j. 47, v. 6, 1571. Yuanwu and Dahui both reference 
the “swallow’s chin and tiger’s head” in portrait commemorations; see Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan 
lu, T. no. 1997, 47: 809a17–18; and Dahui Pujue chanshu yulu, X. no. 1362, 69: 648b11–13. We will 
consider this second case further in Chapter 3. 
 
64 Hou Hanshu, “Ban Liang liezhuan” 班梁列傳, j. 47, v. 6, 1572. 
 
65 Zuting shiyuan, X. no. 1261, 64: 336b3–16. On this text, see Huang, “Lun ‘Zuting shiyuan.’” 
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were said to have begun their monastic careers engaged in study of the fine points of 
Buddhist monastic law, but to have quickly tired of such allegedly tedious and pointless 
work, articulating their aspirations to greater heights of religious achievement in terms of 
the normative model of the great man. “How can a great man be confined to such a petty 
path and [leave] obscure the open-ended vastness [of the true Way]?” asked Daoying. 
Even if the Chan Buddhists who composed these accounts had not read the story of Ban 
Chao (and they may have), it is easy to see why Ban’s example would sooner or later 
have come to be viewed as fitting nicely into the way Chan Buddhists understood their 
tradition’s relationship to the supposed pedantry of their non-Chan peers. Ban’s 
exclamation is particularly illustrative because of its unabashed affirmation of the need to 
imitate famous “great men” who lived previous even to him, demonstrating that the 
figure of the “great man” derived its power partly from its embeddedness in a long chain 
of normative exemplarity. 
 The life story of Ban Chao was well known in the Northern Song, not only among 
Chan Buddhists but also among literati. Su Shi (1037–1101), for example, made 
reference in his writings to the trope of the “swallow’s chin and tiger’s head,”66 while 
Huang Tingjian 黃庭堅 (1045–1105) and He Zhu 賀鑄 (1052–1125) both joked about 
being fated to remain forever bound to literary activity rather than achieving renown for 
military exploits like Ban.67 Although the Song dynasty has sometimes been considered 
fundamentally “civil” compared with the supposedly more “martial” Tang, recent 
scholarship has suggested both that the Tang was more “civil” and the Song more 
                                                
66 Su Shi shiji hezhu, j. 39, v. 3, 2012. 
 
67 See Egan, “The Northern Song,” 420; and Sargent, The Poetry of He Zhu, 239. 
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“martial” than traditionally thought.68 Among Northern Song civil officials who actually 
served in battle was Yang Yi 楊億 (974–1020), who edited and wrote the preface for the 
Jingde chuandeng lu just after returning from the front lines of war with the Khitan 
empire to the northeast.69 On the other hand, when for parts of the eleventh century there 
was relatively little active war, it was civil officials without field experience who 
managed military affairs at the highest level. This did not lead simply to a “Confucian” 
era of rule, however, as Peter Lorge has observed: 
Song civil officials were themselves taking up military affairs and 
combining in themselves the civil and martial aspects of governing. 
Several attempts were made during the eleventh century to set up a 
military education system or a military exam system. On a number of 
occasions civil officials suggested that civil officials should learn martial 
skills. This was in part a desire to return to the classical ideal of the 
official who could function as a general or official as needed. Not 
surprisingly then, military texts received much more attention in the 
eleventh century than they had before. 
 
Indeed, as Lorge notes, among the ranks of advocates for civil elites studying military 
texts was counted the Su family, including Su Shi, his brother Su Zhe 蘇辙 (1039–1112), 
and their father Su Xun 蘇洵 (1009–1066). Little wonder that Su Zhe seems to have 
appreciated Chan’s rhetoric of heroism, writing for example in a postface to the Jingde 
chuandeng lu that he had particularly taken to heart an admonition Chan master Yaoshan 
was said to have given Tang-dynasty intellectual Li Ao 李翱 (772–841). As Mark 
Halperin writes: 
The latter asked what being a monk entailed, and Yaoshan replied that any 
successful undertaking required a loftiness greater than any mountain and 
                                                
68 On the Tang period, see McMullen, “The Cult of Ch’i T’ai-kung.” On the Song, see Lorge, “The 
Rise of the Martial.” 
 
69 Ishii, Sōdai Zenshū, 16. 
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a profundity deeper than any sea. Literati fond of material comforts, he 
warned, would fail miserably. Su tells us that he copied these words onto 
his belt so that he might always remember them. That Su chose to keep 
this passage close to his person demonstrates that Chan's bravado and 
heroism, as well as its call to constant self-cultivation, touched him deeply, 
in a way the sutras had not.70 
 
Chan Buddhists and literati in the Song, both typically lacking actual military experience 
on a battlefield, thus found common ground in a shared appreciation for the affective 
attitude they understood to accompany the martial heroism of figures like Ban Chao: bold, 
decisive, fearless, and not bogged down by overly fastidious attention to trivial details. 
 Some Chan Buddhists deployed the rhetoric of heroism in a manner suggesting 
that Chan mastery, by doing battle with the forces of spiritual delusion, could literally 
help enforce Chinese imperial authority. Zhihai Zhengjue 智海正覺 (fl. ca. 11th c.), a 
Yunmen-lineage Chan master who was granted an imperial title under emperor Shenzong 
神宗 (r. 1067–85), was recorded as having given the following sermon: 
[The master] ascended the hall and said: “Facing [the palms of] one’s hand 
upward is civil; turning one’s hand over [to face down] is martial.71 Yet if 
one grips a single sword, and step by step subdues [all] affairs, neither 
turning up nor turning over, then civil and martial will both be fully 
[developed]. Sitting in the [general’s] tent, one plans a victory [that will 
take place] thousands of li away. The rākṣasas of ignorance will be 
captured alive; the demonic armies of life and death will melt away like 
ice. [Such a one] directly attains the fluttering [hegemony] of the 
emperor’s will and the uniform [sovereignty] of the emperor’s Way, 
unifying the three realms into [a single] home and serving as a refuge for 
the four types of beings.”72 
                                                
70 Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 69. See also Su Zhe ji, j. 9, v. 3, 1232. 
 
71 The expression “turning the hand face up, turning the hand face down” (fanshou fushou 翻⼿手覆⼿手) 
is a common trope in Chan literature, where it usually refers to the basic nonduality of the “two truths” 








In this sermon, Zhihai begins by reading the binary opposition between civil and martial 
virtue in terms of the doctrine of nonduality, suggesting that a true Chan adept is capable 
of mastering both at once in a single gesture. At the same time, Zhihai’s characterization 
of the Chan master as a civil official overseeing military affairs—planning a successful 
attack at a distant remove from the actual battlefield—also offers a particularly vivid 
example of the way Chan Buddhists connected their religious vocation to the prevailing 
Song-period balance of civil and military modes of governance. While to our eyes the 
claim that a Chan master might really help secure the realm from threats at its borders 
may look like nothing more than an extended metaphor, we would do well to recall the 
many centuries-long history of Chinese Buddhist monastics rendering meritorious service 
in ritual protection of the state, not to mention the especially dire threats that really did 
loom at the Song empire’s borders during this period.73 We should also remember that 
the Song period witnessed the rise of the imperial cult of the demon-destroying “Black 
Killer” (Heisha ⿊黑殺)74 and the performance of “thunder rites” (leifa 雷法), which, as 
Edward Davis notes, “ethicized” the power of thunder to deliver divine punishment to 
evildoers in service of the imperium.75 We therefore have every reason to take Zhihai at 
his word that the enlightened authority of Chan masters was seen as capable of upholding 
                                                
73 See Orzech, Politics and Transcendent Wisdom; and Goble, “Chinese Esoteric Buddhism.” As 
Goble notes, “Emphasis on Esoteric Buddhism as a form of state protection is certainly not misplaced, 
but it should be recognized that all rites performed and sponsored by the Imperial Government were 
essentially a matter of state protection. Rituals to ensure timely rainfall, to correctly order the stars, to 
prevent barbarian invasion – these were all elements of traditional Sinitic statecraft” (101–2). 
 
74 See Davis, Society and the Supernatural, Chapter 4. 
 
75 Davis, Society and the Supernatural, 25–26. 
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the emperor’s authority across the land and delivering a blow to enemies of the state, 
demonic and human alike (there being no strict boundary between the two). 
 Yuanwu and his disciple Dahui Zonggao ⼤大慧宗杲 (1089–1163), for their part, 
are known to have associated in the twelfth century with advocates of an aggressive 
foreign policy against the Jurchens who were attacking from the north, often referred to 
as the “pro-war faction” or “anti-peace party.”76 In the case of Dahui these connections 
were sufficiently substantial (or maybe he was just unlucky) that they led him to be sent 
into exile between 1141 and 1155 after peace with the Jurchens was reached on terms 
that many literati considered humiliating to the Song. Yuanwu himself avoided Dahui’s 
misfortune, but it is nevertheless difficult to ignore these connections when we find 
Yuanwu discussing “gripping the adamantine treasure-sword”77 in a letter to prominent 
pro-war official Zhang Jun 張浚 (1097–1164). Yuanwu counted Zhang, who over the 
course of his career in government served in both civil and military positions, among his 
disciples. In the same letter, Yuanwu goes on to quote Chan master Yantou Quanhuo 巖
頭全豁 (828–887) saying: “To discard things is superior; to chase things is inferior. 
When you discourse on war, [you should know that] the strength of each side resides in 
[occupying] the pivotal position.” Yuanwu comments: “If you can quickly position 
yourself above things, then all those standing below you will fall into your hands.”78 Of 
                                                
76 On Yuanwu, see Hsieh, “A Study of the Evolution,” 40–45. On Dahui, see Levering, “Ch’an 
Enlightenment,” 47–57; and Borrell, “Ko-wu or Kung-an?,” 85–87. For a comparison of Dahui’s pro-
war connections and Hongzhi Zhengjue’s pro-peace associations, see Yang, “Kanhua chan he nansong 
zhuzhan pai.” 
 
77 秉⾦金剛寶劒. Foguo Keqin chanshi xinyao, X. no. 1357, 69: 454a18. 
 
78 巖頭云：「却物為上，逐物為下。若論戰也，箇箇⼒力在轉處。」若能於物上轉得疾，則⼀一切
立在下風並歸自掌握。 Foguo Keqin chanshi xinyao, X. no. 1357, 69: 454b10–12. See also the 
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course, it was not uncommon for Chan Buddhists to discuss soteriology in terms of 
military strategy. Even so, addressed to someone who literally wanted to make war rather 
than peace with the invading Jurchens, we cannot help but read lines like these—couched 
in military terms that Yuanwu uses frequently elsewhere in his writings79—as hovering 
ambiguously between “skillful means” and religious sanction of literal militarism. 
 To what extent, then, was Chan’s rhetoric of heroism merely a manifestation of 
the desire to appeal to the political sensibilities of the literati, officials, and emperors 
from whom the tradition received patronage? Certainly we must understand the use of 
martial imagery in Chan literature as bound up with Song-dynasty state power and 
military culture in complex ways. In some cases, Chan literature seems even to have 
impacted cultural representations of military culture itself. For example, the biographical 
record for the soldier Chen Cui 陳淬 (d.u.) in the Songshi 宋史 narrates: 
In the first year of the shaosheng period (1094) [Chen] failed the civil 
service examination, and [thereupon] harbored the intention to journey to 
the west [in the military]. At that time, when Lü Huiqing 呂惠卿 (1032–
1111) was military commissioner of Fuyan circuit, Cui donned military 
attire and went to see him. Huiqing asked what he had come to see him for, 
and Cui said: “A great man has [come] seeking to meet a great man; for 
what other matter [could I have come]?” Huiqing considered him a vessel 
[worthy of deployment as a soldier], and provided him a position in the 
                                                                                                                                            
discussion in Hsieh, “A Study of the Evolution,” 55. My translation departs from Hsieh’s in various 
ways, most notably in that she seems to have accidentally omitted the line “When you talk about war, 
the strength of each side resides in [occupying] the pivotal position.” 
 
79 Yuanwu often repeated the phrase “when you talk about war, the strength of each side resides in 
[occupying] the pivotal position.” See, for example, Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 
751b6–7; 758a6; and 771a19–20; Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 150a16–17; 
150c13–14; 167b14; 177c3; and 206a1; and Foguo Keqin chanshi xinyao, X. no. 1357, 69: 454b11. In 
certain of these cases he makes clear that he understands this phrase to have originally been spoken by 
Yantou, though I have found no extant occurrence of the phrase preceding Yuanwu’s own writings. 
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[Bureau of the] Three Echelons. Cui battled people on the western [front] 
in Wuyuan, personally killing over ten people with his own hand.80 
 
While Chen’s aspiration to cast off the shackles of a faltering civil service career and 
strike out west in pursuit of military glory might be said to more closely resemble Ban 
Chao’s career than that of any Chan master, this biographical account of Chen’s meeting 
with the powerful official Lü Haiqing bears striking resemblance to records of Chan 
aspirants receiving lineage transmission from eminent masters. The notion of “treating 
someone as a vessel” (qi 器 read as a verb) comes originally from the Analects of 
Confucius,81 but here it is used in a manner closely resembling what we find in Chan 
narratives when a master decides that a student is worthy of lineage transmission, such as 
the encounter between Baizhang and Huangbo that we considered above. Chen’s 
reference to a meeting of two equally “great men,” and his rhetorical question “for what 
other matter [could I have come]?” (you heshi 又何事), also strongly resemble tropes 
used in narratives of Chan transmission from the Platform Sūtra onward.82 
                                                
80 紹聖初，下第，挾策西遊。時呂惠卿帥鄜延，淬戎服往見，惠卿問相見何事，淬曰：「⼤大丈
夫求見⼤大丈夫，又何事？」惠卿器之，補三班奉職。與西⼈人接戰于烏原，⼿手殺⼗十餘⼈人。 
Songshi, j. 452, v. 38, 13295. 
 
81 See Yang, Lunyu yizhu, 13.25, 143. 
 
82 As for contexts outside of China, William Bodiford recent reappraisal of the relationship between 
Zen and swordsmanship in Tokugawa Japan touches on the notion of being “atop sword blades” or 
facing “sword blades [pointed] up” (jiandao shang 劍刃上), which originated in canonical Buddhist 
descriptions of the “sword blade hell” where sinners are punished by facing swords stabbing them 
from all sides. The phrase took on new meaning, however, when raised for discussion in the Linji lu 
and in Case 41 of the Biyan lu. In the latter, Yuanwu suggests that a “great fellow” (dashi ⼤大⼠士, 
sometimes used to translate the Sanskrit mahasattva) is capable of walking atop sword blades; see 
Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 178c12–13. Thereafter the expression went on to be 
used in Japan in both Zen and martial arts initiation documents, and comprehension of the phrase 
sometimes implied “both a willingness to risk one’s own life and the skill to succeed. It seems to have 




At the same time, the relationships between Chan masters like Zhihai, Yuanwu, 
and Dahui, on the one hand, and military professionals or enthusiasts (and even with 
imperial power generally) on the other cannot alone fully explain the larger 
transformations in Buddhist soteriology, identity, normative exemplarity, and authority 
that we are outlining here. For one thing, emphasis on the “great man” as a martial hero 
preceded the careers of any of these particular Chan masters, developing in important 
ways between the tenth and eleventh centuries, and its scope exceeded the influence of 
these men alone. Perhaps more importantly, the Chan tradition’s notion of martial 
heroism drew upon the idea that the Buddha himself was a very special kind of martial 
hero: a prince of the warrior class (kṣatriya) who, even in renouncing his warrior identity 
and claim to kingship, ended up transmuting his qualifications for the throne into a loftier 




The Song is widely considered a fundamentally civil or “Confucian” dynasty, a period 
that turned decisively away from the martial ethos that is understood to have prevailed in 
the Tang.83 In response to this trend, Chan Buddhism is also often seen as having become 
more “literary” during the Song.84 In this chapter, we have seen that the situation was 
more complex than this narrative suggests. Even at their most literary, Song-dynasty 
Chan Buddhists like Yuanwu Keqin routinely deployed tropes of martial heroism to 
characterize the ideal Chan master as a vigorous, decisive, and brave “great man.” This 
                                                
83 See, for example, Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, a recent survey history of the Song. 
 
84 For a recent articulation of this longstanding view, see Heine, Chan Rhetoric of Uncertainty, 17–18. 
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notion allowed Chan Buddhists to bring themselves into a new kind of commensurability 
with the loyal ministers and brave generals of Chinese lore, articulating an identity of 
recognizable greatness and useful service to the state. Even Emperor Renzong, in his 
preface to the 1036 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, praised Chan masters as great heroes. 
These comparisons tended, perhaps unsurprisingly, to favor Chan Buddhists as 
greater “great men” than even the greatest generals and ministers. The latter may risk 
their lives, Chan Buddhists like Yuanwu averred, but Chan masters solve the problem of 
life and death entirely by achieving liberation and working to save all sentient beings. In 
arguing for the ultimate superiority of Chan masters over ordinary Chinese heroes in 
service of the state, Chan Buddhists also hinted at other implications of the Indian 
Buddhist trope of the “great man” that did not fit so cleanly into preexisting Chinese 
categories of brave and loyal service to the imperial state. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, in the context of Buddhist lore the Buddha came to stand as a cosmic 
sovereign anchoring karmic law—a “god above the gods” and “king above the kings.” As 
I will suggest in the next chapter, the Chan tradition’s discourse on martial heroism 
exceeded the ideal of service to the state precisely because it tapped into the close 
discursive connection between buddhahood and cosmic sovereignty, mediated in part by 
the figure of the “great man.” It is impossible to fully grasp the meaning of martial 
heroism in Chan, I argue, unless we take stock of the ways Chan Buddhists viewed the 
pursuit of liberation as entailing a battle for spiritual supremacy—both among Chan 





Buddhahood, Sovereignty, and the Chan Master 
 
[Someone] asked: “When two armies cross swords [in battle], what is it like?” 
The master said: “One wins and one loses.” 
問：「兩陣交鋒時如何？」師云：「⼀一得⼀一失。」 
— Discourse record of Xiangshan Yunliang 香⼭山蘊良 (fl. ca. Northern Song)1 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we considered how Chan Buddhists remade the figure of the 
Buddhist “great man” to render it commensurable with the heroic “great men” of Chinese 
lore: brave generals and loyal ministers. The heroism of generals and ministers was, of 
course, normatively measured in terms of loyal service to the ruler and the state. Their 
enemies were presumed to be the state’s “others,” which in the mythology of Chinese 
military heroes most typically consisted of those peoples on the margins of the empire 
seen as either threatening the integrity of its borders or inhibiting the growth of those 
borders, such as the Xiongnu during the Han period and the Khitan and Jurchens in the 
Song. Similarly, the heroism of canonical buddhas and bodhisattvas was always directed 
in opposition to a clear enemy: Māra and his legion of demons, understood both as literal 
malevolent entities existing in the world and as metaphors for sources of delusion in 
one’s own mind (the two understandings were not mutually exclusive). As we have seen, 
Chan Buddhists regularly adopted both of these themes—heroic service to the state and 
                                                
1 Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 682b11–12. This expression yide yishi ⼀一得⼀一失 is 
widely used in Chan literature, and sometimes refers to a single party “winning one and losing one,” 
or plays more heavily on the sense of de 得 as meaning to gain [correct understanding], and shi 失 as 
referring to the failure to gain that understanding. Here, however, it seems to allude to the idea that a 
single battle will inevitably result in a winner and a loser. 
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battle with the demonic hordes of delusion—into their own normative characterizations 
of the “great man.” 
Yet something about the Chan tradition’s vision of the “great man” also exceeded 
the confines of this framework. This is not to say that any Chan Buddhists sought to 
subvert state power—on the contrary, Chan discourse records from the Song period are 
filled with passages in which Chan masters ritually celebrate the emperor’s birthday and 
wish him “ten thousand years of life” (wansui 萬歲).2 But even as Chan Buddhists 
rendered the Indian “great man” in terms commensurable with Chinese generals and 
ministers, this trope also retained many Indian connotations as a figure straddling 
buddhahood and kingship, cosmic and temporal sovereignty. As we have seen, in life 
stories of the Buddha Śākyamuni it is said that his possession of the bodily “marks of the 
great man” elicited the prediction that he would become either a buddha or a wheel-
turning king. This parallelism likely reflects a growing interconnection between 
Buddhism and the imperial state that took shape during the Mauryan period (322–185 
BCE), especially under the rule of King Aśoka. “In this process,” Donald Swearer 
observes, “the Buddha and king become virtual mirror images of one another.”3 The 
result is that “the Theravada tradition constructs kingship in the image of the Buddha and 
Buddhahood in the image of the king with power being the key denominator.”4 Indeed, as 
                                                
2 For more on the relationship between Chan Buddhists and the state during the tenth and eleventh 
centuries, see Brose, Patrons and Patriarchs; and Welter, Monks, Rulers, and Literati. 
 
3 Swearer, The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia, 104–5. 
 
4 Swearer, The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia, 105. Swearer adds on the same page, among other 
parallels, that “kingship in Theravada Buddhism presupposes many lifetimes of preparation as does 
Buddhahood; the ten royal virtues share much in common with the moral perfections associated with 
exalted spiritual achievement; the same amount of merit must be accumulated in previous lives by a 
Buddha and a cakavattin; the same miracles occur at the birth of both; both have the thirty-two major 
and eighty minor marks of the mahapurisa; and in the Theravada tradition bodhisattahood is 
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I suggested following Hubert Durt in Chapter 2, many features of the Buddha’s 
extraordinary person as described in canonical Mahāyāna literature also suggest that he 
was widely understood to be both a “god above the gods” and a “king above the kings.” 
Moreover, to a much greater extent than in the Chinese tradition, kingship in ancient 
India was bound up with ideals of martial prowess embedded in the kṣatriya (warrior 
class) identity into which Siddhārtha Gautama was born. 
 How did the connections between sovereignty, buddhahood, and normative “great 
manhood” that fill Buddhist scriptures impact the Chan tradition’s performances of 
identity and claims to authority, and how did these connections intersect with Chan 
Buddhists’ emphasis on the need for “great men” to possess great martial prowess, which 
we considered in the previous chapter? In this chapter we will explore the ways Chan 
Buddhists adapted and reshaped this nexus of associations, articulating a normative ideal 
of the Chan master as a sovereign whose hegemonic authority holds power over life and 
death. In turn, we will consider the ways this connection between buddhahood and 
sovereignty structured and animated Chan ritual life and literary production, especially in 
the context of the “ascending the hall” ceremony and the literary genres of encounter 
dialogue and “public case” (gong’an) commentary. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
returning to the problem of authority’s ultimate source—a problem we considered from a 
different angle in Chapters 2 and 3 with reference to the “marks of the great man” and the 
invisible uṣṇīṣa—through an examination of the trope of the “true command” issued by 
the invisible yet sovereign authority of buddhahood. 
                                                                                                                                            
associated with both Buddhahood and kingship.” Along similar lines, Ruper Gethin observes that 
“Before his death the Buddha had given instructions that his remains should be treated like those of a 





The Chan master as cosmic sovereign 
 
Just as the Buddha, the paradigmatic Buddhist “great man,” retained and even amplified 
certain features of sovereign authority after renouncing his claim to his father’s throne, so 
Chan Buddhists often described the ideal Chan master using tropes of cosmic kingship. 
For example, one of the Buddha’s canonical epithets is “king of the Dharma” (fawang 法
王). Chan Buddhists often use this term in an abstract sense, to refer to the metaphysics 
of sovereign buddhahood lurking beneath phenomenal reality, as when Dahui Zonggao 
remarks that “mountains, rivers, and all the great land completely reveal the body of the 
Dharma-king.”5 Sometimes, however, the epithet “Dharma-king” was applied to the 
actual persons of Chan masters as well. An interesting case is found in a long narrative 
from a text dating to 953 that purports to describe the famous Chan master Zhaozhou 
Congshen’s interactions with two regional warlords. The warlords are referred to in the 
text as the “princes” or “kings” (wang 王) of respectively Zhao 趙 and Yan 燕 territories, 
and have been identified by scholars as referring respectively to Wang Rong 王鎔 (874–
921) and Li Kuangwei 李匡威 (d. 893), both of whom went on to be counted among 
Zhaozhou’s lineage heirs.6 When the two kings first called upon Zhaozhou, the story goes, 
                                                
5 ⼭山河及⼤大地。全露法王身。 Dahui Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1998A, 47: 835b24–25. Along 
similar lines, Huanglong Huinan remarks: “Tell me: what is it that we call the “body of the Dharma-
king”? The four elements, the five aggregates; walking, standing, sitting, lying down; opening 
platforms [in a sangha hall] and setting out the bowls; the sangha hall [itself] and the buddha hall; the 
kitchen, the storehouse, and the triple gate—none of these is anything but the body of the Dharma-
king.” 且道：何名法王身？四⼤大五蘊，⾏行住坐臥，開單展鉢，僧堂佛殿，厨庫三門，無不是法
王身。 Huanglong Huinan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1993, 47: 639a14–16. 
 
6 See Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 99, n. 26. 
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they entered the monastery, but Zhaozhou remained seated and did not rise to greet them. 
Responding to this lack of deference shown to a pair of visiting rulers, the King of Yan 
thereupon asked: “Is the temporal king more esteemed, or is the Dharma-king more 
esteemed?” Zhaozhou replied: “If one is in the temporal king’s [territory], the temporal 
king [is more esteemed]; if one is in the Dharma-king’s [territory], the Dharma-king is 
more esteemed.” The King of Yan, we’re told, silently assented to this position.7 
In Song-dynasty Chan discourse records, we frequently encounter other Chan 
masters faced with a similar question: “When a temporal king meets a Dharma-king, 
what is it like?” This question, posed to Chan masters whose appointment to a public 
abbacy had been overseen by government officials—and often asked on ritual occasions 
when regional or imperial officials were present in the audience—called for a reply from 
the master that could strike a balance between the performance of religious authority and 
the reassurance that this religious authority posed no political threat to imperial authority 
and social order. One telling case of such a question and answer is found in the record of 
a Tang-dynasty Chan master named Huanglian Yichu 黃連義初 (d.u.). When, having 
                                                
7 ⼆二王稅駕觀焉，既屆院內，師乃端坐不起。燕王遂問曰：「⼈人王尊耶，法王尊耶？」師云：
「若在⼈人王，⼈人王中尊。若在法王，法王中尊。」燕王唯然矣。 Zhaozhou Zhenji chanshi 
xingzhuang 趙州真際禪師⾏行狀, Quan Tangwen, j. 997, 10331a. A later retelling of this scene by 
Huanglong Huinan again sets the meaning of sovereignty in a metaphysical register. Huinan ascends 
the hall and raises for comment an abridged version of this story, recounting how an attendant 
announced to Zhaozhou: “The great king has arrived.” Zhaozhou (who by this time is understood to 
have been quite old) replied: “Ten thousand blessings [to you], Great King!” The attendant said: “He 
hasn’t come [into the room] yet.” Zhaozhou replied: “And you said he’d arrived!” 上堂，舉：趙州因
侍者報云：「⼤大王來也。」州云：「萬福⼤大王！」侍者云：「未到在。」州云：「又道來也！」 
Huinan comments approvingly that “The attendant only knew how to announce a guest; he didn’t 
realize he was [already] in the imperial palace.” 侍者祇解報客。爭知身在帝鄉。 Huanglong 
Huinan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1993, 47: 638b11-14. In line with Huinan’s identification of the “body of 
the Dharma-king” with the mundane material features and activities of monastic life (see above, note 
5), here he suggests that Zhaozhou was not merely nearsighted, but rather was making a profound 
point about the phenomenal world itself being the “imperial palace” of buddhahood. At the same time, 
Huinan’s comment also suggests that the attendant is unaware he is already in the audience of a 
personal Dharma-king—that is, Zhaozhou himself. 
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been invited to the regional government office to give a sermon, he was asked what it’s 
like when a temporal king and a Dharma-king meet, he is said to have replied: “[When] 
two mirrors reflect each other, the myriad phenomena assume their proper order.”8 Both 
Zhaozhou’s and Huanglian’s answers reassure their interlocutors that the relationship 
between temporal rulers and Chan masters is entirely harmonious. Yet whereas the 
description of Chan “great men” as spiritual warriors commensurable with Chinese 
soldiers and ministers implied that all three operated in service of the state, the trope of 
the “Dharma-king” carried the very different implication that Chan masters were the 
equals of temporal rulers—that the two were allied sovereigns overseeing discrete 
domains. 
The notion that Chan masters are not merely enlightened masters but actual 
“Dharma-kings” was enhanced by the spatial symbolics of the “ascending the hall” 
ceremony and its literary representation in Chan discourse records. As we have seen, 
during this ceremony the Chan master stood atop a platform occupying the location in the 
hall typically reserved for altars, and from this elevated position ritually performed the 
status of buddhahood. A crucial prop in this performance was the “high seat” (also called 
the “dhyāna seat” or “Dharma seat”) in which, after giving a sermon, the master would 
typically sit to answer questions from the audience. Often, however, this ritual sequence 
was interrupted when Chan masters used the seat itself as a prop for the explication of 
                                                
8 廣南劉⽒氏嚮師道化請⼊入府內說法。僧問：「⼈人王與法王相見時如何？」師曰：「兩鏡相照，
萬像歷然。」 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no 2076, 51: 297c28–298a1. For other examples of questions 
posed ritually to Chan masters concerning the meeting of temporal and Dharma kings, see Zutang ji, j. 
11, v. 2, 526; Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 303a5–7 and 365c22–23; Tiansheng guangdeng 
lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 490a12–13; 514b7–8; Fenyang Wude chanshi yulu, T. no. 1992, 47: 603b6; 
Yangqi Fanghui heshang houlu, T. no 1994B, 47: 647c6–7. It speaks to a deeper tension embedded in 
this question that, although the question was frequently posed, the answers provided by Chan masters 
were often non-sequiturs without clear meaning. 
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doctrine, usually by playing on the implicit symbolic equivalence of this seat with the 
throne upon which buddhas are understood canonically to sit (also often called the 
“dharma seat”). For example, Yuanwu Keqin is said on a certain occasion to have 
ascended the hall and pointed at his “Dharma seat,” then remarked: “All buddhas of past, 
present, and future have turned the wheel of the Dharma from this [seat], and [likewise] 
all successive [Chan] masters throughout the ages have raised up the seal of the patriarchs 
from this [seat].”9 On other occasions Yuanwu equated the “Dharma seat” with the 
“jeweled lotus-throne” (baohua wangzuo 寶華王座) atop which buddhas are described as 
sitting in commentarial traditions stemming from the Huayan jing.10 In one discourse, for 
instance, Yuanwu points to his “Dharma seat” during the “ascending the hall” ceremony 
and says: “Everything in the ten directions eternally exists inside a jeweled lotus-throne 
[like this one]. What need is there for any other special place?”11 Even as performances 
like this participate in the elaboration of a metaphysics of sovereign buddhahood 
pervading the material environment, they also rely for their meaning upon the manifest 
spatial homology between altars, thrones, and the Chan master’s own “high seat.” 
Indeed, by equating the “high seat” in the Chan monastery’s Dharma hall with the 
throne of a buddha, Chan masters also tapped into numerous preexisting associations 
between the spatial trappings of buddhahood and kingship, some from Indian and some 
                                                
9 指法座，云：「三世諸佛於此轉法輪，歷代宗師於此提祖印。」 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, 
T. no. 1997, 47: 715b5–6. 
 
10 See, for example, Dafang guangfo huayan jing shu, T. no. 1735, 35: 835b1–2. Guifeng Zongmi 
connects the term to other doctrinal traditions in his Yuanjue jing dashu shiyi chao, X. no. 245, 9: 
482c6–8. 
 
11 指法座，云：「盡⼗十⽅方都是箇寶華王座長在裏許。又何須特地？」Yuanwu Foguo chanshi 
yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 714b24–25. 
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from Chinese tradition. In addition to the generally homologous relationship between 
altars and thrones, which in religions the world over gives spatial expression to an 
implied similarity between deities and kings, in China there was a more specific 
architectural similarity or even near-interchangeability between palaces and Buddhist 
monasteries.12 The “high seat” to which the Chan master climbed during the “ascending 
the hall” ceremony thus enacted a spatial symbolics—a kind of architectural-ritual 
citation—of both the cosmic altar-throne upon which all buddhas are understood 
canonically to sit, as well as the physical throne upon which the Chinese emperor sat.13 
This latter resonance, in turn, was complemented by the construction of Chan portrait 
halls to resemble Chinese imperial ancestral shrines.14 
At the same time, Chan Buddhists also drew upon specifically Indian associations 
between buddhahood and kingship when they referred to the “high seat” as a “lion throne” 
(shizi zuo 師⼦子座 or ni zuo 猊座). As the Zuting shiyuan points out, the term “lion throne” 
refers “in the Western regions [of India] to the seat upon which a king sits, equivalent to 
                                                
12 As Alexander Soper writes in discussing the Japanese reception of Buddhist architecture, “It is one 
of the striking facts of Chinese history that that [architectural] standard [adopted in Japan], serving an 
Indian religion, was almost completely Chinese. Its forms, structural methods, and principles of design 
were those that had been worked out to suit the general needs of monumental building. The Chinese 
Buddhist monastery, inheriting those long-established habits, was basically very like the Chinese 
palace, or any other major secular structure.” Paine and Soper, The Art and Architecture of Japan, 291. 
Soper adds that the major difference between Buddhist monasteries and palaces or other large 
complexes in China was the pagoda, an adaptation of the Indian stūpa that had no counterpart in 
China and fit awkwardly with its conventions (291–2). I thank Nancy Steinhardt for making me aware 
of this architectural similarity and for the reference to Soper. 
 
13 Indeed, Soper refers to this “high seat” as the “abbot’s throne.” Paine and Soper, The Art and 
Architecture of Japan, 387. 
 
14 See John Jorgensen, “The ‘Imperial’ Lineage of Ch’an Buddhism,” 110; and T. Griffith Foulk and 
Robert H. Sharf, “On the Ritual Use of Ch’an Portraiture in Medieval China,” 175–76. 
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the Chinese emperor’s ‘dragon bed.’”15 Indeed, as Upinder Singh notes, “[t]he idea of the 
lion as king of wild animals goes back to later Vedic texts and is found in the epics,” 
although “it is only from the Maurya period that the lion becomes a major royal symbol 
in India.” She adds that “[t]he idea of the king’s lion throne (siṁhāsana) occurs from the 
Mahabharata onward.”16 The Zuting shiyuan continues its entry on the “lion throne” by 
offering a passage from the Da zhidu lun explaining to a confused questioner that “this 
epithet ‘lion’ does not [refer to] a literal lion. The Buddha is a ‘lion among men,’ and any 
place the Buddha sits—whether on a raised platform or on the ground—is always called a 
‘lion throne.’”17 
Referring to the Chan master’s “high seat” as a “lion throne” seems to have 
become conventional in the Song period, and this equivalence was often used in the 
“ascending the hall ceremony” to preface the first audience question posed to the master 
following the sermon. To give just one example, we find the following case in the record 
of master Yuwang Huailian 育王懷璉 (1010–1090): 
[Someone] asked: “When buddhas are born into the world, they bring 
salvific benefit to all beings. Now that you have ascended the lion’s throne, 
master, whom will you save?” The master replied: “Mountains are high; 
oceans are broad.”18 
                                                
15 西⽅方王者所坐之座，猶中國龍牀也。 Zuting shiyuan, X. no. 1261, 64: 326c11–12. 
 
16 Singh, Political Violence in Ancient India, 390. Singh also notes on the same page that that “[a]part 
from, and perhaps because of, its connection with royalty, the lion had religious associations as well. 
The Buddha is known as Shakyasimha (lion of the Shakyas), and Mahavira is associated with the lion 
emblem. In the epics, kings and warriors are frequently compared with lions, tigers, and bulls.” 
 
17 是號名「師⼦子」，非實師⼦子也。佛為⼈人中師⼦子。佛所坐處，若牀若地，皆名「師⼦子座」。 
Zuting shiyuan, X. no. 1261, 64: 326c14–16. The original passage in the Da zhidu lun adds that “it is 
just like the place where today’s kings sit, which is also called a ‘lion’s throne.’” 譬如今者國王坐處，
亦名「師⼦子座」。 Da zhidu lun, T. no. 1509, 25: 111b4–5. 
 
18 問：「諸佛出世，利濟群⽣生。猊座師登，將何拯濟？」師云：「⼭山⾼高海闊。」 Jianzhong 
jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 672b13–14. For other examples, see also Jingde chuandeng lu, T. 
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Here we see the lion’s throne operating as a half-serious, half-joking figurative medium 
in the equation of Chan masters and buddhas, providing the Chan monastery’s ritual 
audience an occasion for juxtaposing the Buddha’s miraculous abilities with the Chan 
master’s lack thereof—similar to the questions surrounding the “marks of the great man” 
that we considered in Chapter 2. Because there is no possible straightforward answer to a 
question like this, the Chan master must skillfully sidestep its premise by offering a 
vague but clever answer. Here, by mentioning the vast scale of mountains and oceans, the 
master both alludes to the massive project of liberating all sentient beings incumbent 
upon Chan masters in their role as buddhas, and provides an aesthetic counterpoint to the 
canonical image of buddhas as individuals of great personal power by poetically invoking 
the expansive natural landscape. 
For his part, Yuanwu Keqin is said to have voiced an unusually ecumenical vision 
of the Chan tradition as a whole when on a certain occasion he remarked: 
These days [Chan] monasteries are arrayed across the land, and in every 
single one a true “good friend” sits in the lion throne, each a teacher to 
humans and gods, with teeth like swords and mouths like bowls of blood. 
All the others [merely] follow set patterns and depend on [external] 
things.19 
 
Here Yuanwu paints a vivid and relatively inclusive portrait of all the Chan masters 
scattered in monasteries across the Song empire as fearsome lions sitting on lion 
thrones—although he also writes off non-Chan Buddhists as hopeless amateurs. On the 
other hand and more typically, elsewhere Yuanwu is recorded as pointing to his “Dharma 
                                                                                                                                            
no. 2076, 51: 389b27–29; Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 731b23–24, 787c5–6, 
797b3–4; and Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315: 155a2–8. 
 
19 ⾄至今天下列剎相望，⼀一⼀一真善知識踞師⼦子座，各各為⼈人天師，牙如利劍⼝口似⾎血盆。其餘有窠
⾅臼有依倚。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 753a14–16. 
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seat” and saying: “Thirty-two thousand lion thrones all compete to match this [piece of] 
crooked wood.”20 Again, performances like this deliberately play up the apparent 
differences separating the lofty lion thrones and treasure thrones drawn from the 
figurative repertoire of Mahāyāna literature, on the one hand, and the relatively humble 
wooden chair used for the master’s “high seat,” on the other—only to end by rhetorically 
collapsing the difference or proclaiming the superiority of the master’s own seat. And just 
as we saw in an example above, here Yuanwu both insists on the primacy of a 
metaphysical buddhahood immanent in material things—in effect asking rhetorically, 
“who needs those fancy lion thrones of Indian kingship and canonical Buddhist lore when 
you can have an ordinary wooden chair like this?”—and at the same time suggests that 
his own “high seat,” standing metonymically for his personal authority and teaching, is 
the best of all. 
 The trope of the lion itself features prominently in Chan literature, where it 
operates in a similar manner to the “great man” as a figure of normative Chan mastery. 
The lion, as king of wild animals, is often connected in particular with a lofty and solitary 
freedom. For example, the Zhengdao ge, which we have considered above, contains the 
following lines of verse: 
In the sandalwood grove, no other trees are mixed in; 
In the dense and depths [of the forest], the lion resides. 
It wanders alone in the tranquil forest landscape, 
While all the other birds and beasts flee far away. 
A pack of lion cubs follow behind; 
At three years of age they’re able to roar. 
Even if a fox were to [slip into the pack and] follow this Dharma-king, 
                                                
20 指法座，云：「三萬⼆二千師⼦子座，爭及此箇曲彔⽊木。」 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 
1997, 47: 733b18–19. 
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A hundred years of idle talk by goblins would [still] be in vain.21 
 
This stanza depicts the lion as a majestic creature whose power causes all other animals 
to flee—all, that is, except the lion’s own cubs.22 In these lines we see a vision of the 
Chan master as king of Buddhists, with an elite status and sovereign authority that is so 
obvious it leads all others to distance themselves as a matter of course. The final couplet 
warns of the danger of foxes slipping into the pride and passing as lion cubs, a recurring 
trope in Chan literature to which we will return in the next chapter. Yet here the 
Zhengdao ge reassures us that even if this does come to pass—even if a counterfeit is 
mistaken for the real thing, an imitator accidentally admitted into the elite ranks of 
Chan—and even if this eventuality provokes the slander of “goblins” gossiping about the 
Chan tradition’s reputation, it can only finally be a sideshow and cannot possibly bring 
real harm to the lion’s authority. The king, in other words, remains the king. 
The lion’s solitude, paired with the might of the elephant, is reiterated in a Chan 
axiom attributed from the Zutang ji onward to the Chan master Luopu Yuan’an 洛浦元安 
(835–899): “In the lion’s den, there are no other animals; where the elephant-king walks, 
                                                
21 旃檀林無雜樹，欝密深沈師⼦子住。境靜林間獨自遊，⾛走獸⾶飛禽皆遠去。獅⼦子兒眾隨後，三歲
即能⼤大哮吼。若是野⼲干逐法王，百年妖怪虛開⼝口。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 461a4–8. 
In a similar vein, a poem attributed in the Zutang ji to a disciple of Mazu Daoyi named Guizong 
Zhichang 歸宗智常 (fl. ca. 7th–8th c.) opens with the following lines: “[I,] Guizong, have cut off [both] 
phenomena and principle; / The sun is just overhead. / Free like a lion, / I do not rely on anything. / I 
walk alone atop the four mountain peaks, / And travel in leisure along the three roads. / Birds of 
flattery fall [out of the sky], / And the crowd of groaning beasts is terrified [of me].” 歸宗事理絕，日
輪正當午。自在如師⼦子，不與物依怙。獨步四⼭山頂，優遊三⼤大路。吹噓⾶飛禽墮，嚬呻眾獸怖。 
Zutang ji, j. 15, v. 2, 684. 
 
22 The trope of the Chan master as lion sometimes plays out to interesting effect in encounter 
dialogues; see, for example, Mazu Daoyi’s exchange with a visiting lecturer to his monastery in the 
Zutang ji, j. 14, v. 2, 616; translated in Mario Poceski, The Records of Mazu, 230–31. 
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there are no fox-tracks.”23 This line, in turn, is repeated again and again in Chan 
discourse records. One case from the discourse record attributed to Tang-dynasty Chan 
master Baoci Guangyun 報慈光雲 (d.u.), but surviving only from the Song period 
onward, is particularly instructive: 
The master asked a monk [who had just arrived]: “Where have you come 
from?” [The monk] said: “[From] Wolong’s (lit. “reclining dragon,” 
another name for Luopu Yuan’an) [monastery].” The master said: “How 
long did you spend there?” [The monk] said: “I passed a winter and a 
summer.” The master said: “‘There are no overnight guests at the dragon-
gate.’ How did you stay there so long?” [The monk] said: “In the lion’s 
den, there are no other animals.” The master said: “Why don’t you try 
making a lion’s roar for us to see?” [The monk] said: “If I make a lion’s 
roar, then you’ll have to leave, too, master.” The master said: “Seeing as 
how you’ve just arrived, I’ll spare you the thirty blows [that you’re 
owed].”24 
 
This exchange centers around a typical inquiry posed by Chan masters to monastics who 
have just arrived at the monastery, namely to ask after the master of the monastery where 
the student was last in residence. Learning that the monk has spent a year at Wolong’s 
monastery, Baoci puns on the word “dragon” in Wolong’s name by quoting the well-
known Chan maxim that “there are no overnight guests at the dragon-gate.” As Steven 
Heine notes, 
                                                
23 師⼦子窟中無異獸，象王⾏行處勿狐蹤。 Zutang ji, j. 9, v. 1, 415. This phrase is offered in the 
Zutang ji in response to one question, and in the same master’s Jingde chuandeng lu entry in response 




云：「若作師⼦子吼，即無和尚去。」師云：「念汝新到，放汝三⼗十棒。」 Liandeng huiyao, X. 
no. 1557, 79: 229c10–13. A similar setup ends with different results in another case, when a monk 
asks master Shaozhou Longguang 韶州龍光 (fl. ca. 10th c.) about the phrase “In the lion’s den, there 
are no other animals.” In that case, too, the master suggests that the monk roar like a lion, but the 
monk merely bows. The master says, mockingly, “I thought you might kill someone!” 疑殺⼈人！ 
Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 522a20–22. 
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Chan encounters are said to take place at the proverbial “Dragon Gate” 
(longmen). This mythical barrier is where diligent and determined fish 
swimming upstream in a waterfall during a raging spring thunderstorm are 
said to be able leap past the peak once and for all and thereby transform 
into dragons that fly away on clouds toward heaven while peach blossoms 
of the third lunar month fall and float calmly in the choppy waters 
below.25 
 
At the same time, Baoci’s reference to this lofty saying also likely implies on a more 
personal level that Wolong is reputed not to tolerate long-term guests in his monastery. 
The monk seems to confirm this rumor when he quotes one of Wolong’s (that is, Luopu 
Yuan’an’s) own phrases—“In the lion’s den, there are no other animals”— suggesting 
that the lion (here Wolong himself) had no room for challengers to his authority, 
ultimately forcing the monk to take his leave and seek out new lodging. When Baoci asks 
the monk to produce a lion’s roar of his own, the monk cheekily replies that doing so 
would require Baoci to flee like any other animal.26 The conversation ends with Baoci 
“forgiving” the monk the punishment he’s owed for this insolent statement—a verdict we 
might also read as a half-joking compliment. Yet despite its humorous tone, this 
exchange makes clear that the trope of the lion’s solitude stood in for a host of problems 
attending the Chan master’s authority, rhetorically mediating the complex power 
dynamic that obtained within and between Chan monasteries. 
                                                
25 Heine, Chan Rhetoric of Uncertainty, 13–14. In Chinese culture more generally, the “Dragon Gate” 
refers to a mythical gate built by legendary hero Yu the Great during his taming of the floods, and 
passing through this gate came to refer metaphorically to passing the civil service examination; see 
Cleary and Cleary, Blue Cliff Record, 524. 
 
26 Commenting on this line, Yuanwu Keqin remarks: “Although he’s fallen into the weeds, at least 




Chan Buddhists in the Song often played up a longstanding Buddhist association 
of the figure of the lion with “freedom” (zizai 自在) and “play” (youxi 遊戲).27 Yet 
neither freedom nor play is innocent when used to describe a lion. The lion’s freedom is a 
function of its hegemonic power over all other animals, and its play is the play of a 
predator with its prey. As the Da zhidu lun says of the “lion’s play samādhi” (shizi youxi 
sanmei 師⼦子遊戲三昧), “just as a lion freely amuses itself by wrestling with a deer, so 
the Buddha is also like this.”28 Even the lion’s roar, a canonical trope for the Buddha’s 
teaching, was understood by Chan Buddhists to possess the power to do violence, as we 
see in another line from the Zhengdao ge: “The fearless preaching of the lion’s roar: / 
When all the [other] animals hear it, their heads burst apart.”29 In this passage the Chan 
tradition’s elitism is on full display: it is a royal tradition, an institution of lions and their 
cubs, and the authority it possesses is so potent that it makes ordinary beasts’ heads 
explode.30 Even more than the figure of the “great man,” then, the trope of the lion 
renders especially visible the close connection in Chan soteriology between freedom, on 
the one hand, and sovereign power and authority on the other. Of course, Chan Buddhists 
                                                
27 See, for example, Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 486b2–3; Foguo Keqin chanshi xinyao, 
X. no. 1357, 69: 477b19 and 488a23; and Linjian lu, X. no. 1624, 87: 251b23–24. In one case a student 
plays upon the trope of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī riding a lion, asking master Shenzhao Fazhen 神照法
真 (834–919): “Being a lion, why does he let Mañjuśrī ride him?” The master replies: “[This is] 
subduing freedom.” 問：「既是師⼦子，為什麼被⽂文殊騎？」 師云：「調伏自在。 」 Guzunsu 
yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 230b6–7. 
 
28 譬如師⼦子搏鹿，自在戲樂，佛亦如是。 Da zhidu lun, T. no. 1509, 25: 116c9–10. 
 
29 師⼦子吼無畏說，百獸聞之皆腦裂。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 460b13. This line went 
on to be widely quoted by Chan Buddhists. See, for example, Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 
78: 470c2; Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 670a15 and 759b10–11; and Liandeng 
huiyao, X. no. 1557, 79: 155c9–10. 
 
30 It is not incidental to observe that the beasts’ exploding heads in this formulation recall the 
canonical punishment for anyone who dares attempt to glimpse the Buddha’s uṣṇīṣa. 
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did not invent this web of associations out of whole cloth, but rather reiterated and 
reactivated it from within the heart of canonical Buddhist discourse on the nature of 
buddhahood as a form of cosmic sovereignty. 
The connection of freedom to sovereignty has a long tradition in Buddhism, and 
indeed is embedded in the very word for “freedom” most commonly deployed by Chan 
Buddhists: zizai. This term, which in Chinese literally means something like “presence 
unto oneself,” might also be translated as “sovereignty” or “self-mastery”; it carries all of 
these meanings at once. In Buddhist scriptures, zizai often renders the Sanskrit īśvara, 
which means “lord” or “sovereign” and is regularly found attached to the names of gods 
and bodhisattvas.31 It thus refers to that special sovereign freedom possessed by those—
whether lions, gods, or bodhisattvas—who enjoy totally hegemonic control over their 
proper domain. Just as this notion first emerged out of a nexus of Indian Buddhist 
discourses surrounding the relationship between religious and temporal power during the 
centuries following the time of the Buddha, so this connection was not without practical 
consequences for the relationship between Buddhism and the state in China. As Antonino 
Forte has shown, already in the Tang dynasty Empress Wu Zhao (624–705) took 
advantage of the term zizai’s power to discursively connect temporal rulers with 
                                                
31 For example, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, best known in Chinese as Guanyin 觀音, is also 
sometimes called Guan Zizai 觀自在; see Yü, Kuan-yin, Chapter 2. The god Maheśvara (Chinese Da 
zizai tian ⼤大自在天) is associated with the non-Buddhist deity Śiva; see Iyanaga Nobumi, 
“Daijizaiten.” Few pre-Buddhist Chinese texts seem to use the term zizai to mean “freedom” or 
“sovereignty,” although the Liezi 列⼦子 does mention the figure Lao Chengzi 老成⼦子 attaining 
“freedom to live or die [at will]” 存亡自在 after studying with a magician. See Yang, Liezi ji shi, j. 3, 
100; and the translation by Graham, The Book of Lieh-tzu, 65, who translates this phrase as “appear or 
disappear at will.” 
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bodhisattvas in her efforts to cast herself as both a cakravartin and an incarnation of the 
bodhisattva Maitreya.32 
Among the particular sovereign freedoms attached to zizai often mentioned by 
Chan Buddhists is the freedom to kill and give life (shahuo zizai 殺活自在). Yuanwu, for 
example, sermonizes that someone who attains perfect awakening “is then free to traverse 
adverse and favorable circumstances, to kill and to give life.”33 Again, as we have already 
seen, the license to kill that Buddhist literature grants to buddhas and bodhisattvas is 
often bound up with the eradication of demons in service of the hegemony of Buddhist 
authority. As a buddha, then, the Chan master is expected to participate in this cosmic 
mission against Māra’s demonic horde. Thus Yunmen Daoxin 雲門道信 (fl. ca. Northern 
Song; not to be confused with the more famous Yunmen Wenyan) places enlightened 
Chan masters in the proverbial shoes of canonical bodhisattvas, suggesting that they 
“directly taking up Mañjuśrī’s battle-sword, deciding whether to kill or give life 
according to the circumstances of the moment.”34 
Yet in other cases the authority to kill is directed not at anonymous demons but at 
the master’s own students. For example, Xuedou Chongxian (980–1052) is said to have 
invited students to step forward and ask questions during a performance of the 
“ascending the hall” ceremony in the following terms: “With the handle of power in 
                                                
32 See Forte, Political Propaganda and Ideology, 244. 
 
33 若有出得⼤大圓覺底，便能逆順縱橫，殺活自在。Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 
762b20–21. Chan master Guoqing Xingji 國清⾏行機 (1113–1180) connects this authority over life and 
death with the solitary freedom we have seen associated with both great men and lions: “walking 
alone with bold generosity, [the right to] kill and give life resides with me.” 獨步⼤大⽅方，殺活在我。
Liandeng huiyao, X. no. 1557, 79: 159b8. 
 
34 直得⽂文殊仗劒，殺活臨時。 Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 792b18. 
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one’s grip, one decides whether to kill or give life according to circumstance. If there is a 
master [here], let’s come together and test each other.”35 Here the encounter between 
master and student (or, more precisely, between established master and aspiring master) 
is figured as a fight to the death for sovereignty, a theme to which we will return. The 
pedagogical dimension of “killing and giving life” is also reflected in a trope widespread 
across Song-period Chan, according to which any true master must possess both a “blade 
that kills” (sharen dao 殺⼈人⼑刀) and a “sword that restores to life” (huoren jian 活⼈人劍).36 
This formulation, in turn, is closely connected to the idea that aspirants to Chan mastery 
and buddhahood must spiritually “die” and then “come back to life.”37 It is the master’s 
job to help them along. As Yuanwu, a major proponent of this pedagogical technique, is 
careful to clarify: “In order to save life one must kill; yet although one kills, no one is 
hurt.”38 Although his point may be true in the most literal sense, this nexus of tropes 
nevertheless reveals that the Chan tradition’s normative model of pedagogy is not 
friendly conversation but forceful conversion—resembling the myth of the Buddhist 
protector-deity Vajrapāṇi’s subjugation of the heterodox god Maheśvara, by first 
stomping him to death and then bringing him back to life as a faithful Buddhist convert.39 
                                                
35 權柄在⼿手，殺活臨時。其有作家，共相證據。 Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 
653a23–24. 
 
36 The earliest discussions of this trope are in the Zutang ji, j. 7, v. 1, 341; j. 9, v. 1, 411; j. 10, v. 1, 
486; j. 10, v. 1, 495; and j. 11, v. 2, 510. 
 
37 See Ahn, “The Malady of Meditation,” Chapter 2. 
 
38 護⽣生須殺，雖殺無傷。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 762b17. 
 
39 See Faure, Bouddhisme et Violence, 135–38. The myth of the conversion of Maheśvara exemplifies 
the threat posed by rival sovereigns in Buddhist cosmology, and it is no coincidence that Maheśvara’s 
name includes the īśvara or zizai that we’ve been considering. As Faure notes, demons “represent the 
forces of chaos, which ceaselessly threaten the established order. It is therefore necessary, at full force, 
either to keep them at a distance or, on the contrary, to integrate them, to bring them into the mandala 
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The connection between the trope of “the blade that kills and the sword that 
restores to life,” on the one hand, and the hegemonic authority associated with a Chan 
master standing as unrivalled cosmic sovereign is made explicit in another passage from 
Yuanwu’s discourse record: 
[Someone] stepped forward and said: “If there is a peerless hero with a 
strategy that can capture qian and kun (i.e. Heaven and Earth), possessing 
the blade that kills and the sword that restores to life, does the principle of 
the Buddha-dharma still exist, or not?” The master said: “It exists.” [The 
questioner] stepped forward and asked: “What is the principle of the 
Buddha-dharma?” The master said: “It’s just to be without enemies under 
Heaven.”40 
 
The notion of being “without enemies under Heaven” has multiple resonances in classical 
Chinese literature. On the one hand, Mencius remarks that the benevolent ruler is 
“without enemies under Heaven” because his virtue inspires respect and gratitude rather 
than enmity.41 Yet the Xunzi and other classical texts use this phrase to refer not to 
benevolence-induced harmony, but to matchless power.42 Given the preference for 
martial heroism evident in this passage and throughout Chan literature, it is more likely 
that Yuanwu had the latter meaning in mind. Standing in a position of unmatched power, 
Yuanwu thus suggests, the Chan master oversees a peace ensured by perfectly hegemonic 
                                                                                                                                            
by converting them, and in this way to transform them from attackers into defenders of the Buddhist 
citadel. This conversion is, however, never final, and vigilance toward them is required.” Faure, 
Bouddhisme et Violence, 134 (my translation). 
 
40 進云：「只如蘊定乾坤謀略，有蓋世英雄，具殺⼈人⼑刀秉活⼈人劍，還有佛法道理也無？」師云：
「有。」進云：「如何是佛法道理？」師云：「直是天下無敵。」 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, 
T. no. 1997, 47: 730c22–25. 
 
41 仁⼈人無敵於天下。 Yang, Mengzi yizhu, v. 2, 325. 
 
42 See Wang, Xunzi jijie, 15:266; translated in Knoblock, Xunzi, 219. See also Shiji, v. 7, 2422. 
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sovereignty.43 Along similar lines, elsewhere Yuanwu sermonizes: “If you know the 
myriad differences are all just a single unity, you can spontaneously take on enemies 
coming from [all] eight sides.”44 Here we find wisdom, authority, and martial prowess 
conflated into a single normative ideal. 
In Song-dynasty China as in other parts of the pre-modern world, the ultimate 
right to kill was understood to lie with the sovereign—even if in practice the actual 
execution of this right devolved to lower authorities. Chan Buddhists sometimes 
explicitly register this implication of the phrase “freedom to kill and to give life,” as 
when the Song-period Chan master Nanhua Zhibing 南華知昺 (d.u.) writes that 
liberation entails “grasping the sword that kills and gives life, sitting alone in the royal 
palace.”45 If in the temporal sphere the authority to kill belongs to the king, in the cosmic 
sphere it belongs to the Buddha—or to any Chan master that sits on the throne in the 
royal palace of buddhahood. As a tool of sovereign power, the right to kill or give life is 
situated at the extreme end of a spectrum of possible rewards and punishments available 
to the sovereign in dealing with subjects. Rewards and punishments (shangfa 賞罰) were 
an oft-discussed theme in the theory and practice of law and governance in China, and 
Chan Buddhists picked up this theme as well in discussing ideals of Chan mastery. For 
example, Wuzu Fayan mentions that “a great man clearly distinguishes between rewards 
                                                
43 A similar ideal is expressed by a phrase attributed to the Tang-dynasty master Rirong 日容 (d.u.): 
“With a fierce tiger in the position of authority, who would be an enemy?” 猛虎當軒，誰是敵者？ 
Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no 2076, 51: 288a11–12. 
 
44 若知千差萬別只是⼀一般，自然⼋八面受敵。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 
201b3–4. 
 
45 秉殺活劒，獨踞寰中。 Liandeng huiyao, X. no. 1557, 79: 188c15–16. 
 
 173 
and punishments.”46 On several occasions in his discourse record, Dahui Zonggao raises 
for discussion the pedagogical tool of striking a student with one’s staff, then poses the 
question: “is it punishing him or is it rewarding him?”47 In other words, is hitting a 
student really punishment if it helps lead the student to liberation, or is it in fact a kind of 
reward? 
The Chan master’s sovereign right to punish also carries with it the responsibility 
to properly discern the nature of the crime, as Chan master Miyan Xianjie 密菴咸傑 
(1118–1186) suggests when he sermonizes about “discerning the tune as soon as the 
string is plucked, knowing it’s autumn from the falling leaves; clearly [knowing] three 
things when one is raised, [possessing] an eye for even the minutest detail; like a king 
grasping the sword, deciding whether to kill or give life according to circumstances.”48 
Here the right to kill requires the ability to determine who truly deserves to die. Indeed, 
the administration of punishment is inseparable from the larger juridical apparatus of 
criminal justice, and Chan Buddhists knew it. Already in the early-eleventh-century 
Jingde chuandeng lu we find the following case attributed to Chan master Muzhou 
Daoming 睦州道明, also known as Chen Zunsu 陳尊宿 (780–877): 
Seeing a monk coming, the master said, “[Yours is] a clear-cut case 
(xiancheng gong’an 現成公案), but I release you of the thirty blows [you 
deserve].” The monk said, “This is the way I am.” The master said, “[Then] 
why do the guardian deities in the monastery gate raise their fists?” The 
                                                
46 ⼤大丈夫賞罰分明。 Fayan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1995, 47: 657b4. 
 
47 且道：是賞他，是罰他？ Dahui Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1998A, 47: 844b11. See also Dahui 
Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1998A, 47: 850b26–27 and 940a17. 
 
48 動絃別曲，葉落知秋，舉⼀一明三，目機銖兩，如王秉劒，殺活臨時。 Liandeng huiyao, X. no. 
1557, 79: 162a1–2. Miyan goes on to say that these tropes do not describe the highest path, and that 
Chan masters ought to aim for something greater than skill in discernment. 
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monk said, “The guardian deities are also like this.” The master struck 
him.49 
 
The trope of “sparing” a student thirty blows became ubiquitous in Song-dynasty Chan 
literature, a practical application of the Chan master’s authority to decide whether to 
punish or pardon (and a considerably lighter punishment than execution). Here the statues 
of guardian deities situated at the monastery’s entrance are placed in the role of cosmic 
bailiffs, leering threateningly at the visiting monk in a monastery now cast as a 
magistrate’s courtroom administering punitive justice. 
Insolent Chan students deserving a beating, moreover, were often called “thieves.” 
The trope of the thief in Chan literature played upon the widespread assumption in pre-
modern Chinese culture that thieves and bandits represent a basic threat to imperial order 
and stable sovereignty.50 In the most extreme case, a would-be usurper might be called a 
thief or bandit. An interesting example is found in the historian Sima Guang’s 司馬光 
(1019–1086) comments following a long narrative description of the Tang-dynasty’s An 
Lushan rebellion, preserved in his historical chronicle Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑. After 
detailing an elaborate parade staged by Emperor Xuanzong ⽞玄宗 (r. 712–756), Sima 
Guang asks rhetorically: “Who knew that [standing] on the sidelines was a great bandit 
[An Lushan], already harboring a covetous mind, who would end up sending the imperial 
                                                
49 師見僧來云。見成公案放汝三⼗十棒。僧云。某甲如是。師云。三門⾦金剛為什麼舉拳。僧云。
⾦金剛尚乃如是。師便打。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 291b17–19; translation follows 
Foulk, “The Form and Function,” 19, with minor alterations. 
 
50 In canonical Buddhist texts, mental afflictions are often referred to as “māra-thieves” (mozei 魔賊, 
a rendering of Sanskrit māra-pratyarthika). See, for example, Miaofa lianhua jing, T. no. 262, 9: 
54c12; and Dafang guangfo huayan jing, T. no. 278, 9: 550c10. Relatedly, the six sense faculties are 
also sometimes referred to as the “six thieves” (liu zei 六賊). These resonances participated in the 
broader conflation of phenomenal objects of mental perception, on the one hand, and actual 
individuals in one’s social environment—a conflation we will consider further in the next chapter. 
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carriages into homeless wandering and put the common people through utter misery?”51 
The equal danger to public order posed by “thieves” of the Buddhist variety is registered 
by Sima Guang’s contemporary, Chan master Huanglong Huinan 黃龍慧南 (1002–
1069), who is said to have sermonized: “[Those who] speak of the marvelous and chat 
about the mysterious are treacherous thieves in times of Great Peace. [Those who] wield 
blows and wield shouts are heroes in times of chaotic disorder.”52 In other words, while 
idle talk threatens to topple the utopian empire of buddhahood, blows and shouts are the 
instruments by which an intrepid Chan master might restore law and order. At the same 
time, not only usurpers but even petty criminals posed a threat to sovereign authority. As 
Michel Foucault observes of crime in pre-modern Europe: “Besides its immediate victim, 
the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the 
will of the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of 
the prince.”53 It was indeed both the right and the duty of Chan masters to punish thieves 
of every kind in order to maintain the integrity of the Chan institution and the hegemony 
of Buddhist order in the cosmos. Yunmen articulates this duty in his dictum: “when 
guests arrive [at the monastery], [the master] must examine them; when thieves arrive, 
[the master] must beat them.”54 
                                                
51 豈知⼤大盜在旁，已有窺窬之⼼心，卒致鑾輿播越，⽣生民塗炭？ Zizhi tongjian, j. 218, v. 15, 6994. 
 
52 說妙談⽞玄，乃太平之姦賊。⾏行棒⾏行喝，為亂世之英雄。 Huanglong Huinan chanshi yulu, T. no. 
1993, 47: 637b5–6. Huanglong then adds that his monastery doesn’t tolerate either of these. 
53 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 47. 
 
54 客來須看賊來須打。 Yunmen Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 47: 569c14. In a later 
record, a student asks the master Bajiao Huiqing 芭蕉慧清 (fl. ca. 10th c.), “When guests arrive [at the 
monastery], one must examine them; when thieves arrive, one must beat them. What about when a 
guest and a thief arrive at the same time?” 賊來須打，客來須看。忽遇客賊俱來時如何？ Jingde 
chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 297c13–14. 
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On the other hand, Chan Buddhists also register the ambivalence at the heart of 
Chan authority when they use the trope of the “thief” to grudgingly praise—or signal 
alarm about the threat posed by—ambitious students and rival masters. For example, 
following an exchange in the Linji lu during which Linji rudely upstages his master 
Huangbo, a comment attributed to Yangshan Huiji 仰⼭山慧寂 (807–883) is appended: 
“Although the thief (Linji) is a petty man, his wisdom surpasses that of the gentleman 
(Huangbo).”55 This comment suggests that Linji, despite being a “thief” attempting to 
usurp his master’s authority, in fact exceeds his master’s qualifications for authority by 
virtue of his wisdom. Sometimes students themselves turn the tables and marshal this 
trope to their own advantage by calling the master an “old thief,” suggesting that the 
master’s authority was ill-gained in the first place and is therefore illegitimate.56 In still 
other cases, one master will call another a thief. For example, in an episode that takes 
place after Linji has already become a master in his own right, we’re told that Puhua 普
化 (d. 860), a reclusive Chan master living near Linji’s monastery in Zhenzhou, once 
paid a visit to Linji. On his arrival, “Linji said: ‘Thief, thief!’ The master [Puhua] also 
said: ‘Thief, thief!’”57 While Puhua’s reply can be read as a mocking echo of his 
                                                
55 仰⼭山云：「賊是小⼈人，智過君⼦子。」 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, T. no. 1985, 47: 
505b14. 
 
56 See, for example, Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 295c12–13. 
 
57 ⼀一日⼊入臨濟院，臨濟曰：「賊！賊！」師亦曰：「賊！賊！」 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 
2076, 51: 280b27–28. This encounter echoes but also inverts the encounter between Baizhang and 
Huangbo that we considered in Chapter 2, in which each recognizes the other as a “great man.” Of 
course, unlike that example, this case does not end in a lineage transmission. Yuanwu, for his part, 
appropriates this notion of two thieves meeting into his own repertoire of frequently-deployed 
comments when he wishes to dismiss both figures in an encounter dialogue: “A thief recognizes a 




interlocutor—in effect saying “I know you are, but what am I?”—it also stages the 
necessary contestation of legitimate authority involved in any meeting between two Chan 
masters. After all, there can only be one legitimate sovereign at a time, and any other 
master is by definition a thief threatening to unjustly usurp that sovereign’s authority. 
According to his discourse record, Wuzu Fayan was once invited to give a guest lecture 
outside Shuzhou, the location of his own monastery, at the monastery of another master. 
Following the sermon, the resident master grabs hold of Fayan and says: “It turns out 
there’s a bandit in Shuzhou!” Fayan replies: “You’d better be on guard as well, master.”58 
Fayan’s reply suggests half-jokingly that, if the resident master is not careful, Fayan 
might not only threaten the socio-religious order in Shuzhou but usurp this master’s 
authority as well. This exchange hinges precisely on the ambivalence of the epithet 
“thief,” which sometimes operates as a term of sincere critique and other times serves as 
an ironic badge of honor. 
The trope of the Chan master as judge deciding appropriate punitive measures to 
apply to thieving students, already found in the Zutang ji, soon gave way to a larger 
culture of masters judging each other, and even of students judging their teachers. 
Everyone, in short, was suspiciously judging everyone else. And this trend only grew 
increasingly popular over the course of the Song period. The term “public case” (gong’an) 
itself came to refer broadly to the emerging genre of commentary on excerpted passages 
from already-circulating Chan discourse records. As T. Griffith Foulk observes: 
The practice of commenting authoritatively on old cases… was not simply 
a means of elucidating the wisdom of ancient patriarch s for the sake of 
                                                
58 甘露資長老把師住，云：「舒州管界元來有箇草賊。」師云：「和尚也須隄防。」 Fayan 
chanshi yulu, T. no. 1995, 47: 651b29–c2. Yuanwu Keqin adopted this encounter as Case 85 in the 
Biyan lu; see Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 210b19–26. 
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disciples or a larger audience. It was also a device for demonstrating the 
rank and spiritual authority of the master himself.59 
 
Indeed, the act of judging was itself a component of the performance of Chan mastery 
and buddhahood. To this we may add that pronouncing judgment on masters and students 
(both past and present) at once relied upon and extended the association of Chan mastery 
with cosmic sovereignty, along with the attendant right to decide who deserves reward 
and who deserves punishment. In this way, the trope of cosmic sovereignty broadly 
organized Chan soteriology during the Song, justifying the tradition’s claim that Chan 
masters are living buddhas with a special authority deserving their place at the top of the 
Chinese Buddhist monastic hierarchy. At the same time, it articulated an unstable order in 
which religious “coups” were expected to take place—indeed were even encouraged. As 
a result, Chan monasteries and discourse records became spaces of regulated but never 
entirely established authority. 
 
Rivals for buddhahood on the battlefield of encounter dialogue 
 
With all of this in mind, we may turn to consider a series of cases in which the idea that 
encounter dialogues stage battles for authority becomes explicit within the dialogues 
themselves, or in the layers of commentary that came to be appended to them.60 To begin, 
                                                
59 Foulk, “The Form and Function,” 17. 
 
60 Sometimes Chan Buddhists themselves referred to encounter dialogues as “Dharma battles,” 
(fazhan 法戰), as we see in a case when Shishuang Chuyuan ⽯石霜楚圓 (986–1039) concluded a 
dialogue with the monastery’s rector Kebin 克賓 (d.u.) by hitting him, then remarking: “Rector Kebin 
lost a Dharma battle; I fine him five strings of cash, and he must give up one meal.” 克賓維那法戰不
勝，罰錢五貫，設饡飯⼀一堂。 Liandeng huiyao, X. no. 1557, 79: 100b18–19. See also the 
discussion of “dharma battles” in Heine, Chan Rhetoric of Uncertainty, 37. 
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let us consider a passage from the discourse record of Xuedou Chongxian, around whose 
verse comments on “old cases” Yuanwu’s Blue Cliff Record was built: 
One day Zong, who was head seat [of the monastery], came [to the abbot’s 
quarters] and was about to discuss worldly matters61 when the master 
[Xuedou] stopped him, saying: “Since I already know the battle strategy 
contained in your message, you must simply make obeisance and 
surrender.” Zong said: “Today I have been defeated.” The master said: 
“Even before I had to use my sword, the thief’s body is already exposed.” 
Zong said: “If you’re [too] hasty, [you might] kill someone.” The master 
said: “One doesn’t [need to] execute generals who have [already] lost [the 
battle].”62 
 
In this rather good-humored case, we are told that the highest-ranking monk in the 
monastery has come to consult with Xuedou on some matter. But the master does not 
even let him begin, informing the monk that he has discerned his “strategy” from the 
moment he walked in and has already beaten him in the “battle” of their encounter. Zong 
appears not to have expected this, but admits his fault; after all, he was perhaps preparing 
to discuss a piece of gossip that he might better have kept to himself. Xuedou then mocks 
the monk for conceding defeat so easily, exposing his “thief’s body” before the master 
even had to take out his “sword,” to which the monk replies that this outcome is 
preferable to someone actually getting hurt. The master tells him not to worry: he is 
merciful to those he has defeated, and lets them off with their lives. 
Along similar lines, other cases also make reference to battles that end before they 
begin, such as this exchange between Huanglong Huinan and a monk in the audience of 
his monastery: 
                                                
61 This term renshi ⼈人事 might alternatively refer to matters concerning personnel in the monastery.  
62 ⼀一日宗首座到，⽅方擬⼈人事。師約住云：「既知信之韜略，便須拱⼿手歸降。」宗云：「今日敗
闕。」師云：「劍刃未施，賊身已露。」宗云：「氣急殺⼈人。」師云：「敗將不斬。」 
Mingjue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1996, 47: 677b18–21. 
 
 180 
A monk stepped forward and bowed. The master said: “You have not yet 
asked a question.” The monk then stepped back. The master said: “I was 
going to call you the attacking army’s general, but it turns out you’re just a 
rank-and-file foot soldier. I don’t see you as being at fault. Come along 
and ask your question.”63 
 
Here the master has pity on a student who has presented a far less imposing challenge 
than anticipated. Huinan’s comments seem intended to spur the reticent student on, in a 
sense asking, “is that all you’ve got?” 
 Other students, by contrast, were more eager to show off their skills by 
immediately presenting the master with a direct challenge. As an example, let us consider 
an encounter between an inquiring monk and a Yunmen-lineage master named Miaozhan 
Sihui 妙湛思慧 (1071–1145): 
[Someone] asked: “Master, you have a strategy that could smash through 
heaven; I, your student, have a plan that could enter into the earth. When 
our two armies match swords in battle, what is it like?” The master said: 
“[I,] this mountain monk, beat the drums of retreat.” The monk was about 
to discourse further, but the master gave a shout.64 
 
This confident student does not merely enter into an encounter dialogue-battle with the 
master ready to fight, but actually opens his dialogue with the master by describing what 
that battle will be like—as evenly matched, he claims, as heaven and earth—and asks the 
master to predict its outcome. Sihui feigns a reaction of being overawed, immediately 
“beating the drums of retreat,” but when the student prepares to hold forth further the 
master cuts him off with an abrupt shout, demonstrating that he has not conceded at all; 
his “retreat” was a ruse, and he had no intention of letting the student show off endlessly. 
                                                
63 有僧纔出禮拜。師云：「未得問話。」其僧乃退。師云：「將謂是打陣將軍，元來是⾏行間小
卒。不見爾過，好好問來。」 Huanglong Huinan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1993, 47: 636c10–12. 
 
64 問：「師有衝天之略，學⼈人有⼊入地之謀。兩陣交鋒，如何即是？」 師云：「⼭山僧打退鼓。」
僧擬議，師便喝。 Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 259c18–20. 
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 For Chan Buddhists, then, students’ abilities did not always match their self-
confidence. This fact is made even clearer in a case from the Zutang ji in which the 
student Longya Judun 龍牙居遁 (835–923), a disciple of Dongshan Liangjie (807–869), 
visits his master’s contemporary Deshan: 
Longya asked: “What is it like when I, a student, grip the Moye sword and 
am about to cut off your head?” [Deshan] said: “How will you go about it?” 
Longya said: “Your head has already fallen.” The master [Deshan] did not 
reply. Later Longya went to Dongshan and told him what had happened. 
Dongshan said: “Bring me his decapitated head!” Longya had no 
response.65 
 
In a subsequent version of this story found in the Jingde chuandeng lu, it concludes that 
Longya “recognized his fault and repented.”66 In other words, Longya thinks he has 
succeeded in cutting off Deshan’s proverbial head, and only upon discussing the matter 
with his own teacher does he see that he has done no such thing, but merely made a fool 
of himself (and perhaps embarrassed his master Dongshan in the process). After all, if he 
had really succeeded in executing Deshan, he would be able to bring the proverbial head 
to his own master Dongshan to demonstrate how he managed to take down such an 
illustrious rival teacher. This case is particularly important for understanding that the 
notion of Chan encounters as battles was never merely a game. Even if no heads were 
literally cut off, a meaningful difference always separated the real and the merely pretend 
decapitation of a master’s authority. 
                                                
65 龍牙問：「學⼈人仗莫邪之劍，擬取師頭時如何？」云：「你作摩⽣生下⼿手？」龍牙曰：「與摩
則師頭落也。」師不答。龍牙後到洞⼭山，具陳上事。洞⼭山云：「把將德⼭山落底頭來！」龍牙
(無對)。 Zutang ji, j. 5, v. 1, 275. A similar story featuring different Chan protagonists—Yantou 
Quanhuo 巖頭全豁 (828-887), Xuefeng Yicun, and an anonymous monk rather than Deshan, 
Dongshan, and Longya—is found as case 66 of the Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 196b21–c3. 
 
66 龍牙省過懺謝。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 317c26–27. 
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In another account we find Xuedou, whose exchange with his monastery’s head 
seat we have just considered above, visiting a monastery where he is not abbot and giving 
a guest performance of the “ascending the hall” ceremony at the request of the assembly, 
only to be immediately challenged by a monk in the audience: 
A monk asked: “As for the ‘seven items that accompany your person,’ I 
request you to show them [to me].” The master said: “I beat the drums of 
retreat.” [The monk] stepped forward and said: “We’ve only just begun to 
cross swords, and already we’ve seen a great defeat.” The master sighed. 
The monk considered this, and the master gave a shout, [then said]: 
“What’s this guy in such a deathly hurry for?”67 
 
This monk’s reference to the “seven items accompanying one’s person” (qishi suishen 七
事隨身) refers to a canonical list of seven things that every monastic carries around, 
including robes, a bowl, and other items. Here, however, the term seems to operate as 
code for tangible evidence of the master’s authority, and the monk’s question amounts to 
asking this newcomer to the monastery, “may I see your credentials?” Here, as in the 
above case with Miaozhan Sihui, the master pretends to “retreat,” only to cut the student 
off with a decisive shout. In this case, however, the master also sighs at the student’s 
presumption, and his concluding question—“what is this guy in such a deathly hurry 
for?”—seems to register genuine exasperation at having been invited to lecture as a guest 
(at a monastery with whose assembly he is totally unfamiliar) only to be confronted with 
an impertinent line of questioning from one of the assembled monks. 
                                                
67 師到萬壽，眾請上堂。僧問：「七事隨身，便請相見。」師云：「打退鼓。」進云：「⽅方始
交鋒，已見⼤大敗。」師云噓。僧擬議，師便喝：「者般漢有什麼死急？」 Mingjue chanshi yulu, 
T. no. 1996, 47: 674c3–5. 
 
 183 
What did Chan masters think about such students? Another heir of the Linji 
lineage’s Yangqi branch, Foyan Qingyuan 佛眼清遠 (1067–1120), tells us quite clearly 
his opinion: 
I sometimes see beginner [Chan] brothers enter [my abbot’s] chamber just 
to fight. When I, this mountain monk, observe them, [I conclude that] 
there is nothing I can do [to help them]. They’re just like a village person 
carrying a shoulder pole (to engage in petty labor or trade) entering into a 
fight with a high-ranking general. Among the “seven items accompanying 
my person,” I hold in my hand the sword of Guan Yu [that weighs] eighty 
jin. [Such a Chan student] will then take his shoulder pole and abruptly 
strike me a blow. Seeing I’m unmoved, he’ll get in a few more strikes. I’m 
not afraid of him, for he is not my match.68 
 
In describing how massively overpowered he considers these allegedly clueless students 
to be when faced with his own martial majesty, Foyan also makes reference to the “seven 
items accompanying one’s person” that we have just seen discussed above, again in a 
manner suggesting a more than literal meaning. In particular, he includes an item not 
typically found on that list of seven monastic items: the sword of legendary Chinese 
general Guan Yu 關⽻羽 (d. 219). Foyan’s statement is perhaps a double-entendre also 
referring to another list of “seven items” that were supposed to be carried by military 
generals,69 though for obvious reasons even that list includes only ordinary and not 
mythical swords. But more importantly than these multiple lists of seven literal items, 
Foyan uses the term in the same way it was used by the student who asked Xuedou to 
show his “seven items” to the assembled crowd: as a symbol and proof of his authority. 
By the Song period there was already a growing cult to a deified Guan Yu, who would go 
                                                
68 有時見初機兄弟⼊入室祇是爭。⼭山僧覷他了也不柰何，⼀一似村裏⼈人把扁檐共上將軍闘。我者裏
七事隨身，⼿手中是關⽻羽⼋八⼗十⽄斤⼑刀。他便把扁檐劈頭打⼀一棒。見⼈人不動，又連打數下去。我不是
怕他，葢不是對⼿手。 Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 213b3–7. 
 
69 Hanyu da cidian, v. 1, 156. 
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on to be widely considered the quintessential “god of war” from the Ming dynasty to the 
present day.70 Foyan’s statement that among his personal articles he possesses the sword 
of Guan Yu thus makes a strong claim to his own status as a martial hero of Chan. He 
contrasts this with the shoulder-pole of a villager, the only proverbial weapon possessed 
by an excessively confident beginning Chan student who does not know better than to 
challenge an esteemed general like Foyan to a fight. Foyan needn’t even fight back, he 
tells us, because the challenger’s wisdom and skill is so far beneath his own. 
 The language of battle was used not only within encounter dialogues themselves, 
but also in collections of “public cases” (gong’an) to describe and appraise dialogues 
taken up for comment. Yuanwu and other Chan masters seem to have particularly 
enjoyed singling out and commenting upon cases in which they felt the two dialoguing 
individuals were a good match for each other—the opposite of the Chan trope of the 
“clear-cut case” that we discussed above, in which one party’s fault was obvious.71 
Closely matched encounter dialogue-battles challenged the reader to discern who was the 
true winner, and precisely this challenge elicited enthusiastic commentary from 
connoisseurs of old cases. The dynamism of such battles is captured in a lengthy poem by 
Fayuan Yuanjian 法遠圓鑒 (991–1067) entitled “Song of the clashing swords of Chan 
generals” (Chanjiang jiaofeng ge 禪將交鋒歌), which versifies: “When the swords of 
Chan generals clash, watch [to see who is the] master. / … The blades of their wit (jifeng 
                                                
70 See Ter Haar, “The Rise of the Guan Yu Cult.” On specific connections between Guan Yu and 
Buddhism in the Tang and Song, see Wang, “Tang-Song Guan Yu xinyang.” 
 
71 On the idea of the “clear-cut case,” see Foulk, “The Form and Function,” 20. 
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機鋒) move quickly, and it’s difficult to discern who is who.”72 Along similar lines, a 
verse commentary on a passage from the Linji lu in which Linji encounters another 
master named Magu 麻⾕谷 (d.u.) observes, “One hero with the true eye meets another 
true-eyed [hero]; / Superior and inferior, short and long—in vain one tries to distinguish 
[who holds the position of dominance].”73 Here both masters possess “true eyes”—a 
trope signaling the capacity for skilled discernment—while a viewer witnessing the 
encounter struggles to discern which of the two is superior. 
 Yuanwu’s Blue Cliff Record demonstrates its appreciation for this sort of evenly 
matched Chan battle by offering blow-by-blow commentary on each dialogue as it 
unfolds through the interpolation of interlineal notes. To see how this works, let us begin 
by considering Case 71 in that collection, first with a rendering of the original case’s 
dialogue between Baizhang Huaihai and his disciple Wufeng 五峯 (d.u.) that for the 
moment leaves out Yuanwu’s interlineal commentary: 
Baizhang also asked Wufeng: “With your throat and lips shut, how can 
you speak?” Wufeng said: “Master, you too must shut up.” Baizhang said: 
“In a place without any people, I shade my eyes with my hand and gaze at 
you [from afar].”74 
 
                                                
72 禪將交鋒看作家，... 機鋒迅速⼈人難辨。 Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: p. 817c2–
3. 
 
73 正眼英雄逢正眼，勝劣短長徒用揀。 Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 544b12. 
Some cases instead use the imagery of tigers discussed above, as in the following verse commentary 
on an encounter dialogue: “Two tigers battling, / Both possessing forceful strength.” ⼆二虎爭戰，俱用
勢⼒力。 Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 636b22. 
 
74 百丈復問五峯：「併却咽喉唇吻，作麼⽣生道？」峯云：「和尚也須併却。」丈云：「無⼈人處
斫額望汝。」 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 200a16–18; translation follows 
Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 395, with alterations. 
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In this passage Wufeng appears to behave quite rudely toward his teacher, the legendary 
Baizhang, whom we have considered previously in relation to his other students Weishan 
and Huangbo. While we might expect Wufeng’s command that his master “shut up” to 
have been met by later commentators with incredulity or scandal, instead Yuanwu was 
impressed by Wufeng, commenting in military terms that Wufeng has succeeded in 
“capturing the banner and carrying off the drum,” a metaphor for victory in battle.75 In 
his prose commentary, Yuanwu adds that to achieve what Wufeng has just done “one 
must be a man who takes it up directly, like a head-on clash at the front lines. There’s no 
room for hesitation.”76 Indeed, it seems Yuanwu finds Wufeng’s rejection of theoretical 
speculation in favor of authoritative speech acts particularly appealing. Baizhang has 
asked Wufeng a relatively abstract question about “speaking with the mouth shut,” but 
Wufeng responds by issuing a practical command that the master ought simply to stop 
speaking altogether—to shut up. 
Yet despite his effusive praise of Wufeng, Yuanwu is still not sure who has won 
the battle, and his analysis of this question hinges upon Baizhang’s response. At first 
glance, Baizhang’s reply seems to suggest approval, implying that Wufeng has risen so 
far above the master (and everyone else) that Baizhang must strain his eyes to catch a 
glimpse of him. Yet it is also possible that Baizhang’s remark is sarcastic, an apparent 
compliment veiling a criticism, similar to the way English-language colloquialisms like 
                                                
75 攙旗奪鼓。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 200a17; translation follows Cleary 
and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 395, with slight adjustments. 
 
76 要是箇漢當面提掇，如馬前相撲；不容擬議。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 
200a20–21; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 395, with alterations. The 
literal wording refers to a clash between soldiers standing “in front of the horses.” 
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“good one” or “nice job” are sometimes used sarcastically in the present day. Yuanwu 
writes: 
Wufeng’s answer cut [Baizhang] off immediately; he could not help but 
be fast and brilliant. Baizhang said, “In a place without any people, I shade 
my eyes with my hand and gaze out toward you.” But tell me: is this 
approving of Wufeng or disapproving? Is it killing or bringing to life? 
Seeing him turn so smoothly, Baizhang was just giving him a check.77 
 
In other words, Yuanwu suspects that the legendary Baizhang is going easy on his 
talented student. In the verse commentary by Xuedou around which Yuanwu’s 
subcommentary is drawn up, Xuedou compares Wufeng to Li Guang 李廣 (d. 119), who 
like Ban Chao was a famous general from the Han dynasty. Li was particularly renowned 
for his precision at archery. Xuedou’s verse concludes with the image of an osprey 
soaring high in the sky, and Yuanwu comments: “One arrow shoots down one bird; that 
is certain. There’s no more [chance of] escape. In Xuedou’s verse, Baizhang’s question is 
like an osprey, [while] Wufeng’s answer is like an arrow.”78 Even at the end of Yuanwu’s 
commentary, however, it remains unclear whether he thinks Baizhang was really caught 
off guard by this arrow lobbed at him by his student, or whether he understands Baizhang 
to have been voluntarily “flying” in such plain view in order to present his student with 
the convenient opportunity to “shoot” him and prove his ability. After all, could the 
legendarily heroic Baizhang really be taken down so easily? 
                                                
77 五峯答處，當頭坐斷，不妨快俊。百丈云：「無⼈人處斫額望汝。」且道：是肯他，是不肯他？
是殺是活？見他阿轆轆地，只與他⼀一點。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 
200a24–27; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 395, with alterations. 
 
78 ⼀一箭落⼀一雕，定也。更不放過。雪竇頌百丈問處如⼀一鶚，五峯答處如⼀一箭相似。 Foguo 
Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 200b9–11; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue 
Cliff Record, 396–97, with alterations. 
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 Case 4 of the Blue Cliff Record discusses the Han-period general Li Guang at 
greater length. The case describes Deshan entering a monastery where Guishan Lingyou 
溈⼭山靈祐 (771–853), another disciple of Baizhang whom we considered in Chapter 3, is 
abbot. Deshan investigates the Dharma hall and walks around the rest of the monastic 
compound, only to declare that “it’s completely without [anything or anyone].”79 This, of 
course, is not merely a literal statement that he has searched the grounds and not found a 
single person, but rather an insult to the monastery’s abbot, Guishan, whom he casts as 
totally unworthy of recognition. Before leaving, Deshan does finally encounter Guishan, 
but the latter has not even got a word in edgewise when Deshan preemptively issues a 
shout, shakes out his sleeves, and departs, confirming his judgment that Guishan is 
unworthy even of a conversation. In his verse commentary, Xuedou remarks: “The 
General of the Flying Cavalry enters the enemy camp; / How many [in such a situation] 
would be able to regain their safety?”80 The General of the Flying Cavalry is another 
name for Li Guang, and in his prose commentary Yuanwu narrates at length a famous 
story of Li venturing into Xiongnu territory and being captured alive, but then staging a 
daring escape by leaping onto an enemy horse, pushing its rider off his mount, and riding 
back to Han territory.81 Yuanwu concludes: “This man, with this kind of skill, was able to 
wrest life from the midst of death. Xuedou alludes to this in his verse, comparing [Li 
Guang] with Deshan, who reentered [the monastery] to meet [Guishan] and was able to 
                                                
79 舉德⼭山到溈⼭山，挾複⼦子於法堂上，從東過西，從西過東，顧視云：「無無。」 Foguo 
Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 143b4–6; translation loosely follows Cleary and Cleary, 
The Blue Cliff Record, 22, with alterations. 
 
80 ⾶飛騎將軍⼊入虜庭，再得完全能幾箇？ Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 144b12–
13; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 28, with alterations. 




leap out again, as before.”82 Thus the figure of Li Guang allows Xuedou and Yuanwu to 
compare a rival Chan master’s monastery to enemy territory into which a brave general 
might venture on a military expedition. It is essential to this line of commentary that 
Guishan is understood to be a formidable master in his own right, a potentially 
challenging match for Deshan. Deshan’s maneuver is thus fundamentally dangerous, and 
his escape is understood to have required a considerable amount of courage and skill.83 
 In the Blue Cliff Record’s Case 56, a student named “Chan traveler Liang” (Liang 
chanke 良禪客, d.u.) pays a visit to Chan master Qinshan Wensui 欽⼭山⽂文邃 (d.u.), a 
disciple of Dongshan Liangjie. The case proceeds as follows (again presented first 
without Yuanwu’s commentary): 
Chan traveler Liang asked Qinshan: “What is it like when a single 
arrowhead smashes three barriers?” Shan said: “Bring out the lord within 
the barriers for me to see.” Liang said: “In that case, I recognize my error 
and must change.” Shan said: “What are you waiting for?” Liang said: “A 
well-shot arrow doesn’t hit anywhere,” and [started to] leave. Shan said, 
“Come here a minute.” Liang turned his head; Shan held him tight and 
said: “Leaving aside for the moment a single arrowhead smashing three 
barriers, let’s see you try shooting an arrow at me.” Liang hesitated, and 
Shan hit him seven times, saying, “Mark my words: this guy will be 
doubting for thirty more years.”84 
                                                
82 這漢有這般⼿手段，死中得活。雪竇引在頌中用比德⼭山，再⼊入相見，依舊被他跳得出去。 
Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 144b25–27; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, 
The Blue Cliff Record, 29, with alterations. 
 
83 This case concludes with Guishan remarking that Zhaozhou will likely retreat to some mountain to 
“scold the buddhas and curse the patriarchs” 呵佛罵祖—implying resentfully that Zhaozhou’s 
iconoclasm is both pointless and antisocial. Appraising this belated retort, Yuanwu applies one of his 
favorite critiques: “He draws the bow after the thief has already left.” 賊過後張弓。 Foguo Yuanwu 





疑三⼗十年。」 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190a13–21; translation follows 
Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 324, with alterations. “Lord” translates zhu 主; it might also 
be rendered “master” or “host.” 
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Just as Wufeng responded to his master Baizhang’s question with a command, here 
Qinshan also returns the student Liang’s questions back to him, directing Liang to act 
upon the topics being discussed: not merely to talk about arrows but to shoot an arrow. 
Yet Yuanwu does not consider this a “clear-cut case.” For one thing, he is very impressed 
with Liang’s opening question, writing that “Chan traveler Liang was undeniably a 
battle-tested general.”85 He also admires Liang’s performance under the duress of 
Qinshan’s hard-hitting questions, noting: “In Qinshan’s hand he turned to the left and 
revolved to the right, bringing down his whip and flashing his stirrups.”86 
According to Yuanwu, after remarking that “a well-shot arrow doesn’t hit 
anywhere,” Liang would have been within his rights to shake out his sleeves and 
depart—if not in total triumph, we might suppose, then at least having scored a few good 
blows.87 Yet the battle takes a turn when Liang, unlike Deshan, fails to decisively take his 
leave. Instead, Liang turns back when beckoned by the master, at which point Qinshan 
takes the upper hand, demanding that Liang try unleashing an arrow of his own in the 
master’s direction.88 At this pivotal moment, Liang hesitates: a deadly blunder. 
Commenting on this turning point in the encounter, Yuanwu again brings up the example 
of Li Guang, this time to reference the fact that unlike Ban Chao, Li never received a title 
                                                                                                                                            
 
85 良禪客也不妨是⼀一員戰將。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190a23; translation 
follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 325. 
 
86 向欽⼭山⼿手裏，左盤右轉，墜鞭閃鐙。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190a23–
24; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 325, with Wade-Giles converted to 
Pinyin. 
 
87 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190b7–8; Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff 
Record, 326. 
 
88 Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190b9–10; Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 326. 
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or estate in reward for his military service: “In the end, what a pity—his bow is broken, 
and his arrows are used up. Even so, General Li, though he had a glorious reputation, was 
never enfeoffed as a lord, so it was useless.”89 Here Li Guang offers Yuanwu an example 
not of military prowess but of the tragic end met by a valiant general whose career did 
not in the end live up to its great promise. 
Yuanwu concludes this section of prose commentary by observing: “At that time, 
if this monk (Liang) had been a man, Qinshan would have been in great danger too. Since 
Liang was unable to carry out the command, he couldn’t avoid having it carried out on 
him.”90 What “command” (ling 令) has Liang failed to carry out? Following the metaphor 
of a military general, we might guess that it is the order to attack issued by the Chan 
equivalent of the temporal ruler—the Buddha, or an authority even higher than the 
Buddha, in this case perhaps figured by the mysterious “lord within the barriers.” Indeed, 
Yuanwu concludes by asking: “But tell me: after all, who is the lord within the 
barriers?”91 This final question points back to a source of authority just out of view: the 
faceless face, signless body, and invisible uṣṇīṣa that we considered in Chapter 2. Where, 
Yuanwu seems to ask, does authority ultimately reside amidst this clashing of blades? 
Who after all is acting upon whose orders? 
 
                                                
89 末後可惜許。弓折箭盡。雖然如是。李將軍自有嘉聲在。不得封侯也是閑。 Foguo Yuanwu 
chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190a24–26; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff 
Record, 325, with slight alterations. 
 
90 當時這僧，若是箇漢，欽⼭山也⼤大嶮。他既不能⾏行此令，不免倒⾏行。 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi 
biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190b18–20; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 
326, with slight alterations. 
 
91 且道：關中主畢竟是什麼⼈人？ Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 190b20; 
translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 326, with slight alterations. 
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Killing the Buddha, carrying out the command: sovereignty and the vanishing point 
of authority 
 
One of the most famous axioms to emerge from the Song-dynasty Chan tradition is the 
violent imperative attributed to Linji: “if you see a buddha, kill the buddha; if you see a 
patriarch, kill the patriarch.”92 On the one hand, we can temper the shocking iconoclasm 
of this statement by reading it metaphorically, construing Linji’s words as encouraging 
Chan aspirants to “kill” any ideas they may hold of a figurative buddha or patriarch with 
identifiable marks of authority. In so doing, such aspirants would clear a mental path for 
their own realization of non-figurative, metaphysical buddhahood. Nevertheless, there is 
no avoiding the fact that, issued in the imperative tense, this command is closely bound 
up with the particular authority held by Chan masters themselves. As T. H. Barrett 
observes: 
Ch’an is best known in the West for its iconoclastic spirit, so apparently in 
tune with our own times. Why, it would even do away with its own 
patriarchs! But the patriarchs are there because they embodied spiritual 
authority, an authority which Tang China desperately needed. Kill, says 
Rinzai [Linji]. But that is not a suggestion. It is an order.93 
 
Barrett is quite correct that Linji enacts the special authority of the Chan master in the 
very moment of inviting its destruction—although, again, because we now know that the 
Linji lu was written long after Linji’s own time, we should read this as shedding light on 
the situation in Song and not Tang China.94 Yet even beyond the paradoxical imperative 
                                                
92 逢佛殺佛，逢祖殺祖。 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b22–23. 
 
93 Barrett, “Kill the Patriarchs!,” 97. 
 
94 This passage, along with the first complete version of the Linji lu as a whole, are first found in the 
Tiansheng guangdeng lu of 1036; see X. no. 1553, 78: 471b22–24. On the process by which the Linji 
lu assumed its canonical form, see Welter, The Linji lu, especially Chapters 3 and 4. 
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to iconoclasm contained within Linji’s sermon, this passage also registers the logic of 
sovereignty at the heart of personal buddhahood: to be the greatest, you must kill all other 
buddhas and patriarchs. In this regard it offers an excellent example of the Chan 
tradition’s fundamental ambivalence about the person of the Buddha Śākyamuni. After 
all, in the context of Chan’s “fictive kinship” structure, the Buddha was and remained the 
father of the Chan “partiarchy,” its progenitor, the mythical origin of its lineage. Killing 
the Buddha was thus not only regicide but patricide.95 At the same time, as the 
psychoanalytic tradition knows well, fathers sometimes have greater authority dead than 
alive—though that authority may be more spectral and diffuse.96 Beyond the specific 
quotient of enlightened authority believed to be possessed by any particular Chan master, 
and aside from doctrinal discussions of the signlessness of enlightenment, what was it 
that ultimately authorized the entire enterprise of Chan, a lineage of buddhas, but the 
figure of the Buddha himself? 
 By making explicit a logic of cosmic sovereignty lurking at the heart of canonical 
notions of personal buddhahood, the Chan tradition changed the way ambitious Buddhists 
                                                
95 Relatedly, it is interesting to consider a question riffing on Linji’s exhortation that was posed 
repeatedly to Chan masters in Song-dynasty Chan discourse records: “If one kills one’s father and 
mother, one repents in front of the Buddha. If one kills the Buddha and kills the patriarchs, where does 
one go to repent?” 殺⽗父殺母，佛前懺悔。殺佛殺祖，向什麼處懺悔？ The most widely-repeated 
response to this question is attributed to Yunmen, who is said to have replied with a single word: 
“Exposed” 露. This term is commonly deployed in Chan literature to describe the naked revelation of 
ultimate truth, and its use in response to this question might suggest that, having killed the Buddha, 
one no longer has any authority higher than oneself to which to turn. Conversely, it might suggest that 
one is indeed exposed to a higher authority, but one that resides outside of view. See Yunmen 
Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 47: 547b28–c1. For allusions to this exchange, see, for 
example, Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 146a18–19; Hongzhi chanshi guanglu, T. no. 2001, 48: 14a21–24; 
and Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 683c19–684a10. For examples of other Chan 
masters responding to this same question, see, for example, Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 
498b7–8; and 519c5–7; and Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 45c23-24; and 152a10–11. 
 
96 See Grigg, Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, Part I, especially the discussion of the “symbolic 
father” and “Name-of-the-Father” on 30–31. 
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were expected to relate to the Buddha himself. It was no longer enough to worship or 
even imitate the Buddha; one had to exceed him, to become a greater “great man” than 
the great man who founded Buddhism and all the great men who legendarily carried the 
Chan tradition from India to China. In the end, this imperative opened buddhahood to a 
level of contestation never before seen in China, empowering not only Buddhist 
monastics but also lay literati to consider themselves inherently capable of possessing and 
contesting Buddhist authority.97 This contestation, in turn, facilitated a subtle 
transformation of the meaning of buddhahood, adapting it to a new time and place. With 
each sermon, encounter dialogue, and commentary—each battle for authority or 
judgment of an “old case”—the ideals of Chan mastery were negotiated, the contours of 
Chinese buddhahood sketched out, erased, and redrawn. Killing the Buddha did not kill 
buddhahood, but on the contrary strengthened a widespread soteriological commitment to 
buddhahood as the normative goal of all aspirants to Chan mastery. Chan Buddhists 
could thus never declare that “the Buddha is dead” without also and necessarily adding: 
“long live the Buddha.” 
In Chapter 1 we considered Yunmen’s comment on the infant Buddha’s legendary 
proclamation that “above heaven and below heaven, I alone am honored.” Yunmen 
remarks: “If I had seen [the Buddha do this] at that time, I would have killed him with a 
single blow and fed him to the dogs, in hopes of bringing Great Peace to all under 
heaven.” In light of what we have considered in this and the previous chapter, Yunmen’s 
talk of killing the Buddha makes a lot more sense. We are also now in a much better 
position to appreciate his promise that this assassination would “bring Great Peace to all 
                                                
97 As Mark Halperin writes: “Ch’an rhetoric, unwittingly, granted educated laymen a dominant 
position vis-à-vis pious commoners and vis-à-vis the sangha itself.” Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 81. 
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under heaven.” Yunmen here makes the tongue-in-cheek suggestion that the Buddha, as 
cosmic sovereign, is in fact a tyrannical ruler overseeing a chaotic realm and undeserving 
of the mantle of sovereignty. Only when Yunmen himself takes the throne will the world 
truly know an era of Great Peace—a trope drawn from Han-dynasty Chinese theories of a 
utopian society overseen by a virtuous sovereign.98 Yunmen’s exclamation is perhaps the 
clearest expression of an idea animating the entirety of Chan literature: that the Buddha 
Śākyamuni has no greater intrinsic claim to the throne of buddhahood than anyone else. 
While he might have been a longstanding cosmic sovereign, with the rise of Chan we are 
made to understand that the time for dynastic change has come. Who or what, then, could 
authorize such a change in leadership? What higher authority guarantees the integrity of 
the entire institution of buddhahood, beyond any particular buddha? 
As we saw at the conclusion of the previous section, in a closely matched 
encounter dialogue-battle, victory goes to the one who can better (or at least more quickly) 
“carry out the command.” This “command” (ling) or “true command” (zhengling 正令) is 
a widespread if rather obscure trope in Song-dynasty Chan literature. Sometimes it seems 
to refer to a specific order handed down from a sovereign and carried out by generals in 
the field. Fenyang Wude, for example, mentions “the general beyond the wall carrying 
out the true command.”99 In another case, we’re told that Xuedou was invited to ascend 
the high seat and speak at a gathering of Chan masters from many different monasteries. 
A monk opened the ceremony by asking Xuedou: “All of your Chan compatriots are 
gathered to the side of your [high] seat; [but] I haven’t yet determined whether you have 
                                                
98 See Zhao, “In Pursuit of the Great Peace.” 
 
99 塞外將軍⾏行正令。 Fenyang Wude chanshi yulu, T. no. 1992, 47: 603c3. See also mention of the 
general carrying out the order in Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 746a17–18. 
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anything to say or not.” The master replied: “The Son of Heaven is in the palace; the 
generals are beyond the wall.”100 In line with all we’ve considered above, we might read 
Xuedou as here speaking—on the one hand—to the Chan tradition’s normative vision of 
an ideal state of mind, in which all demons have been vanquished by the sovereign self. 
On the other hand, Xuedou also implies that he himself is emperor sitting on his throne 
and the other Chan masters in attendance are his generals, out beyond the “walls” of the 
raised platform upon which he sits. With such an array of Chan worthies in the audience, 
he suggests, the sovereignty of metaphysical buddhahood stands a fighting chance of 
prevailing in the world. Xuedou’s interlocutor continues this line of thought, remarking: 
“Then the sound of [earth-]shaking thunder [must be] filling the Great Tang (i.e. all of 
China), [right?]” This question follows through on the logic of Xuedou’s pronouncement, 
alluding to the canonical association of the Buddha’s powerful preaching with the sound 
of thunder and asking whether indeed the Buddhist Dharma has become hegemonic in 
China.101 Xuedou replies: “Wait to see if the command is carried out.”102 
“Carrying out the command,” then, is the normative duty of each individual Chan 
master, and is understood to be a key institutional goal of the Chan tradition as a whole. 
                                                
100 A similar expression is attributed to the Chan master Fuchang Weishan 福昌惟善 (fl. ca. Northern 
Song); see Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 529a17–18. 
 
101 See, for example, Dharmarakṣa’s translation of the Lotus Sūtra: Zheng fahua jing, T. no. 263, 9: 
69a6–8; Dafang guangfo huayan jing, T. no. 279, 10: 40b28; Jin’guang ming zuisheng wang jing, T. 




Mingjue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1996, 47: 669b16–19. Elsewhere Xuedou says: “When the blades of two 
swords clash [in battle], the main thing being settled is life and death. If neither side is injured, then 
merit cannot be attained [by either side]. [So] what is the true command [carried out by] the generals?” 
交鋒兩刃，要定⽣生死。彼此無傷，功勳不立。作麼⽣生是將軍正令？ Mingjue chanshi yulu, T. no. 
1996, 47: 692c13–14. 
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Yet more often than not Chan Buddhists cast the institution of Chan as a space where 
aspirants compete to carry out the command, vying for the position of authority—vying, 
as we have seen, even with the Buddha Śākyamuni himself. In this sense, the trope of the 
“true command” evokes more than just a single order issued by a sovereign. Instead, it 
comes to refer to the generalized command of the sovereign Dharma—a command 
capable of ordering both mind and society, if only a suitable ruler would ensure it is 
carried out. For Chan Buddhists, this command is by definition perfectly justified—not 
only “true” but “correct,” as zheng 正 is often rendered in English—and its hegemony 
over society would thus ensure the utopian prosperity and harmony of the Great Peace. 
Hongzhi Zhengjue expresses this idea when he versifies: “The true command is fully 
upheld, and in a single phrase one is intimate [with this inner source of authority]. / 
Walking alone within the palace, [all] is bright and distinct. / Set free to do as they please, 
all the people under Heaven are joyful and happy.”103 This same idea is articulated even 
more clearly in a record attributed to Tiantong Tanhua 應菴曇華 (1103–1163), who 
opens a sermon with the following lines: “When the wind blows, the grass bends; when 
water flows, a canal forms. When the true command is in effect, the ten directions are 
occupied [by the imperial army] and cut off [to enemies].”104 Tanhua’s opening line 
here—“when the wind blows, the grass bends”—is drawn from Confucius’s Analects. 
                                                
103 正令全提⼀一句親，獨步環中明了了，任從天下樂欣欣。 Hongzhi chanshi guanglu, T. no. 2001, 
48: 21c19–20. 
 
104 風⾏行草偃，⽔水到渠成。正令當⾏行，⼗十⽅方坐斷。 Liandeng huiyao, X. no. 1557, 79: 159a10–11. 
The term zuoduan 坐斷 is first found in the Book of the Later Han, where it refers to cutting off the 
supply or communication lines of an army; see Hou Hanshu, j. 16, v. 3, 616; j. 22, v. 3, 777; and j. 58, 
v. 7, 1880. Chan Buddhists like Yuanwu often use this trope in expressions like “occupy and cut off 
the critical junction, permitting neither ordinary people nor sages to pass.” 坐斷要津，不通凡聖。 




There we find Confucius vehemently objecting to the proposal that a ruler might “kill 
those lacking the Way for the sake of those possessing the Way,”105 and arguing by way 
of contrast that the gentleman-ruler (junzi 君⼦子) possesses a more natural hegemony. In 
line with Confucius’s philosophy of sovereignty and social order, such a ruler’s power is 
understood in the Analects to be ensured not by force, but by the example the rulers sets 
of the morally erect fulfillment of one’s social obligations, which all of society follows as 
naturally as grass blowing in the wind. “The gentleman’s virtue is the wind,” Confucius 
says, “and the petty man’s virtue is grass. When wind blows on the grass, [the grass] 
must bend.”106 Conversely, many Chan Buddhists express an understanding of the Great 
Peace that sanctions violence and thus directly opposes Confucius’s vision—coinciding 
with Chan Buddhists’ general preference for ideals of martial over civil virtue, as we saw 
in the previous chapter. We find this understanding expressed in a widely-repeated phrase 
first attributed in a Song-period collection to a disciple of Linji named Zhuozhou Kefu 涿
州剋符 (d.u.): “Wielding the Moye sword and fulfilling the true command; within the 
realm of Great Peace the foolish and obstinate are executed.”107 In this formulation, it is 
precisely the threat of violent punishment that maintains a utopian state of Great Peace. 
                                                
105 殺無道以就有道。 
 
106 君⼦子之德風，小⼈人之德草。草上之風，必偃。 Yang, Lunyu yizhu, 12.19, 129. Yuanwu 
connects this expression with the idea of freedom when he remarks, “[just as] grass bends when the 
wind blows, one attains freedom.” 草偃風⾏行得自由。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 
739b24–25 and 742b23. 
 
107 橫按鏌鎁全正令，太平寰宇斬癡頑。 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 480a3–4. This 
expression is repeated in Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 716b12–13; Dahui Pujue 
chanshi yulu, T. no. 1998A, 47: 812a10–11; Liandeng huiyao, X. no. 1557, 79: 99a19–20; and 
Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 267c24–268a1 and 277b3. 
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 Even as sovereigns, then, Chan masters are mere servants of an even loftier 
command. This ambiguity inherent to the position of Chan masters—their status as both 
sovereign and servant, king and general—is registered in a sermon given by Dahui 
Zongao, which begins with a verse pronounced by the master from his “high seat” and 
addressed to a live audience: 
A great man of great faculties and great capacities 
Completes the great affair108 within [the space of] a single thought. 
The buddhas of the three times (past, present, future) stand below him; 
Such a person is fit to be an emissary of the Thus-come One.109 
 
Here Dahui suggests paradoxically that the Chan master as “great man” is simultaneously 
superior and subordinate to the Buddha or buddhas. Not content to leave this apparent 
contradiction as it stands, Dahui takes it up with his audience for further probing: 
“If the buddhas of the three times already stand below [this great man], 
why would he nevertheless [deign to] act as an emissary of the Thus-come 
One?” After a long while, he said: “The iron wheel-turning Son of Heaven 
(emperor) gives orders from within the palace; you must believe that the 
envoy [carrying out these orders] is not free [to do whatever he wants].”110 
 
With remarkable canniness and candor, Dahui here engages the paradox of authority at 
the heart of Chan identity. The terms by which he frames his analysis are themselves 
rather enigmatic: conflating the canonical Buddhist “iron wheel-turning king” of the 
southern continent of Jambudvīpa with the Chinese convention of the emperor as “Son of 
                                                
108 The “great affair” or “great matter” (dashi ⼤大事), sometimes also called the “great matter of life 
and death” (shengsi dashi ⽣生死⼤大事), is a common expression in Chan, where it stands for the 
“problem” posed by cyclical rebirth that must urgently be resolved by attaining liberation. 
 
109 ⼤大根⼤大器⼤大丈夫，不越⼀一念了⼤大事。三世諸佛立下風，此⼈人堪作如來使。Dahui Pujue 
chanshi yulu, T. 1998A, 47: 845c4–6. Translation adapted from Levering 1992, “Lin-chi (Rinzai) 
Ch’an and Gender,” 141. The concept of being an “emissary of the Thus-come One” is found in 
Mahāyāna scriptures like the Lotus Sūtra; see Miaofa lianhua jing , T. no. 262, 9: 30c24–29. 
 
110 三世諸佛既立下風，為甚麼却作如來使？良久云：鐵輪天⼦子寰中勅，須信官差不自由。 




Heaven,” it suggests but does not state outright that this figure is comparable to the 
invisible authority that issues the “true command.” Only in the act of surpassing all 
buddhas is a Chan master, a “great man,” fit to become the servant of the Thus-Come 
One—which we might read as standing in for buddhahood itself, the final commander 
who remains outside of view. 
The ambivalence of the Chan master as simultaneously sovereign and servant is 
not unique to Chan, but reflects a larger and deeper problematic surrounding authority, 
whether temporal or spiritual (or both). Classical Chinese theories of sovereignty also 
make room for an authority higher than the person of the ruler, hiding just outside of 
plain view yet providing final metaphysical justification of the ruler’s position: namely 
Heaven (tian 天), whose command—the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming 天命)—is 
granted to deserving rulers and revoked from those who fail to carry it out. Indeed, the 
Chan tradition’s “true command” bears more than a passing resemblance to the “Mandate 
of Heaven.” For one thing, the Han-dynasty political theorists who helped shape the 
classical idea of the “Mandate of Heaven” seem to have considered “mandate” (ming) 
and “command” (ling) virtually interchangeable terms.111 And even earlier theorizations 
of sovereignty, such as those found in the Mencius, refer to the authentic ruler as 
“Heaven’s minister” (tian li 天吏)112—a strikingly similar formulation to Dahui’s “great 
man” as “emissary of the Thus-Come One” (rulai shi 如來使). In both cases, finally, the 
                                                
111 For example, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104 BCE) remarked in a memorial to the throne: “The 
command of Heaven is called the mandate.” 天令之謂命。 See Hanshu, j. 56, v. 8, 2515; and Loewe, 
“The Concept of Sovereignty,” 734. (Loewe translates this passage as: “The ordinances of Heaven are 
termed destiny.”) 
 
112 Yang, Mengzi yizhu, v. 1, 77. 
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source of authority is invisible, but is understood to make its will known by signs and 
portents and to take a living person as proxy in carrying out its command. The position of 
authority thus always turns out to be a vessel for a higher authority. Authority is, as a rule, 
deferred; pursuing it, we end up perpetually trying to catch a glimpse of its retreat just 




No matter how much authority any given Chan master may have possessed at any given 
time—no matter how hegemonic a Chan master’s sovereign power may have been—the 
final source of that authority was thus always located out of view.113 Whether it was 
called the “true command,” the uṣṇīṣa, or by any other name, the notion of this 
commanding yet ultimately invisible source was fundamental to the Chan tradition’s 
identity and claim to authority. Considering the sheer number of Chan masters holding 
public abbacies over the course of the Song dynasty, however, the idea of a single 
master’s totally hegemonic cosmic sovereignty was really nothing more than a utopian 
ideal—even a half-joke, as in Yunmen’s promise to usher in the Great Peace by killing 
the infant Buddha. Under these conditions, Chan Buddhists for the most part contented 
themselves with trying to discern reflections of the true command amidst the clashing 
blades of battling Chan generals. In the end, determining who truly held authority in 
Chan at any given time required quick reflexes, constant vigilance, and careful attention 
to detail. 
                                                
113 Of course, we saw in Chapter 2 that Chan Buddhists considered it possible for the enlightened to 




The notion of “blade-sharp wit” (jifeng) wielded in lively conversation, often 
associated with Chan dialogues, was adapted from a passage in the fifth-century 
anecdotal collection Shishuo xinyu 世說新語 to describe Chan Buddhists’ especially 
“sharp” uses of language.114 Even before the rise of Chan, however, expressions like 
“blade-sharp diction” (cifeng 詞鋒) and “blade-sharp disputation” (fengbian 鋒辯) were 
used to describe Buddhists possessing special rhetorical skill.115 Nevertheless, we should 
pause before assuming that the trope of “battling Chan generals” was just a metaphor for 
the light-hearted banter of dueling witticisms, as the connection to the Shishuo xinyu 
might seem to suggest. On the contrary, swords, generals, and battle figured the very real 
contestation of religious authority. And it was precisely because Chan soteriology 
commanded the pursuit not just of loyalty or valor, but of total religious sovereignty, that 
the tradition’s normative ideals could not be bound by tropes associated with brave 
generals and loyal ministers. Chan Buddhists had loftier ambitions.  
  
                                                
114 Zhou, Wenzi chan, 9; Zhu, Shishuo xinyu huijiao jizhu, 85. For the association of the term jifeng 
with Chan even among outsiders to the movement, see, for example, the writings of famous “Learning 
of the Way” (Daoxue 道學) philosopher Zhu Xi: Zhuzi yulei, j. 126, v. 8, 3030; and j. 127, v. 8, 3058. 
The earliest Chan mention of jifeng seems to be found in the Zutang ji, j. 5, v. 1, 247. See also the 
discussion of jifeng in Heine, Chan Rhetoric of Uncertainty, 13. 
 




The Consistency of a “Great Man” 
 
(A Zen story: An old monk busies himself in the hottest weather drying 
mushrooms. “Why don’t you let others do that?” “Another man is not 
myself, and I am not another. Another cannot experience my action. I 
must create my experience of drying mushrooms.”) / I am indefectibly 
myself, and it is in this that I am mad: I am mad because I consist. 
— Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse1 
 
 
Getting to where one cuts off the myriad streams, one [can] arise in the 
east and sink in the west, can move with ease across favorable and adverse 
conditions, can give or take away in sovereign freedom. Yet at just such a 
time, say: whose actions are these? 
⾄至於截斷眾流，東湧西沒，逆順縱橫，與奪自在。正當恁麼時，且道：
是什麼⼈人⾏行履處？ 
— Yuanwu Keqin, Blue Cliff Record (Biyan lu 碧巖錄)2 
 
 
This dissertation opened, in the epigraph to Chapter 1, with a passage from the influential 
Linji lu, a discourse record attributed to Tang-dynasty Chan master Linji Yixuan (d. 866) 
but actually composed and extensively revised over the tenth and early eleventh 
centuries. In that passage, Linji is said to remark: “The state of buddhahood cannot itself 
proclaim, ‘I am the state of buddhahood!’” This passage highlights the basic problematic 
at the center of my dissertation: if buddhahood cannot identify itself, then how are others 
to identify it? By now it should be clear that this is not only a philosophical problem, but 
also a problem of the Chan tradition’s soteriology and institutional identity, both 
                                                
1 Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse, 121. This story original comes from Dōgen’s “Instructions for the 
Cook” (Tenzo kyōkun 典座教訓). 
 
2 Foguo Yuanwu chanshi biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 140a14–15; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, 
The Blue Cliff Record, 1, with alterations. 
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grounded as I have argued in the claim that Chan masters are living buddhas. In the Linji 
lu, however, Linji no sooner raises this problem than he proposes a solution. The passage 
excerpted as Chapter 1’s opening epigraph comes from the middle of a sermon in which 
Linji proclaims his own skill in discerning the true identities of anyone who comes to see 
him: 
Here at this mountain monk’s place, whoever arrives—whether monastics 
or laypeople—I discern them through and through. Regardless of where 
they come from, their reputations and the language [they use] are all just 
dreams and illusions. On the other hand, it’s obvious that someone in 
control of every circumstance [embodies] the mysterious principle of all 
the buddhas. The state of buddhahood cannot itself proclaim, “I am the 
state of buddhahood!” Rather, it is just this very person of the Way who, 
dependent upon nothing, comes forth in control of every circumstance.3 
 
The Chinese word I translate here, following Ruth Fuller Sasaki, as alternately “state” 
and “circumstance”—jing 境—originated as a technical term in translated Buddhist 
scriptures denoting any object of cognition. Here, however, in line with the idealist 
ontology espoused throughout the Linji lu,4 the word jing serves to conflate the mental 
realm of phenomenal perception with the social space of the Chan master’s immediate 
environment. To be “in control of” (literally “to ride,” cheng 乘) jing thus entails at once 
mastery over one’s mind and sovereignty over the individuals with whom one is 
                                                
3 ⼭山僧此間不論僧俗，但有來者盡識得伊。任伊向甚處出來，但有聲名⽂文句，皆是夢幻。却見
乘境底⼈人是諸佛之⽞玄旨。佛境不能自稱「我是佛境」。還是這箇無依道⼈人乘境出來。 Linji lu, 
T. no. 1985, 47: 499a9–13; translation loosely follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 206, but differs in 
many details. 
 
4 For example, Linji remarks: “One thought of your mind produces the three worlds, which are 
divided by circumstances (jing) according to causal conditions into the six dusts (i.e. sense fields).” 爾
⼀一念⼼心⽣生三界，隨緣被境分為六塵。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 499a24–5; translation follows Sasaki, 
The Record of Linji, 208, with alterations. 
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interacting.5 Linji tells us that among the Chan aspirants who visit his monastery, he can 
easily spot a person who is really in control, a sovereign of circumstances who does not 
depend on anyone or anything else. Linji does so, moreover, by peering through the 
surface appearances—layers of words and reputations—preoccupying ordinary, deluded 
people in order to see into their confused interior depths and respond to them 
accordingly. 
 This chapter builds on our analysis in the previous chapter of the idea, reiterated 
across Song-dynasty Chan literature, that Chan masters as “great men” were expected to 
be not only spiritual warriors but also cosmic sovereigns. Here we will explore in greater 
depth how the imperative to achieve cosmic sovereignty was transposed into 
psychological terms. We will take as our point of departure (and regularly loop back to) 
the Linji lu’s foundational articulation of a normative ideal of sovereign selfhood, 
exploring the ways Chan Buddhists in the Song described the subjective state of mastery 
and—inseparably from this sovereign state of mind—the techniques they developed for 
discerning potential masters amidst the crowd of aspirants seeking entry into a Chan 
lineage. In short, we will seek to answer the question: of what, precisely, did the ideal 
Chan master and “great man” consist? In pursuing answers to this question, we will also 
examine how the “great man” operated as a gendered ideal, facilitating the discursive 
practices by which—as we have seen—Chan mastery was made commensurable with 
Chinese ideals of (normatively male) civil and martial virtue even as it also constituted 
the boundaries of that identity through particular exclusions. 
 
                                                
5 Thus, throughout this chapter I either use the English word “circumstance” to translate jing, seeking 
to capture its multivalence in Linji’s useage, or I leave it untranslated as jing. 
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The sovereign self 
 
Early on in the Linji lu, Linji offers his audience the following instruction: 
Followers of the Way, according to this mountain-monk’s view, [we are 
all] no different from Śākya[muni]. What do we lack in our manifold 
activities today? The six-rayed divine light never ceases to shine. See it 
this way, and you’ll be a person with nothing to do your whole life long.6 
 
In accordance with the doctrinal concept of universal buddhahood that we have touched 
upon throughout this dissertation, Linji here suggests that because everyone is already a 
buddha, there is no need to go looking for buddhahood anywhere else. Simply recognize 
your innate buddhahood, Linji says, and you can retire early and take it easy. Yet as we 
have come to expect by now, the matter of liberation—not to speak of eligibility for 
admission into a Chan lineage—is not thereby settled once and for all. In contrast to this 
reassuring message, much of the rest of the Linji lu consists of Linji issuing one dire 
warning after another about the dangers of failure and the urgent need to achieve perfect 
mastery over circumstances, lest one be lured down demonic paths and end up reborn as 
an animal or in hell. In practice, then, the theoretical principle of metaphysical 
buddhahood’s categorical universality does not on its own solve much at all, does not 
automatically extend the property of buddhahood into every corner of the phenomenal 
world and every mundane action. To truly qualify for buddhahood, one must be and act a 
particular way. 
 Sovereignty over circumstances lies at the center of the Linji lu’s normative vision 
of Chan mastery. Indeed, Linji tells us that if one cannot control oneself in the face of all 
                                                
6 道流，約⼭山僧見處，與釋迦不別。今日多般用處，⽋欠少什麼？六道神光未曾間歇。若能如是




of life’s circumstances, one will instead be controlled by those circumstances—to 
disastrous effect.7 One of the most threatening such circumstances identified by Linji is 
mortality. The body, Linji notes, is made up of the four elements, and even the subtler 
part of one’s person is subject to the “four marks” (sixiang 四相) of samsaric life: arising, 
abiding, changing, and extinction (sheng zhu yi mie ⽣生住異滅). Thus Linji urges the 
members of his audience to gain the upper hand over impermanence by “immediately 
apprehending the state of four non-marks, so that you can avoid being buffeted about by 
circumstances.”8 Elsewhere Linji identifies faith (xin 信) in one’s own inherent 
buddhahood as the crux of the issue: “If your faith is insufficient, you’ll keep on tumbling 
                                                
7 Linji’s notion of sovereignty over circumstances echoes certain ideas already found in canonical and 
apocryphal scriptures. For example, the Lotus Sūtra contains the passage: “I am the Dharma-king, free 
with respect to [all] dharmas.” 我為法王，於法自在. Miaofa lianhua jing, T. no. 262, 9: 15b6. Chan 
Buddhists sometimes repeated this phrase while articulating the ideal of the sovereign self; see, for 
example, Jiatai pudeng lu, X. no. 1559, 79: 445c11–13; Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 
775b20; Dahui Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1998A, 47: 932b17–19; Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 
568c20–569a1; Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 6: 337c4; Zhengdao ge zhu, X. no. 1292, 65: 454b24; and 
Wumen Huikai chanshi yulu, X. no. 1355, 69: 363c6. Along similar lines, the Chan-ified discourse 
record of Fu Xi 傅翕 (497–569), a famous medieval Chinese Buddhist layman who went on to be 
transformed into an honorary member of the Chan tradition, contains a line of verse first found only in 
the Song dynasty asserting that a master “can be lord of the myriad phenomena, and does not wither 
and die along with the four seasons.” 能為萬象主，不遂四時凋。 Shanhui dashi yulu, X. no. 1335, 
69: 116b7. In turn, the Song-period “Learning of the Way” philosopher Zhu Xi expressed grudging 
admiration for this passage attributed to Fu and popularized in the Song by Chan Buddhists; see Zhuzi 
yulei, j. 126, v. 8, 3018. Among apocrypha, an important reference point for Chan Buddhists was the 
Lengyan jing 楞嚴經, which says: “From beginningless time, all sentient beings have mistakenly 
conflated themselves with the things [they perceive], losing their fundamental minds and being 
controlled (lit. turned around) by [those] things. If one can [instead] control things, then one is the 
same as the Thus-Come One.” ⼀一切眾⽣生從無始來迷⼰己為物，失於本⼼心為物所轉 … 若能轉物，則
同如來。 Da foding rulai miyin xiuzheng liaoyi zhu pusa wanxing shoulengyan jing, T. no. 945, 19: 
111c25–7. This idea also resonates with certain threads of classical Chinese thought. For example, the 
Guanzi’s Neiye contains the following lines: “Hold fast to the One; do not lose it, / And you will be 
able to master the myriad things. / Gentlemen act upon things, / And are not acted upon by them.” 執
⼀一不失，能君萬物。君⼦子使物，不為物使。 Liang, Guanzi jiaozhu, j. 16, v. 2, 937; translation 
follows Roth, Original Tao, 62, with minor alterations. 
 
8 今時且要識取四種無相境，免被境擺撲。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 98c16–17; translation adapted 
from Sasaki, 200, with alterations. 
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along, following in bewilderment after all kinds of circumstances and being taken by 
them through transformation after transformation without ever attaining freedom.”9 He 
goes on to add that “if you don’t find it here and now, you’ll go on transmigrating 
through the three worlds for myriad kalpas and thousands of lives, and, held in the clutch 
of captivating circumstances, be born in the womb of donkeys or cows.”10 
 Sermonizing around the same time that the Linji lu was taking its final “classical” 
shape, Chan master Fenyang Wude (946–1023/4) offers a similar diagnosis about why 
the Chan aspirants listening to his sermons are failing to become sovereign masters of 
circumstance: 
Don’t race around seeking [buddhahood] outside [yourself]. It emerges 
right where you are; everywhere [you go] it’s already manifest. In qian, 
kun, and the whole wide world, it is clear, bright and obvious. Throughout 
all the twelve [two-hour] periods of the day—whether walking, standing, 
sitting, or lying down—just carefully observe this. Who obstructs you? 
[So] why, on the spur of the moment, can’t you say [what it is]? It’s just 
that you do not penetrate through all kinds of circumstances, and so 
[instead] you are turned around by them. Thus, running about alongside 
circumstances, you are unable to become sovereign (zhuzai 主宰).11 
 
                                                
9 爾若自信不及，即便忙忙地徇⼀一切境轉，被他萬境回換，不得自由。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 
497b5–7; translation adapted from Sasaki, 155, with alterations. 
 
10 此時不遇，萬劫千⽣生輪回三界，徇好境掇去，驢⽜牛肚裏⽣生。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497b11–




得主宰。 Fenyang Wude chanshi yulu, T. no. 1992, 47: 600a7–11. A similar sermon attributed in the 
Zutang ji to Baizhang Huaihai goes as follows: “Right now, simply separate from all dharmas, existent 
and nonexistent, penetrating through the ‘three phrases,’ and spontaneously you will be no different 
from the Buddha. When you’re already a buddha, what [need] is there to worry about a buddha not 
understanding words [from the scriptures]? I’m just afraid that you aren’t a buddha, and that you will 
be turned around by all dharmas, existent and nonexistent, and not attain freedom.” 只如今俱離⼀一切
有無諸法，透過三句外，自然與佛無差。既自是佛，何慮佛不解語？只恐不是佛，被有無諸法
轉，不得自由。 Zutang ji, j. 14, v. 2, 644. On Baizhang’s “three phrases” (sanju 三句), see Tsuchiya, 
Beisong chanzong, 44–52. 
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Here, just as in the Linji lu, we see that no matter how manifestly immanent metaphysical 
buddhahood is understood to be, it offers no solace to Buddhist aspirants unless they can 
take control of all the phenomenal circumstances they encounter—to penetrate (tong 通) 
those circumstances with the power of their awareness. It is this capacity to be in control, 
then, that differentiates living buddhas from ordinary people. 
 The imperative for Chan masters to maintain control over circumstances was 
closely related to the ideal of self-reliance. Linji’s own master Huangbo is credited in the 
Jingde chuandeng lu with the widely-repeated injunction that Chan aspirants “not rely on 
a single thing through all twelve periods of the day.”12 And even already in his Wanling 
lu, which unlike most discourse records for Tang-dynasty Chan masters actually dates to 
a period shortly after the master’s death, Huangbo offers the following sermon: 
Right now, at all times—whether walking, standing, sitting, or lying 
down—you should simply study no-mind. [You should] also not [make] 
distinctions, not depend on anything, and not have any attachments. All 
day, let yourself float freely about, as though you were an idiot. Worldly 
people won’t recognize you, and you won’t tell them whether there’s 
anything to recognize. With your mind like an intractable stone, lacking 
any cracks, not a single dharma will be able to penetrate it.13 
 
                                                
12 ⼗十⼆二時中不依倚⼀一物。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 257c26–7. For allusions to this 
formula, see, for example, Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 517c15-16; Wudeng huiyuan, X. 
no. 1565, 80: 74a3-4; Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 162a21-22; Dahui Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1998A, 
47: 880a12-13; and Xutang heshang yulu, T. no. 2000, 47: 1001b19-20. In one entertaining case from 
the Zutang ji, we’re told that while still a student, Shishi Shandao ⽯石室善道 (d.u.) visited the Chan 
master from whom he would later receive lineage transmission, Changzi Kuang 長髭曠 (d.u.). Asked 
by the master, “from whom did you (lit. whom did you rely upon to) receive the precepts?,” Shishi 
replied cheekily: “I don’t rely on others.” 師問曰：「依什摩⼈人受戒？」對曰：「不依他。」 




⼊入。 Huangbo Duanji chanshi wanling lu, T. no. 2012B, 48: 386c4–8; Iriya, Denshin hōyō, 135. 
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In this passage, Huangbo anticipates certain aspects of Song-dynasty Chan Buddhists’ 
ideal of the sovereign self. While Chan Buddhists in the Song tended to place less 
emphasis on the concept of “no-mind” popular in early Chan,14 they did reiterate 
Huangbo’s use of the trope of the holy fool and his image of the mind as an impenetrable 
stone. Yuanwu Keqin, for example, sermonizes: 
So tell me: what is this affair of the great man? You must simply not take 
orders from anyone, not let anyone cage you, not listen to anyone’s 
binding [words]. Break free of fixed patterns and stand alone, without 
companion. Towering and majestic, you will walk alone [unmatched] in 
the three worlds, with penetrating brightness that breaks through to 
liberation. Without desire and without depending on anything, you attain 
great sovereign freedom, lacking even a hair’s-breadth of sentient 
consideration for the Buddha-Dharma—like a fool, an idiot, like wood or 
like stone.15 
 
In an irony that we have seen running throughout this dissertation, Yuanwu here 
commands his audience not to take orders from anyone else, and paints a picture of the 
normative figure of the “great man” that he suggests they ought to imitate even as he tells 
them to “break free of fixed patterns.” Drawing upon some of the other tropes we’ve 
already considered—such as “towering and majestic, walking alone [unmatched] in the 
                                                




如⽊木如⽯石。 Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 773c12–16. Along similar lines, Chan 
master Danxia Zichun 丹霞⼦子淳 (1066–1119/20) is said to have authored the following verse on an 
old case: “The friendly yet towering great man: / His entire life he lacks wisdom, just like a fool. / The 
buddhas and patriarchs have always been difficult to glimpse; / How could hell and heaven contain 
them?” 相好巍巍⼤大丈夫，⼀一⽣生無智恰如愚。從來佛祖猶難望，地獄天堂豈可拘。 Chanzong 
songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 500c4–5. Just as Danxia associates the “great man” as holy 
fool with the capacity to transcend both heaven and hell, so Xuefeng Yicun congratulates a king 
whom he is tutoring in Chan on his progress along the path by connecting a rock-solid mind with “not 
thinking of good and evil”: “Great king, you have already fully comprehended your mind, and taken 
your mind to be like wood or like stone. For a long time you have forgotten about causal conditions. 
[Now,] you should not give rise to thoughts of good or evil.” ⼤大王既知了⼼心。⼼心如⽊木如⽯石去。久久
忘緣去。莫起善惡量思。 Xuefeng Yicun chanshi yulu, X. no. 1333, 69: 79a4–5. 
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three worlds”—Yuanwu’s program for Chan mastery involves both transcendently 
isolated majesty and humble rock-solidity of mind. While these two registers of 
normative language might seem to contradict each other, they share a connotation of 
perfect consistency: just as a solid stone cannot be penetrated, so a stone-like mind’s 
unalloyed self-so-ness provides the isolated independence and internal consistency 
needed for a Chan master to be “towering and majestic.” 
 Isolated transcendence, mental stoniness, and forbearance in the face of changing 
circumstances are all, in turn, closely bound up with the fierce resolution associated with 
the great man’s normative martial prowess. Again, Yuanwu articulates this nexus of 
intertwined ideals in his Biyan lu: 
One must give rise to the vehement, exceptional resolution of a great man, 
not paying peril or extinction any mind, not being trapped by [concepts of] 
gain and loss, and manifesting an enduring body and mind of iron and 
stone. Meeting with perceived objects and encountering karmic conditions 
[resulting from past actions], [such a one] is constant and unchanging.16 
 
                                                
16 須是發⼤大丈夫慷慨特達之志，不顧危亡不拘得失，存箇長久鐵⽯石身⼼心，逢境遇緣不變不異。 
Biyan lu, T. no. 1997, 47: 751b14–16. The firm resolution required of a Chan master is one of 
Yuanwu’s favorite topics; see also Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 729a27–b1, 748c22–
24, 749a3–9, 751b14–19, 753c4–7, 776b7–13, 777a16–19, and 785c25–786a4. Huanglong Huinan 
(1002–1069) proposes a similar vision of Chan mastery, while also temporally differentiating between 
the resolution needed to acquire awakening and the generosity expected of the awakened master who 
sets about teaching others: “Those who leave the world [to become monastics] must be endowed with 
the intense resolution of a great man, cutting off both ends [of dualistic thinking], [then] returning 
home and sitting firmly [in meditation]. After [having achieved awakening], greatly open up your gate 
(i.e. become a teacher), mobilizing your ‘family estate’ (i.e. your unique talents) to engage with 
anyone who comes along, giving aid to orphans [without a Chan master]. With this, you will have 
repaid a small portion of the deep kindness bestowed by the Buddha.” 夫出家者須稟⼤大夫決烈之志，
截斷兩頭，歸家穩坐。然後⼤大開門⼾戶。運出自⼰己家財，接待往來，賑濟孤露。⽅方有少分報佛深
恩。 Huanglong Huinan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1993, 47: 630a12–15. Even the philosopher and critic of 
Buddhism Zhu Xi echoes many of these ideas in his own writings: “If in the end you’re a fellow with 
resolution, then all you’ll see is one great road by which to directly ascend. You won’t ask any further 
about potential difficulties or obstacles [along the way] … How could you start by making 
calculations or hanging back in fear? If you do that, in the end you won’t accomplish anything.” 若果
是有志之⼠士，只見⼀一條⼤大路直上⾏行將去，更不問著有甚艱難險阻。 … 豈可先自計較，先自怕
卻？如此終於無成。 Zhuzi yulei, j. 126, v. 8, 3017. 
 
 212 
In other words, it is precisely this firm resolution that allows the ideal Chan master to 
maintain sovereignty over circumstances, and by extension to encounter demons, 
students, and rival masters alike with heroic bravery. 
In drawing up this normative ideal of resolute mastery, Chan discourse records 
regularly contrast it with the specter of failure, which often comes cloaked in the tropes 
of hesitation and indecisiveness. For example, Linji tells his audience: “Followers of the 
Way, if you want to accord with the Dharma, just be great men. If you shilly-shally 
spinelessly along, you won’t attain anything.”17 Here it suffices for Linji to say “just be 
great men,” and to contrast this state of manhood with indecisive “shilly-shallying” (as 
Ruth Fuller Sasaki colorfully renders weiwei suisui 萎萎隨隨), and he has already 
succeeded in evoking the whole constellation of normative ideals that we have been 
considering. 
Elsewhere in his discourse record, Linji says: “Just don’t allow others to delude 
you. If you want to act, then act. Don’t hesitate.”18 This turn of phrase—“if you want to x, 
then x”—was widely used in Song-dynasty Chan literature and itself came to operate as a 
calling card of Chan mastery. For example, the Song of Delighting in the Way (Ledao ge 
樂道歌), attributed to the Tang-dynasty Chan master Nanyue Mingzan 南嶽明瓚 (d.u.) 
                                                
17 道流，爾若欲得如法，直須是⼤大丈夫兒始得。若萎萎隨隨地，則不得也。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 
47: 499a18–19; translation follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 206, with minor alterations. 
 
18 秖要爾不受⼈人惑。要用便用，更莫遲疑。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497b4; translation follows 
Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 153, with minor alterations. For other criticisms of hesitation, see also 
Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 304c3–5; and Fenyang Wude chanshi yulu, T. no. 1992, 47: 
626a19–21. For related criticisms of calculation (jijiao 計較), understood as an artificial process of 
deliberation inimical to authentic spontaneity, see Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 448c26–28; 
Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 556c1–4; Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 
781a3–4; Fenyang Wude chanshi yulu, T. no. 1992: 629b1–2; Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 
1997, 47: 766c19–22, 767a9–13, 767c10–12, 768a28–29, and 752c29–753a5; and Biyan lu, T. no. 
2003, 48: 174b24–25, 190b15–17, and 191b19–21. 
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and first preserved in the Zutang ji, includes the line: “if I want to go, I go; if I want to 
stay, I stay.”19 In another entry in the same Zutang ji, the Chan master Changsha Jingcen 
長沙景岑 (788–868) is asked about Mazu Daoyi’s idea of “everyday mind,” to which he 
replies: “If you want to sleep, then sleep; if you want to sit, then sit.”20 And again, 
elsewhere in the Linji lu, Linji says: 
Authentic people of the Way… can conform with the phenomenal 
conditions [they encounter] and exhaust their past karma, resigning 
themselves to their fate and putting on their clothes. If they want to walk, 
they walk; and if they want to sit, they sit. They never have a single 
thought of seeking the fruit of buddhahood.21 
 
The idea behind all these expressions seems simple enough: true greatness is not 
measured by any spectacular display, special austerity, or calculated strategy for reaching 
buddhahood, but rather by the simple ability to accept circumstances as they come and 
respond accordingly. Yet simple as it may seem (especially coming as it does couched in 
a language of effortless rusticity), this idea played an important role in elaborating the 
very specific normative ideal of the Chan master as “great man.” This ideal was not at all 
self-evident as a measure of Buddhist sanctity at the advent of the Song dynasty; on the 
contrary, it had to be invented and popularized by Chan Buddhists. 
An interesting illustration of this point is found in a sermon attributed to the 
famous Tang-dynasty Chan master Baizhang Huaihai, but only first found in the 
                                                
19 要去即去，要住即住。 Zutang ji, j. 3, v. 1, 149. 
 
20 問：「如何是平常⼼心？」師云：「要眠則眠，要坐則坐。」 Zutang ji, j. 17, v. 2, 769. 
 
21 若是真正道⼈人 … 但能隨緣消舊業，任運著衣裳，要⾏行即⾏行，要坐即坐，無⼀一念⼼心希求佛果。 




Tiansheng guangdeng lu of 1036, and thus likely a product of the early Northern Song. 
Baizhang is said to have remarked that 
people of attainment in earlier eras entered fire and were not burned, or 
entered water and did not drown. And if they wanted to burn, they burned! 
If they wanted to drown, they drowned. When they wanted to live, they 
lived; and when they wanted to die, they died. They were free to go or to 
stay. Such people possessed the capacity for freedom.22 
 
In canonical Buddhist scriptures, the powers to enter fire but remain unscathed and to go 
underwater without drowning were counted among the many supernatural abilities 
understood to result from highly advanced skill in meditation.23 Baizhang thus begins by 
praising those worthies of old who, having become masters of meditation, defied the 
elements by overcoming the naturally deleterious effects attending exposure to fire and 
submersion in water. Yet Baizhang (or rather those Song-dynasty authors here speaking 
through the figure of Baizhang) is not satisfied with this classical formulation of 
meditation mastery—after all, by the Song dynasty when this passage was composed, the 
Chan tradition was no longer a school of meditation experts at all (and according to its 
own revisionist historiography, never had been). So Baizhang proceeds to reinvent the 
old formula: supposing those masters wanted to get burned, they went and got burned! 
And if they wanted to drown, they were perfectly capable of drowning themselves! On its 
face, this revised formula makes little sense—why would Chan masters want to get 
burned or drown? It is unlikely that the authors of this text are here referring to the 
                                                
22 先達者⼊入⽕火不燒，⼊入⽔水不溺。儻要燒便燒，要溺便溺；要⽣生即⽣生，要死即死。去住自由。者
箇⼈人有自由分。 Tiansheng guangdeng lu, X. no. 1553, 78: 460c23–461a1; translation adapted from 
Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 154, with alterations. Linji also uses this phrase “free to go or to stay” (qu 
zhu ziyou 去住自由); see Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497b2; and Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 173. The 
phrase seems to originate in the apocryphal Lengyan jing; see Da foding rulai miyin xiuzheng liaoyi 
zhu pusa wanxing shoulengyan jing, T. no. 945, 19: 148b7. 
 
23 See, for example, the Da zhidu lun, T. no. 1509, 25: 211a24–29. 
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practice of self-immolation, an extreme form of ascetic self-abnegation that was not 
particularly popular among Song-dynasty Chan Buddhists.24 Rather, it is much more 
probable that this passage is designed to emphasize that the most important normative 
feature of Chan mastery is not the ability to defy the elements, but the much more 
straightforward (though perhaps no easier) capacity to conceive an intention and then 
decisively act upon it—whatever that intention and action may be. 
Expressions following the formula “if you want to x, then x” thus offer a valuable 
clue about the mechanics of “great manhood” in Song-dynasty Chan. Any such 
expression carries the normative expectation that an ideal Chan master follows through 
on all intentions with decisive action. In the first place, this expectation was already built 
into the canonical concept of buddhahood. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Buddha 
Śākyamuni’s given name Siddhārtha literally means “one whose purpose is 
accomplished”—a meaning preserved in the most widespread Chinese translation of the 
name, yiqie yi cheng ⼀一切義成 (“[one for whom] all aims are accomplished”), and even 
in the transliteration xida 悉達 that ingeniously conveys both sound and meaning (“all 
attained”).25 Reiterated in Song-dynasty Chan, the idea that setting goals and then 
accomplishing them is itself a heroic feat—indeed perhaps the signature of buddhahood 
and great manhood—took on new life. As we have seen in the previous chapter, to win a 
                                                
24 For an overview of self-immolation in Chinese Buddhism, see Benn, Burning for the Buddha. For a 
short discussion of Chan masters in the ninth and tenth centuries who did practice self immolation, see 
Benn, Burning for the Buddha, 154–7. 
 
25 See Funayama, Butten wa dō kan’yaku sareta no ka, 191–92. The linguist Ning Yu calls this sort of 
rendering “simultaneous transliteration and translation”; see Yu, “Ideography and Borrowing in 
Chinese,” 80. The Jingde chuandeng lu contains an interesting episode in which a Chan master 
shames a vinaya master for not knowing that xida 悉達 is both translation and transliteration—a story 
that serves Chan polemically by implying that know-it-all vinaya masters might not be so smart after 
all. See Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 247b6–8. 
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battle on the field of encounter dialogue, a Chan master must be not only powerful but 
also quick, as any hesitation can be deadly. Hesitation was condemned and speedy action 
commended not only in formal sermons and in interactions between teacher and student, 
but also in gong’an commentarial literature. In his Biyan lu Yuanwu does just this, 
pointing out instances of both deadly indecision and praiseworthy decisiveness that he 
perceives in the words and actions of either of the interlocutors in encounter dialogues 
under his consideration. “[This person] saw the opportunity and acted” (jianji er zuo 見機
⽽而作), Yuanwu notes approvingly again and again over the course of this collection and 
his other writings.26 
What seems at first to be Chan Buddhists’ aesthetic preference for everyday life 
and rustic simplicity over spectacular display (a topic to which we will return in the next 
chapter) thus turns out to be the vehicle for a particular understanding of normative 
personhood: the sovereign self. The rhetoric of rustic simplicity thus serves as a 
compelling “reality effect” (in Roland Barthes’s phrasing27) even as it also sketches the 
figurative boundaries of the normative ideal of the “great man” in a very particular way—
boundaries carrying real consequences for the shape of Chan identity and soteriology. As 
Linji says, the Chan master should “just be ordinary, with nothing to do—defecating, 
urinating, wearing clothes, eating food, and lying down when tired.”28 And yet he also 
hastens to add: “Just be master everywhere [you go], and wherever you stand is the true 
                                                
26 Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 140c12, 165a8, 190a15, 202b17, 210b21–22, and 210c27–28; Foguo jijie 
lu, X. no. 1301, 67: 238c9; and Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 768c21 and 789a27. 
 
27 See Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 141–8. 
 
28 秖是平常無事——屙屎、送尿、著衣、喫飯、困來即臥。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 498a16–17; 
translation follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 185, with slight alterations. 
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[place]. No matter what circumstances come, they cannot dislodge you [from there].”29 
Linji’s phrase “being master (or host, lord) everywhere [you go]” (suichu zuozhu 隨處作
主) is repeated again elsewhere in the Linji lu (see below), and in turn was widely 
repeated by Chan Buddhists throughout the Song dynasty.30 As we have seen, this ideal 
of mastery over circumstances—taken as the basic measure of personal authenticity—
undergirded and conjoined the Chan tradition’s seemingly unrelated discourses of rustic 
simplicity, martial prowess, and cosmic sovereignty. 
No matter how “natural” Chan Buddhists made this notion of sovereign selfhood 
seem, it concealed an ideal of perfect articulation between intention and action: not just 
speed but total spontaneity. In such an ideal scenario, hesitation becomes impossible as 
intention and action are fused into a single and unified field. But Chan Buddhists also 
sometimes conceded that exercising such perfect spontaneity is no easy feat. At one point 
in the Linji lu, Linji describes his own experience thus: “It’s not that I comprehended [the 
path of Chan] from the moment I was born from my mother, but that, after exhaustive 
                                                
29 爾且隨處作主，立處皆真，境來回換不得。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 498a19–20; translation 
follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 186, with alterations. 
 
30 Some, like Juefan Huihong, use this phrase to celebrate the perceived glories of Chan masters from 
ages past (among whom Linji would have been included): “Those people of old had great ingenuity. 
For this reason they were able to take any condition they encountered to be the principle, to be masters 
everywhere.” 古之⼈人有⼤大機智，故能遇緣即宗，隨處作主。 Linjian lu, X, no, 1624, 87: 267a15. 
Others reiterated this phrase as an ongoing normative feature of Chan mastery. For example, in his 
Treatise in Defense of the Dharma (Hufa lun 護法論), literatus and government official Zhang 
Shangying 張商英 (1043–1122) repeats the idea that the Chan master is “master everywhere, taking 
any encountered condition to be the principle.” Zhang proceeds to ask rhetorically: “Among worldly 
dharmas, is there any that surpasses this?” 隨緣作主，遇緣即宗 … 世間之法，復有過此者乎？ 
Hufa lun, T. no. 2114, 52: 644a28–b1. For other examples of Song-dynasty Chan Buddhists using this 
phrase, typically as a normative injunction, see Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 714c29, 
724c2, 730b14–15, 752a17, and 766b24–25; Liandeng huiyao, X. no 1557, 79: 159a13; Wumen 
Huikai chanshi yulu, X. no. 1355, 69: 355b4-5; Wumen guan, T. no. 2005, 48: 298c25-26; and Xutang 
Heshang yulu, T. no. 2000, 47: 984b10. 
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investigation and grinding practice, one day I knew for myself.”31 Similarly, in a letter 
addressed to another monk, Yuanwu recognized spontaneity as an extraordinarily 
difficult goal to reach. After describing a state of sovereign selfhood in terms with which 
we are by now familiar—“if you want to act, then act; if you want to walk, then walk”—
Yuanwu asks: “how could it be easy to carry out and adhere to this mindless state?”32 He 
continues: 
There has never been a natural-born Śākyamuni or a spontaneous Maitreya. 
Who among them already comprehended while in their mother’s womb? 
You should just hurry up and show some vitality—time waits for no one! 
Suddenly, in a single bite, you’ll bite it right off—you won’t be able to 
help it. Great men must reach a place of self-attainment, liberty, and 
sovereign freedom before they can begin.33 
 
Yuanwu here suggests that while spontaneous sovereignty of self may be the defining 
feature of the “great man,” arriving at such a state is hard work—not even to Śākyamuni 
and Maitreya did it come naturally. Yet at the same time, Linji’s and Yuanwu’s 
descriptions betray a fundamental tension inherent to their understanding of the 
relationship between work and spontaneity, a tension inherent to the ideal composition of 
the sovereign self. On the one hand, spontaneity names the horizon of possible 
articulation between an individual’s intention and action.34 On the other hand, however, 
                                                
31 不是娘⽣生下便會，還是體究練磨，⼀一朝自省。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b20–21; translation 
follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 235, with alterations. 
 
32 要用便用，要⾏行即⾏行。… 此無⼼心境界豈是容易履踐湊泊? Foguo Keqin chanshi xinyao, X. no. 
1357, 69: 472c6–8. 
 
33 未有天⽣生釋迦自然彌勒。阿那箇在娘肚裏便會？直應快著精彩。時不待⼈人！驀然⼀一咬咬斷也
不柰你何。⼤大丈夫須到自得自由自在處始得。 Foguo Keqin chanshi xinyao, X. no. 1357, 69: 
472c10–12. 
 
34 I have translated the Chinese ziran, literally “so unto itself,” as “spontaneous.” But I also use the 
English word “spontaneous” to refer to the broader issue under consideration here, which is discussed 
in various Chinese terms by Chan Buddhists. 
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such spontaneity is only understood to be truly authentic if it exceeds the individual’s 
own intentionality: if one “cannot help it,” as Yuanwu puts it.35 Indeed, elsewhere 
Yuanwu and others criticize would-be Chan masters who attempt to “force their way to 
sovereignty” (qiangzuo zhuzai 強作主宰)—in other words, who try too hard.36 Just as in 
the previous chapter we saw that the concept of sovereign authority is vexed by its 
perpetual deferment—even the Chan master as sovereign must obey the “true order” 
issued from a higher source—so here we see that the sovereign subject is likewise vexed 
by a paradox of agency. Who, indeed, is the ultimate agent of sovereign subjectivity? 
And what happens if that sovereign source of authentic agency is usurped? 
 
Possessed by the words of another 
 
In one of the passages that we considered above, Fenyang Wude asks his audience: “Who 
obstructs you?” The words Fenyang chooses here are telling: not what, but who is it that 
obstructs his students from attaining sovereign mastery? Similarly, we have already 
considered the case of Yuanwu telling his students that they must not take orders from 
anyone or be bound by others’ words. Indeed, beyond forbearance in the face of mortality 
and control over the mental field of phenomenal perception, Linji and many other Chan 
                                                
35 Elsewhere Yuanwu praises those who “cannot help but be authentic” (bufang zhenzheng 不妨真正); 
see Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 778a9. On a similar paradox that emerges from 
normative ideals in certain early Chinese philosophical traditions, see Slingerland, Trying Not to Try. 
On the problem of spontaneity as an unrealizable ideal in the work of the Song-period poet Su Shi, see 
Yang, Dialectics of Spontaneity. 
 
36 See, for example, Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 767b18–20; Foguo jijie lu, X. no. 
1301, 67: 235c6–7; Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 552a10; and Guzunsu yulu, X. 
no. 1315, 68: 207a20–b9. 
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masters are also concerned about the risk that other people in one’s social environment 
pose to one’s sovereignty of self. Linji sermonizes: 
Just as a cracked jug is unfit to hold ghee, so one who would be a great 
vessel [for the Chan tradition] must not be deluded by other people. Be 
master everywhere [you go], and wherever you stand is the true [place]. 
No matter who comes along, don’t accept them.37 
 
The trope of being master wherever one goes is thus not limited to vigilantly observing 
all phenomena encountered by one’s senses. It also requires—inseparably from the 
problem of mental perception—that one guard against being taken in and fooled by any 
people one meets. Only by doing this is one fit to receive Chan transmission as an intact 
vessel for the tradition. 
Linji’s injunction to “not be deluded by other people,” which went on to be 
widely repeated in Song-dynasty Chan discourse records,38 also extends to students’ 
interactions with their teachers. In the middle of a long exposition about various possible 
scenarios of interaction between Chan masters and disciples, Linji describes a 
hypothetical situation in which the master 
brings out a piece of jing 境 in front of the student and fools around with 
it. [But] the student, discerning this [deception], remains master [of the 
situation] through each step [of the display] and is not deluded by [this] 
jing.39 
 
                                                
37 夫如㽄嗄之器，不堪貯醍醐。如⼤大器者，直要不受⼈人惑。隨處作主，立處皆真。但有來者，
皆不得受。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 499a19–22; translation adapted from Sasaki, The Record of 
Linji, 208, with alterations. 
 
38 See, for example, Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 357a19–21 and 387a16–17; Yangqi 
Fanghui heshang yulu, T. no. 1994A, 47: 641b28–c2 and 641c13–16; Yangqi Fanghui heshang houlu, 
T. no. 1994B, 47: 646c11–15; Mingjue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1996, 47: 672a9–14 and 692a24–27; and 
Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 55c11–12, 159a3–4, 239a12–17, 285b24, and 286c3. 
 
39 如善知識把出箇境塊⼦子，向學⼈人面前弄。前⼈人辨得，下下作主，不受境惑。 Linji lu, T. no. 
1985, 47: 500b3–5; translation adapted from Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 232, with alterations. 
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In my translation I have retained the literal sense of Linji’s unusual wording—to “bring 
out a piece of jing” (bachu ge jing kuaizi 把出箇境塊⼦子)—so that we may carefully 
examine the way Linji uses the word jing to intertwine phenomenal perception with 
social interaction, resulting in a model of conflictual intersubjectivity. As we considered 
at the opening of this chapter, the word jing began as a technical term in Buddhist 
philosophy of mind for any object of perception. Here, however, Linji uses it to refer to a 
kind of spectacle—perhaps a dramatic gesture or dazzling stream of words—that Chan 
masters knowingly deploy in order to test a disciple. A truly first-rate student, Linji tells 
us, can discern the ruse and maintain control of the situation. Such a student is “not 
deluded by this jing” (bushou jing huo 不受境惑), a perfect syntactic parallel to Linji’s 
phrase “not deluded by other people” (bushou ren huo 不受⼈人惑) considered above. Here 
in this parallelism, we see with particular clarity how Linji treats phenomenal objects and 
social individuals as fluidly interchangeable. 
But such first-rate students, Linji soon tells us, are extremely rare: 
If you are not bound by things, you will thoroughly break through to 
sovereign freedom. [But] among all followers of the Way from every 
direction, none has yet come before me without being dependent on 
something … Not a single one has yet come before me in solitary 
freedom. All are clambering after the idly[-produced] jing of [those] 
people of old.40 
 
These idle jing refer to the collected sayings of earlier Chan masters, and possibly also to 
the Buddhist scriptural tradition, both alike cast by Linji as nothing more than transcribed 
spectacles that serve to entrap students in delusion. Linji continues that “[although] five 
                                                
40 不與物拘，透脫自在。如諸⽅方學道流，未有不依物出來底。… 未有⼀一箇獨脫出來底。皆是
上他古⼈人閑機境。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b25–28; translation adapted from Sasaki, The Record 
of Linji, 236–7, with alterations. 
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or even ten years have passed, as yet not one person [has appeared]. All have been 
[ghosts] clinging to grasses or attached to leaves, bamboo tree-sprites, wild foxes, and 
bewitching spirits, wildly chewing on all kinds of dung-clods.”41 In other words, most 
students Linji encounters are not even human, let alone “great men”—they are nothing 
more than ghosts, sprites, and wild foxes. The “dung-clods” in question designate, again, 
recorded words of once-living buddhas and masters upon which these parasitic students 
subsist.42 
The discourse record of Linji’s contemporary Deshan Xuanjian 德⼭山宣鑑 (782–
865)—which, like the Linji lu, actually dates to the Song dynasty—similarly associates 
studying Buddhist literature with ghostly insubstantiality: “[Practitioners] who have 
accomplishments in study are still sprites clinging to grasses and attached to trees, or 
bewitching spirits, or wild foxes.”43 Elsewhere Deshan adds that “even if you study to the 
point of ascertaining a hundred thousand subtle meanings, you would [still] just be a 
                                                
41 ⼗十年五歲，並無⼀一⼈人。皆是依草附葉、⽵竹⽊木精靈、野狐、精魅，向⼀一切糞塊上亂咬。 Linji lu, 
T. no. 1985, 47: 500c1–2; translation adapted from Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 237, with alterations. 
 
42 Similarly, Chan master Baofeng Kewen 寶峰克⽂文 (1025–1102) is said to have ascended the hall 
and recited a poem that includes the lines: “[As for] the Chan school’s mind of sovereign freedom, of 
things going as one wishes, / Its marvelous function traverses all directions; there is nothing that is not 
it. / The fellows on both sides [of an encounter] are great men; / I advise you not to chew on the words 
of other people.” 禪家如意自在⼼心，妙用縱橫無不是。彼此男兒⼤大丈夫，勸君莫咬他⼈人語。 
Guzunsu yulu, X. no. 1315, 68: 291c20–22. Wumen Huikai 無門慧開 (1183–1260) reiterates the trope 
of ghosts clinging to grasses and trees in the context of contemplating “old cases,” opening his 
commentary on the first case of his gong’an collection Gateless Barrier (Wumen guan) by stating that 
“all those who do not penetrate the gate of the patriarchs and cut off the road of their minds are [just] 
sprites clinging to grasses and attached to trees.” 祖關不透，⼼心路不絕，盡是依草附⽊木精靈。 
Wumen guan, T. no. 2005, 48: 292c26–27. This trope is also found in many other Chan texts from the 
Song period onward. 
 
43 是有學得底亦是依草附⽊木、精魅、野狐。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 574c5–6. 
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wart-eating ghost. [Such people] are all bewitching spirits.”44 In yet another passage, 
Deshan remarks: “You all are like crows. Though your bodies are in the air, your minds 
are on the dung pile. You’re only looking for dead things to eat.”45 Finally, in still 
another passage, Deshan chastises his audience: “What is there to study? Eating your fill 
and then talking about thusness and nirvāṇa—is there still blood underneath your skin? 
You must begin by being a man.”46 Indeed, Deshan’s record, which often reads like an 
even more rhetorically extreme elaboration of the Linji lu, reiterates time and again the 
distinction between those select few “great men” who are truly alive, and the multitudes 
of ordinary people who may as well be dead.47 In so doing, Linji and Deshan participate 
in constructing a vast repertoire of tropes that emerged in the tenth and eleventh centuries 
by which Chan Buddhists distinguished living authenticity from ghostly inauthenticity.48 
                                                
44設學得百千妙義，只是箇喫瘡疣鬼，總是精魅。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 574b11–12. 
See also a similar passage in Deshan’s record, Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 574c3–6. 
 
45 你諸⼈人好似老鵶。身在虗空，⼼心在糞堆上。只覔死物喫。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 
575c20–21. 
 
46 學甚麼事？飽喫飯了說真如涅槃，皮下還有⾎血麼？須是箇丈夫始得。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 
1309, 67: 574c1–3. The question “is there still blood underneath your skin?” was reiterated by other 
Chan masters in the Song. See, for example, Yunmen Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 47: 
552, a22–23; and Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 160b3–4. 
 
47 It is worth observing that the similarity between Linji’s and Deshan’s discourse records attests to 
the limits of analyzing Song-dynasty Chan in terms of discrete lineage identities, and suggests that the 
“rhetoric of heroism” identified by Miriam Levering operated well beyond the boundaries of the Linji 
lineage on which she focuses. 
 
48 For example, Deshan is also credited with the injunction “only attend to living words; do not attend 
to dead words” 但參活句；莫參死句。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 599a9. This binary 
distinction went on to be widely repeated in Song-dynasty Chan texts, and was especially emphasized 
by Yuanwu Keqin. For him (and likely others), the term “living words” names language pregnant with 
the potential to shock students into awakening, while “dead words” refers to language whose 
soteriological potency has faded. For discussion of this topic, see Ge Zhaoguang, Zengding ben 
Zhongguo Chan sixiang shi, 424–32; Ogawa, Goroku no shisōshi, chapter 2, section 5; as well as Ahn, 
“The Malady of Meditation,” Chapter 2, and “Who Has the Last Word in Chan?” As another example, 
in a phrase that would be repeated countless times by Song-dynasty Chan Buddhists, Xuansha Shibei 
(835–908) is credited in the Zutang ji with formulating a criticism leveled in dialogue at another Chan 
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Linji and Deshan often attach the tropes of ghosts and spirits to criticisms of 
scriptural study. These criticisms can be read as part of a longstanding Buddhist 
conversation about the powers and perils of language, which as a medium of 
representation and communication was understood to carry the potential to guide sentient 
beings toward liberation, but might also lead them astray if they mistake sign for 
signified—hence the oft-repeated Buddhist injunction not to mistake the finger pointing 
at the moon for the moon itself. More proximately, these criticisms also participated in 
the ongoing elaboration of Chan identity as a “separate transmission outside the 
scriptures” (jiaowai biechuan), which began in the Tang period and continued into the 
Song. Of course, just as we have seen that Chan Buddhist criticism of meditation did not 
mean Chan Buddhists actually stopped meditating, so also—as scholars have noted—
Chan criticisms of scriptural study were first and foremost rhetorical performances that 
did not actually bespeak a literal abandonment by Chan Buddhists of studying scripture.49 
In both cases, the real issues at hand were identity and authority: Chan Buddhists neither 
                                                                                                                                            
master: “I know perfectly well that you’re calculating [how to] make a living while residing in the 
ghost realm [of rebirth].” 正知你鬼趣裏作活計。 Zutang ji, j. 10, v. 1, 456. In other words, Xuansha 
accuses his interlocutor of mistakenly drawing up plans for authentic living, while unbeknownst to 
him he has already died and been reborn as a ghost. His plans proceed from a massive error in 
judgment—thinking he is alive when he is really dead—and are therefore nothing more than mirages, 
impossible to realize and thus patently absurd. See also the allusion to this formula in Zutang ji, j. 13, 
v. 2, 607. In his entry in the Jingde chuandeng lu, Yunmen associates this idea with the quietism of 
“turning to your sense organs and closing your eyes.” 向陰界裏閉眉合眼。 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. 
no. 2076, 51: 358b17–21. In the longer run, Xuansha’s phrase became widespread as the slightly 
amended criticism that someone is “planning a living while residing in a ghost cave” 鬼窟裏作活計, 
substituting the shadowy cave (ku 窟) for the realm of rebirth (qu 趣). See, for example, Yunmen 
Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 1988, 47: 559b9–11 and 566c5–16; Fayan chanshi yulu, T. no. 
1995, 47: 657a13–18; Mingjue chanshi yulu, T. no. 1996, 47: 686a13–20; Yuanwu Foguo chanshi yulu, 
T. no. 1997, 47: 720b29–c5, 748a13–17, 756a24–b5, and 767b10–14; Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 
141a6–7, 160a28–b2, 161a4, 161c22–23, 168a1–2, 178a3–5, 187c15–22, 193c22–23, 210a6, 211c17–
18, 212b15–16, 213b9–10, and 213c23–24; and Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 802b8–
14. 
 
49 See Foulk, “Sung Controversies,” 220–21. 
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stopped meditating nor ceased to read scriptures, but they did ground the special authority 
to which they laid claim in something other than expertise in either scriptural study or 
meditation practice—namely the much loftier claim that Chan masters are buddhas. In so 
doing, they cleared the space for Chan Buddhists to serve as sources of ritual and textual 
authority rivaling the person of the Buddha Śākyamuni. At the same time, in another 
register, criticisms of scriptural study in the discourse records of Linji and Deshan also 
served to warn aspirants to Chan mastery about the dangers lying in their path, the 
vulnerability of any would-be sovereign subject to outside influence. The ghostly figures 
that haunt their records help sketch the “great man” in relief, providing the ominous 
backdrop against which this normative ideal can be contrasted. 
Elsewhere the Linji lu repeatedly invokes the tropes of ghosts, spirits, and wild 
foxes to condemn an unidentified group of “baldheads” or “shavepates” (tunu 禿奴), a 
pejorative epithet for Buddhist monastics.50 In two passages from separate parts of the 
text, Linji describes these preachers as “pointing to the east and gesturing to the west, 
delighting in fair weather and delighting in rain.”51 In other words, they can’t make up 
their minds about what’s what, but they preach to others anyway and in so doing pretend 
to a religious authority they do not truly possess.52 One of the two passages adds that 
                                                
50 “Shavepates” is Ruth Fuller-Sasaki’s rendering; “baldheads” is Burton Watson’s. See Watson, The 
Zen Teachings of Master Lin-chi, 51, 60, and 76. 
 
51 指東劃西，好晴好雨。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497c21–22 and 500b12; Sasaki, The Record of 
Linji, 176 and 234. 
 
52 More specifically, of the phrase “pointing to the east and gesturing to the west” Sasaki suggests that 
it “seems to mean to indulge in quibbles and avoid giving direct answers”; and that “delighting in fair 
weather and delighting in rain” is more obscure, “but it seems from other examples to mean to praise 
or flatter everything or everyone present in order to create a favorable impression.” Sasaki, The 
Record of Linji, 176–77. 
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“they see spirits, they see ghosts.”53 Throughout the text Linji also repeatedly tells us that 
these preachers “do not know [the difference between] good and bad” (bushi hao’e 不識
好惡)54 and “do not distinguish evil from true” (bubian xiezheng 不辨邪正).55 Linji 
warns that these preachers “are all wild foxes, beguiling spirits, and goblins,”56 and as 
such they pose a serious danger to the community: “transfixed by this pack of wild foxes 
and beguiling spirits, sons and daughters of good families thereupon become obsessed 
with supernatural phenomena.”57 Linji goes on to suggest that these preachers are 
ultimately bound for hell, predicting that “the day will come when they will have to repay 
their debts in front of Old Yama [the king of death] by swallowing red-hot iron balls”58 
and asking “how many hairs are left in their eyebrows?”59 As Sasaki observes, both of 
these phrases refer to well-known Buddhist punishments for false speech.60 But by the 
time these preachers are sent to hell for punishment, it might already be too late: the 
danger of false speech as a canonical Buddhist transgression is precisely that it misleads 
others and, in turn, causes those listeners themselves to speak falsely. The result is a 
                                                
53 見神見鬼。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497c21; Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 176. 
 
54 This phrase is repeated three times in the text: Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497c21, 500b11, and 501c17. 
 
55 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b8. Elsewhere Linji accuses “students these days” of the same offense; 
see Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 499a4–5. 
 
56 如是之流總是野狐、精魅、魍魎。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b14; translation adapted from 
Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 235, with alterations. 
 
57 好⼈人家男⼥女，被這⼀一般野狐精魅所著，便即捏怪。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497c23–24; 
translation adapted from Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 176, with alterations. 
 
58 如是之流盡須抵債，向閻老前吞熱鐵丸有日。Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497c22–23; translation 
follows Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 197, with minor alterations. 
 
59 眉⽑毛有幾莖？Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 500b13; Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 234. 
 
60 Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 177–78 and 234–35. 
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vicious cycle, a chain of deadly influence, a malevolent yet capricious agency passing 
from one unsuspecting host to the next. For this reason, the most important thing is 
simply not to be duped in the first place. Linji concludes: “Followers of the Way, it is 
urgently necessary that you endeavor to acquire authentic understanding and spread it 
broadly to all under Heaven, not being deluded by that bunch of beguiling spirits. [One 
who has] nothing to do is noble. Simply don’t strive—just be ordinary. Yet you go 
around outside among the byways seeking tricks and techniques. You’re all wrong!”61 
To whom do these vague yet alarming accusations refer, and what exactly have 
these “shavepates” done wrong, according to Linji? Ruth Fuller Sasaki speculates that the 
line “they see spirits, they see ghosts” “seems to refer to people who utter various 
pronouncements when in a state of trance or delirium, and is probably intended to 
criticize esoteric Buddhist and Taoistic practices adopted from or closely related to 
shamanism.”62 Sasaki also draws our attention to a similar passage in Deshan’s discourse 
record that provides us with further clues: 
Good people, don’t seek the Buddha. The Buddha is a great murderous 
thief. How many people has he tricked into entering the lust-demon’s pit? 
Don’t seek [the bodhisattvas] Mañjuśrī or Samantabhadra. They are 
rascally field hands. What a pity that [even] a majestic fellow, having 
swallowed their poison, tries to put on the face of a Chan master. He sees 
spirits, he sees demons; later, having gone mad, he runs about among the 
byways seeking a witch to divine [his fate] by striking a tile [and 
observing the shape of the cracks]. Then, having been led by these 
ignorant bald-headed rascals (that is, the Buddha et al.) into the path of 
divination, [this would-be Chan master] teaches you to worship the ghosts 
                                                
61 道流，切要求取真正見解，向天下橫⾏行，免被這⼀一般精魅惑亂。無事是貴⼈人。但莫造作，秖
是平常。爾擬向外傍家求過覓脚⼿手。錯了也！ Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 497c26–9; translation 
adapted from Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 178, with alterations. 
 
62 Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 176. 
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of the patriarchs, the ghosts of the buddhas, the ghosts of bodhi and 
nirvāṇa. A little hussy like this doesn’t understand!63 
 
Leaving aside for the moment Deshan’s female-gendering of divination and phony 
mastery—the ominous figure of the witch and the pejorative epithet “little hussy”—to 
which we will return, for now let us consider what this passage tells us about the intended 
object of Linji’s and Deshan’s critique and its relationship to Chan Buddhists’ elaboration 
of a normative ideal of sovereign selfhood. It becomes clear here that the object of 
criticism for both Deshan and Linji is not, as Sasaki suggests, shamanistic practices of 
spirit-possession per se. Rather, spirit-possession and divination—which Linji and 
Deshan undoubtedly hold in contempt—operate as rhetorical means to another critical 
end, namely the critique of a mindset that seeks outside guidance or puts stock in some 
authority external to one’s own sovereign self.64 For Deshan, the only thing that separates 
reading Buddhist scriptures from divining cracks on tiles is an extremely slippery slope. 
The object of critique in these passages, then, is a foil of sovereign selfhood: the 
monstrous, agentively uncertain self that allows any and all outside influences to control 
it. 
                                                
63 仁者，莫求佛。佛是⼤大殺⼈人賊。賺多少⼈人⼊入婬魔坑？莫求⽂文殊普賢。是田舍奴。可惜許⼀一箇
堂堂丈夫兒喫佗毒藥了，便擬作禪師面孔。見神見鬼，向後狂亂傍家⾛走覔師婆打瓦⼘卜去。被無
知老禿奴便即與⼘卜道，教你禮祖師鬼、佛鬼、菩提涅槃鬼。是小婬⼥女⼦子不會！ Zheng fayan 
zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 575b11–16. Translation partially adapted from Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 176. 
Sasaki’s translation cuts off after the line about divination on tiles. 
 
64 Echoing these themes, in a letter to a grand councilor, Dahui Zonggao writes: “To study this Way, 
you must have determined resolution. If you don’t have this determined resolution, then you’ll be like 
one who takes advice from a fortune-teller—when you hear him say “east,” you will immediately fall 
in line and run eastward. When you hear him say “west,” you will immediately fall in line and run 
westward. If you have determined resolution, then you’ll succeed in stabilizing your grasp and 
become the sovereign.” 學此道，須有決定志。若無決定志，則如聽聲⼘卜者，見⼈人說東便隨⼈人向
東⾛走，說西便隨⼈人向西⾛走。若有決定志，則把得住作得主宰。 Dahui Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 
1998A, 47: 942a22–25; translation follows Broughton, The Letters of Chan Master Dahui Pujue, 313, 
with minor alterations. 
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 In the discourse records of Linji and Deshan, there are only these two possible 
ways of being: one is either a “great man” or else one is a ghost, spirit, or wild fox. 
Indeed, this stark bifurcation is already adumbrated in Huangbo’s Chuanxin fayao, 
wherein Huangbo says: “If you do not recognize [the true nature of] your own mind, then 
everything [you do] is called evil action, and you can surely be counted among Māra’s 
family members.”65 The records of Linji and Deshan thus might be said to represent the 
culmination of a logic of Chan mastery that was, by the Northern Song, already at least a 
century old. But Linji and Deshan frame the problem in extreme shades of black and 
white: there is no in-between, one is either ruler or ruled, in control or being controlled by 
someone else. Returning to an observation made by Alan Cole on the distinction between 
“sudden” and “gradual” awakening quoted in Chapter 1, in Chan “[o]ne is a master or not; 
there are no half-masters, just as there are no half-kings, and thus movement between 
ordinary identity and buddha-identity cannot be gradual.”66 Cole’s choice of analogy 
turns out to be quite apposite, since as we have seen the concepts of buddhahood and 
kingship were always closely intertwined. The result is that, for Huangbo, Linji, and 
Deshan, there is no neutral place, no such thing as an ordinary person that might embark 
on the path to buddhahood. One is either already a “great man” or is already possessed by 
the words and wills of others—already, without realizing it, speaking falsely and acting 
evilly. 
                                                
65 不識自⼼心，盡名邪⾏行，定作天魔眷屬。 Huangbo Duanji chanshi chuanxin fayao, T. no. 2012A, 
48: 383b26; Iriya, Denshin hōyō, 77. 
 
66 Cole, Fathering Your Father, 23. 
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Yet if the Linji lu problematizes the speaking agent and warns that speaking 
falsely leads to rebirth in hell, it does not propose silence as a solution. On the contrary, 
Linji mocks those who stay silent for fear of the karmic repercussions of their words: 
Followers of the Way, you seize upon words from the mouths of those old 
masters and take them to be [inherently] true, saying: “These good 
teachers’ [methods] are marvelously inconceivable, and I, simple-minded 
fellow that I am, don’t dare measure such old worthies.” Blind idiots! You 
go through your entire life holding such views, betraying your own two 
eyes. Trembling with fright, like donkeys on an icy path, [you say to 
yourselves,] “I don’t dare disparage these good teachers for fear of making 
mouth-karma!” Followers of the Way, it is only a great teacher who dares 
to disparage the buddhas and disparage the patriarchs, to determine the 
right and the wrong of the world, to cast aside the teachings of the 
Tripiṭaka, to curse and berate all infantile fellows, and to look for a [true] 
person amidst fortunate and unfortunate circumstances.67 
 
Here it becomes clear that the problem is not language as such, or even the paradoxical 
need to express the inexpressible. Language is just another kind of jing (a phenomenal 
spectacle or social circumstance), and the problem is most fundamentally a question of 
control: an authentic Chan master controls language, while everyone else is controlled by 
it. 
 The suggestion that quoting Buddhist scripture amounts to the crime of false 
speech, or that worshipping the Buddha is a form of evil action, stretches the meaning of 
the terms “false speech” and “evil action” very far from their canonical Buddhist 
connotations. And indeed, all of this dramatic rhetoric from Linji and Deshan might seem 
like mere hyperbole. But Linji’s assertion that the bravery to condemn the buddhas and 
patriarchs is a mark of mastery participated in the claim that Chan masters are themselves 




辱諸小兒，向逆順中覓⼈人。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 499b19–26; translation adapted from Sasaki, 
The Record of Linji, 216, with alterations. 
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both patriarchs and buddhas, as well as the broader reorientation of Buddhist authority 
that Chan Buddhists were bringing about during the Song period. Moreover, the starkly 
binary logic according to which Linji and Deshan repeatedly distinguish sovereign 
selfhood from ghostly indeterminacy of self went on to pervade Song-dynasty Chan 
soteriology. It justified the Chan tradition’s institutional exclusivity by casting Chan 
masters as lone, authentic heroes in a world of demonic uncertainty.68 It also helped flesh 
out the normative subjectivity that all aspirants to Chan mastery were expected to 
embody. Chan masters, in turn, scrutinized their students’ words and actions for clues 
about their state of realization, ultimately relying on this same binary division of the 
world into buddhas and ghosts, sovereigns and servants, in order to judge each student 
either worthy or unworthy of candidacy for lineage transmission. 
The capacity for discernment expected of Chan masters, along with the authority 
granted them to judge (and punish) others, was closely bound up with the broader ideal of 
sovereign subjectivity. Yet even if Linji and Deshan paint a picture of the world as 
divided starkly into black and white, their discourse records also reveal an anxiety that 
appearances can be deceiving, registering the need for Chan masters to deal skillfully in 
shades of gray. As we have seen, Linji repeatedly urges his audience members not to be 
deceived by any circumstances (jing) that they might encounter. And Deshan, in the 
passage we just considered, does not simply describe the unfortunate descent of an 
unsuspecting “majestic fellow” (tangtang zhangfu’er 堂堂丈夫兒) into madness by way 
of overreliance on scriptural authority; he also warns that this fellow will “try to put on 
                                                
68 As Deshan remarks at another point in his record: “Lately, in this final age of the Dharma, there are 
a lot of ghosts and spirits.” 近來末法時代多有鬼神。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 574a14. 
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the face of a Chan master.” In other words, those who have been “deluded by that bunch 
of beguiling spirits”—as Linji puts it—are not only in danger, but are also dangerous. 
They pose falsely as Chan masters, using the Chan tradition’s institutional prestige to 
wreak havoc on society. Indeed, elsewhere Deshan warns: “Having been bewitched by all 
of those old shavepates, you obstinately make yourself into a model and strike a pose, 
putting on a face that looks exactly like someone who has attained the Way.”69 For 
Deshan and Linji, then, the fate of the entire Chan tradition rests on the sovereign 
subject’s capacity for discernment. Students must learn to be discerning so as to avoid 
being tricked by phony masters, and (true) masters in turn must decisively judge their 
students in order to ensure that no wild foxes sneak into the elite ranks of the Chan 
school. This normative ideal of sovereign selfhood, then, was not simply a space for 
doctrinal speculation. Rather, it was one of the main foundations of the Chan tradition’s 
claim to the status of buddhahood, a centerpiece of its elite and exclusive identity. 
 
Authenticity and artifice 
 
Both Deshan and Linji spell out at various points in their discourse records the need for 
Chan aspirants to possess skill in discernment. Deshan, for example, remarks in one 
passage: “You absolutely must be equipped with your own eyes, distinguishing between 
                                                
69 你被佗諸⽅方老禿奴魔魅著，便道「我是修⾏行⼈人」，打硬作模作樣，恰似得道底⼈人面孔。 
Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 574a18–20. In still another passage, Deshan says: “First of all, 
don’t join your hands [in a pious gesture] and be a Chan master, looking for a place to stick your head 
out, bewitching the next generation of students with clever words, hoping for others to call you 
‘elder.’” 第⼀一莫拱⼿手作禪師，覔箇出頭處，巧⾔言語魔魅後⽣生，欲得⼈人喚作長老。 Zheng fayan 




pure and impure, between buddha-language and māra-language. Don’t be deluded by 
other people.”70 For his part, Linji offers the following harangue on the matter: 
Students nowadays know nothing of the Dharma. They’re just like sheep 
that take into their mouths whatever their noses happen to hit against. 
They neither discriminate between master and slave, nor distinguish host 
from guest. … Renouncers of home must discern a correct understanding 
[amidst] everyday life, discern buddhas and discern māras, discern true 
and discern false, discern ordinary person and discern sage. If you can 
discern like this, then you can be called someone who has truly renounced 
the home. If you do not distinguish between māras and buddhas, you’ve 
only renounced one home to enter another home.71 
 
As we have already seen, each of these pairs of opposing categories—master and slave, 
host and guest, buddha and māra, and so on—might equally be applied to objects of 
phenomenal perception and to individuals in one’s social environment. Indeed, shortly 
after this passage Linji reaffirms this rhetorical conflation with recourse, again, to the 
term jing, when he adds that “buddha and māra are two jing, one pure and the other 
impure.”72 
 For Chan Buddhists like Linji, the importance—as well as the challenge—of 
distinguishing buddhas on the one hand from māras, ghosts, and spirits on the other 
derives from the inherent guile attributed to the latter, and the associated fear that even 
someone who really looks like a buddha might be a malevolent spirit in disguise. Perhaps 
the quintessential figure of deceptive appearance and false identity in Chan literature is 
                                                





佛不辨，正是出⼀一家⼊入⼀一家。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 498a21–26; translation adapted from Sasaki, 
The Record of Linji, 188, with alterations. 
 
72 然佛與魔是染淨⼆二境。 Linji lu, T. no. 1985, 47: 498b4; translation adapted from Sasaki, The 
Record of Linji, 190, with alterations. 
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the wild fox (yehu 野狐) or wild fox spirit (yehu jing 野狐精)—a trope we have already 
seen mentioned several times by Linji and Deshan. This trope is fairly well known to 
scholars; for example, Steven Heine has written a detailed study of the figure of the wild 
fox in one particular gong’an in which the Chan master Baizhang encounters a fox spirit, 
using this case to illuminate the intersection of Chan doctrine and popular folklore in 
China and Japan.73 Here we will be more concerned with the role of the wild fox as a 
trope participating in the elaboration of Chan Buddhists’ normative ideal of sovereign 
selfhood, and the problem that deceptive appearances were understood to pose to all 
would-be Chan masters seeking to embody this subjective state of control over 
circumstances. 
 As Xiaofei Kang has noted, foxes were worshipped in China from the medieval 
period onward. Yet the widespread association of foxes with trickery and deception 
meant that these cults often evoked more anxiety than adoration.74 As Rania Huntington 
observes, “Already by the Han, the fox was considered a magical and ominous animal; in 
the Six Dynasties it emerged as the beast most gifted at transformation and trickery.”75 
Foxes were especially associated with sexual deception, and in Six Dynasties zhiguai 志
怪 (tales of the strange) they were often described as assuming (typically female) human 
form in order to seduce others.76 Huntington adds that “[t]he tales do not attribute any 
overt motive to these creatures; their implied motives seem to be to confuse categories, 
                                                
73 Heine, Shifting Shape, Shaping Text. 
 
74 Kang, “The Fox [hu 狐] and the Barbarian [hu 胡],” 41. 
 
75 Huntington, “Foxes and Sex,” 80. 
 
76 Huntington, “Foxes and Sex,” 81. 
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first changing shape and then mixing with men in the most intimate way.”77 Indeed, the 
abiding feature of the fox—from Six Dynasties zhiguai literature to Song-dynasty Chan 
discourse records—is its predilection for concealing its true nature and donning a false 
identity. The deep cultural connection in China between foxes and the epistemological 
state of uncertainty is further attested by the widely used compound “fox-doubt” (huyi 狐
疑), already found in early Chinese texts like the Chuci 楚辭 and Shiji 史記 and widely 
used in Chan discourse records.78 
In Song-dynasty Chan encounter dialogue literature, the verdict that someone is a 
“wild fox” is often rendered to students who attempt a skillful performance in front of the 
master, but end up failing to compellingly demonstrate authentic realization. One 
entertaining example from the record of a disciple of Mazu Daoyi named Guizong 
Zhichang 歸宗智常 (fl. ca. 9th c.) preserved in the Zutang ji goes as follows: 
The master asked a monk [who had just arrived at the monastery]: “Where 
have you come from?” The monk said: “From somewhere.” The master 
said: “Did you bring it?” The monk said: “I brought it.” The master said: 
“Where is it?” The monk took his hand and [mimed] producing something 
from the crown of his hand, and then holding it up to show the master. The 
master [mimed] taking it from the monk and throwing it away behind his 
back. The monk had no reply. The master said: “This wild fox!”79 
                                                
77 Huntington, “Foxes and Sex,” 81. 
 
78 See Hanyu da cidian, v. 5, 35–6. In addition to Chan Buddhists’ regular use of this expression, 
Yuanwu Keqin and Dahui Zonggao each offer explanations for the discursive connection between 
foxes and doubt. See Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 162b23–6; and Dahui Pujue chanshi yulu, T. no. 




「者野狐兒！」 Zutang ji, j. 15, v. 2, 686. The line “from somewhere” is likely supposed to be read 
as an artifact of the transcription process, implying that the exact place mentioned by the student was 
not written down, rather than as the transcription of a cheekily noncommittal response from the monk; 
in the version of this story found in the Jingde chuandeng lu, the monk says he is from Fengxiang 鳳
翔 (Shaanxi). (In this latter version, the actions of miming are also slightly clearer). See Jingde 
chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 256a19–23. Conversely, in another humorous case from the record of 
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What is the unnamed “it” (or “that one”; nage 那個) about which Guizong inquires, and 
which the monk claims he has indeed brought? While the answer is never explicitly given, 
we can take an educated guess that it refers to the monk’s buddhahood or buddha-nature, 
which he pretends to remove from the crown of his head—the location of the invisible 
uṣṇīṣa—and show to Guizong.80 The monk’s gesture is undeniably clever, if a bit too on 
the nose, but the master has none of it and mimes tossing the student’s buddhahood away 
as though it were nothing. At this the student is stumped, prompting the master to render 
judgment: the student is merely a wild fox putting on a spectacle, and not a true “great 
man.”81 Similarly, we also find the judgment that one or another participant in an 
encounter dialogue—sometimes master and sometimes student—is actually a “wild fox” 
rendered in gong’an commentaries such as the Biyan lu.82 
In the previous chapter we considered a passage from the Zhengdao ge describing 
a lion, king of the beasts, wandering boldly through the forest and trailed by a pack of 
                                                                                                                                            
Tang-dynasty master Xiantian 僊天 (d.u.), the student recovers from the accusation that he is a “wild 
fox” by upstaging the master: “Another monk stepped forward and was about to bow, when the master 
said: “This wild fox-ghost! What did you see to make you bow?” The monk said: “[I saw] an old 
shavepate. What did you see to make you ask?” The master said: “Good effort, good effort. Today [I,] 
Xiantian, have forgotten to watch my step (lit. forgotten what’s in front of me and lost what’s behind 
me).” 又有⼀一僧⾄至擬禮拜。師云：「野狐鬼！見什麼了便禮拜？」僧云：「老禿奴。見什麼了
便恁問？」師云：「苦哉，苦哉。僊天今日忘前失後。」 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 
316c18–21. 
 
80 My reading of this passage is indebted to a brilliant analysis performed by Ogawa Takashi on a 
similar encounter dialogue from the Zutang ji, which also uses the term nage to refer to someone’s 
buddha-nature, and to contrast the buddha-nature with the phenomenal self. See Ogawa, Goroku no 
shisōshi, 114–15. 
 
81 For other similar cases, see, for example, Zutang ji, j. 14, v. 2, 631; j. 17, v. 2, 745; j. 19, v. 2, 860; 
Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 358a10–11; and Yunmen Kuangzhen chanshi guanglu, T. no. 
1988, 47: 550c1–4, 554a16–20, and 567c10–13. 
 
82 See, for example, Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 140a20–21, 143b4, and 148c12–13. 
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lion cubs. “Even if a fox were to [slip into the pack and] follow this Dharma-king,” we’re 
told, “a hundred years of idle talk by goblins would [still] be in vain.” In these lines, the 
Zhengdao ge projects confidence that even though the Chan tradition—a pride of kingly 
lions—is sure to attract students seeking entry by guile rather than merit, the school’s 
integrity is sufficiently strong to withstand the threat of foxlike imposters infiltrating its 
ranks. This passage echoes an earlier poem attributed to the mythic Tang-period Buddhist 
recluse Hanshan 寒⼭山, whose work was broadly influential among Song-dynasty Chan 
Buddhists. Although the poem opens on a pessimistic note, over several lines this 
pessimism gives way to the conviction that all fox’s masks will drop sooner or later: 
Alas, [this] place overflows with pollution, 
And rākṣa [demons] live together with worthies. 
They say these [two] kinds [of beings] are equivalent; 
Don’t they know that the Way does not play favorites? 
A fox [might] assume the posture of a lion, 
Deceptively peddling mistaken ideas and claiming them to be treasure. 
[But] when lead ore enters the furnace, 
Then [everyone] knows it is not really gold.83 
 
Hanshan opens by expressing anxiety about the ease with which he observes rākṣas 
passing as Buddhist worthies. Implicit in these opening lines is the claim that unlike 
everyone else, Hanshan alone has never been fooled by this ruse. When he goes on to tell 
us that “the Way does not play favorites,” he suggests that the impartial law of the 
Buddha-Dharma guarantees that even a well-disguised fox’s true identity will eventually 
be disclosed to all. Yet only in the poem’s final two lines—as Hanshan shifts from the 
trope of foxes and lions to that of base and precious metals—does he explain more 
                                                
83 吁嗟濁濫處，羅剎共賢⼈人，謂是等流類，焉知道不親，狐假獅⼦子勢，詐妄卻稱珍，鉛礦⼊入爐
冶，⽅方知⾦金不真。 Iritani and Matsumura, Kanzan shi, 164–65. On the dating of this collection, see 
especially Pulleyblank, “Linguistic Evidence for the Date of Han-shan.” 
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precisely by what mechanism the fox’s subterfuge will be made known. That mechanism 
is the furnace’s powerful heat, which melts down all metals and reveals their essential 
identity. 
 The trope of testing metal in a furnace went on to be widely repeated in Song-
dynasty Chan literature. A short poem attributed to Chan master Baoning Renyong 保寧
仁勇 (fl. ca. Northern Song), for example, reiterates the premise of Hanshan’s poem: 
With a face like a scale-model, it looks just like the real thing; 
Picked up and handled in public, it becomes even more radiant. 
But when it enters the fire to be smelted back down, 
In the end it returns to [its true state], fake silver.84 
 
Similarly, a verse comment on another passage in the Zhengdao ge by Fohui Faquan 佛
慧法泉 (fl. ca. Northern Song) asks: “What can we make of all the past’s truths and 
falsehoods? / Who knows how many sheep have dressed up in a tiger pelt? / If you want 
to identify real gold, [put it] in the fire and look.”85 Still another verse comment on an old 
case, this one attributed to Dinghui Chaoxin 定慧超信 (also known as Haiyin Xin 海印
信, fl. ca. Southern Song), goes as follows: “If you want to identify real gold, you have to 
put it in the fire; / Smelt it down three times over and you’ll see if it’s fine or base. / If 
                                                
84 顏⾊色規模却似真，⼈人前拈弄越光新。及乎⼊入⽕火重烹試，到了終歸是假銀。 Chanzong songgu 
lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 544a10–11. 
 
85 從來真偽豈相⼲干，虎皮⽺羊質知多少，要識真⾦金⽕火裏看。 Zhengdao ge song, X. no. 1291, 65: 
445a3–4. Elsewhere in the same commentary, Faquan returns to the figure of the wild fox: “In the 
forest and by the mountains, coming and going in deception; / Faking the power of tigers, foxes only 
cheat themselves; / Living in fear until they encounter their [own] true colors.” 林下⼭山邊謾來去，狐
假虎威徒自欺，才逢本⾊色還驚懼。 Zhengdao ge song, X. no. 1291, 65: 446a11–12. 
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you’re buying and selling at a high level, [the market] is unforgiving; / The distinct value 
of a high-quality item always makes itself known.”86 
What exactly is this furnace (and, in Chaoxin’s verse, this marketplace87) that 
impartially tests the mettle (or metal) of all those aspiring to buddhahood? We do not find 
an explicit answer in any of the preceding poems. But in many Chan discourse records, 
the furnace clearly refers metaphorically to the monastic practice of a Chan master testing 
a student under threat of blows. For example, in a widely-quoted scene from the 
discourse record of Xuedou Chongxian (980–1052), we’re told that “the master ascended 
the hall. The assembly was gathered closely around him, and the master threw down his 
staff, saying: ‘The tip of this staff has eyes as bright as the sun! If you want to identify 
real gold, [put it] in the fire and look.’”88 Xuedou’s statement is a variation on the 
common moment in performances of the “ascending the hall” ceremony when the master 
invites bold students to step forward and be tested in front of everyone assembled. Here 
the master’s staff—an implement for issuing punitive judgment by striking students, as 
we have seen in the previous chapter—is said itself to possess bright eyes, metonymically 
signaling the power of discernment with which the staff’s wielder, Xuedou, is endowed 
                                                
86 要識真⾦金須⼊入⽕火，再三煅煉見精麤。上⾏行買賣不饒讓，好物從來價自殊。 Chanzong songgu 
lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 600c9–10.  
 
87 In several cases, Chan commentaries remark critically that a master “hangs up a sheep’s head [in the 
storefront] but sells dog’s meat” 懸⽺羊頭賣狗⾁肉. See, for example, Fayan chanshi yulu, T. no. 1995, 
47: 656b13–14; and Wumen guan, T. no. 2005, 48: 293c17–18. 
 
88上堂，⼤大眾雲集，以拄杖拋下云：「棒頭有眼明如日；要識真⾦金⽕火裏看。」 Mingjue chanshi 
yulu, T. no. 1996, 47: 670b18–19. For allusions to this passage, see, for example, Yuanwu Foguo 
chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 765a1–2 and 792c25–26; Jianzhong jingguo xudeng lu, X. no. 1556, 78: 
746a24–b1 and 767a12; and Chanzong songgu lianzhu tongji, X. no. 1295, 65: 605a5–6. Along similar 
lines, and in conjunction with themes discussed in the previous chapter, Yuanwu tells us that “[the 
difference between] living and dying is revealed on the tip of the sword.” 劍刃上顯殺活。 Yuanwu 
Foguo chanshi yulu, T. no. 1997, 47: 790a3–4. 
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(and closely associating discernment with the administration of punitive justice). 
Similarly, commenting on an “old case” in the Wumen guan, Wumen praises the master 
Songyuan Chongyue 松源崇嶽 (1132–1202) in the following terms: 
Songyuan can be said to have poured out his guts and emptied his stomach 
[for all to see]. It’s just that he lacks anyone to pick up and shoulder [his 
teaching]. Even if there is someone [who can] immediately shoulder it, 
you’d better come to Wumen’s place [first] and have a painful taste of my 
staff! Why? If you want to identify real gold, [put it] in the fire and look.89 
 
In other words, by raising an old case featuring Songyuan, Wumen invites students to try 
to carry out that master’s lofty teaching—but, as the curator of old cases who has raised 
Songyuan’s case for consideration in the first place, Wumen also asserts his position as 
gatekeeper rendering final judgment on students aspiring to join the ranks of Chan 
mastery. 
For Yuanwu Keqin, the contemplation of old cases not only provided a chance to 
test students—he routinely prefaces cases in the Biyan lu with the phrase “to test you, I 
raise this for your consideration” (shi ju kan 試舉看)—but also, correspondingly, 
presented an opportunity for students to develop their own skill in discernment. In the 
opening comment to the Biyan lu’s thirty-fifth case, for example, Yuanwu presses his 
readers on their capacity to discern: 
Telling dragons apart from snakes, separating jade from [ordinary] stones, 
distinguishing black [monastic robes] from plain [robes of a layperson], 
cutting off hesitation and indeterminacy: if you don’t have an eye on your 
forehead and a talisman [for subduing demons] at the ready (lit. behind 
your elbow), time and again you will miss it [even though] it’s right in 
front of you. Yet right now, when seeing and hearing are not obscured, 
when sound and form are purely real, say: is it black or is it white? Is it 
                                                
89 無門曰：松源可謂傾膓倒腹。只是⽋欠⼈人承當。縱饒直下承當，正好來無門處喫痛棒。何故𦗚？
要識真⾦金⽕火裏看。 Wumen guan, T. no 2005, 48: 295b28–c1. 
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crooked or is it straight? Coming to this point, how will you 
discriminate?90 
 
Just as we saw in the previous chapter that Yuanwu takes the opportunity of commenting 
on “old cases” to delight in parsing the subtle shades of contested authority animating 
each encounter dialogue, so here we see that this ability to distinguish the truly 
authoritative master—the real gold, the dragon, the true black-robed monastic—is also 
something Yuanwu seeks to teach his students to perform on their own. Yet here, once 
again, discerning a “great man” is not only a matter of reading signs on the surface of the 
encounter, but also requires probing to each contender’s core—sometimes revealing, as 
Yuanwu often notes, that an apparent master really only has “the head of a dragon [but] 
the tail of a snake” (longtou shewei 龍頭蛇尾).91 Like the wild fox, such a person puts on 
an impressive show, but is in the end no sovereign of circumstances. 
Although for heuristic purposes I have separately examined tropes of martial 
heroism, discernment, sovereign selfhood and anarchic ghosthood, for Chan Buddhists 
like Yuanwu these figurative repertoires were all woven into a single fabric of discourse. 
The opening comment to the thirty-seventh case of the Biyan lu, for instance, seamlessly 
integrates many of the ideas we have been considering: 
                                                
90 垂示云：定龍蛇，分⽟玉⽯石，別緇素，決猶豫──若不是頂門上有眼，肘臂下有符，往往當頭
蹉過。只如今見聞不昧，聲⾊色純真，且道：是皂是白？是曲是直？到這裏作麼⽣生辨？ Biyan lu, 
T. no. 2003, 48: 173b25–28; translation follows Cleary and Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 216, with 
alterations. 
 
91 See Biyan lu, T. no. 2003, 48: 150a25, 151b17, 168b8, 172a22, 192c20, 196a5, and 203c2. This 
critique was already being leveled as early as the Zutang ji; see Zutang ji, j. 9, v. 1, 448; j. 10, v. 1, 
491; j. 11, v. 2, 510; and j. 13, v. 2, 604. For other examples, see Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 
51: 293c25–6, 347c3–4, 349a26–7, 368c11, 391b4–5, and 406c8–9; Yangqi Fanghui heshang houlu, T. 




It is futile effort to linger in thought over the action of a lightning bolt; 
when the sound of thunder fills the sky, you will hardly have time to cover 
your ears. To unfurl the red flag of victory over your head, to whirl the 
twin swords behind your ears—if not for a discriminating eye and a 
familiar hand, how could anyone succeed? Some people lower their heads 
and linger in thought, [looking] to the roots of their ideas to divine the 
answer. Little do they know that they are seeing ghosts without number in 
front of their skulls.92 
 
For Yuanwu, then, the discriminating eye that allows one to skillfully render judgment on 
old cases is the same eye that the sovereign subject uses to win every battle and maintain 
total control over encounters with phenomenal objects and social individuals alike. This 
normatively exacting gaze, we are made to understand, immediately reveals the truth 
hidden underneath deceptive appearances wherever it goes. It also provides the only 
assurance that wild foxes will be kept outside the elite gates of Chan, the sole guarantee 
that the Chan tradition is truly what it claims to be: a tradition of buddhas. 
 
The gender of buddhahood 
 
So far we have only made oblique mention of a fact that, although obvious, has often 
been overlooked by scholars of Chan Buddhism: the “great man” was, from the 
beginnings of Buddhism to the rise of Chan, always understood to be a male-gendered 
sovereign. The gendering of buddhahood pervades many aspects of normative Chan 
mastery that we have already considered, but it also deserves more thorough treatment in 
its own right as a pivotal aspect of the Chan ideal of sovereign selfhood. As we saw in 
                                                
92 垂示云：掣電之機，徒勞佇思。當空霹靂，掩耳難諧。腦門上播紅旗，耳背後輪雙劍，若不
是眼辨⼿手親，爭能搆得？有般底，低頭佇思，意根下⼘卜度。殊不知髑髏前見鬼無數。 Biyan lu, 




Chapter 1, a well-known episode in the Buddha’s life story describes physiognomists 
observing that the body of the infant Siddhārtha Gautama possesses the “marks of the 
great man” and predicting that he would become either a buddha or a cakravartin (wheel-
turning king). Writing about early Buddhist iconography, Vidya Dehejia suggests that no 
matter which of these two paths he went down, the Buddha was ultimately destined to 
become a cakravartin of one kind or another: 
[T]he only open question was whether he would conquer the territories of 
the earth, or renounce the world to conquer the minds of men. Either way, 
evidence of his virility and sexuality—essential qualities in any monarch, 
and even more so in a chakravartin—seems to have been considered 
important enough in the first and second centuries to be specifically 
portrayed. While the Buddha had renounced the world, he remained a 
chakravartin, a wheel-turner of the Buddhist doctrine, whose virility and 
potency had been transmuted into spiritual power over the minds of men. 
The depiction of the Buddha’s sexuality in sculptural imagery seems to 
have been one way of stressing his imperial identity.93 
 
As Dehejia suggests and as we have seen, personal (as opposed to metaphysical) 
buddhahood was always bound up with tropes of kingship. Buddhahood and kingship, in 
turn, were both closely intertwined with normative masculinity. This was true not only in 
visual culture, as Dehejia suggests, but also in the textual culture of canonical scriptures. 
As John Powers has shown, Prince Siddhārtha Gautama was routinely portrayed in 
canonical Buddhist literature as a “bull of a man” and a sexual “stallion” in possession of 
a large harem. At the same time, in a hedge against the risk that people might think his 
luxurious royal lifestyle and the company of women had softened him, he was also 
depicted as an expert in martial arts who always placed first in tests of strength, 
performances of martial prowess particularly important for demonstrating the full 
                                                
93 Dehejia, The Body Adorned, 164. 
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enactment of his kṣatriya (warrior class) identity.94 These qualities already found in the 
young Prince Siddhārtha were in turn carried into his religious persona after he 
abandoned his life in the palace on a heroic quest to become a fully-realized buddha. 
 As is well known, when Buddhist monasticism arrived in China, the notion of 
shaving one’s head and renouncing the family to become a monk or nun was widely seen 
as violating norms of filial piety. Bret Hinsch suggests that Buddhist monasticism was 
particularly challenging to Chinese norms of masculinity, most importantly because 
celibacy meant monks could not have sons and continue the family line.95 But the 
situation might not have been so simple. After all, there was already a similar tension in 
pre-Buddhist Chinese culture between the conflicting imperatives that capable men on 
the one hand serve the state and realm, and on the other care for their families and 
oversee the propagation of the lineage. Ban Chao, for example—whose influential 
example as paradigmatic martial hero we considered in Chapter 3—was only said to have 
remained as long as he did in a dead-end clerical job before striking out for the western 
front owing to his obligation to provide for his parents. 
As another example from even earlier Chinese culture, we might also consider the 
case of the legendary sage and ruler of ancient China, Yu the Great (Da Yu ⼤大禹). After 
being appointed Minister of Works (sikong 司空) by emperor Shun 舜, legends say that 
Yu worked so dedicatedly to tame the floods troubling the land that for years on end he 
                                                
94 Powers, A Bull of a Man, 33. Literatus and official Zhang Shangying 張商英 (1043–1121), in his 
Treatise in Defense of the Dharma (Hufa lun 護法論)—to which we will return in Chapter 4—wrote 
of the Buddha when he was a prince that “his virtue, and [skill in] civil and martial [arts], were 
magnificent and exceptional” 道德⽂文武端嚴殊特。 Hufa lun, T. no. 2114, 52: 638b8–9. 
 
95 Hinsch, Masculinities in Chinese History, Chapter 3. 
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passed repeatedly by his family’s front door in the course of his work but refused to go 
inside.96 Yu was exalted as an ideal official, described in the Shiji 史記 as “a man both 
diligent and indefatigable. His character was impartial, his personality endearing, his 
words trustworthy; his voice was the law, his behavior the standard.”97 In other versions 
of this story, Yu was said to have conceived a child with his wife, who gave birth to a son, 
but to have been too dedicated to his work to help raise the child.98 The similarity of this 
aspect of Yu’s biography to that of the Buddha, who also begot a son prior to departing 
from the palace in pursuit of enlightenment, leaving the child to his wife’s care, 
demonstrates that family life and the heroic fulfillment of a man’s individual destiny 
were understood in both India and China to be equally necessary yet fundamentally 
incompatible. (At the same time, as Powers notes, the begetting of a son narratively 
proves that the Buddha was capable of engendering progeny, that his celibacy thereafter 
was purely voluntary and not indicative of any sexual “inadequacy.”99 The same might be 
said of Yu.) 
 Buddhist and Chinese ideals of manhood were thus not static sets of coherent 
norms, but nexuses of often conflicting imperatives—sometimes intersecting with each 
other (as with the Buddha’s and Yu the Great’s respective relationships to their wives and 
children) and other times diverging. The distinction in China between civil (wen) and 
                                                
96 See Shiji, j. 2, v. 1, 50–51; translated in Nienhauser, The Grand Scribe’s Records, 21–22. 
 
97 禹為⼈人敏給克勤；其德不違，其仁可親，其⾔言可信；聲為律，身為度。 Shiji, j. 2, v. 1, 51; 
translation follows Nienhauser, The Grand Scribe’s Records, 22, with slight alterations. 
 
98 See Lewis, The Flood Myths, 98. For lengthier analysis of Yu’s marriage, see also Lewis, The Flood 
Myths, 134–143. 
 
99 Powers, A Bull of a Man, 38. 
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martial (wu) virtues—which Kam Louie has argued provide a better rubric for analyzing 
Chinese norms of masculinity than does the binary dichotomy of yin 陰 and yang 陽100—
complicates things further. While civil officials held a great deal of cultural power in 
early and medieval China, and the “talented scholar” (caizi 才⼦子) was later portrayed in 
literature and opera as a masculine ideal,101 there was undoubtedly also a robust culture 
of what Louie calls “wu masculinity” that helped shape Chinese attitudes toward gender. 
As we have seen, Chan Buddhists intervened in this web of cultural traditions by 
articulating an understanding of the Buddho-Chinese “great man” as a fundamentally 
martial figure, a cosmic sovereign in the mold of the Indian kṣatriya harboring ambitions 
greater even than China’s loyal ministers and brave generals. Louie sees “wu masculinity” 
as personified most fully in the figure of Guan Yu, the late-Han general who went on to 
be deified as the god of war. Unsurprisingly, the figure of Guan Yu was appealing to 
Chan Buddhists—for example, as we saw in Chapter 3, Foyan Qingyuan counted Guan 
Yu’s legendary sword among the “seven items accompanying his person.” At the same 
time, Chan Buddhists also elaborated a ritual and textual culture that depended heavily on 
excellence in the civil arts of reading, composing poetry and prose, and engaging in 
debate.102 
Both the civil and martial worlds were in China centered on homosocial 
communities of men whose chief engagements were with other men. Confucius, for 
                                                
100 Louie, Theorising Chinese Masculinity, Chapter 1. 
 
101 Geng, The Fragile Scholar. 
 
102 See Zhou, Wenzi chan yu Songdai shixue; Zhou, Zhongguo chanzong; Keyworth, “Transmitting the 
Lamp of Learning”; and Byrne, “Poetics of Silence.” For an examination of Song-period Buddhist 




example, had only male disciples,103 and as the cultural portrayal of heroic martiality 
increasingly focused on bands of brothers bound by oaths of chivalry, it became a truism 
that warriors and women don’t mix.104 Chan Buddhism too was at once a patriarchy and a 
fraternity. Chan Buddhists did not entirely exclude women from their ranks, but neither 
did they include them in any great number: as Ding-hwa Hsieh notes, there are fifteen 
total women included in Chan records through the Song period.105 Perhaps surprisingly, 
among those relatively few Song-dynasty Chan masters who took on female students and 
lineage heirs were Yuanwu Keqin and his disciple Dahui Zonggao, two of the strongest 
advocates of a martial approach to Chan soteriology, as we saw in Chapter 3.106 Dahui in 
particular explicitly argued—with reference to the categorical metaphysics of universal 
buddhahood, or what Miriam Levering calls the “rhetoric of equality”—that gender is 
irrelevant to liberation in Chan, even as he repeatedly reiterated the centrality of the 
“great man” as a prototype for the ideal Chan master.107 
                                                
103 See Nyitray, “The Real Trouble.” 
 
104 In one Yuan-period play drawing upon the Three Kingdoms (sanguo 三國) cycle, for example, 
Guan Yu is presented by his brother-in-arms with a widow for his taking, only to decapitate her with 
his sword instead (see Louie, Theorising Chinese Masculinity, 28–29). The decapitation by “upright” 
men of women portrayed as treacherous temptresses is also famously found in the Ming novel The 
Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan ⽔水滸傳); see, for example, the discussion in Hsia, The Classic Chinese 
Novel, 97–99; and Sun, “The Seditious Art.” For a broader overview of these themes and their 
contexts, see also the discussion of chivalric friendship in Vitiello, The Libertine’s Friend, Chapter 2. 
 
105 Hsieh, “Images of Women,” 155. She adds that thirty-three women are listed in post-Song Chan 
genealogies (177). For more on post-Song female Chan Buddhists, see Grant, “Da Zhangfu”; Eminent 
Nuns; and “Female Holder of the Lineage.” 
 
106 Levering, “Lin-chi (Rinzai) Ch’an,” 138. 
 
107 Levering, “Lin-chi (Rinzai) Ch’an,” 139. 
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 As Levering observes, Chan was hardly the most conservative Buddhist tradition 
with regard to women.108 Chan Buddhists did not for example align themselves with 
those Mahāyāna Buddhists who held that, as a rule, women cannot become buddhas 
owing to their “five hindrances” (wuzhang 五障), which is to say their incapacity to be 
reborn in five noble stations of birth that precede entry into buddhahood—as do the Great 
Perfection of Wisdom Treatise (Da zhidu lun) and other important scriptures.109 But 
avowals by Chan Buddhists of soteriological inclusiveness should not lead us to overlook 
the tradition’s institutional and discursive androcentrism, as well as its occasional 
misogyny.110 For one thing, against other more androgynous ideals of monastic 
personhood, the generals and ministers with whom Chan Buddhists brought the Chan 
master into a commensurable relationship via the figure of the “great man” were 
normatively male. Moreover, the evaluation of women seeking admission into Chan 
lineages took place in public training monasteries filled, as Miriam Levering observes, 
with portraits and legends told and retold of (male) patriarchs, as well as altars featuring 
statues of the (male) buddhas Śākyamuni, Amitābha, Maitreya, and other figures. 
Contemplating the women who did successfully navigate “the overwhelming maleness of 
                                                
108 Levering, “The Dragon-Girl,” 20–21. 
 
109 Da zhidu lun, T. no. 1509, 25: 72b27–28. In China this idea was often combined with the notion of 
“three kinds of subordination” (sancong 三從), that is, women’s necessary subservience to their father 
when young, husband when married, and son when widowed; see Kajiyama, “Women in Buddhism,” 
54–56. 
 
110 These terms were coined by Alan Sponberg, who identified them, along with ascetic misogyny and 
soteriological androgyny, as “four distinct attitudes toward women and the feminine” in early 
Buddhism; see Sponberg, “Attitudes toward Women.” 
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authority, symbol, text, and institution in this tradition,” she wonders, “How could 
women have felt at home in this male-dominated milieu full of masculine symbols?”111 
 Indeed, beyond the gendering of sovereignty itself as normatively male, as we 
have seen, it is worth reflecting on the gendered dimensions of some of its constituent 
parts, like the notion of heroic “resolution” (zhi 志). A Song-dynasty legend about Tang-
dynasty Chan master Judi 俱胝 (d.u.) narrates that before the start of his Chan career Judi 
was upstaged in conversation by a nun, whereupon he lamented: “Although I am a man, I 
lack the resolute energy of a man!”112 With this, the story continues, Judi set out in search 
of Chan masters from whom he could learn. In another very similar case we’re told of 
Jinhua Juzhi ⾦金華俱胝 (d.u.), who after being bested in an encounter with a nun named 
Baoji 實際 (d.u.), exclaims: “Although I have the form of a man, I lack the energy (qi) of 
a man!”113 In both cases, the nun serves as a narrative instrument spurring a man’s 
recognition that he is inadequately masculine, and leading him to seek out a Buddhist 
tradition for whom liberation is coextensive with fully realized masculinity—namely, 
Chan.114 Similarly, scholars have observed that nameless “old women” often serve as 
foils in Chan texts, acting as narratively unexpected sources of wisdom who challenge 
                                                
111 Levering, “Stories of Enlightened Women,” 140. 
 
112 我雖是丈夫漢，⽽而無丈夫志氣！ See Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 592a6–10. 
 
113 我雖處丈夫之形，⽽而無丈夫之氣！ Jingde chuandeng lu, T. no. 2076, 51: 288a27. 
 
114 In other cases Chan Buddhists attempted to dislodge the term “great man” from its obvious 
gendered implications. For example, the Chan master Yanqi suggests that women who possess 
resolution can also be counted among the ranks of “great men”: “It is said that even if one is a woman 
or child, if she possesses this resolution then she is also called a great man; and even if there is a 
fellow towering at eight chi in height, if he lacks this resolution he is not called a great man.” 傳曰：
雖⼥女⼈人孺⼦子，有此志者亦名⼤大丈夫；雖⼋八尺巍巍之⼠士，無此志者不名⼤大丈夫也。 Zhengdao ge 
zhu, X. no. 1241, 63: 270c22–24. Of course, even in such cases the normative figure remains a “man.” 
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male masters-to-be like Linji and serve as catalysts on their path to awakening, but 
themselves remain anonymous.115 
On the flipside of these male-gendered norms, many of the tropes associated with 
deceptive appearance, overreliance on the authority of others, and ghostly agentive 
uncertainty were gendered female, either by Chan Buddhists themselves or by Chinese 
culture generally. For example, the wild fox—though sometimes appearing in the form of 
a man—was best known in Chinese culture for taking female form in order to seduce 
men and lead them astray. And we have already seen how the record of Deshan 
associates the practice of divination, which for him exemplifies the problem of agentive 
uncertainty, with “witches” (shipo 師婆). He even goes so far as to say that a “majestic 
fellow” will become a “little hussy” (xiao yin nüzi 小婬⼥女⼦子) under the allegedly 
feminizing influence of Buddhist scriptures.116 In still another passage, Deshan complains 
that his students “race around in every direction, leaning on others’ doorways, just like a 
ghost-maiden passing along rumors and gossip.”117 All of these tropes, from the wild fox 
to the witch to the gossiping ghost, give female form to the deceptive disjuncture between 
appearance and essence and the agentive uncertainty associated with repeating words 
heard from others. The negative example provided by this female figure, in turn, serves 
as foil of the great man’s perfectly articulated intention and action. 
                                                
115 Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao chanshi yulu, T. no 1985, 47: 506b10–12; Sasaki, The Record of Linji, 336. 
See also Zhang, “Les Grand-mères Vulgaires.” 
 
116 Elsewhere Deshan criticizes the people with same sorts of alleged failings as resembling 
“insatiable hussy who does not uphold the precept of abstaining from meat and alchohol” 似貪婬⼥女⼈人
不持齋戒; see Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 575c11. 
 
117 馳騁四⽅方，傍佗門⼾戶，恰似⼥女姑鬼傳⾔言送語。 Zheng fayan zang, X. no. 1309, 67: 575c22–3. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Chan masters routinely deemed actual women 
practitioners exemplary only in spite of their gender. As Ding-hwa Hsieh notes, female 
Chan students were praised for being “a true man (zhangfu) among women”118 or in 
terms like the following: “Although she is a woman, she acts like a man (zhangfu). She is 
superior to any number of worthless [male] abbots.”119 Hsieh points out that praise of 
female Chan aspirants expressed in this manner 
plays to the presumption that the distinction between men and women in 
the phenomenal world implies a hierarchy of superiority and inferiority. 
Hence it is a matter of astonishment when a woman attains the ultimate 
goal of the Ch’an path and a great shame when a man fails to. In other 
words, only very few exceptional women who have the strong will and 
great energy of a nun like [the women in question] Miao-tao can surpass 
men in their spiritual attainment.120 
 
Yet as Hsieh has also suggested, actual women aspirants seem to have treated their own 
appraisal by their male teachers as honorary “men” or “great men” to be relatively 
unproblematic.121 Indeed, on the rare occasions that Song-period Chan lamp collections 
actually preserve the recorded words of female Chan aspirants or masters, we find them 
defending themselves from the challenges of male teachers and students in terms 
similar—but not identical—to those of their male colleagues. 
Two examples that Miriam Levering has identified and translated from the Jingde 
chuandeng lu warrant our careful attention. In the first, an unnamed nun requests of 
                                                
118 ⼥女流中真⼤大丈夫. Pujue Zonggao chanshi yulu, X. no. 1362, 69: 646a7–8; translation follows 
Hsieh, “Images of Women in Ch’an,” 161–62. 
 
119 他雖是箇⼥女⼈人，宛有丈夫之作，勝却多少杜撰長老也。Conglin shengshi, X. no. 1611, 86: 
698a11–12; translation follows Hsieh, “Images of Women in Ch’an,” 162. 
 
120 Hsieh, “Images of Women in Ch’an,” 162. 
 
121 Hsieh, “Images of Women in Ch’an,” 162. 
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Tang-dynasty master Youzhou Tankong 幽州譚空 (d.u.), a disciple of Linji, that she be 
permitted to “open the hall” (kaitang). Typically “opening the hall” refers to the first 
“ascending the hall” ceremony performed by the newly appointed abbot of a monastery, 
as we have seen in Chapter 2, but here it is unclear whether the nun wishes to “open the 
hall” of her own monastery or be allowed to perform a guest sermon at Tankong’s. In any 
case, Tankong does not approve: 
The master said: “Nun, as a woman you should not open the hall.” The 
nun said: “The Dragon Girl [from the Lotus Sūtra] attained Buddhahood at 
the age of eight sui—what do you think about that?” The master said: 
“The Dragon Girl [could change into] eighteen [different] forms. Try one 
change of form for me.” The nun said: “Even if I could change form, [it 
would prove nothing more than] that I was a wild fox spirit.” The master 
chased her out with blows.122 
 
Challenged by the master, who seems to consider women categorically unfit for Chan 
mastery and “opening the hall,” this nun takes recourse to the canonical example of the 
Dragon Girl, who in the Lotus Sūtra’s twelfth chapter astonishes the assembled crowd by 
instantaneously achieving buddhahood. This comes as a special surprise to the Buddha’s 
disciple Śāriputra, who objects that because women’s bodies are impure and they suffer 
from the five hindrances, they cannot become buddhas—only to be immediately upstaged 
by the Dragon Girl’s accomplishment.123 Nevertheless, the Dragon Girl does not attain 
buddhahood as a woman, but only after first magically transforming into a man. The 
result is a decidedly mixed message on the capacity of women for buddhahood. Yet it is 
                                                
122 有尼欲開堂說法。師曰：「尼⼥女家不用開堂。」尼曰：「龍⼥女⼋八歲成佛又作麼⽣生？」師曰：
「龍⼥女有⼗十⼋八變，汝與老僧試⼀一變看。」尼曰：「變得也是野狐精。」師乃打趁。 Jingde 
chuandeng lu, T. no. 2976, 51: 294c6–9; translation follows Levering, “The Dragon Girl,” 24–25, with 
alterations. 
 




clear from this and other Chan cases that Chinese women aspirants did not necessarily 
consider the Dragon Girl’s last-minute bodily transformation an essential part of the 
story, and often took her instead as a straightforward canonical precedent for the idea that 
women can indeed become buddhas.124 They did so with recourse to still other tropes. For 
example, prompted to change her form as the Dragon Girl did, this nun replies that 
magically changing one’s bodily form would attest not to buddhahood but to wild 
foxhood. In so doing, she reappropriates the gendered trope of the wild fox in order to 
suggest that remaining unchanged in her female body is the true mark of buddhahood. By 
thus tapping into the normative ideal of authentic consistency that we have found 
associated with the “great man,” she turns the tables on Tankong’s suggestion that she 
transform her body. 
 A similar rhetorical maneuver is found in the short discourse record of another 
female Chan master from the Tang dynasty named Moshan Liaoran 末⼭山了然 (d.u.), a 
disciple of Mazu-lineage master Gao’an Dayu ⾼高安⼤大愚 (d.u.) who was abbess of her 
own monastery. When a student of Linji named Guanxi Zhixian 灌谿志閑 (d. 895) 
arrived, we’re told that he remarked to himself: “If this place is all right, then I’ll stay. If 
not, then I’ll overturn the Chan platform”—which is to say, upstage the master in 
residence. When he enters the dharma hall and encounters Liaoran sitting in her 
ceremonial abbot’s seat atop the platform, she asks him: “Head seat, where did you start 
your journey today?” Her question is very polite—Zhixian is not literally the “head seat” 
of any monastery, but she has addressed him this way as a sign of respect. Beyond this 
                                                
124 Levering writes that when she asked contemporary nuns in Taiwan about this, they felt the same 
way, suggesting that it would be a misinterpretation of the story to argue that it proves women must 
transform into men to become buddhas; see Levering, “The Dragon Girl,” 30–31. 
 
